SUPREME COURT OF
INDIA
Government
of West Bengal
Vs.
Tarun
K. Roy
(V.N. Khare, S.B.
Sinha and A.K. Lakshmanan JJ.)
18.11.2003
JUDGMENT
S.B. SINHA,
J.
1. Applicability
of the doctrine of 'equal pay for equal work' is the question involved in this
appeal which arises out of a judgment and order dated 3^rd December, 1997
passed by a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in FMAT No. 1505/1996.
FACTUAL
BACKGROUND:
2. In the
Irrigation Department of the State of West Bengal inter alia there existed two
posts - Operator-cum-Mechanic and Sub-Assistant Engineer. The First Pay
Commission of the State of West Bengal in its report dated 31.12.1969
recommended the following pay-scales relating thereto.
Posts Pay scale
recommended
Operator-cum-Mechanic
Rs. 200-250
Sub-Assistant
Engineer Rs. 350-600
3. It is not in
dispute that by reason of statutory rules the minimum qualification required
for recruitment for the said two posts were laid down as under:
"
Operator-cum-Mechanic
(a) Pass in
School Final Examination or its equivalent;
(b) Pass in
Certificate Course in the trade of internal composition engine from ITI or
Technical School recognized by the Government.
Sub-Assistant
Engineer
(a) Pass in
School Final Examination or its equivalent;
(b) Pass in
Diploma Course in Engineering from any Government Polytechnic. "
4. The
Government of West Bengal framed The West Bengal Service (Revision of Pay &
Allowances) Rules, 1970 (hereinafter referred to as the "ROPA Rules')
whereby and whereunder, the pay scale for the post of Operator-cum-Mechanic was
initially prescribed as Rs. 180-350/- which was subsequently revised to Rs.
230-425/- with effect from 1^st April, 1970. The pay-scale for the post of
Sub-Assistant Engineer, however, was prescribed at Rs. 300-600/-with higher
initial start at Rs. 330/- with effect from the same date. By a notification
No. 10303 F dated 19^th November, 1974 in modification of ROPA Rules, 1970 it
was laid down :
"IV (i)
Sub-Assistant Engineers having Engineering Degree shall have an initial start
in the existing scale of Rs. 300-Rs. 600/- at the stage of Rs. 360/- p.m. They
will also get the benefit of age relaxation for direct recruitment either
through the Public Service Commission or for ad-hoc appointments.
(ii) All Test
Relief Overseers and other Diploma holder Engineers will henceforth be termed
as Sub-Asstt. Engineers."
5. The
Sub-Assistant Engineers, it is not disputed, are directly recruited through
Public Service Commission whereas no such procedure is laid down for
appointment in the Post of Operator-cum-Mechanic. It is not in dispute that
some persons in the category of employees of Operator-cum-Mechanic who were
possessing Diploma in Engineering claimed entitlement to the nomenclature of
the Sub-Assistant Engineer and the scale of pay prescribed therefore by filing
two writ petitions in Calcutta High Court. The matters eventually came up to
this Court. A plea was taken in the said writ petitions by the appellants
herein that the diploma holder engineers working as Operators-cum-Mechanic in
the Irrigation Department were not entitled to the said designation. The said
plea was negatived by this Court in its judgment titled State of
West Bengal and Ors. v. Debdas Kumar and Ors. [Reported in 1991
Suppl. (1) SCC 138] holding:
"15. It has
been contended for the appellants that by construing the notification as
including Operators-cum-Mechanics in the lower time scale as Sub-Assistant
Engineers and giving them a higher scale, there would be a division amongst the
Operators-cum-Mechanics in the matter of their pay scale and such an anomaly
would not have been contemplated by the rule makers. There is no force in this
contention. It is well settled that difference in pay of employees belonging to
the same cadre post or educational qualification is constitutionally valid and
permissible and is not violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. The
post of Sub-Assistant Engineer is a direct recruitment post. It appears that
the Division Bench assumed that the post of Sub-Assistant Engineers were
ultimately a promotional post for the Operators-cum-Mechanics through
intermediary promotions in intermediary grades. This is incorrect. Under the
Rules, the post of Sub-Assistant Engineer is not at all a promotional post for
any categories of employees in the State, on the contrary, it is a direct
recruitment post. It is not contested that 17 other employees similarly placed
as the respondents herein were given the benefits of the said amended
notifications and were conferred both status of Sub-Assistant Engineers and
also the pay scale thereof for the reason that they were also diploma holder
Engineers though they were not in the pay scale of Rs. 300-600. This is a
concurrent finding that these respondents have been discriminated and the State
Government had acted arbitrarily without any rational basis by conferring
benefits of the notification to 17 other employees in other departments while
denying the said benefits to the said respondents in the Agriculture
Department.
(Emphasis
Supplied)
6. Another group
of Operators-cum-Mechanic who did not possess diploma in engineering and were
mere graduates or holding School Final Examination filed a writ petition which
was marked as matter No. 2564 of 1988 (Nemai
Chand Ghosh and Ors. v. State of West Bengal and Ors.) claiming
the higher pay-scale of Rs. 300-Rs. 600/- with higher initial start at Rs.
330/- relying on the doctrine of equal pay for equal work. The said writ
petition was dismissed and appeal preferred thereagainst by the writ
petitioners therein admittedly is still pending for hearing before the Division
Bench of the High Court.
7. A similar
writ petition being C.R.No. 9167 (W)/1990 (Nazimuddin Ahmed and Ors. v. State of West Bengal
and Ors.)
was, however, allowed by a judgment and order dated
25^th August, 1989 despite the fact that the writ petitioners therein were not
holders of diploma in engineering. The said judgment is said to have been
passed ex-parte and without noticing the earlier judgment in Nemai Chand Ghosh
(supra).
8. As
allegedly the said judgment was not implemented, an application for Contempt of
Court was filed by the writ petitioners when the court's attention was drawn to
the judgment of the earlier writ petition and its pendency before the Division
Bench, the learned Single Judge modified his order dated 25.8.1989 by an order
dated 1^st October, 1991 directing the State to pay all benefits in terms of
the earlier order dated 25.8.1939 with a rider that in the event the writ
petitioners in the appeal preferred against the judgment delivered in Nemai
Chand Ghosh (supra) fails, the State would be entitled to recover the amount by
such easy instalments as would be decided by the authorities concerned. With
the aforementioned directions, rule issued in the contempt proceeding was
disposed of.
9. The
respondents therein thereafter filed a writ petition which was marked as G.R.
No. 8728 (W) of 1991 (Tarun Kumar Roy and Ors. v. State of West Bengal and
Ors.). Following the judgment dated 25.8.1989 passed in the case of Nazimuddin
Ahmed (supra) the said writ petition was allowed. The State preferred an appeal
thereagainst and by reason of the impugned judgment the said appeal was
dismissed holding that as no appeal had been preferred against the order dated
25.8.1989 the same attained finality and, thus, the respondents herein became
entitled to grant of similar relief holding:
"When
the Diploma Holder Operator-cum-Mechanics got the above benefits, those who
were regularly appointed as Operator-cum-Mechanics found that in their category
of service those who were having Diploma in Engineering, were placed in higher
scale of pay. They moved this Court for equal pay for equal work which, as the
Courts have held, is one of the facets of the right of equality before law and
equal protection of law as enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution of
India. Since such Operator-cum-Mechanics who were not having Diploma or Degree
in Engineering and who were otherwise qualified to be appointed as
Operator-cum-Mechanics, got the relief as aforementioned, the persons who were
in the same category and were left-out, moved the Court and the Learned Single
Judge has granted them the same relief as others pursuant to the order of the
Court in C.R. No. 9167 (W) of 1980.
There
is some attempt made before us that the order passed by the Ld. Single Judge in
the contempt petition is enough for the appellants herein to revert the
petitioners in C.R. NO. 9167(W)/1980. This, however, in our opinion, will not
be possible unless the judgment in the said case is reversed. In the absence of
any appeal, the said judgment has become final. A view contrary to the view in
CR 9167(W)/1980, in the instant proceeding, shall place the petitioners in the
instant proceeding at disadvantage as a class apart from others
similarity/similarly situated who were/are petitioners in C.R. 9167(W)/1980.
SUBMISSIONS:
10.
Mr. Bhaskar Gupta, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant,
inter alia would contend that the High Court committed a manifest error in
passing the impugned judgment insofar as it failed to take into consideration
that the order passed in the case of Nazimuddin Ahmed (supra) could not be
treated as a precedent as the said judgment was subject to the order passed in
the first writ petition filed by Nemai Chand Ghose.
11.
The learned counsel would submit that, in any event, non-filing of an appeal
could not be a ground to pass the same order without considering the merit of
the matter.
12.
Mr. Krishnamani, the learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the
respondents, on the other hand, would submit that as indisputably the earlier
judgment passed by a learned Single Judge of the Calcutta High Court was acted
upon by the appellant they cannot be permitted how to turn round and contend
that similar scale of pay would not be granted. It was submitted that whereas
in CR 9167 (W)/1980 there were 56 writ petitioners, only 10 employees are
involved in the present case and as such they being graduates in science should
be given the same relief as the minimum qualification laid down for holding the
post of Operator-cum-Mechanic is merely matriculate. Having been better
qualified, Mr. Krishnamani would urge, there is absolutely no reason as to why
the respondent should not be treated as a separate class keeping in view of the
fact that they have been performing the same duties as are being performed by
the Sub-Assistant Engineers. The cases of the respondents, Mr. Krishnamani
would contend, being peculiar in nature this court in exercise of its equity
jurisdiction may grant appropriate relief confining the same to the respondents
on the ground that they are graduates and declining the same to the
matriculates holding the posts of Operator-cum-Mechanic.
13. The
learned counsel would submit that in any event, having regard to the fact that
the respondents herein had approached the High Court in 1992, even on the
ground of delay, similar relief can be denied to those who are only
matriculates.
EQUAL
PAY FOR EQUAL WORK:
14.
Article 14 read with Article 39(d) of the Constitution of India envisages the
doctrine of equal pay for equal work. The said doctrine, however, does not
contemplate that only because the nature of the work is same, irrespective of
an educational qualification or irrespective of their source of recruitment or
other relevant considerations the said doctrine would be automatically applied.
The holders of a higher educational qualification can be treated as a separate
class. Such classification, it is trite, is reasonable. Employees performing
the similar job but having different educational qualification can, thus, be
treated differently.
15. In
State of Jammu & Kashmir v. Triloki Nath Khosa and Ors. , this Court held:
"Educational
qualifications have been recognized by this Court as a safe criterion for
determining the validity of classification."
16.
The Post of Operator-cum-Mechanic and Sub-Assistant Engineers are technical
posts. As noticed hereinbefore, whereas for the posts of Operator-cum-Mechanic
the qualification of school final examination and a certificate obtained from
the Industrial Training Institute would be sufficient; for the posts of
Sub-Assistant Engineer the person must have a diploma from a polytechnic apart
from being a matriculate.
17. It
is also not in dispute that such qualification was prescribed as far back as in
the year 1971 and the respondents herein were appointed thereafter.
18.
The Court, in exercise of its power of judicial review cannot hold that
matriculates with a certificate from ITIs or simply graduates in science would
be entitled to hold the posts of Sub-Assistant Engineers. It is for the
executive to lay down the qualification required for holding a post and not for
the courts.
19. In
Debdas Kumar (supra) the issue which fell for determination by this Court was
as to whether those Operators-cum-Mechanic who were diploma holders, having
regard to the aforementioned notification dated 19^th November, 1974 were
entitled to be designated as Sub-Assistant Engineers. This Court noticed that
the Post of Sub-Assistant Engineer is direct recruitment post and not a
promotional post and, thus, they are entitled to be designated as Sub-Assistant
Engineers, particularly, when such a status had been conferred upon 17 persons
similarly situated. This Court granted relief to Debdas Kumar (supra) only on
the ground that they had been discriminated against.
20.
Question of violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India on the part of
the State would arise only if the persons are similarly placed. Equality clause
contained in Article 14, in other words, will have no application where the
persons are not similarly situated or when there is a valid classification
based on a reasonable differentia. Doctrine of equal pay for equal work,
therefore, is not attracted in the instant case.
21.
There is nothing on record to show that the duties and functions of two
categories of employment are at par, and, thus, parity in pay-scales is not
permissible.
22.
The very fact that from the very beginning two different pay scales were being
maintained is itself suggestive of the fact that the duties and functions are
also different. In fact it is not disputed that the two post of Sub-Assistant
Engineer is a higher post.
23. In
Chairman-cum-Managing Director, National Textiles Corporation Ltd. and Ors. v.
N.T.C. (WBAB & O) Ltd. Employees Union and Ors. [2003 (8) SCALE 613] this
Court held:
"In
view of the fact that the nature of duties of the staff in the two categories
has been found to be not at part, parity in pay scales may not be possible.
24. In
Orissa, University of Agriculture & Technology and Anr. v. Manoj K. Mohanty
this Court noticed:
"It
is clear from the averments made in the writ petition extracted above, nothing
is stated as regards the nature of work, responsibilities attached to the
respondent without comparing to the regularly recruited Junior Assistants. It
cannot be disputed that there was neither necessary averments in the writ
petition nor any material was placed before the High Court so as to consider
the application of principle of 'equal pay for equal work'."
25.
This Court further noticed:
"...In
the absence of material relating to other comparable employees as to the
qualifications, method of recruitment, degree of skill, experience involved in
performance of job, training required, responsibilities undertaken and other
facilities in addition to pay scales, the learned Single Judge was right when
he stated in the order that in the absence of such material it was not possible
to grant relief to the respondent.
Before
giving such direction, the High Court also did not keep in mind as to what
would be its implications and impact on the other employees working in the
appellant-University. From the averments made in the writ petition extracted
above, it is clear that no details were given and no material was placed before
the High Court for comparison in order to apply the principle of 'equal pay for
equal work'. The Court in State of Haryana and Ors. v. Jasmer Singh and Ors.
observed that the principle of 'equal pay for equal work' is not always easy to
apply. There are inherent difficulties in comparing and evaluating work done by
different persons in different organizations or even in the same organization.
13.
Yet, in another decision in State Bank of India and Anr. v. M.R. Ganesh Babu
and Ors. , a Bench of three learned Judges of this court, while dealing with
the same principle, in para 16 has expressed that:-
"...It
is well settled that equal pay must depend upon the nature of work done. It
cannot be judged by the mere volume of work; there may be qualitative
difference as regards reliability and responsibility. Functions may be the same
but the responsibilities made a difference..."
26. In
a case of this nature, the courts are required to determine the issue having
regard to larger public interest. It is one thing to say that in a given case
the High Court or this Court may not exercise an equitable jurisdiction under
Article 226 or Article 136 of the Constitution of India, but it is another
thing to say that the courts shall grant a relief to a party only on the ground
that a contention which is otherwise valid would not be raised on the ground
that the same was not done in an earlier proceedings.
27. In
the instant case, the appellant has explained under what circumstances the
order of the learned Single Judge of the Calcutta High Court had to be obeyed.
If rule of law is to be followed, judicial discipline demands that the court
follows its earlier binding precedent. The Calcutta High Court itself has
rejected such a plea. The matter is pending in appeal. An order passed to the
contrary by another learned Single Judge in ignorance of the earlier binding
precedent by itself would not constitute a binding precedent and may be held to
have been rendered per incuriam.
28.
Furthermore, in the order dated 1^st October, 1991, the learned Judge
categorically directed that the same would be subject to any order that may be
passed in the appeal which is pending before the Division Bench from the
judgment and order dated 20 January, 1989 passed in Nemai Chand Ghose (supra).
The said order, therefore, did not attain finality.
29. In
the aforementioned situation, the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court
manifestly erred in refusing to consider the contentions of the appellant on
their own merit, particularly, when the question as regard difference in the
grant of scale of pay on the ground of different educational qualification
stands concluded by a judgment of this Court in Debdas Kumar (supra). If the
judgment of Debdas Kumar (supra) is to be followed & finding of fact was
required to be arrived at that they are similarly situated to the case of
Debdas Kumar (supra) which in turn would mean that they are also holders of
diploma in engineering. They admittedly being not, the contention of the
appellants could not be rejected. Non-filing of an appeal, in any event, would
not be a ground for refusing to consider a matter on its own merits. (See State
of Maharashtra v. Digambar )
30. In
State of Bihar and Ors. v. Ramdeo Yadav and Ors. wherein this Court noticed
Debdas Kumar (supra) holding:
"Shri
B.B. Singh, the learned counsel for the appellant contended that though an
appeal against the earlier order of the High Court has not been filed, since
larger public interest is involved in the interpretation given by the High
Court following its earlier judgment, the matter requires consideration by this
Court. We find force in this contention. In the similar circumstances, this
Court in State of Maharashtra v. Digambar, (1995) 4 SCC 633) and in State of
West Bengal v. Debdas Kumar, (1991) Suppl. SCC 138), had held that though an
appeal was not filed against an earlier order, when public interest is involved
in interpretation of law, the Court is entitled to go into the question. "
EQUITABLE
CONSIDERATION:
31. The
respondents are merely graduates in science. They do not have the requisite
technical qualification. Only because they are graduates, they cannot, in our
opinion, claim equality with the holders of diploma in engineering. If any
relief is granted by this court to the respondents on the aforementioned
ground, the same will be in contravention of the statutory rules. It is trite
that this Court even in exercise of its jurisdiction, under Article 142 of the
Constitution of India would not ordinarily grant such a relief which would be
in violation of a statutory provision.
32. In
Common Cause, A Registered Society v. Union of India and Ors. , this Court
held:
"Even
under Article 142 of the Constitution, such a direction cannot be issued. While
passing, an order under Article 142 of the Constitution, this Court cannot
ignore the substantive provision of law much less the constitutional rights
available to a person. (See: Supreme Court Bar Assn. v. Union of India, )
33. In
M.C. Mehta v. Kamal Nath and Ors. this Court observed:
"
...The Court further observed that though the powers conferred on the Court by
Article 142 are curative in nature, they cannot be construed as powers which
authorize the Court to ignore the substantive rights of a litigant. The Court
further observed that this power cannot be used to "supplant"
substantive law applicable to the case or cause under consideration of this
Court. "
34.
Further in State of Punjab and Anr. v. Rajesh Syal this Court opined:
"...This
Court has ample jurisdiction to pass orders under Article 142(1) of the
Constitution which may be necessary for doing complete justice in any case or
matter. But even in exercising this power, it is more than doubtful that an
order can be passed contrary to law."
35.
The respondents furthermore even are not entitled to any relief on the ground
of gross delay and latches on their part in filing the writ petition. The first
two writ petitions were filed in the year 1976 wherein the respondents herein
approached the High Court in 1992. In between 1976 and 1992 not only two writ
petitions had been decided. But one way or the other, even the matter had been
considered by this Court in Debdas Kumar (supra). The plea of delay, which Mr.
Krishnamani states, should be a ground for denying the relief to the other persons
similarly situated would operate against the respondents. Furthermore, the
other employees not being before this Court although they are ventilating their
grievances before appropriate courts of law no order should be passed which
would prejudice their cause. In such a situation, we are not prepared to make
any observation only for the purpose of grant of some relief to the respondents
to which they are not legally entitled to so as to deprive others therefrom who
may be found to be entitled thereto by a court of law.
36.
For the reasons aforementioned, the impugned judgment cannot be sustained which
is set aside accordingly. This appeal is allowed. No costs.