SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Justiniano Antao
Vs
Smt. Bernadette B. Pereira
Civil Appeal No. 901 of 1999
(Ashok Bhan and A.K.Mathur)
22/11/2004
JUDGMENT
A.K.MATHUR, J.
1. This appeal is directed against the order passed by the Single Judge of the
High Court of Bombay, Panaji Bench, Goa in Second Appeal No.4 of 1995 on
February 13, 1998 whereby learned Single Judge has reversed the order passed by
the first appellate Court.
2. Brief facts which are necessary for disposal of this appeal are that Smt.
Bernadette B. Pereira filed a suit seeking declaration that she had acquired
easement right of access through the property of respondents, Shri Justiniano
Antao, his wife Smt. Seaman Antao and Shri Diogo Antao (hereinafter referred to
as the respondent-defendants) and for permanent injunction against the
respondent-defendants for restraining them from obstructing, blocking,
interfering with the motorable access.
3. The trial court by its order dated February 26, 1991 decreed the suit of the
plaintiff against the respondent-defendants holding that the plaintiff had
right of motorable access to her house through the property of the
respondent-defendants by way of easement right through prescription. On appeal
being filed before the District Court by the respondent-defendants, the
judgment of the trial court was reversed by the first appellate court on two
grounds, namely, that the plaintiff had failed to allege in the pleadings that
the way in question was not being used as of right and since the way was not
claimed as of right the relief in question could not be granted to the
plaintiff in view of Section 15 of the Easements Act, 1882 which provided that
easement right must be claimed as of right. The second ground on which the
findings were upset was that the plaintiff's property was bounded on two sides
by road and it does not stand to reason that in such a state of affairs the
plaintiff would pass through the property of the respondent-defendants in order
to reach the same road which bounds the property of the plaintiff. Aggrieved
against the said order the plaintiff filed a second appeal before the High
Court of Bombay, Panaji Bench, Goa and the High Court reversed the finding of
the first appellate court and hence this appeal on grant of special leave.
4. The plaintiff and her husband Shri Bruno B. Pereira are permanent residents
of Chandor-Goa and are absolute owners in possession and peaceful enjoyment
along with others a landed property known as "COLOSSO" situated at
Colosso, Chandor, Salcete, Goa and in this property there exists their
residential house which faces towards the eastern side built by her in-laws
more than 75 years ago bearing village Panchayat House NO.432. Besides the said
house, there exists a garage on the north-eastern corner of the said house,
built by her husband more than 25 years back. Her house along with the garage
is surrounded by a compound wall on the eastern side and west, north and south
with ado of rubbles and on the eastern side of the said compound wall, there is
an iron frame gate of about 4 metres width. This compound wall was also
constructed by her in-laws at the time of construction of the said residential
house. It is alleged that prior to her marriage, her husband owned a car
besides two trucks, one in working condition and the other in scrap condition
and one luna moped. These vehicles were bought between the period 1960 and 1982
and these vehicles were being parked in the said garage from time to time. The
defendants are the owners of the adjoining property on the eastern side of her
property through which the suit access passes; the same is surveyed under No.9,
Sub-division No.15 of Guirdolim village. It is alleged by the plaintiff that
there exists a motorable access of about 50 metres long starting from the main
village Panchayat public road and adjacent to the eastern boundary wall of the
plaintiff's property and passes through the defendants' property under survey
No. 9/15 and it reaches to the gate of the plaintiff. It is alleged that the
plaintiff had been enjoying the suit motorable access peacefully, continuously
free from any obstruction and as an easementary right for the last over more
than about 25 years and prior to that by her in-laws for more than 75 years for
all purposes. It is alleged that even harvesting paddy crops were brought by
the plaintiff through the trucks through the access motorable road. It is
alleged that on July 5, 1986 at about 8.00 P.M. the defendants dumped three
bullock cartloads of rubble stones near the starting point of the suit
motorable access thereby attempting to obstruct the same. The plaintiff not to
strain the relations with the defendants removed the said obstruction of rubble
stones from the suit motorable accesses. Then again on July 6, 1986 the
defendants abused the plaintiff and started pelting stones. It is alleged that
the defendants threatened the plaintiff that they are going to block the said
access. A complaint was filed by one of the sons of the plaintiff. The contents
of the complaint was that the defendants had no right or claim to interfere
with the suit access as they have acquired a right by way of prescription. The
suit was contested by the defendants by filing a written statement. It was
pointed out in the written statement by the defendants that there was an
opening to the compound wall of the plaintiff on the southern side which gave
access to the public road and the same was used by the plaintiff as per access
to go from the public road to her house. They denied that there was any access
passing through the property of the defendants lying on the eastern side of the
plaintiff's property. It was submitted that the plaintiff was always passing
through the wide gate which she had opened in her compound wall on the
south-east corner directly opening on the public road. It is alleged that this
gate was closed by the plaintiff only in 1984 so as to claim the suit access
which they had never used for all these years. It was alleged that they were
using the access through the south-eastern gate and it is only closed in 1984.
5. On the pleadings of the parties three issues were framed which read as
under:
"1. Whether the plaintiff proves that she is entitled for a decree that
she has acquired the right by way of prescription and easementary right for a
motorable road in the suit property?
2. Whether the plaintiff proves that she is owner in possession of a property
known as "Colosso", situated at Colosso, Chandor, Salcete, Goa,
registered in the Land Registration Office under No.458 and in the Revenue
Office under Matriz No.51?
3. Whether the plaintiff proves that she is entitled for an injunction as
prayed in prayer (b) of the plaint?" *
The plaintiff examined five witnesses. P.W.1, Bruno B.Pereria, is the husband
of the plaintiff and the power of attorney holder of the plaintiff. He has
deposed that his residential house is in Survey No. 9/1 and this property is
bounded by eastern side by the property of the defendants and west by the
property of one Cruz, on the north by the property of one Fernandes and to the
south by a public road. He has deposed that there is a garage constructed and
his house was constructed by his father about 80 years back and the garage was
constructed about 30 years back. He has deposed that in order to go to his
house he has to take his vehicles to the defendants' property which lies on the
eastern side. The length of the access passing through the defendant's property
is about 50 metres and this access is being used from his childhood and ever
prior to that. Her has further deposed that he has n other access to go to his
house. It is also submitted that in between the rubble stone wall on the south
of the public road there is a drain of about one and half foot deep. He
admitted that the southern side wall was broken at the corner of about 10 years
back and the same was repaired by him. He has deposed that as the access
through the property of the defendants was obstructed on July 5, 1986
therefore, the present suit was filed. It was put to him in the
cross-examination that he has closed the opening on its southern side wall in
the year 1984 and started using the suit access from 1984 onwards. He has also
denied that the drain which was on the southern side of the property was
repaired by him in order to take his vehicles from the southern side by public
road. P.W.2 is another person who claims to have knowledge about the
plaintiff's property. He has admitted that the on the south eastern side of the
plaintiff's house there was a gate. On the south of the property there is a
public road and in between the road on the south and the southern wall of the
compound wall of the plaintiff there is a drain. However, he has deposed that
the plaintiff is using the access on the eastern side for bringing their
vehicles. He has further deposed that his house is at a distance of five
minutes walk from the house of the plaintiff. He is friendly with the plaintiff
and is visiting his house for a long time. P.W.3 has stated that from the date
of her marriage she has been residing in Chandor. She has deposed about the
situation of the property and has also deposed that the plaintiff had four
metres wide gate on the eastern side. She also admitted that on the southern
side of the plaintiff's house there is a compound wall of rubble stone and
beyond that there is a public road. P.W.4, Norma Bakboda has also similarly
deposed. Likewise, P.W. 5- Alleluia Gomes. As against this, the defendants have
examined Justianano Antao, Defendant No.2 as D.W.1. He has deposed that their
property is situated outside the compound wall of the plaintiff. He has
acquired the same through their ancestors. It is allege that the plaintiff has
a compound wall on the south and west of their property. He has also deposed
that towards the west there is a public road. He had further deposed that
presently the plaintiff comes to the road by passing through their property.
But initially the plaintiff was using his land to come to the main road but has
started using the same since 1984. Prior to 1984 the plaintiff used to come to
the main road from the southern side of his property where there was a gate. He
has deposed that the plaintiff's cars and trucks used to pass through that
gate. He has further deposed that prior to 1984 the plaintiff had a very small
opening from the eastern side in his property. It was alleged that at the time
when this small gate was installed he and his brother were on board of ship.
After they saw the gate they kept some rubble stones in their property in front
of this gate. But the plaintiff removed the same overnight. It is alleged that
the plaintiff constructed a road with the help of kharate, belt and chains. He
has deposed that photographs were taken by one Anthony Dias, the photographer.
He has also deposed that the plaintiff can take their vehicles from the southern
side by making on opening which was in existence previously, by filling the
drain towards south by mud. It has also been deposed by him that the open land
belongs to him. It is admitted that in the year 1984, the plaintiff widened the
opening by putting a gate in the eastern compound wall. Previously, it was a
small opening and it was obstructed by them. He admitted that no complaint was
filed by him in 1985 or in 1986. D.W.2, Rosario S. Antao, admitted that in the
eastern side on the plaintiff's house is the property of the defendants. He has
also deposed that on the south of the compound wall of the plaintiff there was
an opening. It was existing for about 30 to 40 years. Presently it was closed
with the help of rubble stones. It was deposed by him that earlier opening was
smaller but subsequently it was widened. He has also deposed that in the year
1976 he was one of the Panch of the village Panchayat and every year the
Panchayat used to dig the drain for the passage of water near the eastern compound
wall of the plaintiff. The plaintiff used to take his truck by putting mud over
the said drain. He has also deposed that the opening in the southern compound
wall was closed by the plaintiff in the year 1984 and the plaintiff widened the
opening from the eastern compound wall after about 2 to 3 years of closing of
the opening in the southern wall. D.W.3 is Anthony Dias, the photographer. He
has taken the photographs of the compound wall and he has produced the same as
Ext. D.W.3/A along with the negatives of the same. He has deposed that these
photographs were clicked in the year 1986. These photographs were also produced
before us and we have perused the photographs. It appears that there were
pillars on both sides showing that there was a gate. D.W.4, Chandrakant
Kakolkar had deposed that in front of the house of the plaintiff he was washing
his clothes. He has also deposed that towards the south of the house of the
plaintiff there exists a road and the plaintiff has access to come to the road
but the same was closed by the plaintiff in the year 1984. He has also
supported the defendants that there was a small opening which was widened
subsequently.
6. On the background of these evidence which has been led by the parties, the
trial court after appreciating the evidence felt persuaded to grant reliefs to
the plaintiff and it observed that the plaintiff is entitled to permanent
injunction restraining the defendants, or their agents, servants or any other
person acting on their behalf from blocking, obstructing or interfering with
the suit memorable access in any manner.
7. Aggrieved against this order an appeal was preferred and the appellate court
reversed the findings of the trial court that there is admission by the
plaintiff that there existed a public road towards the west and south of their
property. It was further observed that when the plaintiff has got road towards
the west and south in that case why the plaintiff should be permitted to use
the way from the property of the defendants. The first appellate court also
observed that in order to establish acquisition of easement by prescription the
plaintiff is duty bound to prove that she has been peaceably and openly using
the land of the defendants without interruption for the last 20 years. It further
found that there is no pleading in the plaint that the plaintiff used the said
access for 20 years as an easement and as of right in order to get the
acquisition of easement by prescription. It further found that it is not the
case of the plaintiff that she has no other way out and she cannot use her
property without passing through the property of the defendants. It also found
that in the south west of the property of the plaintiff there is an opening and
she can have access to that. Therefore, the first appellate court found that
the plaintiff has failed to prove that she is entitled for a decree that she
has acquired the right of way by prescription for a motorable road in the suit
property and accordingly reversed the finding of the trial court and dismissed
the suit.
8. Aggrieved against this, the matter was taken in the second appeal before the
High Court. Learned Single Judge of the High Court of Bombay, reversed the
finding of the first appellate court and decreed the suit of the plaintiff by
upholding the order of the trial court and setting aside the order of the
learned Additional District Judge. Hence, the present appeal.
9. We have gone through the three judgments i.e. trial court, first appellate
court and that of the High Court. We have gone through the evidence adduced.
From this, it is more than clear that there is no specific averment in the
plaint or in the statement of the witnesses showing that this access from the
land of the defendants was used as of right for the last 20 years. The evidence
very categorically shows that the plaintiff has an access on the south east
side and this was being used by her for a long time. It was pointed out that
only in the year 1984 the plaintiff has started using the access through the
property of the defendants. It is also admitted that the defendants were during
that time on board of ship and as soon as they came and saw the use of their
land by the plaintiff, they put obstructions to it. Therefore, it is clear that
it is not the case that the plaintiff has been using the access as of right
through the property of the defendants for more than 20 years. Since the
plaintiff has an access through the southern side of her property we see no
reason why the property of other persons be used as an access to her house. If
the plaintiff had no access to her house except through that of the property of
the defendants then perhaps we would have considered appreciating as easement
of necessity. But in order to establishing a right by way of prescription
one has to show that the incumbent has been using the land as of right
peacefully and openly and without any interruption for the last 20 years. There
should be categorical pleadings that since what date to which date one is using
the access for the last 20 years. In order to establishing the right of
prescription to the detriment of the other party, one has to aver specific
pleadings and categorical evidence. In the present case, after going through
the pleadings as well as the statement of the witnesses it is more than clear
that the plaintiff has failed to establish that she has been using the access
peacefully, openly as of right for the last 20 years. # More so we find
that material placed on record and especially the photographs which have been
exhibited and marked as Ex.D.W.3/A in the court that there are two pillars
showing the existence of a gate in southern side but it has been closed down by
rubble stones. The defendants have put up a strong case that the plaintiff has
an opening in the southern side and it is amply established that there exist
two pillars showing the existence of a gate which has been covered by rubble
stones in the southern side. It was also pleaded that the plaintiff was using
the same and it is only after 1984 she got the gate constructed through the
land of the defendants. Therefore, on the basis of the evidence and statement
of the witnesses, we are satisfied that the first appellate court has correctly
approached the matter and the view taken by the High Court as well as the trial
court does not appear to be based on correct appreciation of facts.
10. In the result, we allow the appeal and set aside the order of the High
Court as well as the order of the trial court and dismiss the suit and we
uphold the order of the first appellate court. There shall be no order as to
costs.