SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Indian City Properties Limited
Vs
The Municipal Commissioner of Greater Bombay
Civil Appeal No.4801 of 2005
((Mrs.) Ruma Pal and Dr. A.R.Lakshmanan)
05/08/2005
MRS. RUMA PAL, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. The appellant is the owner of Plot No. 2M/748 situated at M.L. Dhanukar
Marg, Mumbai. On the plot, there is a bungalow, an out-house, cooling towers, a
pump room, servants quarters and a watchman's room. The first appellant has let
out the bungalow and the outhouse to the appellant No.2 for use as a guest
house. On 16th November, 1999 a notice was issued to the appellants under
Section 299 of the Mumbai Municipal Corporation Act, 1888, (hereinafter
referred to as "the Act") to the effect that the Corporation would
take possession of "certain land not occupied by a building" forming
part of the premises within the regular lien of public street as prescribed by
the Commissioner, under Section 299 of the Act together with its enclosing
wall, hedge, or fence, if any, and any platform, verandah, step or other
structure, which may be found upon the said land." Notice was also given
that if necessary the authority issuing the notice namely, the Deputy Municipal
Commissioner (Zone-I), Greater Bombay, would "proceed to clear the
building".
3. Section 299 in so far as it is relevant is extracted verbatim below:-
"299. Acquisition of open land or of land occupied by platforms, etc,
within the regular line of a street.
(1) If any land not vesting in the corporation, whether open or enclosed, lies
within the regular line of a public street, and is not occupied by a building,
or if a platform, verandah, step or some other structure external to a building
abutting on a public street, or a portion of a platform, verandah, step or
other such structure, is within the regular line of such street, the
Commissioner may, after giving to the owner of the land or building not less
than seven clear days' written notice of his intention so to do, take
possession on behalf of the corporation of the said land with its enclosing
wall, hedge or fence, if any, or of the said platform, verandah, step or other
such structure as aforesaid, or of the portion of the said platform, verandah,
step or other such structure aforesaid which is within the regular line of the
street, and, if necessary, clear the same and the land so acquired shall
thenceforward be deemed a part of the public street". *
4. The question is whether the land in the appellant's premises which is sought
to be affected by the notice is "not occupied by any building" or
occupied by "some other structure external to a building"? In terms
of the Section, if the land is occupied by a building it is outside the scope
of Section 299; but if there are only structures external to a building, action
may be taken under Section 299 by the respondent to take possession of the land
and demolish the structure. The notice was challenged by the appellants under
Article 226 of the Constitution contending that the former was true in its case.
5. By an order dated 2nd May, 2001, the High Court directed the Propthonotary
and Senior Master of the High Court to appoint an Officer of the Court to visit
the property and verify whether the proposed acquisition affected any of the
structures of the appellant. Pursuant to the order, the Commissioner was
appointed. The Commissioner visited the premises upon notice to the parties and
submitted a report. According to the report, the proposed acquisition affected
the following permanent existing structures in the premises to the extent
indicated:
1. Servants Room in two parts (Gr. Floor structure) a) 12'-6"x9'-6"
128.25
b) 12'-6"x20'-6 256-25
2. Security Cabin (Gr. Floor Structure) 6'-6x6'6' 42.25
4. Pump Room with Compressor (Gr. Floor Structure) 9'-0"x6'-0" 54.00
4. Under ground RCC tank with Cylinder shape pre-cast tank on Top
14'-6"x11'-6" 166.75
5. A.C. Plant 12'-6x10'-6" 131.25
6. Part portion of Main Structure in two parts viz. Ground and First Floors, staircase;
part bed room Part bed room and balcony a) 2x13’ 6"x10'-0" 270
b) 2x9'-0"x2'6" 22.50
6. The writ petition was ultimately dismissed on 15th July 2001 by the High
Court which held Section 299 of the Act permitted such action against the six
structures which were held to be "other structures" external to the
main building within the meaning of the phrase in Section 299. The High Court
however noted the respondents' submission that "the petitioners will be
entitled either for compensation or permissible FSI in accordance with the
relevant provisions and rules".
7. The appellants contend that the High Court misconstrued Section 299 of the
Act and erred in treating the six items mentioned in the Commissioner's report
as structures external to a building. According to the appellants each
structure was a 'building' within the definition of the word in Section 3(s) of
the Act of which possession could not be taken under Section 299 of the Act.
Our attention was also drawn to several photographs in support of the
submission.
8. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents has submitted that
the definition of the word "building" in Section 3)s) was subject to
the context to the contrary and that in the context of the language of Section
299, it was clear that at least items 1-5 in the Commissioner's report were
structures in respect of which proceedings could be taken under Section 299. It
is contended that the expression "other structure external to a
building" in Section 299 means such other structures as are not part of
the main building. It is said that an important test to determine what
structure can be considered as part of a building is whether the FSI is
exhausted by "such other structure". In reckoning the FSI of
constructed structures, water tanks, pump rooms, security canopy or make-shift
servant quarters with temporary construction are not counted. It is the
respondent's case that in the present case no FSI is exhausted by the
structures proposed to be taken away. Reference has been made to Regulations
3(42), 30 and 35 of the Development Control Regulations for Greater Bombay,
1991 (referred to as "the Regulations"). It is said that the land
beneath the disputed structures was considered to be vacant. According to the
respondent the legislative intent is to provide for acquisition of such
external structures of buildings as are required in public interest to widen
the road. It was also submitted that the need for taking over the portion of
the premises in question was admittedly to widen the existing road on which the
premises abutted and to bring it in within the regular line of the public
street which had been determined by the Commissioner under Section 297.
According to the respondents, the adjacent properties failing on the prescribed
regular line had given or not contested the area needed for road expansion-and
that the appellants were really interested in the grant of a greater Floor
Space Index (FSI) under the Regulations in lieu of the portion of the premises
sought to be taken over by the Corporation. However it was said that the
Corporation was not interested in item six of the Commissioner's report and it
was conceded that the said item fell outside the purview of the Commissioner's
power under Section 299. As far as the remaining part of the premises was
concerned, the Corporation was willing either to grant FSI in terms of the
Regulations or pay compensation to the appellants in respect of the loss or
damage which may be suffered by reason of the widening of the street.
9. The word 'building' occurs in different statutes and has been construed
according to the context in which the word has been used. It is not necessary
to consider those judgments given the fact that the word "building"
has been defined in sub-section (s) of Section 3 of the Act as follows:-
"(S) "building" includes a house, outhouse, stable, shed,
hut, tank (except tank for storage of drinking water in a building or part of a
building) and every other such structure, whether of masonry, bricks, wood,
mud, metal or any other material whatsoever." *
10. The body of the Section however qualifies the definition with the words
"unless there be something repugnant in the subject or context". The
phrase in Section 3 means precisely what it says-namely, that the definition
will apply unless excluded expressly or by necessary implication. The onus is
on the person alleging such exclusion. It is not the respondent's case that the
item found to be permanent existing structures by the Commission of the High
Court, would not fall within the general definition of building. The submission
is that the word should be read in a more restrictive manner in the context of
Section 299. The question then is, has, the onus been discharged by the
respondent?
11. The definition itself is in terms an inclusive one and is therefore to be
widely construed. It seems to indicate that a structure would be a building if
it has been erected by the use of whatever material, which may or may not be
used by human beings since it specifies stables and tanks as buildings. The
respondent's submission is that the servant quarters, security cabin, the pump
room, underground RCC Tank with Cyliner shape pre-cast tank and the AC Plant
are temporary building and are ancillary to the main residential building and
not buildings for the purposes of exclusion from Section 299.
12. Section 200 itself does not draw a distinction between a main building and
an ancillary building, or between a permanent building and a temporary
building. But the phrase 'temporary buildings' has been defined in Section
2(sb) of the Act which says that:-
"temporary building" means any building which is constructed
principally of mud, leaves, grass, cloth, thatch, wood, corrugated iron or
asbestos cement sheets or such other material and includes a building of
whatever size constructed of whatever material which the Commissioner has
allowed to be built as a temporary measure". *
13. In other words a temporary building is that which is not permitted to
remain permanently. When the Act separately defines a temporary building as
opposed to a "building" it indicates that, in the absence of the word
`temporary' in a particular section what is meant is a permanent building.
14. This Court in Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay vs. Indian Oil
Corporation Limited , construed the words "every other such
structure" in Section 3(s) in the context of Section 143 (a) of the Act
(which authorizes a levy of general tax on building and land) and held that.- a
petrol storage tank although not fixed to the earth was such a structure,
holding that permanency is the tests.
15. The context of Section 299 is Chapter 11 of the Act which deals with the
regulation of streets. The chapter contains inter alia (a) provisions relating
to the construction, maintenance and improvement of public streets and (b)
preservation of the "regular line" in public streets. Section 296 of
the Act falls within the first set of provisions and provides:-
"(1) The Commissioner may, subject to the provisions of Sections 90, 91
and 92-
(a) acquire any land required for the purpose of opening, widening, extending
or otherwise improving any public street or of making any new public street,
and the buildings, if any, standing upon such land;
(b) acquire in addition to the said land and the buildings, if any, standing
thereupon, all such land with the buildings, if any, standing thereupon, as it
shall seem expedient for the corporation to acquire outside of the regular
line, or of the intended regular line, of such street;
(c) lease, sell or otherwise dispose of any land or building purchased under
clause (b). *
(2) Any conveyance of land or of a building under clause (c) may comprise
such conditions as the Commissioner thinks fit, as to the removal of the
existing building, the description of new building to be erected, the period
within which such new building shall be completed and other such matters."
*
16. The power of acquisition under Section 296 is to be exercised by the
Commissioner under the provisions of the Land Acquisition
Act 1894 [See : Sections 87, 91 (i)]
17. Sections 297 to 311 are grouped together under the sub-title
"Prevention of Regular Line in Public Streets". Section 297
prescribes the method by which the Commissioner may prescribe a line on each
side of any public street which is called the "regular line" of the
street. Section 298 allows the Commissioner to dispose of proposals relating to
re-building or removal or re-construction or additions in respect of any part
of a building abutting on a public street which is within the regular line of
such street. In passing an order on the proposals under Section 345 or 346, the
Commissioner may require such building to be set back to the regular line of
the street Section 301 mandates payment of compensation to be paid by the
Commissioner to the owner of any building or land acquired for a public street
under Sections 298 or 299 for any loss which such owner may sustain in
consequence of his building or land being so acquired and for any expenses
incurred by such owner in consequence of an order made by the Commissioner
under either of the Sections.
18. It needs to be noted that in all these sections the word used is 'building'
in contradistinction with Section 299 which speaks of 'structures' and
'buildings'.
19. The word 'structure' is used as a generic term so that while all buildings
may be structures, all structures are not buildings. That structure which is
not a building and is a platform, verandah, step, or some other such structure
external to a building may be taken over by the Commissioner under Section 299
(1) if it is within the regular line of the street. The words "some other
such" must be construed as structueres similar or like platform, verandah
and step. The words must be read ejudem generis with the preceding words since
the word 'such' means "of the type previously mentioned". See Concise
Oxford English Dictionary (10th Edn.) The word "other" has also been
held to indicate that it must be construed ejusdem generis. Siddeshwari Cotton
Mills (P) Ltd. vs. Union of India: Assistant Collector of Central Excise
vs. Ramdeo Tobacco Co: The underlying characteristic of platforms,
verandahs and steps is that they are not independent structures and are
external to a building, that is they are attached to the outside and form an
inessential part of a building. In our opinion, therefore in order to be a
building for the purpose of Section 299 the structure would have to be an
independent, permanent structure. Thus there is no repugnancy if one were to
read the definition of building and Section 299 and in our opinion the word
'building' has been used in Section 299 in the sense defined in Section 3(s). #
20. Of the six items listed by the Commissioner in his report, learned counsel
appearing on behalf of the respondents has, as we have noted earlier, already
conceded that the part of the main structure described against serial No.6
would be excluded from the purview of the action proposed in the impugned
notice under Section 299. Even without the concession in our view, applying the
test of independence and permanence each of the items fall within the
definition of 'building' in Section 3(s) of the Act, and therefore, fall
outside the purview of Section 299.
21. The next argument put forth by the respondent is that the word 'building'
in Section 299 must be understood in the context of floor space index (FSI) as
provided under the Development Control Regulation of Greater Bombay 1991. The
argument is unacceptable.
22. FSI merely relates to the permission to build having regard to various
features such as height of the building, tenement density, object with which
the building is to be erected etc. The computation of the FSI is in a context
which is wholly different from the context in which the word has been used in
Section 299. In any event it is in dispute which structures are taken into
account for the purposes of calculating FSI.
23. Apart from the language of Section 299, and the immediate context in which
the Section appears the power to take over possession conferred on the
Commissioner under Section 299 in respect of certain structures is a summary
power. Having regard to the nature of the power, it is unlikely that the
legislature intended that the Commissioner would exercise such summary powers
in respect of independent structures which have been defined as 'building'
under the Act. Needless to say it is always open to the municipal authority
subject to the provisions of the Act, to acquire any land or building under
Section 296 of the Act.
24. In the circumstances of the case, we allow the appeal by setting aside the
impugned judgment as well as the impugned notice dated 16th November, 1999.
There will be no order as to costs.