SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Sultan Sadik
Vs
Sanjay Raj Subba
Civil Appeal No. 8425 of 2002
(S. B. Sinha)
05/01/2004
S.B. SINHA, J.
1. The appellant herein was elected from 110 Naoboicha Legislative Assembly
Constituency in the State of Assam. An election petition was filed by the first
respondent herein questioning the election of the appellant in terms of
Sections 100(1) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 (hereinafter
referred to and called as 'the said Act'), for the sake of brevity), on the
ground that he stood disqualified being the holder of a post of profit under
the State of Assam.
BACKGROUND FACTS:
2. The appellant was said to have been appointed as an Assistant Teacher in
'Pabha Charjali M.E. Madarassa School' (hereinafter referred to as 'the said
School'). He was working therein as an Assistant Teacher without any
remuneration. Primary education is imparted in the said School. It appears that
the primary education in the State of Assam used to be governed by three Acts,
known as 'Assam Basic Education Act, 1954', Assam, Elementary Education Act,
1962' and 'Assam Elementary Education Act, 1968'.
3. In terms of the 1968 Act, the Regional Boards of Elementary Education were
constituted which took over the management of elementary schools and
pre-primary schools. There also existed a State Board of Elementary Education
constituted under Section 4 of Assam Elementary Education Act, 1968.
4. The State thereafter enacted the Assam Elementary Education (Provincialisation)
Act, 1974 (Assam Act No. VI of 1975) to provide for provincialisation of the
elementary education in the State of Assam, in terms whereof the services of
employees of the different categories of the State Board and Regional Boards
for Elementary Education were to be provincialised for the purpose of bringing
them under the direct management and control of the State Government. Pursuant
to or in furtherance of the said Act, all assets and liabilities of the State
Board and all Regional Boards vested in the State Government. In terms of the
Section 3 of the 1974 Act, the services of all teachers of elementary schools
and pre-primary schools maintained by the Regional Boards of Elementary
Education, all employees of the State Board of Elementary Education, all
teachers appointed by the Regional Boards of Elementary Education and all
ministerial staff appointed by the State Board of Elementary Education were
provincialised under the said Act. The consequence of vesting of the
institutions maintained by the authorities under the aforementioned three Acts
is provided in Section 4A thereof which reads thus:-
"Services of all teachers and employees who rendered services under the
following repealed Acts and whose services are taken over by the Government on
provincialisation on 5th September, 1975 under the principal Act shall be
deemed to be services under the Government and shall qualify and count for
pension and other retirement benefits." *
5. Section 27(1) of the 1974 Act provides for rule making power. Pursuant to or
in furtherance thereof, the State of Assam made rules for regulating the terms
and conditions of services of teachers of elementary schools and employees
employed therein known as 'the Assam Elementary Education (Provincialisation) Service
and Conduct Rules, 1981 (hereinafter referred to as 'the 1981 Rules').
6. "Service" has been defined in Rule 2(xii) of the 1981 Rules to
mean:
"Service" means service rendered under the State Board for
Elementary Education constituted under the Assam Elementary Education Act, 1968
and service rendered under the Government before or after provincialisation
both in respect of teachers and other employees." *
7. Rule 3(i) of the said Rules reads thus:
"Terms and Conditions: The services of all teachers of Elementary
Education taken over by the Government on provincialisation on 5th September,
1975, as provided under Section 3 of the Assam Elementary Education
(Provincialisation) Act, 1974, as amended, shall be subject to the following
conditions:
(a) Services rendered during the repealed Acts:-
The Assam Basic Education Act, 1954 (Act XXVI of 1954), the Assam Elementary
Education Act, 1962 (Act XXX of 1962), and the Assam Elementary Education Act,
1968 (Act XVIII) of 1969) shall be counted towards pension and other retirement
benefits provided such services are substantive and permanent.
Explanation: Services rendered temporarily against leave or deputation
vacancies shall be excluded.
(b) They shall be entitled to such scales of pay and allowances and other
benefits as may be admissible to the teachers of corresponding rank of the
Government School services with effect from the date of provincialisation. *
(c) They shall be superannuated on attaining 58 years of age."
8. The said school was not being maintained by any authority constituted
under any of the aforementioned statutes. A notification, however, was issued
on or about 19.11.1991 whereby and whereunder the said school was
provincialised. Indisputably, the names of the appellant herein and a large
number of teachers were dropped from the list of approved teachers and their
services had not been provincialised under the provisions of the 1974 Act.
9. All Assam Middle English School Association of which the appellant is said
to be a member filed a writ petition before the Assam High Court for
regularization of services of the dropped teachers, which was marked as Writ
Petition No. 2833 of 1997. The said writ petition was dismissed where-against
an appeal before the Division Bench was filed being Writ Petition No.474 of
1997. The Division Bench while reversing the judgment of the learned Single
Judge by reason of a judgment and order dated 13.11.1998, inter alia, directed:
"For the purpose of enabling the Government to complete process of
regularization/provincialisation, the appellants association will furnish all
necessary documents and particulars including names of concerned assistant
teachers to the Director of Elementary Education, Assam, within two weeks from today.
It will be open for the State Government to consider
regularization/provincialisation of Assistant Teachers dropped at the time of
provincialisation of the ME and ME Madrassas during the year 1991-92 in
addition to 1123 Assistant Teachers in case they find genuineness in the claims
of such additional Assistant Teachers.
The impugned order dated 25.6.97 of the learned Single Judge passed in CR No.
2833/97 is set aside and the writ appeal is disposed of in terms of the
aforesaid directions. But considering, however, the facts and circumstances of
the case, the parties shall bear their own costs."
10. Pursuant to or in furtherance of the said directions, the services of
190 working teachers were sought to be regularized w.e.f. 24.4.1998 by an order
dated 8.1.1999 stating:
".. The services of the teachers may be regularized out of the posts
already allotted to you vide this office letter No. EPD/OB/6/98/156 dated
24.4.98. Before issuing the regularization order to the working teacher concern
the Dist. Ele. Edn. Officer should authenticate the same. The name of the
teachers and the name of the schools as furnished the list received from Govt.
The regularization of service of working teachers should be made on seniority
basis as per physical verification report of Dist. Ele. Edn. Officer concerned
and were working before the date of provincialisation of school and duly
approval of the posts against section. No teachers should be regularized in
case of readjustment of schools as per need of enrolment without prior approval
of this Directorate..." *
11. It appears that the District Elementary Education Officer by a letter dated
16.12.1999 addressed to the Secretary to the Government of Assam allegedly
informed the latter about regularization of 97 numbers of dropped teachers and
brought to his notice that it may be necessary to take steps for regularization
of other teachers by creating posts therefor. As, allegedly, the order of the
High Court was not complied with, a contempt petition was filed wherein, in his
affidavit the District Elementary Education Officer alleged that in compliance
with the order of the court dated 13.11.1998, the services of 105 dropped
teachers were regularized w.e.f. 24.4.1998 by an order dated 30.10.2000, and
therein the name of the appellant found place at Sl. No. 28. It, however
appears that the appellant herein stopped attending the said school whereafter
the Head Master of the said School by letters dated 2.5.2000, 12.6.2000 and
21.8.2000 asked the appellant to come to the school with sufficient cause for
his absence failing which action would be taken against him. The appellant
neither joined the School nor replied to the said notices. The Managing
Committee of the said School adopted a resolution to the following effect:
"Since Md. Sultan Sadique, Assistant Teacher has unauthorisedly been
absent from his duty without any notice/intimation and it has been informed him
on 2.5.2000, 12.6.2000 and 21.8.2000 by serving written notices. But no reply
has been received from him in this regard.
The matter has thoroughly been discussed in today's and unanimously decides
that in the interest of the school, Md. Sultan Sadik, Assistant Teacher of the
Pabha Charali M.E. Madrassa has been released from his post with immediate
effect.
It has also been decided to inform the authority concerned to take necessary
action."
12. A copy of the said resolution was forwarded to the appellant herein and
a copy thereof was sent to the District Elementary Education Officer and the
Block Elementary Education Officer by the Head Master of the said School by
letter dated 30.8.2000, which is to the following effect:
"Office of the Head Master and Secretary Pabha Charali ME Madrassa,
P.O. Kutubpur : Dist. Lakhimpur
Date: 30.8.2000
To
M/d. Sultan Sadik
Assistant Teacher
Pabha Charali M.E. Madrassa
Subject: Release from service
Sir,
With reference to the subject cited above and due respect it has been informed
you that the Managing Committee of Pabha Charali M.E. Madrassa vide its
resolution No.1 passed in its meeting held on 25.8.2000 decided to release you
from the post of Assistant Teacher from Pabha Charali M.E. Madrassa.
This decision will be implemented with immediate effect.
Sincerely yours,
Sd/- illegible
Seal: Headmaster
Pabha Charali M.E.
Madrass, P.O. Kutubpur
Dist. Lakhimpur
13. It is not in dispute that the appellant herein despite receipt of the
said purported order dated 30.8.2000 did not question the legality or validity
thereof. He accepted the said order.
14. A notification for holding an election was issued on 16.4.2001. The
appellant and the first respondent herein amongst others pursuant thereto filed
their nomination papers. The first respondent herein filed objections to the
nomination of the appellant on the ground that he was a Government employee and
hence ineligible for contesting the election. The appellant herein took the
stand that as despite order of regularization passed in his favour, he did not
join duties nor received any salary, he was not a Government employee. The said
plea was accepted. In the election, as noticed hereinbefore, the appellant was
elected whereafter the election petition was filed by the first respondent.
ISSUES:
15. The High Court having regard to the pleadings of the parties, inter alia,
framed the following issues:
"(5) Whether the Respondent No.1 on the date of his nomination held any
office of profit?
(6) Whether on the date of scrutiny of nomination papers and also on the date
of election the Respondent No.1 was disqualified for being chosen to the
Legislative Assembly of the 191(1)(A) of the Indian Constitution and Section
100(1)(a) and Section 100(1)(d)(iv) of the Act?"*
HIGH COURT JUDGMENT:
16. The High Court in its impugned judgment held that:
(i) an Assistant Teacher in the school whose services had been
provincialised by the Government of Assam would be holder of an office of
profit under the State of Assam, in view of the order of the High Court in Writ
Appeal No. 474 of 1997 whereby and whereunder the State was directed to
consider cases of 1123 dropped teachers for regularization / provincialisation:
(ii) As pursuant to or in furtherance thereof the services of several teachers
including that of the appellant were regularized in terms of order dated
8.1.1999 (Ext.9) as also the order dated 30.10.2000 (Ext. 14) wherein the name
of the appellant found place at Sl. No. 28, he would be deemed to have become
an Assistant Teacher with retrospective effect from 24.4.1998. Keeping in view
the fact that the appellant was in Government service on 25.8.2000, the
Managing Committee of the said school had no authority to terminate his
services without approval of the appropriate authority of the Government
thereabout:
(iii) Although proceedings of the Managing Committee bore the endorsement of
the Block Elementary Education Officer, it had no authority to terminate the
services of the appellant. Even if the appellant was a dropped teacher, the
question of the Managing Committee releasing or relieving him would not arise
and, thus, the said order dated 25.8.2000 is of no legal effect:
(iv) There is no explanation as to why even after 30.8.2000 the Head Master
requested the District Elementary Education Officer to take action against the
appellant for his absence from duty, which also shows that the Head Master
considered him to be a regularized teacher on that day; *
(v) The letter dated 30.10.2000 must be presumed to have been served upon
the appellant in terms of Section 114 of the Evidence Act;
(vi) As the effect of regularization of provincialisation / regularization has
been provided for under the Act, the non-joining or non-drawing of any salary
by the appellant was irrelevant.*
17. On the aforementioned findings, the election petition was allowed by the
High Court.
SUBMISSIONS:
18. Mr. V.A. Mohta, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant
would submit that having regard to the fact that the appellant had been served
with notices on 2.5.2000, 12.6.2000 and 21.8.2000 by the School and furthermore
in view of the order dated 30.8.2000 as also the resolution of the Managing
Committee dated 25.8.2000, the purported order of regularization dated
30.10.2000 cannot be said to have been acted upon. The learned counsel would
urge that the High Court committed a manifest error insofar as it failed to
consider the purport of the letter dated 30.8.2000 (Ext. G.), genuineness
whereof is not in dispute. Mr. Mohta would submit that as the appellant has
accepted the said order of termination, the first respondent had no locus
standi to question the same. Our attention in this behalf has also been drawn
to the show cause filed by the District Elementary Education Officer, Lakhimpur
in the contempt proceedings. The learned counsel would contend that as the
order of regularization was passed only on 30.10.2000, the same was non est in
the eye of law. It was further submitted that even from the said order dated
30.10.2000, it would appear that one Naseema Begum claimed seniority over the
appellant on the ground that he superseded her and, thus, even the order of
regularization did not attain finality. The learned counsel would submit that
in terms of Rule 8 of 1981 Rules, a register is required to be opened at the
beginning of service by the DI of School and as no service records had been
opened the appellant cannot be said to be holder of an office of profit under
the State. Relying on or on the basis of a decision in R.P. Moidutty vs. P.I.
Kunju Mohammad and Another ), the learned counsel would argue that the
first respondent herein has filed to discharge his heavy onus. Mr. Mohta would
also contend that the High Court committed an error in setting aside the
election on mere surmises and conjectures.
19. Mr. U.N. Bachawat, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the
respondents, on the other hand, would submit that the expression
'regularization' connotes that the services of a person who has irregularly
been appointed would be made regular and, thus, such an order can be given to
have a retrospective effect. Strong reliance, in this regard has been placed on
State of Mysore and Another vs. S.V. Narayanappa) and B.N. Nagarajan and Others
etc. vs. State of Karnataka and others etc. 1979 AIR (SC) 1679).
20. The learned counsel would contend that as the institution stood
provincialised in terms of notification dated 19.11.1991 issued by the State of
Assam, as would appear from the deposition of the Head Master of the School,
the consequences provided for in Section 4A of the Act and Rule 3 of the 1981
Rules shall ensue in terms whereof the appellant would be deemed to be a
Government servant with retrospective effect from 24.4.1998. Mr. Bachawat would
urge that keeping in view of the provisions of Section 87 of the Representation
of the People Act and having regard to the pleadings of the parties as
contained in Para 16 of the election petition and para 18 of the written
statement wherefrom it would appear that the factum of provincialism had not
been denied or disputed and, thus, the same would be deemed to have been
admitted and, in that view of the matter it was not necessary for the High
Court to consider the effect of mode of provincialisation of teachers. The
learned counsel would contend that the role of the Managing Committee of a
provincialised school being a limited one, the purported resolution dated
25.8.2000 and letter dated 30.10.2000 being wholly illegal and without
jurisdiction, the same would be non est in the eye of law. Strong reliance in
this behalf has been placed on Mysore State Road Transport Corporation vs.
Mirja Khasim Ali Beg and Another ). The learned counsel would submit
that in view of the aforementioned legal position, it was not even necessary
for the authorities of the State of Assam to communicate the order of
regularization dated 30.10.2000 insofar as the same would be deemed to be
communicated as soon as it went out of the control of the District Elementary
Education Officer. Reliance has been placed on State of Punjab vs. Khemi Ram
). Non-receipt of salary by the appellant is also not relevant in view
of the fact that the State has made budgetary provision therefor according to
Mr. Bachawat and in support of his aforementioned contention he relied upon
M.V. Rajashekaran & Others vs. Vatal Nagaraj & others).
Analysis:
21. The parties have not brought on records the offer of appointment, if any,
issued in favour of the appellant herein by the Managing Committee of the said
School at the time of his joining. Admittedly, he had been rendering his services
in the School without any remuneration. The terms and conditions of his job are
not known. It is admitted from the records that he fought election in the year
1998 and during the relevant period he discontinued going to the School but
thereafter again he started going to the School. It is also not disputed he had
not been going to the School for a long time, as a result whereof the said
letters 2.5.2000, 12.6.2000 and 21.8.2000 came to be issued. The authenticity
of the letter of the Head Master dated 30.8.2000 is not in dispute.
22. The question in the aforementioned situation would be as regard the effect
thereof vis-a-vis his purported regularization in terms of letter dated
30.10.2000 w.e.f. 24.4.1998.
Legal Implications:
23. The statutory provisions, as referred to hereinbefore, ex facie demonstrate
that the 1974 Act was enacted for the purpose of the provincialisation of
services of employees of different categories of the State Board and Regional
Boards for Elementary Education and bringing them under direct management and
control of the State Government.
24. The pleadings of the parties before the High Court do not reveal that the
School in question was maintained by the Regional Board. Had it been so, the
question of the appellant being a dropped teacher would not have arisen.
Furthermore, no occasion would have also arisen for the State of Assam to issue
a separate notification dated 19.11.1991 for provincialisation of the said
school. We have also not been shown any provision of law in terms whereof such
a notification could be issued. Be that as it may, the fact remains that the
appellant herein was not recognised as a teacher working in the said School. He
continued to render voluntary services without receiving any remuneration. It
may be that such rendition of service by the appellant or the teachers
similarly situated was on the hope or belief that their services would also be
provincialised by the State one day or the other. But only by reason thereof,
it is difficult to conceive that a relationship of a master and servant came
into being by and between the management of the School and the appellant. Even
if such a relationship existed, the same was a fragile one. The services of the
appellant in terms of the 1974 Act or the rules framed thereunder were not
protected. He did not enjoy and status; his services could be dispensed with by
the Managing Committee of the said School at any time. Even after
provincialisation of the School, keeping in view the admitted fact that the
appellant was not an approved teacher, it must be held that he was merely
rendering some services and, thus, either in law or on fact, no jural
relationship between the State and the appellant came into being # .
25. The High Court, however, proceeded on the basis that such a relationship
existed. It opined that the order of the Division Bench dated 13.11.1998 was
mandatory in character. The fact that the said order attained finality is not
in dispute but a bare perusal of the directions issued therein would reveal that
the Association was asked to furnish necessary documents and particulars
including names of the concerned teachers so as to enable the State to consider
and complete the process of regularization / provincialisation of ME Madrassas
during the year 1991-92 in addition to 1123 Assistant Teachers in case they
find genuineness of claims of such Assistant Teachers.
26. The order dated 8.1.1999 of the Director of Elementary Education stated
that the services of the teachers should be regularized out of the posts
already allotted to the concerned District Elementary Education Officer. He was
asked to authenticate list of working teachers before regularization of
services of such teachers. Despite that the name of the appellant appeared at
Sl. No. 56 thereof, such a direction was not final. The letter of the District
Elementary Education Officer dated 16.12.1999, although discloses that he had
finalized the list of 97 names, no order pursuant thereto had been issued. Even
the order dated 30.10.2000 says that such purported provincialisation /
regularization was provisional in nature. Such regularization was further
subject to the outcome of order dated 25.9.2000 in Writ Appeal No. 474 under
C.R. No. 2833 of 1997 in Contempt Case (C) No. 420 of 2000 of the High Court of
Gauhati. From the list of dropped teachers purported to have been regularized
from 24.4.1998, it appears that there existed a factual dispute as to whether
the appellant superseded one Mst. Naseema Begum who had joined the said School
on 1.4.1984 or not. The appellant contended that he even did not receive the
said purported order of regularization. The High Court having regard to the
provisions contained in Section 114 of the Evidence Act, was of the opinion
that a presumption that he had received the said order could be drawn but it
failed to take into consideration that such presumption stood rebutted then the
appellant stated on oath that he did not receive such letter. In such an event,
the onus was on the election petitioner to show that the same had been
delivered or tendered to him by the postal peon of the concerned post office.
It is not a case where the High Court directed regularization of services of
the appellant. It is furthermore not a case where the posts were existing on
the date on which the appellant joined the said School. The additional posts,
admittedly, had been created by the State in the year 1998. Prior to
30.10.2000, thus, there existed no relationship of master and servant. The
offer came to be made by the State to the appellant only on the issuance of the
said order. The said offer was not only required to be communicated but also
was required to be accepted by the appellant.
27. It is true that the school in question stood provincialised in terms of the
notification issued by the State of Assam but the same by itself would not lead
to the conclusion that the services of the Assistant Teachers working therein
stood automatically provincialised. Had such consequences of provincialisation
of the school been flown from the notification, it would not have been
necessary for the teachers to approach the High Court. The very fact that even
in terms of the order of the High Court, the genuineness of claims of the
concerned Assistant Teachers was required to be verified is itself a pointer to
the fact that no order of regularization could be passed pursuant to or in
furthermore of the judgment of the High Court only.
28. It is not a case, it will bear repetition to state, where the State or
its authorised officer made an appointment of an employee either on ad hoc
basis or on daily wages or on contract basis or otherwise. Only in cases of
such irregularities in the matter of appointment, the employees can be
regularized in their services. #
29. In S.V. Narayanappa (supra) whereupon Mr. Bachawat strongly relied, this
Court stated that for the purpose of application of a Government order, it must
be shown that the local candidate claiming the benefit thereof must satisfy
that he was initially appointed prior to 31.12.1959 and was in service on
1.1.1960 and continued till 22.9.1961. It was held:
".. This construction finds support from sub-cl. (iii) which provides
that local service prior to regularization would be counted for the purposes of
leave, pension and increments though not for seniority as seniority was to be
fixed from the length of service calculated from the date of regularization. It
is manifest that unless the local service was continuous such service could no
be taken into account for the purposes, in particular of pension and
increments. How would increments, for example, be granted unless the service
prior to such increments was continuous? The same consideration would also
apply in the case of pension. It had, therefore to be provided as has been done
in sub-cl. (iv) that a break in service would not be condoned for a period
howsoever short. Continuity of service is thus a condition for both sub-cls. 2
and 3...." *
30. Yet again in B.N. Nagarajan (supra), this Court repelled the argument that
regularization gives a colour of permanence and the appellants therein must be
deemed to have acquired substantive rights stating:
".. The argument however is unacceptable to us for two reasons. Firstly
the words "regular" or "regularization" do not connote
permanence. They are terms calculated to condone any procedural irregularities
and are meant to cure only such defects as are attributable to the methodology
followed in making the appointments. They cannot be construed so as to convey
an idea of the nature of tenure of the appointments..."*
31. It is interesting to note that therein this Court quoted with approval a
decision of this Court in R.N. Nanjundappa vs. T. Thimmaiah ), which is
to the following effect:
"... If the appointment itself is in infraction of the rules or if it
is in violation of the provisions of the Constitution illegality cannot be
regularized. "Ratification or regularization is possible of an act which
is within the power of province of the authority but there has been some
non-compliance with procedure or manner which does not go to the root of the
appointment. Regularization cannot be said to be a mode of recruitment. To
acceded to such a proposition would be to introduce a new head of appointment
in defiance of rules or it may have the effect of setting at naught the
rules." *
32. These decisions of this Court do not support the contention of Mr. Bachawat
and in fact run counter thereto. It is not the case of the parties that
there existed even semblance of any legal right of the appellant and there
existed a relationship of employer and employee between the State and him. In
law the appellant did not enjoy any status. His services had not been
recognized by the State. The terms and conditions of his services were not
governed by any statute and, thus, the same were not protected. The
relationship of employer and employee, if any, between the State and the
appellant was to come into being (may be with retrospective effect) only upon
receipt of the offer of an appointment dated 30.10.2000 and acceptance thereof
by him. A contract of service in absence of any statutory provisions must be
preceded by an offer and acceptance. A contract of service in absence of any
statute, a fortiori is also governed by the provisions of the Indian Contract
Act. It is, therefore, not correct to contend that the order dated 30.10.2000
was not required to be communicated for making a valid contract of service. It
was absolutely necessary to communicate the said order to the appellant by the
State, acceptance thereof whether expressly or by necessary implications by the
appellant was also required. The appellant did not do it nor it is the case of
the State or the statutory authorities that such a relationship had come into
being. #
33. The decision of this Court in Khemi Ram (supra) relied upon by Mr. Bachawat
is not apposite as therein an order of suspension was in question. This Court
in the said decision itself referred to its decision in State of Punjab vs. Amar
Singh Harika), which stated that communication of an order dismissing an
employee from service is imperative. If communication of an order for
terminating the jural relationship is imperative, a fortiori it would also be
imperative at the threshold.
34. The High Court proceeded to render its opinion on a wrong premise. It was
not a case where the High Court having regard to the provisions contained in
Article 191 of the Constitution of India vis-à-vis Section 100 of the
Representation of the People Act was required to determine a question as to
whether the appellant being holder of an office of profit of the Government of
the Assam was wrongfully dismissed from his services. Only holding of an
office of profit under the Government of India or the Government of any State
would render a candidate disqualified from contesting an election. Only in that
event, the High Court could have been entitled to declare such election as a
void one, but the question involved herein is not so. #
35. What was necessary to be considered by the High Court was as to whether any
relationship of employer and employee between the State of Assam and the
appellant herein came into being. The submission of Mr. Bachawat, therefore, to
the effect that the High Court had the requisite jurisdiction by invoking the
doctrine of 'implied powers' to go into the question of
termination/dismissal/removal of the appellant does not arise for consideration
in the instant case.
Effect of Resolution Dated 25.8.2000:
36. Furthermore, even the de facto relationship of employer and employee (as
contra-distinguished from de jure relationship) existed, the same came to an
end in view of the aforementioned resolution of the Managing Committee of the
said School and the communication thereof by the Head Master of the said School
to the appellant in terms of letter dated 30.8.2000. An administrative order
can be challenged in a proper forum only by the right person for a right
remedy.
37. In Administrative Law, Eighth Edition by HWR Wade & C.F. Forsyth, at
p.293, it is stated:
"An officer de facto is one who has the reputation of being the officer
he assumes to be, and yet is not a good officer in point of law."
38. The question as to whether the relationship of the appellant with the
said School could be validly terminated by the Managing Committee or not could
have been raised only in an appropriate proceeding where the State was a
necessary party.
39. An order may be void for one and voidable for the other. An invalid order
necessarily need not be non est: in a given situation it has to be declared as
such. In an election petition, the High Court was not concerned with the said
issue.
40. In Administrative Law, Eighth Edition by HWR Wade & C.F. Forsyth, at
page 309, it is stated:
"Effect on third parties:
If an act or order is held to be ultra vires and void it is natural to assume
that, being a nullity, it is to be treated as non-existent by all who would
otherwise be concerned. But the judgment of a court binds only the parties to
it, so that here also there are problems of relatively. Once again Lord Diplock
has supplied the answer.
Although such a decision is directly binding only as between the parties to the
proceedings in which it was made, the application of the doctrine of precedent
has the consequence of enabling the benefit of it to accrue to all other
persons whose legal rights have been interfered with in reliance on the law
which the statutory instrument purported to declare.
In effect, therefore, the court's judgment of nullity operates erga omnes, i.e.
for and against everyone concerned.
Patent and latent invalidity.
In a well-known passage Lord Redcliffe said:
An order, even if not made in good faith, is still an act capable of legal
consequences. It bears no brand of invalidity upon its forehead. Unless the
necessary proceedings are taken at law to establish the cause of invalidity and
to get it quashed or otherwise upset, it will remain as effective for its
ostensible purpose as the most impeccable of orders. *
This must be equally true even where the 'brand of invalidity' is plainly
visible : for there also the order can effectively be resisted in law only by
obtaining the decision of the court. The necessity of recourse to the court has
been pointed out repeatedly in the House of Lords and Privy Council, without
distinction between patent and latent defects. Lord Diplock spoke still more
clearly, saying that it leads to confusion to use such terms as 'voidable'
'voidable ab initio', 'void' or 'a nullity' as descriptive of the status of
subordinate legislation alleged to be ultra vires for patent or for latent
defects, before its validity has been pronounced on by a court of competent
jurisdiction." *
41. The appellant herein had accepted the order of termination. In that view
of the matter, the High Court could not have proceeded on the basis that the
order of termination was illegal. So long as the order of provincialisation was
not issued, as noticed hereinbefore, there was no relationship of employer and
employee between the appellant and the State of Assam. The appellant had been
working subject to the discretion of the Managing Committee. His voluntary
services could be refused to be taken by the Managing Committee of the School.
# The question would have been otherwise, had the purported service
conditions of the appellant been governed by a statute or statutory rules,
regularization of a teacher would be permissible in law, if he remains a
teacher on the day on which such an order is passed. Had he been in service
on 30.10.2000, the same could have been regularized with retrospective effect
but he was not in service of the School and on that date the question of his
regularization would not arise. # It is only in that context the High Court
was required to consider as to whether the validity or otherwise of the order
of termination passed by the Managing Committee could have been the subject
matter of a decision by an Election Tribunal.
42. The contention of Mr. Bachawat to the effect that services of an employee
can only be terminated in certain situations could have been accepted if the
jural relationship had come into being and not otherwise.
CONCLUSION:
43. For the reasons aforementioned, we are of the opinion that the High
Court has committed a manifest error in holding that the appellant being a
holder of an office of profit disentitled himself from contesting the election
in terms of Article 191 of the Constitution of India.
44. The appeal, therefore, is allowed. The judgment and order of the High Court
under challenge is set aside. # However, in the facts and circumstances of
the case, there shall be no order as to costs.