SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Talcher Municipality
Vs.
Talcher Regulated Mkt. Committee
C.A.No.2150 of 1998
(S. B. Sinha and S.H.Kapadia JJ.)
28.07.2004
JUDGMENT
S. B. Sinha, J.
1. The Appellant Talcher Municipality constructed a market purported to be
in exercise of its power conferred upon it under Section 295 of the Orissa
Municipal Act, 1950. The control of the said market is vested in the Municipal
Council in terms of Section 296 thereof. Agricultural produces within the meaning
of provisions of the Orissa Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1956 (for
short "the Act") are bought and sold in the said market.
2. The Respondent-Market Committee sent a requisition dated 13.2.1996 to the
Executive Officer of the Appellant stating therein that as it was in possession
of the said market where agricultural produces were being bought and sold it
was liable to transfer the same in terms of Sub-section (4) of Section 4 of the
Act. A similar request was made to hand over the Hat and the land situated at
Angarua in terms of a letter dated 19.7.1996.
3. The Appellant having failed and/or neglected to comply with the said
statutory requisition, the respondent herein filed a writ petition before the
High Court of Orissa praying for a direction upon the appellant for
transferring its weekly market popularly known as Jajangi Weekly Market. By
reason of the impugned judgment, the said writ petition has been allowed.
4. The core question which falls for consideration is as to whether the land
and building of a daily market owned by a Municipality or a Gram Panchayat
where notified agricultural produces are bought and sold is liable to be
transferred to the Market Committee, if requisition therefor is made.
5. Submission of Mr. P.N. Misra, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of
the Appellant is that the said Act which was enacted by the State of Orissa in
exercise of its legislative competence contained in Entries 26, 27 and 28 of
List II of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of India; the object whereof
being to protect the producers of agricultural produce from being exploited by
the middlemen and profiteers and enable the agriculturists to secure a fair
return for their produce, the market where pre- dominantly non-agricultural
produces are bought and sold, Sub-Section (4) of Section 4 of the Act would not
apply. Strong reliance in this behalf has been placed on M.C.V.S. Arunachala
Nadar Etc. Vs. The State of Madras & Others [ ] and Belsund Sugar Co.
Ltd. Vs. State of Bihar and Others.
6. Submission of Mr. Das, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
respondent, on the other hand, is that the language used in Section 4(4) of the
Act being clear and explicit, the judgment of the High Court must be held to
have correctly rendered. The learned counsel pointed out that the vires of
Section 4(4) of the Act has not been questioned.
7. The Act has been enacted to provide for better regulation of buying and
selling of agricultural produce and the establishment of markets for
agricultural produce in the State.
8. The Cooperation Department of the Government of Orissa issued notifications
dated 2.8.1993 and 19.11.1994 whereby and whereunder various cereals, oilseeds,
gur and sugarcane, fruits, vegetable items and animal husbandry products were
notified as agricultural produces.
9. By reason of the provisions of the Act not only wholesale but also retail
sale of the agricultural produces as also the market wherein the buying and
selling of the agricultural produces are carried on is sought to be regulated
and controlled. A "market area" and the "market" as defined
in Section 2(vii) and 2(vi) respectively are required to be declared as such in
terms of sub-section (1) of Section 4 and sub-section (5) of Section 4
respectively.
10. Once the market area is declared, the rights of those dealing in
agricultural produces would be governed by the provisions of the said Act.
11. The legislative competence of the State to enact such enactment in exercise
of its power under Entries 26, 27 and 28 of List II of the Seventh Schedule of the
Constitution of India is not in dispute. The Act deals with the supply and
distribution of goods as well as the trade and commerce therein as it seeks to
regulate the sale and purchase of goods carried on in the specified markets.
12. Entry 5 of List II of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of India
whereunder the Orissa Municipal Act has been enacted would be subject to the
provisions of Entry 28 as the power to establish a market is a separate and
distinct one. It is true that the primary object of the Act, as has been held
in M.C.V.S. Arunachala Nadar (supra) and Belsund Sugar Co. Ltd (supra), is to
protect the producers inter alia from being exploited from the middlemen but
the State has the requisite legislative competence to establish a market and in
that view of the matter the said Act falls within the ambit of markets and
covered by Entry 28. (See ITC Ltd. Vs. Agricultural Produce Market Committee
and Others, ). The said decision has recently been followed in Engineering
Kamgar Union Vs. M/s. Electro Steels Castings Ltd. & Anr.1
13. The said Act, as noticed hereinbefore, was enacted for better regulation of
buying and selling of agricultural produce.
14. The power to regulate buying and selling of agricultural produce must be interpreted
in the context in which the same has been used. Each person whoever is engaged
in buying and selling of the agricultural produce in the market shall be
subject to the regulation for which the same has been enacted. The expression
"regulation" is a term which is capable of interpreted broadly. It
may in a given case amount to prohibition.
15. Section 4(4) of the Act must be construed in that context.
16. Section 4(4) of the Act reads thus:
"Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any law for the
time being in force, the market committee may, after a notification issued
under sub-section (1), by requisition, require any Municipality or Grama
Panchayat to transfer to it any land or building in possession of such
Municipality or Grama Panchayat wholly or partly situated within the concerned
market area which immediately before the establishment of the market was being
used by such Municipality or Grama Panchayat for similar purpose, and the
Municipality or Grama Panchayat, as the case may be, shall within one month
from the date of receipt of the requisition, transfer the land or building or
both, as specified in the requisition to the market committee and the net
income derived there from by the market committee under Section 11 shall be shared
equally by the market committee and the concerned Municipality or Grama
Panchayat, every year:
Provided that the share of the Municipality or Grama Panchayat in any one year
shall not be less than eighty per cent of the average net income derived by it
from land or building or both so transferred during the three years immediately
preceding the transfer."
17. A market may be belonging to a Municipality or Gram Panchayat but once a
market area has been declared the provisions of the said Act will bring within
its sweep even such markets. Sub-Section (4) of Section 4 clearly mandates that
even the market of a Municipality or a Gram Panchayat falling within the market
area will have to be transferred if requisitioned therefor. In the event
of such transfer, the net income derived therefrom by the market committee
under Section 11 shall be shared equally by the market committee and the
concerned Municipality or Gram Panchayat every year. The proviso appended to
Sub-section (4) of Section 4 furthermore stipulates that the share of the
Municipality or Gram Panchayat in any one year shall not be less than eighty
per cent of the average net income derived by it from land or building or both
so transferred during the three years immediately preceding the transfer.
18. It is true that the appellant Municipality is a local authority. It is
furthermore true that in terms of Section 295 of the Orissa Municipal Act the
appellant was entitled to provide places for use as public markets, the control
of which, as noticed hereinbefore, is to be exercised by the Municipal Council.
19. The Act, however, contains special provisions. The provision of Section
4(4) of the said Act operates notwithstanding anything to the contrary
contained in any other law for the time being in force. The provisions of the
said Act, therefore, would prevail over the provisions of the Orissa
Municipality Act. The maxim 'generalia specialibus non derogant' would, thus,
be applicable in this case. [See D.R. Yadav and Another Vs. R.K. Singh and
Another, , Indian Handicrafts Emporium and Others Vs. Union of India and
Others, [ ] and M.P. Vidyut Karamchari Sangh Vs. M.P. Electricity
Board2 .
20. If in a market where together with agricultural produces some
non-agricultural produces are also sold, the same by itself would not
disentitle the respondent to exercise its statutory power contained in Section
4(4) of the Act. Once, the respondent has the requisite jurisdiction in terms
of provisions of the said Act to notify the market area within which there may
exist a market owned by and/or belonging to a Municipality or a Gram Panchayat,
power under Sub-section (4) of Section 4 can, in our opinion, be exercised by
the respondent Committee.
21. Contention of Mr. Misra to the effect that in the market in question apart
from agricultural produces, non-agricultural produces are also bought and sold
and, thus, it was obligatory on the part of the authorities concerned to find
out the dominant object of the Municipality in establishing the said market
cannot be gone into by this Court for the first time as such a contention has
not been raised before the High Court.
22. The appellant furthermore did not raise any contention before the High
Court as regard the effect of sale of non-agricultural produces in the said
market. Such a contention which would involve investigation into questions of
fact cannot be allowed to be raised for the first time before this Court; more
so when even before us no factual foundation has been laid down in the Special
Leave Petition.
23. Furthermore, the validity or legality of the said provision having not been
questioned, the appellant at this stage cannot be permitted to urge that the
same will have no application in the case of this nature.
24. For the reasons aforementioned, there is no merit in this appeal which is
accordingly dismissed. No costs.
1JT 2004 Suppl.1 SC 78
22004 (3) JT 423