SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Mahadeo Bajirao Patil
Vs
State of Maharashtra
Appeal (Civil) 867 of 2003
(B.P.Singh and S.B.Sinha)
06/09/2005
B. P. SINGH, J.
This appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment and order of the
High Court of Judicature at Bombay dated October 30, 2001 in First Appeal No.
981 of 1996. By the aforesaid judgment the High Court allowed the appeal
preferred by the State of Maharashtra/respondent No.1 herein and held that the
application filed by respondent No.1 under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition
Act for making a reference was barred by limitation. The sole question which,
therefore, arises for consideration in the instant appeal is whether the said
application filed by the appellant herein under Section 18 of the Land
Acquisition Act was barred by time.
The facts of the case in so far as they are relevant for the disposal of this
appeal are as follows:-
One Kulkarni held a lease executed on December 3, 1979 for a period of 20 years
in respect of an area of 142 Hectares 78 Ares from the State of Maharashtra for
mining Silica sand. The aforesaid lessee applied to the State of Maharashtra on
May 3, 1991 for transfer of the mining lease in favour of the appellant herein.
In the mean time, on October 8, 1991 a proposal was submitted to the Collector
of Sindhudurg by Respondent No.136, namely, M/s. Konkan Railway Corporation
Ltd. for acquisition of land for the purpose of the said Corporation situated
in village Achirne. Pursuant thereto land measuring 13 Hectare 9 Ares were
notified for acquisition by Notification issued under Section 4 of the Land
Acquisition Act on February 13, 1992. Subsequent thereto the Government by its
Order dated February 20, 1992 allowed the application for transfer of mining
lease in favour of the appellant herein. This included the lands notified for
acquisition of village Achirne. The agreement was thereafter executed by and
between the aforesaid Kulkarni and the appellant on May 15, 1992 and the
lease-hold rights were transferred in favour of the appellant.
On July 25, 1992 a declaration under Section 6 of the Act was issued in respect
of the lands earlier notified on February 13, 1992.
Sometime in May 1994, the appellant filed a writ petition before the High Court
of Bombay being Writ Petition No. 1238 of 1994 for quashing the acquisition
proceeding as also the inquiry conducted under Sections 9 and 11 of the Act. It
was also prayed that respondent No.136 M/s. Konkan Railway Corporation. Ltd. be
restrained from taking any further action in the matter. This writ petition was
disposed of by order of June 7, 1994 which directed the State of Maharashtra to
comply with the requirements of Section 17(3)(a) of the Act within eight weeks
and declare the award within eight weeks thereafter. The award ultimately came
to be declared on August 29, 1994 which awarded compensation only to the land
owners/ respondents 2 to 135 and not to the appellant who was a mere lessee and
found not entitled to grant of compensation. It is also not disputed that on
September 18, 1994 a telegram was sent to the appellant herein by the Special
Land Acquisition Officer informing him of the declaration of the award which
translated into English reads as follows:-
"This Office No. LQN/Konkan Railway Project/Sank-3-Achirne 463/91 dated
31-8-94 be perused Mouje Achirne Taluka Vaibhavwadi Award No.463/91 has been
declared on 29-8-94".
"As per the discussion in this Award first demand is rejected". *
On receiving the telegram on September 20, 1994 the appellant immediately
applied to the Collector for providing him a copy of the award filed in his
office. Thereafter, on December 9, 1994, the appellant filed Writ Petition
No.447 of 1995 before the Bombay High Court. In the Writ Petition, he admitted
the fact that although an award had been declared by the Special Land
Acquisition Officer it had not been officially served upon him. The appellant
annexed to this writ petition as Ex. B an ordinary copy of the award and
challenged the validity of the award in as much as the appellant had not been
awarded any compensation. This writ petition was disposed of by the High Court
by its judgment and order of January 30, 1995 directing the appellant to seek
remedy under Section 18 of the Act with liberty to make an appropriate application
for condonation of delay. On February 20, 1995 an application under Section 18
of the Act was filed. The Joint Civil Judge who heard the aforesaid Land
Reference No.69 of 1995 allowed the reference application and awarded
compensation of Rs.4 crores to the appellant with interest @ 10% per annum from
November 1, 1996 onwards. We may only notice that in the aforesaid writ
petition the land owners/ respondents 2 to 135 were added as party respondents
while respondent No.136 intervened in the writ petition making a grievance that
in the land reference case no order should have been passed in the absence of
respondent 136 i.e. M/s Konkan Railway Corporation. Ltd. since the acquisition
was made at the instance of the aforesaid Corporation.
The State of Maharashtra challenged the judgment and order of the Joint Civil
Judge in First Appeal No.981 of 1996 before the Bombay High Court. It was
contended, inter alia, that the application for reference made under Section 18
was barred by limitation and there was no power in the Court or the Land
Acquisition Officer to condone the delay in filing an application under Section
18 of the Act. The High Court by its impugned judgment and order has upheld the
contention of the State of Maharashtra.
From the facts noticed above it cannot be disputed that an award had been
declared by the Special Land Acquisition Officer on August 29, 1994. Intimation
about the declaration of the award was sent to the appellant by telegram dated
September 18, 1994 which was admittedly received by the appellant on September
20, 1994. In the writ petition filed on December 9, 1994 the appellant admitted
knowledge of the fact that an award has been declared but asserted that a copy
of the award had not been officially served upon the appellant. However, an
ordinary copy of the award was annexed to the writ petition as Ext-B. The
application under Section 18 of the Act was made by the appellant on February
20, 1995. Section 18 of the Act reads as follows:-
"18.Reference to Court (1) Any person interested who has not accepted
the award may, by written application to the Collector, require that the matter
be referred by the Collector for the determination of the Court, whether his
objection be to the measurement of the land, the amount of the compensation,
the persons to whom it is payable, or the apportionment of the compensation
among the persons interested.
(2) The application shall state the grounds on which objection to the award is
taken: Provided that every such application shall be made
(a) if the person making it was present or represented before the Collector at
the time when he made his award, within six weeks from the date of the
Collector's award.
(b) in other cases, within six weeks of the receipt of the notice from the
Collector under section 12, sub-section (2); or within six months from the date
of the Collector's award, whichever period shall first expire". *
A mere perusal of section 18 discloses that there are three situations for
which period of limitation has been provided for making an application for
reference. Firstly, if the person making the application was present or
represented before the Collector at the time when he made his award, the
application must be filed within six weeks from the date of the Collector's
award. #
In the instant case, it is not disputed that the appellant was not present when the award was made and, therefore, Section 18(2)(a) is not applicable to the facts of this case.
Second and third situations are envisaged by Section 18 (2) (b). The second
situation envisaged is where a notice is received by the applicant under
Section 12 sub-section (2) of the Act. In such a case, the period of limitation
prescribed is six weeks from the date of the receipt of the notice or within
six months from the date of the Collector's award whichever period shall first
expire. In the instant case, the High Court has held the application to be
barred by limitation, firstly, on the ground that the telegram sent to the
appellant on September 18, 1994 amounted to a notice under sub-section (2) of
Section 12 of the Act, and secondly, on the ground that in any event as on
December 9, 1994 the applicant had not only knowledge of the fact that an award
had been declared but had also a copy of the award which he annexed with writ
petition as Ext.B. If the date of knowledge is taken to be December 8, 1994,
even then the application under Section 18 was barred by limitation. The
correctness of these findings has been assailed before us.
It is by now well settled that notice under Section 12(2) of the Act is a
clear intimation of making of the award requiring the owner or person
interested to receive the compensation awarded under Section 11 of the Act. It
is not necessary that the notice should contain all the details of the award
including the consideration by the Land Acquisition Collector and its manner of
determination of the compensation. No particular form is prescribed by the Act
or the Rules. #
In State of Punjab and another vs. Satinder Bir Singh: 6 (referred) this Court held:-
"The question then is whether the notice under Section 12(2) is a valid
notice. From a conjoint reading of Sections 11 and 12, it is clear that notice
is only an intimation of making of the award requiring the owner or person
interested to receive compensation awarded under Section 11. On receipt of the
notice, if the person interested receives compensation without protest,
obviously no reference need be made. The determination of compensation becomes
final and binds the parties. When he receives the compensation under protest as
contemplated under Section 31 of the Act, the need to make the application for
reference under Section 18(1) would arise. At that juncture it will be open to
the person interested either to make an inspection of the award which was
conclusive between him and the Collector by operation of sub-section (1) of
Section 12, or seek a certified copy of the award from the Collector and the contents.
Thereon he could make necessary objection for the determination inter alia, of
compensation for the land. It is not necessary that the notice should contain
all the details of the award including his consideration and its manner of
determination of the compensation as opined by the learned Judge of the High
Court. It is not incumbent that the person interested should immediately make
the reference application on his receiving compensation under Section 31. In
other words receipt of the amount and making the reference application are not
simultaneous. The statutory operation of limitation mentioned by Section 18(2)
does not depend on the ministerial act of communication of notice in any
particular form when the Act or Rules has not prescribed any form. The
limitation begins to operate from the moment the notice under Section 12(2) is
received or as envisaged by Section 18(2)". *
It is not disputed that a telegram was sent to the appellant by the Special
Land Acquisition Officer informing the appellant that the award had been
declared on August 29, 1994 and further stating that the first demand as
discussed in the award was rejected. The counsel for the appellant sought to
contend before us that though this telegram intimated the factum of declaration
of the award necessary particulars were not disclosed therein. On the other
hand, counsel for respondent No.1 and 136 contended that the telegram clearly
mentions the fact that the demand of the appellant had been rejected. The
appellant sought to contend that the reference to "first demand" in
the telegram is to the request of the appellant made on September 15, 1993 to
change the alignment of the railway track so that the mining area of which the
appellant was the lessee, was not disturbed. It was this demand that had been
rejected. Such a plea does not appear to have been raised before the High
Court. The appellant has not placed before us a copy of the award declared by
the Special Land Acquisition Officer. The representation made by him on
September 15, 1993 to the Collector, Sindhudurg, of which copy had no doubt
been endorsed to the Special Land Acquisition Officer, did not relate to any
claim of compensation payable in respect of the lands to be acquired. It was
only a representation confined to the request made by the appellant to change
the railway alignment so that the mining area was not disturbed. He submitted
that the appellant later claimed compensation amounting to Rs.29 crores by a
demand made on May 26, 1994. We are not persuaded to accept this contention.
The Special Land Acquisition Officer while making an award was certainly not
concerned with the alteration of railway track alignment. He was only concerned
with the grant of compensation in accordance with law relating to the lands
forming subject matter of the declaration under Section 6 of the Act. The
submission urged on behalf of the appellant before the High Court that since no
amount had been awarded to the appellant, the award declared on August 29, 1994
was not an award under Section 11 of the Land Acquisition Act, must also be
rejected. It is not disputed before us and also noticed by the High Court, that
the Land Acquisition Officer held that the appellant being a lessee was not
entitled to any compensation and compensation was payable only to the land
owners, namely, respondents 2 to 135.
We are here not concerned with the correctness of the decision, but the fact
remains that having considered the claim of the appellant for compensation, the
Special Land Acquisition Officer rejected the claim. This does amount to the
making of an award, commonly described as "nil award". If the
appellant was aggrieved by such an award, it was open to him to seek reference
under Section 18 of the Act which the appellant actually did. We, therefore, cannot
hold that no award as envisaged by Section 11 of the Act was declared on August
29, 1994, since the claim of the appellant was considered and was totally
rejected. There was, therefore, no question of giving any calculation of the
manner in which the compensation was computed. Since, the application under
Section 18 was not filed within six weeks of the receipt of notice under
Section 12(2) of the Act, the High Court did not commit any error in holding
that the application was barred by limitation. It was not disputed before us
that the Land Acquisition Officer making a reference, or the Court considering
a reference under Section 18 of the Act has no power of condonation of delay in
making an application under the aforesaid Section.
The next ground on which the High Court held the application to be barred by
limitation is that in any event the appellant had knowledge of the award being
made on December 8, 1994, since he filed a copy of the award as annexure to the
writ petition filed on December 9, 1994 and, therefore, should have filed the
application under Section 18 of the Act within six weeks. The submission urged
on behalf of the appellant relying upon the decision of this Court in Raja
Harish Chandra Raj Singh Vs. The Deputy Land Acquisition Officer and Anr.
(referred) that in the instant case even if it is assumed that the appellant
had knowledge of the award at least on December 8, 1994, he could make an
application within six months from the date of such knowledge, would have
deserved serious consideration, but for the finding recorded by us earlier that
the appellant had notice under Section 12(2) of the Act and, therefore, period
of limitation for filing the application under Section 18 was six weeks from
the date of receipt of the notice and not six months from the date of knowledge
of the award.
In the view that we have taken, we find no merit in this appeal and the same
is, accordingly, dismissed.