SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Government of A.P.
Vs.
Kollutla Obi Reddy
C.A.No.3274-75 of 2003
(Arijit Pasayat and H.K.Sema JJ.)
10.08.2005
JUDGMENT
Arijit Pasayat, J.
1. In these appeals challenge is to the judgment of a Division
Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court setting aside the orders/awards made
under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (in short the 'Act') and
directing Land Acquisition Officer to pass fresh awards keeping in view the
observations made in the judgment.
2. A brief reference to the factual aspects would suffice.
3. In 1956 Nagarjuna Sagar Project (Acquisition of Lands) Act, 1956 (in
short the 'Nagarjuna Act') was enacted. Under the said Act Sections 11 and 23
of the Act were amended. In 1979 writ petition was filed by one K. Rangaiah and
others questioning constitutional validity of Nagarjuna Act. A Division Bench
of the Andhra Pradesh High Court by its judgment dated 31.8.1979 in writ
petition No.2110/79 (K. Rangaiah v. State of A.P.1) held that
the amendment to Section 23(1) (first clause) of the Act as made by the
Nagarjuna Act is violative of second proviso to Article 31-A of the Constitution
of India, 1950 (in short the 'Constitution') only so far it relates to
acquisition of land within the ceiling limit and is under personal cultivation.
The correctness of the judgment was questioned before this Court. Several other
writ petitions were also decided following K. Rangaiah's case (supra). All the
Civil Appeals against those judgments were taken up by a Constitution Bench in
Civil Appeal Nos.1220-42/82 and connected matters.
4. This Court did not go into the constitutional issues in view of the fact
that respondents were small land owners having less than one acre of land.
Possession has been taken in the lands involved in those appeals on different
dates between 1980 and 1984. Being of the impression that the notifications had
lapsed, fresh notifications were issued under Sections 4 and 6 in 1991. Land
Acquisition Officer after due inquiry determined the market value in accordance
with the Nagarjuna Act and the awards were made in 1992. In February 1997 and thereafter
writ petitions were filed questioning validity of the actions taken and prayed
for direction to determine the market value on the date of notification in 1991
under Section 4(1) of the Act without resorting to Nagarjuna Act.
5. The Division Bench held that subsequent notifications were really
unnecessary in view of the decision of this Court in Allahabad Development
Authority and Ors. v. Nasiruzzaman and Ors. 9). It was held that when
possession of the land has been taken pursuant to Section 17 of the Act, the
provisions of Section 11-A do not have any application. Therefore, subsequent
notifications were held to be of no consequence. After being held so, the High
Court remitted the matter to the Land Acquisition Officer by quashing the
awards and directed passing of fresh orders.
6. Learned counsel for the appellant-State and its functionaries submitted that
the High Court did not consider the specific plea raised regarding delayed
presentation of writ petition after long passage of time. Further the writ-
petitioner had not effectively availed the remedies available under the Act and
could not have indirectly asked for interference with the awards made long
prior to the filing of the writ petitions. It was further submitted that the
undisputed position is that references were pending in terms of Section 18 of
the Act when writ petitions were filed. That being so, the High Court should
not have entertained the writ petitions.
7. In response, learned counsel for the respondents submitted that this Court's
order in the earlier matters dated 8th July, 1996 to which reference has been
made earlier, did not in essence find fault with the reasoning of the High
Court in the earlier decision. Further, the Land Acquisition Officer had passed
the awards in some cases after the impugned judgments of the High Court were
passed and at this length of time this Court should not interfere.
8. We shall first deal with the plea relating to the maintainability of the
writ petition filed after long passage of time. In a catena of decisions this
Court has held that High Court should not entertain writ petitions when there
is delayed challenge to notification under Section 4(1) and declaration under
Section 6 of the Act. (See Aflatoon and Ors. v. Lt. Governor of Delhi ),
State of T.N. and Ors. v. L. Krishnan and Ors. ) and Municipal
Corporation of Greater Bombay v. Industrial Development Investment Co. Pvt.
Ltd. and Ors. 2).
9. The High Court was moved in these matters by writ petitions long after
Section 4(1) Notification and Section 6 declarations were made. On that ground
alone the writ petitions should not have been entertained. Additionally, the
respondents clearly accepted that references in terms of Section 18 were
pending. The High Court has not even indicated any reason as to why the writ
petitions were being entertained when the references in terms of Section 18
were pending. On that score also the High Court's judgment becomes
unsustainable.
10. We, therefore, set aside the judgment of the High Court. The references
which were pending and have been closed in view of the impugned judgment of the
High Court shall be revived. In some of these cases also the fresh awards have
been passed. They are set aside and the original reference stands revived. Only
references which were pending on the date of the High Court judgment i.e.
14.3.1997 shall stand revived. Other claims and adjudications, if any, pursuant
to the High Court's impugned order in these cases shall have no effect.
11. The appeals are accordingly allowed with no order as to costs.
11980 AIR(SC) 165