SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Shri Kailash Chand
Vs.
Shri Dharam Dass
C.A.No.390 of 2004
(Arijit Pasayat and C.K.Thakker JJ.)
07.10.2004
ORDER
1. The present appeal is filed against the judgment and order dated November
27, 2001 passed by the High Court of Himachal Pradesh, Shimla in Civil Revision
No. 35 of 1999. By the said order, a single Judge of the High Court of Himachal
Pradesh dismissed the eviction petition filed by the landlord reversing order
of ejectment passed by the Rent Controller, Shimla and confirmed by the
Appellate Authority (II), Shimla.
2. The appellant herein is the owner of the building being House No. 108,
Anandele, Shimla ('suit premises' for short). He let the first floor of the
suit premises to the respondent. The landlord filed an eviction petition
against the tenant in respect of the first floor of the building in November,
1980. The petition was allowed by the Rent Controller by an order dated October
31, 1984. The tenant preferred an appeal and challenged the decree of eviction.
On September 17, 1986, however, a compromise was arrived at between the
parties. On the basis of the said compromise, the tenant agreed to vacate first
floor in favour of the landlord and was inducted as tenant of the ground floor
of the same building.
3. According to the landlord, at the relevant time he was staying all alone in
Shimla. Subsequently, however, his wife had also shifted from village Panhoi to
Shimla. Moreover, the landlord wanted to get his child educated at Shimla where
best facilities for studies are available. He therefore, filed eviction
petition against the tenant. The Rent Controller, Shimla, by an order dated
January 20, 1993, held that the landlord wanted the premises for his bona fide
occupation and accordingly an order of eviction was passed. Being aggrieved by
the said order, the tenant preferred an appeal which was dismissed by the
Appellate Authority (II), Shimla, by an order dated November 30, 1998. The
aggrieved tenant carried the matter to the High Court by filing Civil Revision
35 of 1999. According to the landlord, a new ground which was never raised
before the courts below was put forth by the tenant contending that the
eviction petition filed by the landlord was not maintainable in view of third
proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent
Control Act, 1987 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'). Section 14 of the
Act provides for eviction of tenants in certain cases on certain grounds.
Sub-section (3) deals with cases of requirement of building premises by the
landlord. The relevant part of sub-section (3) reads as under:
"(3) A landlord may apply to the Controller for an order directing the
tenant to put the landlord in possession –
(a) In the case of a residential building, if –
(i) He requires it for his own occupation:
xx xx xx
xx xx xx
Provided further that where the landlord has obtained possession of any
building or rented land under the provisions of clause (a) or clause (b) he
shall not be entitled to apply again under the said clause for the possession
of any other building of the same class or rented land:"
4. It was contended on behalf of the tenant before the High Court that since
the landlord had obtained possession of the first floor earlier he was not
entitled to apply again. The petition, therefore, was not maintainable and was
liable to be dismissed on that ground alone. The High Court upheld the
contention relying on a decision of this Court in Molar Mal (dead) through LRs.
vs. M/s. Kay Iron Works (Pvt.) Ltd.
5. A two-Judge Bench of this Court in Molar Mal had an occasion to consider a
similar provision in Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and eviction) Act, 1973
(hereinafter referred to as 'the Haryana Act'). Proviso to Section 13(3)(b) of
the Haryana Act also creates an embargo on the landlord from seeking eviction
of the tenant if he had earlier obtained eviction of other tenants under the
said provision. Considering the ambit and scope of the provision, the Bench
observed:
"On behalf of the landlord, it is next contended that the proviso does not
apply to the facts of this case, since on the date of filing of the present
eviction petition, the landlord had not obtained possession of any other
tenanted premises. Subsequent possession obtained by it would not be an embargo
for the landlord to claim possession of the present petition-scheduled
premises. Elaborating this argument on behalf of the landlord, it is contended
that if on the date of filing of the the eviction petition, a landlord has not
by then obtained possession of any other premises, then the proviso would not
be a bar for the landlord to file an eviction petition and obtain possession of
another premises, even though during the pendency of the petition, he obtains
possession of other premises. The landlord wants us to give a literal meaning
to the words 'entitled to apply again' found in the proviso. If we give such a
meaning to the words 'entitled to apply again' without taking into
consideration the object and scheme of the Act, the proviso may give an
impression that the embargo incorporated in that proviso would be applicable
only at the stage of filing of the eviction petition. But such an
interpretation will run counter to the very scheme of the Act. It goes without
saying that the Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1973
like any other similar Act in other States in India is an enactment which
controls the fixation of rent and eviction of the tenants from rented premises
to which the Act is applicable. This Act controls the right of a landlord to
seek eviction of tenanted premises, it restricts the right of a landlord to
seek eviction on those grounds mentioned in the Act. As a matter of fact, a
landlord can seek eviction only the grounds enumerated under the Act and on no
other grounds. This is clear from the language of Section 13(1) of the Act
which in specific terms says that a tenant in possession of a building or
rented land shall not be evicted therefrom except in accordance with the
provisions 'of this section'. Section 13 enumerates various grounds on which a
landlord can seek possession. This right is further restricted if the landlord
has obtained possession of similar premises under the same provisions of law by
the proviso. Now the question is whether the bar under the proviso is
applicable only to the filing of an application or it is a bar on the right of
the landlord. If the interpretation suggested by the landlord is accepted then
the bar will be on the application by the landlord and not on his right to
evict. This, in our opinion, will not be the correct interpretation of the
proviso. A careful perusal of the various provisos found in sub-section (3) of
Section 13 of the Act clearly shows that the legislature intended to further
restrict the right of a landlord to seek eviction under the clauses mentioned
in that sub-section apart from the restrictions imposed in Section 13 of the
Act. For example, if the landlord is seeking eviction of a tenant on the ground
that the same is required for the use of his son then, in view of the proviso
applicable to that sub-section, he can seek eviction of the premises only once.
Similarly, if the landlord is seeking eviction for his own occupation under
Section 13(3)(b) of the Act then by virtue of the proviso applicable to that
sub-section, the landlord can seek such eviction only once in regard to the
premises of the same nature. Therefore, in our opinion, the bar imposed by the
proviso is in fact a bar on the right of the landlord to seek actual eviction and
not confined to the filing of the application for eviction. On behalf of the
landlord, it is contended that while interpreting a statute the courts should
apply the rule of literal construction and if it is so interpreted then the
wording of the proviso would show that the restriction imposed by the proviso
is restricted to the stage of filing of the application for eviction only. We
agree with this contention of the landlord that normally the courts will have
to follow the rule of literal construction which rule enjoins the court to take
the words as used by the legislature and to give it the meaning which naturally
implies. But, there is an exception to this rule. That exception comes into
play when application of literal construction of the words in the statute leads
to absurdity, inconsistency or when it is shown that the legal context in which
the words are used or by reading the statute as a whole, it requires a
different meaning. In our opinion, if the expression 'entitled to apply again'
is given its literal meaning, it would defeat the very object for which the
legislature has incorporated that proviso in the Act inasmuch as the object of
that proviso can be defeated by a landlord who has more than one tenanted
premises by filing multiple applications simultaneously for eviction and
thereafter obtain possession of all those premises without the bar of the
proviso being applicable to him. We are of the opinion that this could not have
been the purpose for which the proviso is included in the fact. If such an
interpretation is given then the various provisos found in sub-section (3) of
Section 13 would become otiose and the very object of the enactment would be
defeated. Any such interpretation, in our opinion, would lead to absurdity.
Therefore, we have no hesitation in interpreting the proviso to mean that the
restrict contemplated under that proviso extends even up to the stage when the
court or the tribunal is considering the case of the landlord for actual
eviction and is not confined to the stage of filing of eviction petition
only."
6. The attention of the Court was invited the two decisions of the High Court
of Punjab and Haryana in (i) Brij Lal Puri vs. Muni Lal1 and (ii)
Jagir Singh vs. Jagdish Pal Sagar2 wherein the High Court held
that the proviso does not lay down that if the entire building which is needed
by a landlord for his personal use, is occupied by more than one tenant, he or
she cannot take out proceeding against other tenants after having evicted one.
It was further observed; 'The object of this proviso is that a landlord should
not be allowed to seek unreasonable ejectment of tenants from independent
buildings if he has already succeeded in evicting a tenant from the building
which is sufficient for his personal occupation." * Observing that the law
was not correctly laid down by the High Court, the two-Judge Bench proceeded to
state;
'Based on the above-cited two judgments of the High Court it is contended that
the landlord in the instant case is seeking eviction of a part of the premises
owned by it which is leased to the present appellant. Eviction of the three
other tenants referred to hereinabove was from the premises which are parts of
the same premises, therefore, in view of the above judgment the bar under the
proviso is not applicable. We find it difficult to accept this argument of the
landlord also. From the language of the proviso we do not find any support for
this argument of the appellant or to the conclusions arrived at by the High
Court in the above-referred judgments. The proviso does not make any such
distinction between a landlord seeking possession of the premises held by more
than one tenant occupying the same building or the tenants occupying different
independent buildings under the same landlord. As we have observed, the object
of the proviso like any other provisions of the Act, is to further restrict the
right of the landlord to seek eviction; if that be so, we do not find any
justification in reading into the proviso something as conferring a larger
right on the landlord to evict more than one tenant if those tenants are
occupying different parts of the same premises. Therefore, we are of the
opinion that the view expressed by the High Court in the above-referred case
does not lay down the correct law. Consequently, the argument of the landlord
based on the said judgment is also rejected."
7. Before us, the learned counsel for the respondent-tenant contended that the
point is finally concluded by this Court in Molar Mal. Since the
appellant-landlord has already obtained possession in previous proceeding from
the respondent-tenant, bar of third proviso to sub-section (3) of Section 14 of
the Act got attracted and he was not entitled to apply again under sub-section
(3) of Section 14 of the Act for possession of the ground floor occupied by the
tenant. The High Court was, therefore, right and wholly justified in dismissing
the petition.
8. Learned counsel for the landlord, on the other hand, strenuously argued that
the landlord has not got possession as contended by the tenant. Pursuant to the
compromise arrived at between the parties, the landlord obtained possession of
first floor, but in lieu thereof, he allowed the tenant occupy the ground
floor. Thus, it was not a case of obtaining of possession. It was submitted
that third proviso to Section 14(3) of the Act would not apply to such
compromise and exchange of premises so as to deprive the right of the landlord
to get eviction of tenant on the ground of bona fide requirement. It was also
urged that what is contemplated by the third proviso to Section 14(3) of the
Act is that a landlord on the "self-same grounds" is not entitled to
apply again for possession of any other building, if he has obtained possession
from the tenant. But if the circumstances have changed or his need is
increased, the bar has no application and the petition for eviction of tenant
will be maintainable and the case has to be decided on its own merits. It was
also contended that if the interpretation sought to be suggested by the tenant
is accepted irrespective of need and requirement by the landlord that the
petition would not be held maintainable; the provision should be held
arbitrary, unreasonable and ultra vires.
9. In support of the above contentions, the learned counsel drew our attention
of the following decisions: Food Corporation of India vs. New India Assurance
Co.Ltd. & Others 5], K.S. Sundararaju Chettiar vs. M.R. Ramachandra Naidu,
6], State of Punjab & Another vs. Khan Chand, ], Bhatia
International vs. Bulk Trading S.A. & Another, ], Rakesh Wadhawan
& Others vs. Jagdamba industrial Corporation & Others, ]; Suraj
Mal vs. Radheysham ].
10. Having considered the rival contentions of the parties, in our opinion,
prima facie the submission of the landlord deserves serious consideration. In
our opinion, it may be possible for the landlord to argue that in the facts and
circumstances of the case, it may not be said that the landlord has obtained
possession of a building or premises falling within the mischief of third
proviso to Section 14(3) of the Act. Again, the third proviso to Section 14(3)
of the Act may apply to the facts which were before the court when the
suit/application was decided by the court/authority and the landlord has
obtained possession of a building or a part thereof. But if the circumstances
have changed and the necessity increases, it may be possible for the landlord
to apply under sub-section (3) of Section 14 of the Act on the ground of bona
fide requirement. To such a situation, third proviso to Section 14(3) of the
Act may not prohibit him from approaching a competent court/authority. It
appears to us, as observed by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana in two cases
referred to above, that the object of the proviso is to restrict the landlord
from seeking unreasonable ejectment of tenants. If he was successful in
evicting a tenant from a building and his personal requirement is fulfilled or
satisfied, he cannot invoke Section 14(3) of the Act again. But if the
requirement still continues or the circumstances are different, the third
proviso to Section 14(3) of the Act has no application. The submission of the
learned counsel that if the third proviso to Section 14(3) of the Act is not
interpreted reasonably as submitted by him, it may have to be tested on the
touch stone of Article 14 cannot be said to be totally ill-founded.
11. In view of the aforesaid, in our view a fresh look is necessary on the
provision, so that the grey areas noticed by us earlier may be creased out. It
is, therefore, appropriate that the matter be placed for consideration of the
question by a Bench of three Judges. Accordingly, we direct Registry to place
the papers before Hon'ble the Chief Justice of India for taking an appropriate
action.
12. Order accordingly.
1AIR 1979 P & H 132
21980 (1) RCR 494 (P & H)