SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Madan Singh
Vs
State of Bihar
Appeal (Crl.) 1285 of 2003
(Doraiswamy Raju and Arijit Pasayat)
02/04/2004
JUDGMENT
ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.
In this appeal under Section 19 of Terrorist and
Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 (in short the 'TADA Act')
the appellants question their conviction for offences punishable under Section
302 read with Sections 149, 307 read with Sections 149, 352, 379 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short 'the IPC'), Section 27
of the Arms Act, 1959 (in short 'the Arms Act') and
Section 3 (2)(i) of the TADA Act as done by the Sessions Judge, Jahanabad-cum-
Special Judge, TADA.
Twenty persons faced trial for alleged commission of various offences
punishable under IPC, TADA Act and Arms Act. Two of them (i.e. A-8 and A-9)
died during trial. Two other accused persons were held to be juveniles within
the meaning of Juvenile Justice Care Protection of Children Act, 2000 (in short
'the Juvenile Act'). It was held that they were entitled to the benefit under
the said Act. Each of the convicted accused-appellants was given life
imprisonment for the offences punishable under Section 302 read with Section
149 IPC and Section 3 (2)(i) of the TADA Act in addition to 7 years and one year
custodial sentence imposed for the offence relatable to Section 307 read with
Sections 149 and 353 IPC respectively. No separate sentence was imposed for the
offence relatable to Section 379 IPC and 27 of the Arms Act.
Prosecution version as unfolded during trial is as follows:
According to the first information report (Ext.4) lodged on 27.11.1988 Sri
Rasid Imam (hereinafter referred to as 'deceased') the officer-in-charge of
Arwal Police Station on receiving information about assemblage of extremists at
village Bhadasi in the house of acquitted accused Vakil Ram, with police
revolver and other ammunitions looted from the police giving rise to Arwal P.S.
Case No. 174/88 and their plan to attack their adversaries to kill them, formed
a raiding party with the other police officials including Sub Inspector Mohan
Singh, the informant (PW-12), Sub Inspector Gajadhar Chaubey (PW-22), Assistant
Sub Inspector S.N. Pandey (PW-11), Constable Ram Binay Singh (PW-9), Constable
Amul Kumar Singh (PW-10), Constable Md. Najim (PW-8), Constable Babu Mahto
(PW-5) and others. He also requisitioned additional force from Kishan Bhavan,
Baidrabad. After entering the information in the station diary he proceeded to
village Bhadasi. On the way he met another police official Irshad Ahmed who was
going to see the DSP. He was asked by the deceased to inform the DSP in regard
thereto. On reaching Jahanabad, more additional force consisting of Hridyanand
Puri (PW-17), Babu Lal Manjhi (PW- 18) and others reported to him. At about 11.30
a.m. on reaching village Bhadasi, the police party proceeded towards the house
of acquitted accused Vakil Ram along with Sant Prakash (PW-3) and Jitendra
Prasad (PW-4) by observing the required procedures. On reaching the house of
Vakil Ram, the deceased posted some police personnel with Sub Inspector
Gajadhar Choudhary at the gate of the house, and sent another section of force
with S.N. Pandey towards eastern northern direction. The deceased along with
others on entering the house saw 20-25 persons there. On seeing the police
party accused Mukaiya Shah Chand of Bhadasi (A-1) directed others to bring
rifles and carbines and to kill the police party, whereupon the accused persons
started firing by going inside a room. As a result of the firing, constable Amul
Kumar Singh (PW-10) was hit on his left side of the body. In spite of the
injury, said Amul Kumar Singh (PW-10) fired one round, but fell on the ground.
One of the extremists snatched his rifle who was shot at by firing made by Babu
Mahto (PW-5). Again while one of the extremists attempted to flee away with the
rifle, the deceased snatched it after chasing him. But in between the extremist
had made firings as a result of which the deceased died at the spot.
In the meantime, the extremists started firing upon the police party, who by
taking position behind a door fired at the extremists. As a result of firing by
the extremists Hridyanand Puri received injury in his hand. Taking stock of the
situation, the informant apprehending threat on the life of police party as
well as snatching of the ammunition, ordered for firing. On the firing made by
Hridyanand Puri, one of the extremists was killed followed by three rounds of
firing by Babu Lal Manjhi (PW-18) and five rounds of firing by Md. Nazim
(PW-8). As a result of the firing, one more extremist was killed. Even after
firing by the police the accused persons continued firing on the police party
which compelled the police party for further firing, which caused injury in the
leg of one extremist, who started fleeing away. While the accused persons
started fleeing, some of them Lakshman Sao (A-5), Lakhi Choudhary, Shyama
Choudhary (A-7), Madan Singh (A-10), Ajit Kumar (A-6), Ram Janam Ram (A-3),
Nanhe Rajwar (A-4), Manhgu Choudhary (A-15), Mahendra Choudhary, Shorai
Choudhary (A-12), Baleshwsar Choudhary (A- 14), Arvind Chaudhary (A-13) were
apprehended by the police party. They also apprehended Shanti Devi (A-8) along
with two children Lila and Chandan from a room situated south of the courtyard
of the house. In the meantime DSP Arwal arrived along with Sub Inspector Irshad
Imam and additional reinforcement. It came to light that the extremists were
fleeing away by making firing and he along with other police personnel chased
the extremists for seizing their arms, but they managed to flee away.
On search of the house of Vakil Ram in presence of witnesses, arms,
ammunitions, several documents, files, letters regarding banned organizations,
rifles, cartridges and carbine were seized. A copy of the seizure list was handed
over to Ram Janam Ram son of Vakil Ram. The informant claimed to have
identified Tribhuwan Sharma (A-18), Dr. Jagdish (A-16), Arun Kumar Bharti
(A-17), and Churaman Bhagat (A-2) besides Shah Chand Mukaiya (A-1) while they
were fleeing.
After investigation charge sheet was placed and cognizance was taken for
offences relatable to Sections 302, 307, 353, 379, 411, 324, 326, 414, 124A
read with Section 34 IPC and Sections 25, 27 and 35 of the Arms Act and
Sections 3 and 4 of the TADA Act. Charges were framed for offences punishable
under Sections 302 and 307 read with Section 149 IPC and Sections 353, 379,
124A IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the Explosive Substances
Act, 1908 (in short 'the Explosive Act') and Section 3(5) of the TADA
Act. Acquitted-accused Vakil Ram was separately charged for offence punishable
under Sections 3 (4) of the TADA and 25(1B) and 27 of the Arms Act.
In order to substantiate its accusations, 25 witnesses were examined by the
prosecution. The accused persons pleaded innocence and examined 5 witnesses. On
consideration of the materials on record the Trial Court recorded conviction
and imposed sentences as aforesaid.
In support of the appeal, Mr. Shanti Bhushan, learned senior counsel for the
appellants in Criminal Appeal No.1297 of 2003 submitted that the judgment of
the Trial Court cannot be maintained on several grounds. Firstly, there is no
evidence to show that the accused persons were terrorists or extremists or that
the activities or actions alleged are encompassed by Section 3 (1) of the TADA
Act to be described as terrorist acts. Further, the prosecution evidence is to
the effect that on getting secret information the police officials went to the
spot of occurrence and then some one amongst them is supposed to have cried out
that police officials have come and got weapons. Thereafter, the firing is
supposed to have started from both sides. 3 persons have been killed who were
claimed to be terrorists by the prosecution. It may be that they are
responsible for the killing of the deceased and for the injuries on the police
constables. The witnesses have admitted that they did not know the accused
persons earlier and after firing started when some persons were fleeing away
they were caught. There is no reason to hold that they were guilty of any
offence when admittedly large number of villagers had assembled on hearing the
gun fire. It has also come on record that when the persons were apprehended no
arms were recovered, from any of the persons who were apprehended while
allegedly fleeing, though one witness has stated that some arms were recovered
from the persons running away. Even if there was any assembly it cannot be said
that the same was unlawful to bring in application of Section 149 IPC. There is
no evidence to show as to who had fired the gun or had asked to start firing.
The definite case of the accused persons, right from the beginning, was that
there was dispute regarding cutting of singadas. Investigating Officer accepted
that he had not made any investigation to find out as to whether persons had
assembled for cutting singada. Documents were produced to show that some of the
accused persons had raised singada crops. The accused persons have taken a
definite stand that they were apprehending danger from the higher caste people
and, therefore, some of them may have been armed to protect themselves in case
of attack by the higher caste people. The Trial Court has acquitted Vakil Ram
in whose house the alleged occurrence took place.
It has not been shown that the assembly had any common object to commit any
crime or any member of the assembly had knowledge that crime was likely to be
committed. Those who were supposedly present may not have information about
presence of arms which were seized. Therefore, Section 149 IPC has no
application. The place of occurrence has not been established by cogent
evidence. The defence stand that occurrence took place near Singara pond is
more probable in view of the evidence adduced. In this background it was
submitted that conviction as done is uncalled for. Learned counsel for
appellants in Crl.A. No.1285/2003 advanced similar arguments.
In response, Mr. H.L. Agarwal, learned senior counsel for the respondent-State
submitted that the assembly was in an isolated place. The materials seized clearly
show that there was planned preparation and intention to cause terrorist
activities. Sophisticated arms were used and seized. Common object can develop
at the spot. It is the existence of the common object at the time of actual
occurrence which is to be seen. The factual scenario clearly goes to show the
existence of common object. If the assembly was for protection from an attack
by higher caste people as claimed, the arrival of the police would have been
welcomed because that would have provided protection. When the call was given
to start firing, after collecting arms several persons started firing. All the
arms were inside the house and it is not the stand of the accused persons that
anybody went outside to collect them. Therefore, the accused persons were well
prepared to commit violent acts. If really there was any apprehension of attack
by the higher caste people, the normal conduct would have been to inform the
police personnel on their arrival about their so called fears and sought their
assistance or protection and not to start firing at them. The acts referred to
in Section 3 (1) of TADA Act are comprehensive in nature and, therefore, the
acts committed are clearly covered by said provision. The plea that place of
occurrence was different and was near the singada pond is clearly disproved by
the fact that dead bodies of the 3 terrorists were recovered from the house
itself.
Major plea which was emphasized relates to the question whether Section 149,
IPC has any application for fastening the constructive liability on the basis
of unlawful acts committed pursuant to the common object by any member or the
acts which the members of the unlawful assembly knew to be likely to be
committed which is the sine qua non for its operation. The emphasis is on the
common object and not on common intention. Mere presence in an unlawful
assembly cannot render a person liable unless there was a common object and he
shared the same or was actuated by that common object and that object is one of
those set out in Section 141. Where common object of an unlawful assembly is
not proved, the accused persons cannot be convicted with the help of Section
149. The crucial question to determine is whether the assembly consisted of
five or more persons and whether the said persons entertained one or more of
the common objects, as specified in Section 141. It cannot be laid down as a
general proposition of law that unless the commission of an overt act is proved
against a person, who is alleged to be a member of unlawful assembly, it cannot
be said that he is a member of an assembly. The only thing required is that he
should have understood that the assembly was unlawful and was likely to commit
any of the acts which fall within the purview of Section 141. The word 'object'
means the purpose or design and, in order to make it 'common', it must be
shared by all. In other words, the object should be common to the persons, who
compose the assembly, that is to say, they should all be aware of it and concur
in it. A common object may be formed by express agreement after mutual
consultation, but that is by no means always necessary. It may be formed at any
stage by all or a few members of the assembly and the other members may just
join and adopt it. Once formed, it need not continue to be the same. It may be
modified or altered or abandoned at any stage. The expression 'in prosecution
of common object' as appearing in Section 149 have to be strictly construed as
equivalent to 'in order to attain the common object'. It must be immediately
connected with the common object by virtue of the nature of the object. There
must be community of object and the object may exist only up to a particular
stage, and not thereafter. Members of an unlawful assembly may have community
of object up to certain point beyond which they may differ in their objects and
the knowledge, possessed by each member of what is likely to be committed in
prosecution of their common object may vary not only according to the
information at his command, but also according to the extent to which he shares
the community of object, and as a consequence of this the effect of Section
149, IPC may also vary on different members of the same assembly.
'Common object' is different from a 'common intention' as it does not require a
prior concert and a common meeting of minds before the attack. It is enough if
each has the same object in view and their number is five or more and that they
act as an assembly to achieve that object. The 'common object' of an assembly
is to be ascertained from the acts and language and utterances of the members
composing it the nature of arms carried , and from a consideration of all the
surrounding circumstances. It may be gathered also from the course of conduct
adopted by and behaviour of the members of the assembly at or before the actual
conflict. What the common object of the unlawful assembly is at a particular
stage of the incident is essentially a question of fact to be determined,
keeping in view the nature of the assembly, the arms carried by the members,
and the behaviour of the members at or near the scene of the incident. It is
not necessary under law that in all cases of unlawful assembly, with an
unlawful common object, the same must be translated into action or be
successful. Under the Explanation to Section 141, an assembly which was not
unlawful when it was assembled may subsequently becomes unlawful. It is not
necessary that the intention or the purpose, which is necessary to render an
assembly an unlawful one, comes into existence at the outset. The time of
forming an unlawful intent is not material. An assembly which, at its
commencement or even for some time thereafter, is lawful may subsequently
becomes unlawful. In other words it can develop during the course of incident
at the spot eo instante.
Section 149, IPC consists of two parts. The first part of the section means
that the offence to be committed in prosecution of the common object must be
one which is committed with a view to accomplish the common object. In order
that the offence may fall within the first part, the offence must be connected
immediately with the common object of the unlawful assembly of which the
accused was member. Even if the offence committed is not in direct prosecution
of the common object of the assembly, it may yet fall under Section 141, if it
can be held that the offence was such as the members knew was likely to be
committed and this is what is required in the second part of the section. The
purpose for which the members of the assembly set out or desired to achieve is
the object. If the object desired by all the members is the same, the knowledge
that is the object which is being pursued is shared by all the members and they
are in general agreement as to how it is to be achieved and that is now the
common object of the assembly. An object is entertained in the human mind, and
it being merely a mental attitude, no direct evidence can be available and,
like intention, has generally to be gathered from the act which the person
commits and the result therefrom. Though no hard and fast rule can be laid down
as to the circumstances from which the common object can be called out, it may
reasonably be collected from the nature of the assembly, arms it carries and
behaviour at or before or after the scene of incident.
The word 'knew' used in the second branch of the section implies something more
than a possibility and it cannot be made to bear the sense of 'might have been
known'. Positive knowledge is necessary. When an offence is committed in
prosecution of the common object, it would generally be an offence which the
members of the unlawful assembly knew was likely to be committed in prosecution
of the common object.
That, however, does not make the converse proposition true; there may be cases
which would come within the second part but not within the first part. The
distinction between the two parts of Section 149 cannot be ignored or
obliterated. In every case it would be an issue to be determined, whether the
offence committed falls within the first part or it was an offence such as the
members of the assembly knew to be likely to be committed in prosecution of the
common object and falls within the second part. However, there may be cases
which would fall within first part being offences committed in prosecution of
the common object, while at the same time, though not always falling within the
second part, as offences which the members of the unlawful assembly knew to be
likely to be committed by a person engaged in the prosecution of the common object
and acting with the purpose of executing it. (See Chikkarange Gowda and others
v. State of Mysore)
As noted by this Court in Sukhbir Singh v. State of Haryana 0) common object in
terms of Section 149 can develop at the spot. Existence of the object has to be
considered at the time of actual occurrence and not necessarily from anterior
point of time.
When the factual scenario is considered in the background of the legal position
enumerated above, the inevitable conclusion is that Section 149 has been rightly
applied. The fact that the unlawful assembly's common object was to resist
the enforcement of law, and to commit criminal offences and to overawe the
authorities/public servants by use and show of criminal force stood firmly
established on the evidence on record. Consequently, the criminal acts
committed in furtherance of the common object, which acts were not only part of
the common object of the unlawful assembly but also such which the members of
the assembly knew reasonably well are such as are likely to be committed
squarely attract Section 149 I.P.C. # Certain salient factual aspects
clearly establish prosecution version. Firstly, defence plea regarding alleged
apprehended attack by higher caste people has been found to be of no substance.
If really the accused persons had gathered for reaping singada as claimed,
there was no reason for the call to be given to start shooting at the police
and then actual firing. A person who apprehends attack from some other person
would rather welcome the arrival of the police and bring to notice of the
officials about the apprehended danger and not to start firing at the police
officials knowing them to be police, with defiance adopting a violent posture.
This it is sufficient to discard the defence version about nature and object of
assembly. Further, the materials seized show that the object of the assembly
was preparation for commission of crime. The presence of huge quantity of arms
and that too sophisticated arms unerringly shows the nature of the assembly was
unlawful. # One of the printed materials i.e. literatures seized clearly
indicates their involvement in nature and type of activities which were
envisaged in and covered by section 3 (1) of the TADA Act. The plea that place
of occurrence was different and was near pond where singadas were grown is also
without substance. The dead bodies of the 3 persons who fired at the police
officials were found in the house said to belong to the acquitted accused Vakil
Ram and the dead body of the deceased was also nearby. The evidence of the
injured police officials is also relevant, and there is no reason as to why
they would falsely implicate the accused persons. It is not correct as
submitted by the learned counsel for the appellants that none the persons who
were arrested were carrying arms. In fact, some of the prosecution witnesses
have stated that they were also carrying arms, and this evidence has not been
successfully rebutted.
A 'terrorist' activity does not merely arise by causing disturbance of law
and order or of public order. The fallout of the intended activity is to be one
that it travels beyond the capacity of the ordinary law enforcement agencies to
tackle it under the ordinary penal law. It is in essence a deliberate and
systematic use of coercive intimidation. # It is a common feature that
hardened criminals today take advantage of the situation and by wearing the
cloak of terrorism, aim to achieve acceptability and respectability in the
society; because in different parts of the country affected by militancy, a
terrorist is projected as a hero by a group and often unfortunately even by
many misguided youth. As noted at the outset, it is not possible to precisely
define "terrorism". Finding a definition of "terrorism" has
haunted countries for decades. A first attempt to arrive at an internationally
acceptable definition was made under the League of Nations, but the one which
the convention drafted in 1937 never came into existence. The UN member States
still have no agreed-upon definition apparently on account of what at times
reveal to be state sponsored terrorism, both at national and international
levels. Terminology consensus would, however, be necessary for a single
comprehensive convention on terrorism, which some countries favour in place of
the present 12 piecemeal conventions and protocols. The lack of agreement on a
definition of terrorism has been a major obstacle to meaningful international
countermeasures. Cynics have often commended at national and international
levels that one State's "terrorist" is another State's "freedom
fighter" and that too with the blessings of those in power. Crime became
an highly politicised affair and greed compounded by corruption and violence
enabled unscrupulousness and hypocrisy reigns supreme, supported by duplicity
and deceitful behaviour in public life to amass and usurp public power to
perpetuate personal aggrandizement, pretending to be for the common good. If
terrorism is defined strictly in terms of attacks on non-military targets, a
number of attacks on military installations and soldiers' residences could not
be included in the statistics. In order to cut through the Gordian definitional
knot, terrorism expert A. Schmid suggested in 1992 in a report for the then UN
Crime Branch that it might be a good idea to take the existing consensus on
what constitutes a "war crime" as a point of departure. If the core
of war crimes - deliberate attacks on civilians, hostage-taking and the killing
of prisoners - is extended to peacetime, we could simply define acts of
terrorism veritably as "peacetime equivalents of war crimes".
League of Nations Convention (1937)
"All criminal acts directed against a State along with intended or
calculated to create a state of terror in the minds of particular persons or a
group of persons or the general public." * (GA Res. 51/210 - Measures
to eliminate international terrorism)
"1. strongly condemns all acts, methods and practices of terrorism as
criminal and unjustifiable, wherever and by whomsoever committed;
2. Reiterates that criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a state of
terror in the general public, a group of persons or particular persons for
political purposes are in any circumstances unjustifiable, whatever the
considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic,
religious or other nature that may be invoked to justify them." *
3. Short legal definition proposed by A.P. Schmid to United Nations Crime
Branch (1992) Act of terrorism = peacetime equivalent of war crime
4. Academic consensus definition "Terrorism is an anxiety-inspiring of
repeated violent action, employed by (semi-) clandestine individual, group or
State actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal or political reasons, whereby - in
contrast to assassination - the direct targets of violence are not the main
targets. The immediate human victims of violence are generally chosen randomly
(targets of opportunity) or selectively (representative or symbolic targets)
from a target population, and serve as message generators. Threat-and violence-based
communication processes between terrorist (organization), (imperiled) victims,
and main targets are used to manipulate the main target [audience(s)], turning
it into a target of terror, a target of demands, or a target of attention,
depending on whether intimidation, coercion, or propaganda is primarily
sought." * (Schmid, 1988)
Definitions:
Terrorism by nature is difficult to define. Acts of terrorism conjure up
emotional responses in the victims (those hurt by the violence and those
affected by the fear) as well as in the practitioners. Even the U.S. Government
cannot agree on one single definition. The old adage "one man's terrorist
is another man's freedom fighter" is still alive and well. Listed below
are several definitions of terrorism used by the Federal Bureau of
Investigation:
"Terrorism is the use of threatened use of force designed to bring about
political change." Brian Jenkins "Terrorism constitutes the
illegitimate use of force to achieve a political objective when innocent people
are targeted." Walter Laqueur
"Terrorism is the premeditated, deliberate, systematic murder, mayhem,
and threatening of the innocent to create fear and intimidation in order to
gain a political or tactical advantage, usually to influence an audience."
*
James M. Poland
"Terrorism is the unlawful use or threat of violence against persons or
property to further political or social objectives. It is usually intended to
intimidate or coerce a Government, individuals or groups, or to modify their
behavior or politics." * Vice-President's Task Force, 1986
"Terrorism is the unlawful use of force or violence against persons or
property to intimidate or coerce a Government, the civilian population, or any
segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives." *
FBI definition
Terrorism is one of the manifestations of increased lawlessness and cult of
violence. Violence and crime constitute a threat to an established order and
are a revolt against a civilised and orderly society. "Terrorism"
though has not been separately defined under TADA there is sufficient
indication in Section 3 itself to identify what it is by an all inclusive and
comprehensive phraseology adopted in engrafting the said provision, which
serves the double purpose as a definition and punishing provision nor is it
possible to give a precise definition of "terrorism" or lay down what
constitutes "terrorism". It may be possible to describe it as use of
violence when its most important result is not merely the physical and mental damage
of the victim but the prolonged psychological effect it produces or has the
potential of producing on the society as a whole. There may be death, injury,
or destruction of property or even deprivation of individual liberty in the
process but the extent and reach of the intended terrorist activity travels
beyond the effect of an ordinary crime capable of being punished under the
ordinary penal law of the land and its main objective is to overawe the
Government or disturb the harmony of the society or "terrorise"
people and the society and not only those directly assaulted, with a view to
disturb the even tempo, peace and tranquility of the society and create a sense
of fear and insecurity.
In the aforesaid background, the inevitable conclusion is that the appeals are
sans merit and deserve dismissal, which we direct.