SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
President, Poornathrayisha Seva Sangham, Thripunithura
Vs.
K. Thilakan Kavanal
C.A.Nos.874-876 of 2005
(Arijit Pasayat and S.H.Kapadia JJ.)
03.02.2005
Arijit Pasayat, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. The decision rendered by a Division Bench of Kerala High Court is questioned
by the appellants, primarily on the ground that it should not have entertained
the original petition which was purportedly filed as public interest
litigation.
3. A brief reference to the factual position would suffice. Respondent No.1
filed a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, of India, 1950
(in short the 'Constitution') questioning correctness of the decision taken by
the Cochin Devaswom Board (in short the 'Board') in granting permission to the
appellant-society for use of Oottupura (dining hall) on the left side of the
Sri Poornathrayisha Temple. Grievance of the respondent No.1 - writ petitioner
was that the appellant-society was charging huge charges by letting the Oottupura
to various devotees for performing pooja in the temple and for permitting
feasts to be organized on the Oottupura.
4. It was alleged that some officials and the appellant-society had made some
secret arrangements for sharing the receipts surreptitiously. Grievance was
made that the appellant-society was in fact operating as a parallel Board. A
counter-affidavit was filed by the Board taking the stand that the present
appellant-society was in no way interfering with the administration of the
temple. The poojas and the routine functions of the temple are conducted under
supervision and guidance of some officials as per traditional customs. The
present appellant-society took initiative to conduct annual functions and other
functions. Since amount that was being received by the Board was meagre and the
appellant-Society wanted to provide necessary amenities in the Oottupura by
converting it to a modern marriage hall so that financial benefits would accrue
to the Board, the decision was taken to allow the appellant-society to give the
hall on rent to be used for marriage purposes. The amount offered by the
appellant-Society was much more than what the Board used to earlier received.
The appellant-Society and the Board took the stand that the Writ petitioner had
suppressed material facts and relevant facts without ulterior motives. The
society was functioning for the welfare of the temple and the devotees; it was
not functioning as a profit making body. The society was registered under the
Travancore Cochin Literary, Scientific and Charitable Societies Registration
Act. The petition was not in essence a public interest litigation but was filed
to wreck personal vendetta. The High Court gave certain directions which are
contained in paragraphs 8 and 9 of the impugned judgment which are contrary to
and/or beyond the pleadings.
5. Mr. C.S. Vaidyanathan, learned Senior counsel for the appellant-Society
submitted that the High Court had travelled beyond the grievances made in the
petition and in any event the purported public interest litigation was not
maintainable. There was nothing irregular in the action of the Board in
granting permission to the appellant-Society. Certain observation made by the
High Court were beyond the prayers and the pleadings; and the appellant-Society
has been condemned without hearing.
6. Learned counsel for the Board supported the stand of the appellant. However,
learned counsel appearing for the respondent no.1 i.e. the writ petitioner
submitted that the appeal was infructuous because of some intervening
circumstances and in any event the writ petition was filed in public interest
an the High Court's directions are innocuous and do not, in any way, reflect on
the credibility of the appellant-Society.
7. The scope and ambit of a public interest litigation in the matter of
management of a temple, governed by the provisions of a statutory enactment,
came up for consideration of this Court in Guruvayoor Devaswom Managing
Committee vs. C.K. Rajan). It was, inter alia, held as follows:
"When the administration of the temple is within its control and it
exercises the said power in terms of a statute, the State, it is expected,
normally would itself probe into the alleged irregularities. If the State
through its machinery as provided for in one Act can arrive at the requisite
finding of fact for the purpose of remedying the defects, it may not find it
necessary to take recourse to the remedies provided for in another statute. It
is trite that recourse to a provision to another statute may be resorted to
when the State finds that its powers under the Act governing the field is
inadequate. The High Courts and the Supreme Court would not ordinarily issue a
writ of mandamus directing the State to carry out its statutory functions in a
particular manner. Normally, the Courts would ask the State to perform its
statutory functions, if necessary within a time frame and undoubtedly as and
when an order is passed by the State in exercise of its power under the
Statute, it will examine the correctness or legality thereof by way of judicial
review."
8. We need not go into the primal question in view of the accepted position
that with effect from 1.8.2001 the Board, on getting approval of the bye laws,
issued a circular dissolving all the Devaswom samities in the various temples
with effect from 1.8.2001 and consequently new advisory committees have been
constituted.
9. Above being the position, we feel that nothing further remains to be
done in this appeal except noticing that certain observations made, as regards
the functioning of the appellant-society and its credibility were unnecessary.
For the purpose of adjudication of the dispute before the High Court which only
related to the permission granted to use Oottupura, other observations and
views expressed by the Division Bench are, therefore, treated as inoperative.
Since disputed facts were involved, the High Court should not have gone into
them even in respect of the primary grievances of the writ petitioner.
10. With the aforesaid observations these appeals are disposed of with no
orders as to costs.