SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Nitco Tiles Limited
Vs.
Gujarat Ceramic Floor Tiles Manufacturing Assn
C.A.Nos.1091-1093 of 2005
(C.K.Thakker and Ruma Pal and Arijit Pasayat JJ.)
09.02.2005
1. Leave granted.
2.These appeals have been preferred from an interim order passed by the High
Court of Gujarat on a writ petition filed by the respondent No. 1 initially,
challenging the final finding of the designated authority on a New Shipper
Review. Subsequent to the filing of the writ petition, the final finding of the
designated authority was notified by the Central Government by Notification
dated 28-7-2004. A second Notification was issued by the Central Government
also dated 28-7-2004 rescinding an earlier Notification dated 1-7-2003 by which
provisional assessment had been levied on the imports made from Nanhai and
Prestige, being the respondents 10 and 11 herein. The writ petition was amended
and the subsequent Notification dated 28th July, 2004 have also been challenged.
3. The High Court refused to accede to the preliminary objections raised by the
Union of India that the respondent No. 1 should be relegated to the alternative
remedy available to it under the Customs Tariff Act, 1985. The only ground for
entertaining the writ petition given by the High Court was that "the
question raised in this petition is not only important but also sensitive
affecting the people of the country at large".
4. This is no reason at all, as the economic impact of every case of alleged
dumping would necessarily affect the people of the country at large. If the
reasons given by the High Court were to be accepted as a valid basis for
exercise of its judicial discretion to entertain the writ petition in its extra
ordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, then the
provisions for appeal against the orders passed by the designated authority in
respect of anti-dumping issues would be rendered otiose and a person aggrieved
by the final finding of the designated authority could, despite the express
provision of Section 9C of the Customs Tariff Act, invoke the writ jurisdiction
with impunity.
5. The High Court not only entertained the writ petition but also granted
interim relief to the respondent No. 1 restraining, inter alia, the appellant
and the other respondents from giving effect to the Notification No. 81/2004,
dated 28-7-2004 by which the earlier Notification imposing provisional
antidumping duty has been rescinded and from given effect to the proviso
inserted before the explanation in C.G. Notification No. 73/2003, dated
1-5-2003 by Notification No. 80/2004. The interim relief was granted for no
discernible reason. Indeed the High Court said that no reasons were given in
support of the interim relief because any observation made was likely to come
in the way of the party at the stage of final relief.
6. It is well established that orders passed on interlocutory proceedings do
not conclude the merits of the matter. We fail to see how observations made at
an interim stage could come in the way of either of the parties at the final
stage. It is also well established that an interim relief should, particularly
when that order may be impugned before a higher authority, contain reasons
however brief in support of the grant or refusal thereof. In the absence of
such reasons, it is virtually impossible for such higher authority to determine
what persuaded the grant of refusal of relief.
7. We are also aware of the well established principle that this Court normally
does not interfere either with a Courts decision not to relegate a writ
petitioner to an alternative remedy or with the grant of interim relief. It is
unnecessary to cite any authority in support of this as the proposition cannot
admit of any controversy. However, having regard to the singular lack of any
acceptable reason in the impugned order we have no hesitation in interfering
with this particular exercise of discretion by the High Court and set aside the
same.
8. It may be mentioned that in related matters, in which there was also a
challenge to the final finding of the Designated Authority and the identical
Notifications, we had directed the matter be agitated before the CESTAT. Indeed
the appeal is already pending before the CESTAT.
9. In the circumstances, we are of the view that the impugned order must
necessarily be set aside but that the writ petition itself should be dismissed
with liberty granted to the parties to respondent No. 1 to approach the CESTAT
under provisions of Section 9C and to agitate all points raised in the writ
petition before such Tribunal. Inasmuch as the proceedings have been conducted
before an inappropriate forum and keeping in view the provisions of Section 14
of the Limitation Act, 1963 the period spent in prosecuting the writ
petition should be condoned.
10. The civil appeals are accordingly disposed of with no order as to costs.