SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Jayamma
Vs
Maria Bai Dead By Proposed Lrs.
Appeal (Civil) 5637 of 1999
(S. B. Sinha and S.H.Kapadia)
28/07/2004
JUDGMENT
S. B. SINHA, J.
Interpretation of Section 61 of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961 (for short, "the said Act") falls for consideration in this appeal which arises out of a judgment and order dated 25.5.1999 passed by a Division Bench of the High Court of Karnataka in Misc. First Appeal No. 2353 of 1990.
Before adverting to the issue involved in this appeal, the factual matrix of
the matter may be noticed.
The appellant herein filed an application purported to be under Section 276 of
the Indian Succession Act, 1925 for grant of letters
of administration with a copy of the Will dated 20.2.1984 annexed purported to
have been executed by one Anthony Rebello. The respondents herein are the wife
and children of the testator. The factum of the execution of the Will having
been denied and disputed by the noticees, the said application was converted
into a suit and marked as O.S. No. 66 of 1986.
The Trial Court decreed the suit holding, inter alia, that the testator
executed the Will with full knowledge, having sound state of mind and it was
not obtained by practicising fraud, misrepresentation or duress.
On an appeal preferred there against, the High Court while exercising its
appellate jurisdiction under Section 299 of the Indian Succession Act, allowed
the same holding that the application for grant of letters of administration
with a copy of the Will was not maintainable in view of Section 61 of the said
Act, inasmuch as the subject-matter of testament being agricultural land with
occupancy right could not have been assigned.
The High Court also rejected the contention raised on behalf of the appellant
herein that a disputed question of title cannot be gone into in an application
for grant of Letters of Administration.
Before us Mr. Bhat, learned counsel appearing for the appellant herein raised
the following contentions : (i) that the Trial Court had no jurisdiction to go
into the question as regard the title of the property inasmuch as while
disposing of an application under Section 276 of the Indian Succession Act, the
Court is only concerned with genuineness or otherwise of the Will and in the
event there exists a dispute with regard to title, a separate suit may be
filed. It was pointed out that the impugned judgment wherein a contrary finding
had been arrived at has since been overruled by a Full Bench of the High Court
of Karnataka in Smt. Severine D'Souza and Anr. Vs. Felix Ambrose D'Souza
[ILR 2003 Kar 194]; (ii) that the expression 'family' used in Section 61
of the said Act must be given an extended meaning so as to include the persons
related to the testator by legitimate kinship or otherwise and in that view of
the matter, the appellant being the cousin's daughter of the testator would
come within the purview thereof. Reliance in this behalf has been placed on
Sangappa Kalyanapa Bangi (Dead) through L.Rs. vs. Land Tribunal, Jamkhandi and
Ors. [ 8].
Ms. Arora, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents, on the other
hand, would contend that the appellant was mere a neighbour and has not been
proved to be a member of the testator's family. Our attention, in this behalf,
has been drawn to the statement of the appellant herein made by her in
examination in chief before the Trial Court.
The said Act was enacted for the purpose enacting a uniform law relating to
land reforms in the State of Karnataka. The expressions 'family' and 'joint family'
have been defined in Sections 2(12) and 2(17) of the said Act to mean :
"2(12) "Family" means, -
(a) in the case of an individual who has a spouse or spouses, such individual,
the spouse or spouses and their minor sons and unmarried daughters, if any;
(b) in the case of an individual who has no spouse, such individual and his or
her minor sons and unmarried daughters;
(c) in the case of an individual who is a divorced person and who has not
remarried, such individual and his minor sons and unmarried daughters, whether
in his custody or not; and
(d) where an individual and his or her spouse are both dead, their minor sons
and unmarried daughters;"
"2(17) "Joint family" means in the case of persons governed by
Hindu Law, an undivided Hindu family, and in the case of other persons, a group
or unit the members of which are by custom joint in estate or residence."
*
Various restrictions have been imposed as regard sub-division or sub- letting
of the land held by a tenant or assignment of any interest therein.
Sections 21(1) and 61(1) and 61(3) of the said Act impose such restrictions
which read as under:
"21. Sub-division, sub-letting and assignment prohibited.-(1) No
sub-division or sub-letting of the land held by a tenant or assignment of any
interest therein shall be valid :
Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall affect the rights, if any, of a
permanent tenant:
Provided further that if the tenant dies, -
(i) if he is a member of joint family, the surviving members of the said
family, and
(ii) if he is not a member of a joint family, his heirs shall be entitled to
partition and sub- divide the land leased, subject to the following conditions
:-
(a) each sharer shall hold his share as a separate tenant;
(b) the rent payable in respect of the land leased shall be apportioned among
the sharers, as the case may be, according to the share allotted to them;
(c) the area allotted to each sharer shall not be less than a fragment;
(d) if such area is less than a fragment the sharers shall be entitled to enjoy
the income jointly, but the land shall not be divided by metes and bounds;
(e) if any question arises regarding the apportionment of the rent payable by
the sharer it shall be decided by the Tahsildar.
Provided that if any question of law is involved the Tahsildar shall refer it
to the court. On receipt of such reference the court, shall, after giving
notice to the parties concerned, try the question as expeditiously as possible
and record finding thereon and send the same to the Tahsildar. The Tahsildar
shall then give the decision in accordance with the said finding.
"61. Restriction on transfer of land of which tenant has become
occupant.-(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law, no land of which
the occupancy has been granted to any person under this Chapter shall within
fifteen years from the date of the final order, passed by the Tribunal under
sub-section (4) or sub-section (5) or sub- section (5-A) of Section 48-A be
transferred by sale, gift, exchange, mortgage, lease or assignment; but the
land may be partitioned among members of the holder's joint family.
(2).........
(3) Any transfer or partition of land in contravention of sub-section (1) shall
be invalid and such land shall vest in the State Government free from all
encumbrances and shall be disposed in accordance with the provisions of Section
77." *
On a bare perusal of the aforementioned provisions, it would appear that
whereas Section 21 refers to sub-division, sub-letting of the land held by a
tenant or assignment of any interest therein, Section 61 imposes a stricter
restriction on transfer of land of which tenant has become occupant.
The said provisions are further required to be read with the expressions
'family' and 'joint family' as contained in Section 2(12) and 2(17) of the Act.
It is not in dispute that a tenant who has become an occupant cannot, except on
the grounds stated in the said Act, be evicted therefrom. Section 61 contains a
non obstante clause. It is also not in dispute that although tenancy would be a
heritable interest, the right of occupancy can be granted to an heir only if he
is qualified there for, that is, there must be a cultivable land on the
appointed day. However, all heirs cannot become occupant. Even a married
daughter of the deceased tenant would not be granted such a right. The sine qua
non for obtaining the status of occupancy of tenancy is that the person
concerned must be a tenant on the appointed day.
Section 213 of the Indian Succession Act provides that no right as executor or
legatee can be established in any Court of Justice, unless a Court of Competent
jurisdiction, inter alia, grants a letters of administration with a copy of the
Will annexed.
The Court empowered to grant a letter of administration although ordinarily may
not go into the question of title in respect of property sought to be
bequeathed by the testator; the situation would be different where the
authority of the testator to execute a Will in relation to the subject matter
thereof is in question. When a statutory embargo exists on execution of a Will,
the court shall not refuse to determine the question as regard validity
thereof, as in terms of the provisions of a statute, the same would be void ab
initio.
We would discuss the construction of the provision of Section 61 of the said
Act, a little later., but we have no hesitation in holding that in the event
if it be held that the testator could not have executed the Will in favour of a
person who could not be declared to be a tenant having occupancy right, such a
Will would be void ab intio and, therefore, non est in the eye of law. The
court in such an event would not be determining a disputed question of title
but would be considering the effect of the statute vis-a-vis the Will in
question.
The submission of Mr. Bhat for the foregoing reasons cannot be accepted.
As we have noticed hereinbefore, that the statutory embargo on transfer of land
is stricter in a case where the tenant has become occupant than a land held by a
tenant simpliciter. We have also noticed that the embargo on transfer is not
only by way of sale, gift, exchange, mortgage, lease but also by assignment.
What is permitted under the law is partition of the land amongst the members of
the family. Section 61 of the Act is to be read in its entirety.
Sub-section (3) of Section 61 lays down that any transfer of land in
contravention of sub-section (1) shall be invalid whereupon the same shall vest
in the State Government free from all encumbrances . The legislative intent
that the land should not be allowed to go to the hands of a stranger to the
family is, therefore, manifest. Whereas in terms of Section 21, strangers to
the family of the tenant to come upon the land is not allowed, the tenor of
Section 61 is that except partition amongst the co-sharers, no transfer of the
property , in any manner, is permissible.
When an assignment or transfer is made in contravention of statutory
provisions, the consequence whereof would be that same is invalid, and thus, being
opposed to public policy the same shall attract the provisions of Section 23 of
the Indian Contract Act.
It is not disputed that in view the purport and object the Legislature sought
to achieve by enacting the said provision the expression 'assignment' would
include a Will.
In this case, there is also no dispute that grant of agricultural land with
occupancy right in terms of the provisions of the said Act was made on
14.10.1981. The Will in question having been executed on 20.2.1984; the
transfer has been made within a period of fifteen years from the date of grant
which is prohibited in law.
In Sangappa Kalyanappa Bangi (supra), whereupon Mr. Bhat placed strong
reliance, a Division Bench of this Court held:
"We have to read Section 21 with Section 24 to understand the full purport
of the provisions. Section 24 is enacted only for the purpose of making it
clear that the tenancy continues notwithstanding the death of the tenant and
such tenancy is held by the heirs of such tenant on the same terms and
conditions on which he had held prior to his death. The heirs who can take the
property are those who are referable to in Section
21. If he is a member of the joint family, then the surviving members of the
joint family and if he is not such a member of a joint family, his heirs would
be entitled to partition. Again, as to who his heirs are will have to be
determined not with reference to the Act, but with reference to the personal
law on the matter. The assignment of any interest in the tenanted land will not
be valid. A devise or a bequest under a Will cannot be stated to fall outside
the scope of the said provisions inasmuch as such assignment disposes of or
deals with the lease. When there is a disposition of rights under a Will,
though it operates posthumously is nevertheless a recognition of the right of
the legatee there under as to his rights of the tenanted land. In that event,
there is an assignment of the tenanted land, but that right will come into
effect after the death of the testator. Therefore, though it can be said in
general terms that the devise simpliciter will not amount to an assignment, in
a special case of this nature, interpretation will have to be otherwise."
*
Having held so, the Bench, however, having regard to the phraseology used in
Section 21 of the said Act proceeded to observe that the object of the law is
not to allow strangers to the family of the tenant to come upon the land
stating :
"We must take into consideration that when it is possible for the tenant
to pass the property to those who may not necessarily be the heirs under the
ordinary law and who become heirs only by reason of a bequest under a Will in
which event, he would be a stranger to the family and imported on the land thus
to the detriment of the landlord. In that event, it must be taken that a devise
under a Will will also amount to an assignment and, therefore, be not valid for
the purpose of Section 21 of the Act. If Section 24 is read along with Section
21, it would only mean that the land can pass by succession to the heirs of a
deceased tenant, but subject to the conditions prescribed in Section 21 of the
Act. Therefore, we are of the view that the broad statement made by the High Court
in the two decisions in Shivanna ((1977) 1 Kant LJ 146 (Short Notes Item 160))
and Dhareppa v. State of Karnataka ((1979) 1 Kant LJ 18) would not promote the
object and purpose of the law.
Therefore, the better view appears to us is as stated by the High Court in
Timmakka Kom Venkanna Naik v. Land Tribunal ((1987) 2 Kant LJ 337). *
It was further observed:
"It is no doubt true that the meaning attributed to an heir could be as
suggested by the learned counsel for the appellants so as to include the descendant
and other persons related by legitimate kinship or otherwise who may be covered
by a Will, but the true question to be decided in this case is if a devise of
that nature is hit by Section 21 of the Act or not. The object and purpose of
Section 21 being to confine the rights of tenancy only to those known under law
as heirs and therefore, assignment to strangers is barred" *
Apart from the fact that the interpretation was rendered having regard to the
language used in Section 21 of the said Act which would not ipso facto apply to
Section 61 thereof; as thereby a stricter statutory embargo has been imposed on
transfer or assignment, the contention of Mr. Bhat to the effect that the
appellant was a relation of the testator also does not appear to be correct. In
her examination in chief itself, the appellant stated:
"I am the Plaintiff. P.W. 3 Richard D'Souza is my son-in-law. He was
residing at Kinnigoli and after marriage he is residing at Kateel. He was
living in a house within a distance about meter from the house of the deceased
Anthony Rebello. I was living in the house of my son-in-law. Anthony Rebello
was living alone in his house. He is no more. I knew him for a period of about
1 year and 9 months prior to his death. I came to know him as I was living in
the house of my son-in-law. Anthony Rebello came to my son-in-law's house and
told him that he has no one to look after him and he is aged 82 years. During
this 1 year and 9 months his wife or children had not come to see him. Anthony
Rebello requested my son-in-law for assistance and therefore, I, my son-in-law
looking after him." *
The appellant, therefore, in view of the aforementioned statement was not
having any legitimate kinship with the testator of the Will.
On a fair construction of Section 61 of the Act, in our opinion, a transfer
of agricultural land with occupancy right is permissible only in favour of one
of the heirs who would be entitled to claim partition of land and not others
having regard to the definition of 'family' as contained in Sections 2(12) and
'joint family' as contained in Section 2 (17) of the said Act.
We, therefore, find no force also in the second submission of Mr. Bhat.
For the reasons aforementioned, we do not find any merit in this appeal, which is dismissed accordingly. No costs.