SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Virendra Nath through Power of Attorney Holder R.R. Gupta
Vs.
Mohd. Jamil
C.A.No.4007 of 1999
(Shivraj V. Patil and D.M.Dharmadhikari JJ.)
14.07.2004
JUDGMENT
D. M. Dharmadhikari, J.
1.
This appeal has been preferred against the judgment dated 07.8.1997 of the High
Court of Allahabad whereby revisional order dated 10.2.1975 passed by the
Deputy Director of Consolidation, Allahabad, has been set aside and the order
dated 26.3.1974 passed by the Assistant Settlement Officer of Consolidation has
been restored.
2. Relevant facts leading to filing of this appeal are as under:-
3. In relation to the lands in question, an objection was filed by Jan Mohammad
(represented now by the respondents) in the court of Consolidation Officer
under provision of section 9A of Uttar Pradesh Consolidation of Holdings
Act, 1953 [for short the Consolidation Act, 1953] for declaring and
recording him on the land as Sirdar in accordance with section 210 of the Uttar
Pradesh Zamindari Abolition & Land Reforms Act, 1950 [for short the
Abolition Act]. The claim of Jan Mohammad was on the basis of his alleged
adverse possession on the land for long period of 40 years. The Consolidation
Officer accepted case of Jan Mohammad and recorded him as Sirdar on the land.
4. The recorded owners of the lands preferred an appeal under section 11 of the
Consolidation Act to Assistant Settlement Officer of Consolidation. In the
appeal, it was pointed out that in the basic years of Fasali 1359 and 1361 in
the revenue papers i.e. Khasras name of Jan Mohammad was recorded in respect of
the lands as a mortgagee [Murtheen]. The case of the petitioners before
Appellate Authority was that Jan Mohammad came in possession of the property as
a mortgagee and could not acquire any title by adverse possession. The
appellate authority took the view that the mortgage of the land was for a loan
of more than Rs.100/- and the mortgage- deed required compulsory registration.
The appellate court came to the conclusion that as the alleged mortgage is not
evidenced by any registered document, the oral evidence of mortgage cannot be
relied.
5. The Appellate Authority, therefore, dismissed the appeal and maintained the
order of the Consolidation Officer directing recording of name of Jan Mohammad
as having acquired ownership to the land by adverse possession.
6. The petitioners then preferred a revision under section 48 of the
Consolidation Act to the court of Deputy Director of Consolidation, Allahabad.
The revisional authority took the view that though the unregistered written
mortgage-deed being in possession of the mortgagee, could not be produced, oral
evidence was admissible to ascertain the nature of possession of Jan Mohammad
on the land.
7. The revisional authority relied on the earliest entries in the Khasaras of
basic years to come to the conclusion that Jan Mohammad came into possession of
the land as mortgagee. His possession could not be held to be adverse. His
possession would be deemed to be only permissive as a mortgagee. The revisional
authority, therefore, relying on the entry in khasaras of fasli 1359 where Jan
Mohammad is recorded as a mortgagee, allowed the revision and dismissed his
claim for being recorded as Sirdar of the land.
8. The legal representatives of Jan Mohammad preferred writ petition to the
High Court of Allahabad.
9. The High Court in the writ petition reversed the judgment of the revisional
authority on the ground that the plea of relationship of mortgage and mortgagee
and the possession of Jan Mohammad to be permissive was raised for the first
time in revision. The High Court held that the revisional authority was in
error in upsetting orders of the lower authorities.
10. Learned counsel representing the original recorded owner of the lands in
this appeal submits that claim of Jan Mohammad was based on alleged adverse
possession on the land. It was an error on the part of the High Court to hold
that relationship of mortgage and mortgagee never came up for consideration
before the Consolidation Officer and Assistant Settlement Office of
Consolidation. The order of the appellate authority has been placed on record
of this appeal which clearly shows that the alleged relationship of mortgage
and mortgagee between the parties was under discussion. Despite the entry in
the remarks column of the Khasara of the fasli years 1359 and 1361 showing Jan
Mohammad as mortgagee on the land, his possession was held to be adverse and
his claim for recording him as Sirdar on the land was allowed.
11. Learned counsel appearing for the respondents has filed written
submissions. In opposing the appeal, it is contended that the revisional
Authority exceeded its powers of revision under section 48 of the Consolidation
Act.
12. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties and perusing the record
we find that the High Court had no justification to upset the decision of the
revisional Authority. The earliest khasara records clearly show nature of
possession of Jan Mohammad on the lands as mortgagee. Even though,
mortgage-deed which was unregistered and being in possession of mortgagee could
not be produced by the mortgagor, evidence could be admitted for collateral
purpose of ascertaining the nature of possession of Jan Mohammad. There is no
evidence that the possession of Jan Mohammad as mortgagee ever became adverse
to the knowledge of the original owner that is the mortgagor. The claim for
recording Jan Mohammad as Sirdar on the land was filed under section 210 of the
Abolition Act which reads as under:-
"210. Consequences of failure to file suit under section 209. -If a suit
for eviction from any land under section 209 is not instituted by a bhumidhar
or asami, or a decree for eviction obtained in any such suit is not executed
within the period of limitation provided for institution of such suit or the execution
of such decree, as the case may be, the person taking or retaining possession
shall
a) where the land forms part of the holding of a bhumidhar with transferable
rights, become a bhumidhar with transferable rights of such land and the right,
title and interest of an asami, if any, in such land shall be extinguished;
b) where the land forms part of the holding of a bhumidhar with
non-transferable rights, become a bhumidhar with non- transferable rights and
the right, title and interest of an asami, if any, in such land shall be
extinguished;
c) where the land forms part of the holding of an asami on behalf of the Gaon
Sabha, become an asami of the holding from year to year."
13. Provided that the consequences mentioned in clauses (a) to (c) shall not
ensue in respect of any land held by a bhumidhar or asami belonging to a
Scheduled Tribe. Section 209 of the Abolition Act confers right on a recorded
owner of the land to eject persons occupying land without title. In case of a
mortgage, the mortgagor has no right in law to eject a mortgagee until the
mortgage is redeemed. Even though, the mortgage was not by any registered
instrument, it is not disputed that the possession of the land was taken by Jan
Mohammad as a mortgagee. If his entry on the land was as mortgagee, nature of
his possession would continue to be as mortgagee unless there is evidence to
show that, at any point of time, he asserted his adverse title, by repudiating
his possession as mortgagee and continued in adverse possession for the prescribed
period of more than 12 years to the knowledge of the mortgagor. From none of
the orders either of the original or appellate authority, any evidence seems to
have been led to establish date or period from which the possession of Jan
Mohammad became adverse to the knowledge of the recorded owner. In the state of
above evidence on record, the revisional court was fully justified in coming to
the conclusion that Jan Mohammad, who came in possession of the land as
mortgagee, cannot be recorded as Sirdar or Bhumidar under section 210 of the
Abolition Act.
14. The High Court in reversing the order of the revisional Authority
erroneously attached undue importance to the fact that there was no specific
plea or evidence led on behalf of the recorded owner that the possession of Jan
Mohammad on the land was permissive. From the orders passed by the authorities
under the Consolidation Act, it is apparent that throughout the stand of the
original recorded owner, was that Jan Mohammad came in possession of the land
as a mortgagee. The argument of permissive possession was advanced before the
revisional Authority on the plea of mortgage. The High Court committed a
serious error in upsetting the judgment of the revisional court on the ground
of alleged want of plea of permissive possession by the original recorded
owner.
15. Consequently, we allow this appeal, set aside the impugned judgment dated
07.8.1997 of the High Court of Allahabad and restore the revisional order dated
10.2.1975 of Deputy Director, Consolidation.
In the circumstances, we, however, make no order as to costs.