SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Union of India
Vs.
Sri Janardhan Debanath
C.A.No.1010-1011 of 2004
(Doraiswamy Raju and Arijit Pasayat JJ.)
13.02.2004
ORDER
Arijit Pasayat, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. In these two appeals, the Union of India questions legality of the judgment
rendered by a Division Bench of the Guwahati High Court, Agartala Bench,
Agartala whereby two writ petitions filed by the respondents were allowed and
the common order of transfer dated 10.9.2002 in respect of four employees was
quashed so far as it relates to the respondents.
3. Background facts sans unnecessary details are as follows:
4. The respondents were working in the Postal Services Department. They were
transferred from Agartala Division to Meghalaya Division by order of transfer
dated 10.9.2002. Feeling aggrieved by the order, the respondents (writ
petitioners) along with others moved the Central Administrative Tribunal at
Guwahati (in short the 'Tribunal'). The Tribunal after hearing the parties
directed the authorities to consider the representations made by the two lady
applicants who were co-applicants along with the respondents within one month.
So far as the present respondents are concerned, no interference was made by
the Tribunal with the order. Challenging the decision of the Tribunal, the writ
petitions were filed. The grounds on which the writ petitions were filed were
(a) the transfer orders of the two respondents were in violation of the
provisions of Rule 37 of the Posts and Telegraphs Manual. Volume IV (in short
'the Manual') read with D.G. Posts Letter No. 20-12/90 SPBI dated 23.8.90; (b)
the transfer is in violation of Rule 15 of the Fundamental Rules (in short 'FR
15') and (c) the inter Divisional transfer would effect the seniority and
promotional prospects of the writ petitioners and (d) the transfer order was
passed as a measure of penalty.
5. The Union of India took the stand that the transfer was done in public
interest and on account of exigencies of administration. It was pointed out
that the respondents not only misbehaved with the Director (Postal Services), a
senior lady officer, she was confined and dragged from one room to another and
this was done with a view to force her to withdraw the charge sheet against the
Deputy Post Master. She was abused in filthy language and was physically
manhandled. This conduct was certainly unbecoming of an employee and with a
view to enforce discipline and to avoid recurrence of such unfortunate
incident, they were transferred. There was no violation of either Rule 37 of
the Manual or FR 15. The High Court accepted the prayers made in the writ
petitions and held that transfer was impermissible in terms of Rule 37 and was
in violation of FR 15. It was as a measure of penalty and the seniority and the
promotional prospects were likely to be affected.
6. In support of the appellants Mr. Raju Ramachandran, learned senior counsel
submitted that the approach of the High Court is clearly erroneous. It
erroneously held that there was violation of Rule 37 or FR 15. The
interpretation put on the ambit of FR 15 is clearly wrong, as the proviso has
not been taken note of. As the transfer was not a punitive one but as a measure
of enforcing discipline, in public interest and in the exigencies of
administration there was no scope for the High Court to entertain the writ
petitions and grant relief.
7. Per contra, Mr. Rajinder Sachar, learned senior counsel submitted that in
the transfer order itself it has been mentioned that the employees were
undesirable, as they had misbehaved. Before effecting transfer there ought to
have been an enquiry to find out whether there was any misbehaviour committed
by the respondents, or that they were undesirable as stated. According to him,
the High Court has correctly interpreted FR 15. With reference to a letter
dated 23.8.1990, it was submitted that there was no scope for transferring from
any part of the country to another part as was stipulated in the appointment
order. It was submitted that in terms of the letter, the scope of transfer to
any part of the country was obliterated. There can be no grievance if the
transfer was affected within the same circle, but making the transfer from one
circle to another was impermissible.
8. As Rule 37 and FR 15 form the foundation of the claim of the respondents, it
would be appropriate to quote them. Rule 37 read as follows:
"All officials of the Department are liable to be transferred to any part
of India unless it is expressly ordered otherwise for any particular class or
classes of officials. Transfers should not, however, be ordered except when
advisable in the interests of the public service. Postmen, village postmen and
Class IV servants should not, except for very special reasons, be transferred
from one district to another. All transfers must be subject to the conditions
laid down in Fundamental Rules 15 and 22."
9. FR 15 reads as follows:
"(a) The President may transfer a Government servant from one post to
another provided that except –
(1) one account of inefficiency or misbehaviour, or
(2) on his written request. a Government servant shall not be transferred to,
or except in a case covered by Rule 49, appointed to officiate in a post
carrying less pay than the pay of the post on which he holds a lien."
10. A bare reading of Rule 37 shows that officials of the Department are liable
to be transferred to any part of India unless it is expressly ordered otherwise
for any particular class or classes of officials. Transfers were not to be
ordered except when advisable in the interests of public service. The transfers
can be made subject to conditions laid down in FR 15 and 22. # The appellant
has indicated as to why and under what circumstances the transfers were thought
proper in the interests of public service. The High Court while exercising
jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, 1950
(in short the 'Constitution') had gone into the question as to whether the
transfer was in the interest of public service. That would essentially require
factual adjudication and invariably depend upon peculiar facts and
circumstances of the case concerned. No government servant or employee of a
public undertaking has any legal right to be posted forever at any one
particular place or place of his choice since transfer of a particular employee
appointed to the class or category of transferable posts from one place to
other is not only an incident, but a condition of service, necessary too in
public interest and efficiency in the public administration. Unless an order of
transfer is shown to be an outcome of mala fide exercise or stated to be in
violation of statutory provisions prohibiting any such transfer, the courts or
the tribunals normally cannot interfere with such orders as a matter of
routine, as though they were the appellate authorities substituting their own
decision for that of the employer/management, as against such orders passed in
the interest of administrative exigencies of the service concerned. This
position was highlighted by this Court in National Hydroelectric Power
Corporation Ltd. vs. Shri Bhagwan and Anr.
11. The Fundamental Rules primarily deal with the financial implications and
consequences relating to services of government servants whose pay is debited
to Civil Estimates and to any other class of Governments servants too which the
President may, by general or special order, declare them to be applicable, Rule
15 has to be read along with Rule 14-B. FR 15 has been quoted above and,
therefore, quotation of FR 14-B would suffice. The same reads as follows:
"FR 14-B: Subject to the provisions of Rule 15, the President may transfer to another post in the same cadre, the lien of a Government servant who is not performing the duties of the post to which the lien relates."
12. A bare reading of FR-15 makes it clear that except in cases where the
transfer is (a) on account of inefficiency or mis-behaviour or (b) on a written
request the government servant cannot be transferred or except in a case
covered by Rule 49 appointed to officiate in a post carrying less pay than the
pay of the post on which he holds a lien. The clear intention of the
prescription is that except the two categories indicated above, in all other
cases they pay to be paid on transfer shall not be less than of the post on
which he holds a lien. Exception is made in case of a transfer where it is on
account of inefficiency or mis-behaviour. In a case where transfer is on
account of inefficiency or mis-behaviour, the same can be made to a post
carrying less pay than the pay of the post on which he holds a lien. Similar is
the position where a transfer is made on a written request. Where the transfer
is otherwise than for inefficiency or mis-behaviour or on a written request
made by the transferred employee, the protection of pay is ensured. The High
Court seems to have completely mis-construed the rule as if there cannot be any
transfer in terms of FR 15 on account of inefficiency or mis-behaviour. The
view is clearly contrary to the pronounced intention of FR 15.
13.
That brings us to the other question as to whether the use of the expression
'undesirable' warranted an enquiry before the transfer. Strong reliance was
placed by learned counsel for the respondents on a decision of this Court in
Jagdish Mitter vs. The Union of India para 21, p.456) to contend that
whenever there is a use of the word 'undesirable' it casts a stigma and it
cannot be done without holding a regular enquiry. The submission is clearly
without substance. The said case relates to use of the expression 'undesirable'
in an order affecting the continuance in service by way of discharge. The
decision has therefore no application to the facts of the present case. The
manner, nature and extent of exercise to be undertaken by Courts /Tribunals in
a case to adjudge whether it casts a stigma or constitutes one by way of
punishment would also very much depend upon the consequences flowing from the
order and as to whether it adversely affected any service conditions - status,
service prospects financially and same yardstick, norms or standards cannot be
applied to all category of cases. Transfers unless they involve any such
adverse impact or visits the persons concerned with any penal consequences, are
not required to be subjected to same type of scrutiny, approach and assessment
as in the case of dismissal, discharge, reversion or termination and utmost
latitude should be left with the department concerned to enforce discipline,
decency and decorum in public service which are indisputably essential or
maintain quality of public service and meet untoward administrative exigencies
to ensure smooth functioning of the administration.
14. Additionally, it was pointed out by learned counsel for the Union of India
that as indicated in the special leave petition itself there was no question of
any loss of seniority or promotional prospects. These are the aspects which can
be gone into in an appropriate proceeding, if at all there is any adverse order
in the matter of seniority or promotion. It was also submitted that transfer
was within the same circle i.e. the North Eastern Circle and, therefore, the question
of any seniority getting affected by the transfer prima facie does not arise.
15. The allegations made against the respondents are of serious nature, and the
conduct attributed is certainly unbecoming. Whether there was any mis-behaviour
is a question which can be gone into in a departmental proceeding. For the
purposes of effecting a transfer, the question of holding an enquiry to find
out whether there was mis-behaviour of conduct unbecoming of an employee is
unnecessary and what is needed is the prima facie satisfaction of the authority
concerned on the contemporary reports about the occurrence complained of and if
the requirement, as submitted by learned counsel for the respondents, of
holding an elaborate enquiry is to be insisted upon the very purpose of
transferring an employee in public interest or exigencies or administration to
enforce decorum and ensure probity would get frustrated. The question whether
respondents could be transferred to a different division is a matter for the
employer to consider depending upon the administrative necessities and the
extent of solution for the problems faced by the administration. It is not for
this Court to direct one way or the other. The judgment of the High Court is
clearly indefensible and is set aside. The writ petitions filed before the High
Court deserve to be dismissed which we direct. The appeals are allowed with no
order as to costs.