SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Indian Drugs and Pharmaceuticals Limited
Vs
R.K. Shewaramani
Civil Appeal No. 5595 of 2002
(Arijit Pasayat and H.K.Sema)
03/08/2005
JUDGMENT
ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.
1. Legality of the judgment rendered by a Division Bench of the Delhi High
Court is questioned by the appellants. High Court held that the termination of
services of respondent by order dated 8.1.1991 was illegal.
2. The basic facts in a nutshell are as under:
The respondent-employee was at the relevant point of time working as a medical
representative of appellant No.1- company which undisputedly is
"State" within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of
India, 1950 (in short the 'Constitution'). He was transferred from Delhi to
Eluru in the State of Andhra Pradesh by order dated 17.6.1989. Alleging that
the respondent-employee had not joined the transferred post a charge sheet was
issued on 27.9.1989. There was another set of charges and the charge sheet was
issued on 12.12.1989. While these two charges were pending consideration in
departmental proceedings, action in terms of Rule 30A of the Industrial Drugs
and Pharmaceutical Ltd. Conduct Discipline and Appeal Rules, 1978 (in short the
'Rules') was taken. A show-cause notice was issued requiring the respondent to
show cause as to why his services shall not be terminated on account of
unauthorized absence from duty exceeding 30 days. Rule 30(A) was introduced by
way of an amendment w.e.f. 30th March, 1990 on the basis of a decision taken by
the Board of Directors on 24.4.1990. On receipt of the show cause notice the
respondent-employee took the stand that he had already been charge sheeted and
enquiry was going on and, therefore, the employer cannot be permitted to turn
around and by-pass the enquiry and take action on the basis of alleged amended
Rule 30(A). Company has realized that it cannot prove the charges in the
enquiry and, therefore, the enquiry was being by-passed. He wanted a copy of the
approval of the Board of Directors for amending the Rule 30(A) as done on
30.3.1990. The order of termination was passed keeping in view the unauthorized
absence and unsatisfactory reply to the show cause notice. The Screening
Committee after assessing the materials on record came to the conclusion that
the services of the respondent were to be terminated with immediate effect
under Rule 30(A).
3. The order of termination was questioned by filing a writ petition before the
Delhi High Court. Validity of amended Rule 30(A) was challenged in addition to
taking the stand that the authorities have found it inconvenient to establish
the earlier charges and, therefore, have by-passed them and taken resort to
amended Rule 30(A) with mala fide intents. Present appellants rebutted the
stand and supported the action impugned in the order.
4. The High Court allowed the writ petition primarily on two grounds; firstly
it was noted that there was no material to show that in the last show-cause
notice it was indicated that the earlier departmental proceedings were dropped
and secondly, in the notice it was not indicated that the same was in terms of
the amended Rule 30(A) of the Rules and was not in continuation of the earlier
charge sheets. Even after service of the last show-cause notice, the respondent
had been served minutes of charge sheets dated 27.9.1989 and 12.12.1989 of the
proceedings held on 30.7.1990. He was also asked to attend enquiry on certain
dates. The High Court, therefore, held that the impugned order cannot be said
to have been passed bona fide. Rule 30(A) of the Rules had no application as
the two departmental proceedings were already pending and those related to
periods prior to coming into effect of Rule 30(A) which cannot be said to have
any retrospective effect. Accordingly, the writ petition was allowed and the
order of termination was set aside. Liberty was however given to the employer
for proceedings further with the departmental proceedings against the
respondent.
5. In support of the appeal, learned counsel submitted that the approach of the
High Court is clearly erroneous. There is no requirement in law that when a
fresh enquiry is commenced, the earlier proceedings should be given a go by.
Further, factually also it is not correct as held by the High Court that the
show cause notice was not in terms of Rule 30(A). In any event, the respondent
himself knew that the action had been taken under Rule 30(A). There was no mala
fide involved as erroneously observed by the High Court.
6. In response, learned counsel for the respondent- employee submitted that
because of trade union activities the respondent was made a victim. When two
proceedings were already in progress, there was no necessity to take resort to
Rule 30(A) and that too in a hurried manner without proper opportunity being
granted to the respondent to place his side of the case. Therefore, the High
Court was justified in interfering with the order of termination.
7. Rule 30(A) reads as follows:
"30(A) Notwithstanding anything contained to the contrary in any other
rules, the services of any employee shall be terminated by the Company if:-
(a) his post is abolished; (b) he is declared on medical ground to be unfit for
service in the Company, or (c) he remains on unauthorized absence for thirty
days or more.
Explanation:
1. In a case of (a) & (b) above, the services shall be terminated after
giving three months' notice to a permanent employee and one months' notice to a
temporary employee or pay in lieu thereof in both the cases;
2. In the case of (c) above, services of any employee shall be terminated if he
fails to explain his conduct satisfactorily within 15 days from the date of
receipt of the Show Cause Notice by him. The Management shall be empowered to
take a decision without resorting to further enquiries.
3.(a)The decision in case of (c) above would be taken only with the prior
approval of a Screening Committee of 2 Directors/Executive Director to be
constituted for this purpose by the Chairman & Managing Director. (b) The
reasons for the decision would be recorded in writing. “*
8. These rules are made effective with effect from 30th March, 1990.
9. At this juncture, it is to be noted that the validity of a Rule similar to Rule
30(A) was considered by this Court in Pyare Lal Sharma v. Managing Director and
Ors. ). In that case after having held that the concerned rule was
intra-vires, on the facts of the case it was held the amended rule could not
operate retrospectively and could operate only from the date of amendment and,
therefore, on the facts of that case it was held that for a period prior to the
introduction of the amended provision, action cannot be taken. In the instant
case, the period of absence to which reference has been made by the appellants
clearly related to a period subsequent to the date of introduction of the
amended provision. That being so, the High Court has rightly not led any stress
on that plea though urged by respondent-employee before the High Court.
10. That brings us to the crucial question as to whether the High Court's view
is sustainable on the facts of the case.
11 . There is no requirement in law that for continuing with fresh
proceedings the charge sheet issued must indicate that the previous proceedings
pending have been given a go by. The employer is free to proceed in as many as
departmental proceedings as it considers desirable. Even in a hypothetical case
in two of the departmental proceedings the finding is in favour of the delinquent
employee, yet in another departmental proceeding finding adverse to the
delinquent officer can be recorded. Merely because the two proceedings were
pending, that did not in any way stand on the way of the employer to initiate
another departmental proceeding and that too on the basis of an amended
provision which came into effect after initiation of the previous departmental
proceeding. The High Court's view therefore is clearly unsustainable. # The
High Court had also observed that in the show cause notice there was no
reference to Rule 30(A). This is not factually correct. As the records reveal
clear reference was made to IDPL Corporate Office letter No. IDP /7/32 /Estt
/90 dated 24.9.1990. This related to the amendment of Rule 30(A). Additionally,
the respondent- employee was not taken to surprise and no prejudice was caused
to him by not mentioning of Rule 30(A) specifically. On the other hand, from
his reply dated 22.6.1990 it is clearly revealed that he knew that the
proceeding was in terms of the amended Rule 30(A). His specific stand as is
revealed from reply to the show-cause notice is that the company having become
realized that it will not be in a position to establish the allegations forming
foundation of the two departmental proceedings, has resorted to Rule 30(A).
That being so, the High Court was not justified in drawing an adverse inference
by concluding that non mention of Rule 30(A) specifically in the show cause
notice vitiate the proceedings. There is no dispute that factors necessary to bring
in application of Rule 30(A) existed. The High Court was also not justified in
coming to the conclusion that the action of the authorities in initiating the
proceedings in terms of Rule 30(A) is not bona fide.
12. Looked at from any angle, the High Court's order is indefensible and is set
aside. The appeal succeeds but without any order as to costs.