SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Union of India
Vs.
M/s. Essel Mining and Industries Limited
C.A.No.5920 of 1999
(Arijit Pasayat and H.K.Sema JJ.)
09.08.2005
Arijit Pasayat, J.
1. Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment rendered by a Division Bench of
the Orissa High Court quashing Clause-iii of paragraph 7 of the Explanation in
Notification No.517(E) dated 12.07.1994 issued by the Government of India,
Ministry of Labour in purported exercise of powers conferred by Section 3(1)(b)
read with Section 4(1)(iii) and 5(2) of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 (in
short 'the Act). Stand of the writ petitioners before the High Court in the
writ petition was that the inclusion sought to be made was impermissible in the
background of what has been stated in The Mines Act, the Mines Rules and other
pieces of legislation dealing with mining activities. The relevant portion of
the Notification reads as follows:
EXPLANATION FOR THE PURPOSE OF THE NOTIFICATION:
"A person working or employed in or in connection with a mine is said to
be working or employed "below ground" if he is working or employed:-
(i) in a shaft which has been or is in the course of being sunk; or
(ii) in any excavation which extends below superjacent ground; or
(iii) in an open cast working in which the depth of the excavation measured
from its highest to its lowest point exceeds six metres." *
2. The High Court held that the authority issuing the Notification overlooked
that it did not have the source of statutory power to incorporate such
explanation in the Notification as done and, accordingly, as noted above, held
that though the Notification was in operation, the Clause-(iii) of paragraph 7
of the Explanation is non est.
3. Mr. Amarendra Sharan, learned Additional Solicitor General submitted that
the High Court failed to notice various facets of the Act and put unnecessary
stress on the statutes relating to mining activities which had no relevance so
far as the fixation of minimum wages is concerned. In response, Mr. Dushyant Dave,
learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent-Company submitted that the
classification contained in clauses (i) & (ii) of paragraph 7 of the
Notification do not pose any problem but clause-(iii) which was impugned
creates a class of employees which is not recognized under any statute relating
to mining activities and therefore there is no sanctity in the Notification so
far as that part is concerned.
4. We find that though the High Court referred to various statutes
relating to the mining activities, e.g. The Mining Act etc., it did not
indicate any reason as to why it was of the view that the authority issuing the
Notification lacked statutory power to issue the Notification. Though the
judgment runs to several pages, after noticing the rival submissions, the High
Court in a very cryptic manner, disposed of the writ petition coming to the
aforesaid view. It is not the number of pages in a judgment which is relevance.
It is on the other hand, the sufficiency of reasons indicated to justify the conclusions.
We may only add here that the paragraphs 28 and 29 of the judgment which
are supposed to contain the conclusion are not only confusing, but also make
little sense. They to quote the immortal words of Lord Summer in Rex. vs.
Nat Bell Liquors Ltd.1 "speak only with the
inscrutable face of a Sphink. "It is "unspeaking order" as
classically described by Lord Gairns IC in Overseas of the Poor of Walsall
Overseas vs. London & NWR Co.2. In the fitness of things,
therefore, the High Court should re-hear the writ petition and dispose of the
same by a reasoned order. We make it clear that we have not expressed any
opinion on the merits of the Case. It goes without saying that the parties
shall be free to place all relevant aspects for consideration of the High Court
when the matter is taken up afresh. It appears that no interim orders were
passed by this Court. While the writ petition is being heard by the High Court,
the relief that was granted to the writ petitioners, would be continued. By
granting this protection, it shall not be construed as if we have expressed any
opinion on the merits of the case. It would be relevant to note one further
fact, as contended by the respondent that a Notification containing similar
stipulation as was impugned, has been issued on 03.01.2002. The relevance and
effect thereof, it goes without saying, shall be considered by the High Court
if brought to its notice with appropriate pleadings. Since the dispute raised
in the writ petition filed in the year 1994, we request the High Court to
dispose of the writ petition as early as practicable.
The appeal is disposed of accordingly. No costs.
11922 AC 128
21879 (4) AC 30