SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
The High Court of Judicature at Bombay, through its
Registrar
Versus
Shashikant S. Patil
(K.T. Thomas, A.P. Misra and S.S. Mohammed Quadri, JJ.)
Civil Appeal No. 1656 of 1998.
28.10.1999
JUDGMENT
K.T. Thomas, J. - A judicial magistrate has been
disrobed of his judicial vestment by a panel of five judges of the Bombay
High Court on the administrative side. This was sequel to an innocent
litigant being wrongfully arrested, handcuffed and paraded in public. But two
other judges of the same High Court, on the judicial side, ordered him to be
re-robed with full chasuble. That judgment of the Division Bench is now being
challenged by the Registrar of the High Court of Bombay (on behalf of the said
High Court) by special leave.
2. First respondent was Joint Civil Judge (Junior
Division) of the Maharashtra Judicial Service. While functioning as a
Judicial Magistrate of First Class at Ahmadnager he had to deal with a
criminal case instituted on a police report in which the complainant was one
Ranchhoddas Govinddas Gandhi (hereinafter referred to as `the complainant').
First respondent magistrate pronounced judgment in the case acquitting the
accused on 7.11.1985. But the complainant sent a petition to the District and
Sessions Judge, Ahmadnagar on 4.1.1986, alleging that he was wrongfully
arrested by the police on 15.10.1985 as per a warrant of arrest issued by the
magistrate; and that he was handcuffed and paraded through the streets of his
locality; and that he was kept in the lock-up during the night; and that on
the next day (16.10.1985) he was produced before the magistrate. It was
further alleged that the first respondent magistrate, when the complainant
was produced in open court, retired to his chambers and ordered release of
the complainant. It was further alleged in the complaint that the said arrest
was knavishly manipulated at the behest of the accused in the criminal case
through an illegal warrant of arrest surreptitiously stage managed.
3. After holding a preliminary enquiry the High Court
framed charges against the first respondent and appointed Shri K.J. Rohee,
Joint District Judge (as the inquiry officer) to conduct a formal inquiry
into the charges. He submitted a report on 1.3.1994 exonerating the first
respondent of the charges. But the Disciplinary Committee of the High Court
(consisting of five judges of the Bombay High Court) after a scrutiny of the
report of the inquiry officer, was not disposed to approve the findings
therein. The Committee differed from the findings and proposed to proceed
into the matter. A notice was thereupon issued to the first respondent
calling upon him to show cause as to why the findings of the inquiry officer
on the crucial points be not repudiated, and a major penalty of dismissal
from service be not imposed on him.
4. First respondent submitted his representation to the
aforesaid notice. The Disciplinary Committee of the High Court considered the
said representation and decided to reject the same as it arrived at the
conclusion that the charges framed against him stood proved. So the Committee
decided to recommend imposition of punishment of compulsory retirement on the
first respondent. The Governor later issued orders on the said recommendation
compulsorily retiring the first respondent.
5. The Division Bench of the High Court quashed the order
of imposition of compulsory retirement on the first respondent mainly on the
premise that the Disciplinary Committee had not put forward adequate reasons
for differing from the findings of the Inquiry Officer. It was further held
that the Disciplinary Committee did not discuss how the Inquiry Officer went
wrong and why his findings were not acceptable to the Committee. The Division
Bench has upheld the contention of the first respondent that "when the
Disciplinary Authority differed from the findings entered by an Inquiry
Officer, it is imperative to discuss materials in detail and contest the
conclusions of the Inquiry Officer and then record their own conclusions."
6. The Division Bench of the High Court has propounded a
legal proposition as follows :-
"It is an established principle in disciplinary
jurisprudence that when the disciplinary authority differs from the findings
of the Inquiry Officer, it has to discuss the entire case threadbare and
establish that each finding of the Inquiry Officer was totally improbable
that in the light of the materials the only conclusion that can be arrived at
by an ordinary prudent man, is the conclusion arrived at by the Disciplinary
Authority."
7. Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, learned counsel who argued for
the appellant has termed the aforesaid reasoning as contrary to the well
established principles in service law and that the Inquiry Officer's
conclusions cannot be equated with the findings of a statutory body, nor the
disciplinary committee's powers be made equivalent to the powers of a
revisional or appellate authority. According to the learned counsel, the
Division Bench has misdirected itself on the legal premise as to the
disciplinary committee's power to dissent from the conclusion of the Inquiry
Officer.
8. Before we consider the aforesaid legal aspect a few
mare factual details are to be delineated. Warrants of arrest were issued by
the first respondent magistrate to the prosecution witnesses in the criminal
case on 30th August, 1985. When the complainant appeared in court on
16.9.1985 without knowing the aforesaid order he was told by the Assistant
Public Prosecutor (Smt. Jyotsna Rathod) that a non-bailable warrant of arrest
was pending against him. On her advice the complainant filed an application
for cancellation of the warrant and the first respondent magistrate passed
orders thereon cancelling the warrant.
9. In spite of such order of cancellation the complainant was
arrested on 15.10.1985 and was subjected to the ignominy of parading him
manacled through the public road in his locality and he was produced before
the court on 16.10.1985. On that day also, the Assistant Public Prosecutor
Smt. Jyotsna Rathod helped him by bringing to the notice of the first
respondent magistrate that the complainant was brought under arrest
unnecessarily. According to the complainant the accused and his advocate were
present in the court on 16.10.1985 when he was produced there, even though
there was no posting of the case on that day. The complainant sent a petition
to the Sessions Judge against the first respondent magistrate and the bench
clerk of the court complained of the said arrest alleging that it was ordered
by the magistrate under illegal influence exerted on him by the accused in
the criminal case.
10. The consistent stand of the first respondent
magistrate was that the above story of arrest of the complainant on
15.10.1985 is absolutely untrue and that neither the complainant nor any
witness was produced before him on 16.10.1985 and that the complainant made a
false petition against him as he would have been very much piqued by the
order of acquittal of the accused in the criminal case.
11. The fact that the complainant was arrested on
15.10.1985 and was handcuffed and paraded through the road and was produced
before the magistrate on the next day has been spoken to by the complainant
in the enquiry with all vivid details. That part of the story is fully
supported by Smt. Jyotsna Rathod (by the time she was examined in the enquiry
she became a judge of the Junior Division) by testifying that she too was
present in the court when the complainant was produced in court order under
arrest on 16.10.1985 and that she herself saw the warrant of arrest under
which he was taken into custody. That apart, a report forwarded by the
Assistant Inspector of Police, Karmala Police Station showed that he verified
the station records and found that a warrant of arrest had reached the police
station on 15.10.1985 for arresting a man named Ranchhoddas Govinddas Gandhi
and that he was arrested thereunder and he was produced before the court on
the next day. (Shri Uday Umesh Lalit, learned counsel for the first
respondent contended that the said report of the Assistant Inspector of
Police was not made available to the Inquiry Officer. However, it must be
pointed out that first respondent was aware of such a report as he had
referred to it in his reply to the show cause notice issued by the Disciplinary
Committee).
12. The following facts are, therefore, crystally clear :
First is, that the complainant made an application on 16.9.1985 for
cancellation of the warrant of arrest which he believed to have been ordered
by the magistrate. Second is that a month later i.e. on 15.10.1985, the
complainant was arrested by the police under a warrant of arrest issued by
the first respondent and he was produced before the magistrate on 16.10.1985
who released him. Repudiation of those facts made by the first respondent is
motivated to cover up the real facts.
13. Third is, that the warrant of arrest under which the
complainant was arrested on 15.10.1985 should have been part of the records
of the magistrate's court. But in spite of detailed search the aforesaid warrant
could not be traced. Such a surreptitious missing of that warrant is a strong
circumstance which the Disciplinary Committee had countenanced against the
first respondent.
14. The fourth is that fact that the Roznama (Proceedings
Diary of the court) maintained in the said criminal case as it is now made
available is a fabricated document. We perused the original of that
fabricated Roznama. It is unnecessary for us to enumerate the various broad
grounds for showing that the present Roznama is a fabricated document, for,
even the first respondent's counsel was unable to explain the glaring
features of fabrication thereof. It was so fabricated as to suit the present
stand of the first respondent that the complainant was not arrested and
produced before him on 16.10.1985. It is important to point out that first
respondent did not dispute that the aforesaid forged Roznama contains his
signature at a number of places where the magistrate's signature should
appear.
15. The Disciplinary Committee enumerated all the above
reasons in its proceedings for dissenting from the Inquiry Officer's
conclusions. In fact all such reasons have been set out in the notice issued
by the Disciplinary Committee to the first respondent requiring him to show
cause why the conclusions of the Inquiry Officer be dissented from.
16. The Division Bench of the High Court seems to have
approached the case as though it was an appeal against the order of the
administrative\disciplinary authority of the High Court. Interference with
the decision of departmental authorities can be permitted, while exercising
jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution if such authority had held
proceedings in violation of the principles of natural justice or in violation
of statutory regulations prescribing the mode of such inquiry or if the
decision of the authority is vitiated by considerations extraneous to the
evidence and merits of the case, or if the conclusion made by the authority,
on the very face of it, is wholly arbitrary or capricious that no reasonable
person could have arrived at such a conclusion, or grounds very similar to
the above. But we cannot overlook that the departmental authority (in this
case the Disciplinary Committee of the High Court) is the sole judge of the
facts, if the Inquiry has been properly conducted. The settled legal position
is that if there is some legal evidence on which the findings can be based,
then adequency or even reliability of that evidence is not a matter for
canvassing before the High Court in a writ petition filed under Article 226
of the Constitution. 373_
17. In State of Andhra Pradesh v. S. Sree Rama Rao,
1964(3) SCR 25 this Court has stated so and further observed thus :
"Thus High Court is not constituted in a proceeding
under Art. 226 of the Constitution as a Court of appeal over the decision of
the authorities holding departmental enquiry against a public servant : it is
concerned to determine whether the enquiry is held by an authority competent
in that behalf and according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf and
whether the rules of natural justice are not violated. Whether there is some
evidence, which the authority entrusted with the duty to hold the enquiry has
accepted and which evidence may reasonably support the conclusion that the
delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, it is not the function of the
High Court in a petition for a writ under Art. 226 to review the evidence and
to arrive at an independent finding on the evidence."
18. The above position has been reiterated by this Court
in subsequent decisions. One of them is B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of
India, 1995(6) SCC 749.
19. The reasoning of the High Court that when the
Disciplinary Committee differed from the finding of the Inquiry Officer it is
imperative to discuss the materials in details and contest the conclusion of
the Inquiry Officer, is quite unsound and contrary to the established
principles in administrative law. The Disciplinary Committee was neither an
appellate nor a revisional body over the Inquiry Officer's report. It must be
borne in mind that the inquiry is primarily intended to afford the delinquent
officer a reasonable opportunity to meet the charges made against him and
also to afford the punishing authority with the materials collected in such
inquiry as well as the views expressed by the Inquiry Officer thereon. The
findings of the Inquiry Officer are only his opinion on the materials, but
such findings are not binding on the disciplinary authority as the decision
making authority is the punishing authority and, therefore, that authority
can come to its own conclusion, of course bearing in mind the views expressed
by the Inquiry Officer. But it is not necessary that the disciplinary
authority should "discuss materials in detail and contest the conclusions
of the Inquiry Officer." Otherwise the position of the disciplinary
authority would get relegated to a subordinate level.
20. Legal position on that score has been stated by this
Court in A.N. D'Silva v. Union of India, 1962 Supple.(1) SCR 968
that neither the findings of the Inquiry Officer nor his recommendations are
binding on the punishing authority. The aforesaid position was settled by a
Constitution Bench of this Court way back in 1963 (Union of India v.
H.C. Goel, 1964(4) SCR 718). The Bench held that "the Government
may agree with the report or may differ, either wholly or partially, from the
conclusion recorded in the report." Their Lordships Laid down the
following principle : "If the report makes findings in favour of the
public servant and the
Government disagree with the said findings and holds that
the charges framed against the public servant are prima facie proved,
the Government should decide provisionally what punishment should be imposed
on the public servant and proceed to issue a second notice against him in
that behalf."
21. Thus the Division Bench of the High Court has not
approached the question from the correct angle which is evident when the
Bench said that it is imperative for the Disciplinary Committee to discuss
materials in detail and contest conclusions of the Inquiry Officer. The
interference so made by the Division Bench with a well considered order
passed by the High Court on the administrative side was by overstepping its
jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.
22. It is the Full Court of all Judges of the High Court
of Bombay which has authorised the Disciplinary Committee of five Judges of
that High Court to exercise the functions of the High Court in respect of
punishment of judicial officers. Such functions involve exercise of the
powers envisaged in Article 235 of the Constitution. It is the constitutional
duty of every High Court, on administrative side, to keep guard over the
subordinate judiciary functioning within its domain. While it is imperative
for the High Court to protect honest judicial officers against all ill
conceived or motivated complaints, the High Court cannot afford to bypass any
dishonest performance of a member of the subordinate judiciary. Dishonesty is
the stark antithesis of judicial probity. Any instance of a High Court
condoning or compromising with a dishonest deed of one of its officers would
only be contributing to erosion of the judicial foundation. Every hour we
must remind ourselves that judiciary floats only over the confidence of the
people in its probity. Such confidence is the foundation on which pillars of
the judiciary are built.
23. The Judges, at whatever level they may be, represent
the State and its authority, unlike the bureaucracy or the members of the
other service. Judicial service is not merely an employment nor the Judges
merely employees. They exercise sovereign judicial power. They are holders of
public offices of great trust and responsibility. If a judicial officer
"tips the scales of justice its ripping effect would be disastrous and
deleterious." Dishonest judicial personage is an oxymoron. We wish to
quote the following observation made by Ramswamy, J. in High Court of
Judicature at Bombay v. Shirishkumar Rangrao Patil, 1997(6) SCC 339 :
"The lymph nodes (cancerous cells) of corruption
constantly keep creeping into the vital veins of the judiciary and the need
to stem it out by judicial surgery lies on the judiciary itself by its
self-imposed or corrective measures or disciplinary action under the doctrine
of control enshrined in Articles 235, 124(6) of the Constitution. It would,
therefore, be necessary that there should be constant vigil by the High Court
concerned on its subordinate judiciary and self-introspection."
24. When such a constitutional function was exercised by
the administrative side of the High Court any judicial review thereon should
have been made not only with great care and circumspection, but confining
strictly to the parameters set by this Court in the aforecited decisions. In
the present case, as per the judgment under appeal the Division Bench of the
Bombay High Court appears to have snipped off the decision of the
Disciplinary Committee of the High Court as if the Bench had appeal powers
over the decision of five judges on the administrative side. At any rate the
Division Bench has clearly exceeded its jurisdictional frontiers by
interfering with such an order passed by the High Court on the administrative
side.
25. We, therefore, allow this appeal and set aside the impugned
judgment of the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court.
Appeal allowed.
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