SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Municipal Corporation Chandigarh and Others, Etc
Vs
Messrs Shantikunj Investment Private Limited Etc
Appeal (Civil) 1342 of 2006 Arising Out of Slp(Civil) No. 12794/2001; Civil Appeal Nos .Of 2006 , [Arising Out of Slp(Civil) Nos. 12935/2001, 12987/2001, 12995/2002, 13449/2001, 14289/2003, 16503/2001, 18353/2002, 18911/2002, 18978/2002, 22515/2002, 23737/2002, 23738/2002, 23941/2002, 2948/2003, 3601/2003, 5748/2003, 9178/2003 & 13640-13641/2004] [With Slp(Civil) No 22517/2002]
(B. N. Agarwal and A. K. Mathur, JJ)
28.02.2006
A. K. MATHUR, J.
Leave granted.
All these petitions involve common question of law, therefore, these are taken up together for disposal by the common judgment.
In all these petitions, there are two class of petitions, one filed by the
private parties/individuals against the Division Bench judgment of the Punjab
& Haryana High Court whereby the Division Bench has not given any relief
following its judgment passed in CWP No.13695 of 2001 dated 18.2, 2002 [M/s.
D.L.G.Builders Private Limited vs. The Advisor to the Administrator, Chandigarh
Administration & Ors.]. The relevant portion of that judgment reads as
under:
"In our considered view, the allottee is bound to pay the premium and
other charges in accordance with the conditions of allotment. If the judgment
of M/s. Shanti Kunj Investments Pvt. Ltd.(supra) is read as laying down a
proposition that the allottee is not obliged to pay the balance of premium even
after raising construction of the building and occupying it on the pretext that
beautification of the site has not been done or land-scaping has not been
provided or payment of the tiles has not been done, extremely anomalous
consequences would follow inasmuch as, the allottee would construct building
and utilize the same by renting out or otherwise and hereby reap huge benefits,
but would not pay a single penny towards balance of premium and ground rent
etc.
Therefore, while examining the complaint of the allottee about the lack of amenities, what the Court is required to consider is whether the basic amenities, electricity, approach road, sewerage and drainage have been provided in the area so as to facilitate construction of the building within the specified time. If such amenities have been provided, the Court will not interdict in the matter and facilitate withholding of the balance of premium, ground rent etc. Rather, it would insist that all the dues of public money are paid by the allottee in accordance with the relevant rules/ regulations and conditions of allotment."
Another class of cases in which the Municipal Corporation of Chandigarh and the Chandigarh Administration have filed the special leave petitions against the order passed by the Division Bench of the Punjab & Haryana High Court against the judgment dated 2.2.2002 passed in M/s. Shantikunj Investment Pvt. Ltd. and batch. Relevant portion of the judgment reads as under :
"They having failed to provide the basic amenities, the order of resumption
and forfeiture cannot be sustained.
The impugned orders are, consequently set aside. The respondents are directed
to provide the amenities in accordance with law. The needful shall be done
within three months. No interest shall be chargeable from the petitioners if
they make the entire outstanding amount within three months from the date of
the provision of the amenities."
It would not be proper to refer to all individual cases because various orders have
been passed by the High Court from time to time but largely, the cases have
been divided into two class of cases i.e. one governed by M/s. Shantikunj
Investment Pvt. Ltd. and the other governed by M/s. D.L.G. Builders Private
Limited. We are only deciding the question in principle and leaving the rest to
be decided by the High Court. In all these petitions, the common question is
whether grant of the amenities is a condition precedent or not. All the plots
in question were allotted by the Chandigarh Administration as well as the
Municipal Corporation of Chandigarh on certain terms and conditions of the sale
of residential and commercial sites & buildings by auction on lease for 99
years and certain terms and conditions were laid down therein. But the challenge
in these various petitions filed before the Punjab & Haryana High Court was
that the basic amenities were not provided and, therefore, the Chandigarh
Administration and the Municipal Corporation of Chandigarh were not entitled to
charge interest @ 18% or 10%, as the case may be, on the installment as well as
non-payment of installment and non-payment of the ground rents. Likewise, they
cannot charge the penalty for delayed payment at the rate of 10% and at the
rate of 24% interest on the amount falling short of equated instalment or part
thereof and likewise on the ground rents. So far as the Division Bench of
Punjab & Haryana High Court in the case of Shanti Kunj Investment (supra)
held that providing of amenities is a condition precedent to the payment of the
interest and penalty. As against this, two Division Bench in the case of G.S.
Khurana vs. Chandigarh Administration by order dated 18.2.2002 and in the case
of DLG Builders Pvt. Ltd. vs. The Advisor to the Chandigarh Administration have
taken a different view in the matter.
In Shanti Kunj, the Division Bench held that grant of amenities is a condition
precedent whereas, in the case of DLG Builders and G.S. Khurana, it took a
contrary view to the effect that it is not a condition precedent. This apparent
contrary view has given rise to all the litigation before this Court. In order
to resolve the inconsistent view of the two Division Bench, we shall deal with
the issue involved in the matter in a great detail hereinafter.
In order to appreciate the controversy involved in the matter, we may refer to
few bare facts in the case of Municipal Corporation, Chandigarh & Ors. vs.
M/s. Shanti Kunj Investment Pvt. Ltd. in SLP(Civil) No. 12794/2001. Seven
petitioners in the aforesaid petition were the allottees of different
commercial sites. The grievance was that the Chandigarh Administration has
failed to provide basic amenities/facilities for use and occupation of the
sites sold to them. It is alleged that they are guilty of mal- administration.
They have arbitrarily charged the ground rent, interest and penal interest and
they are resorting to the resumption of the sites for non- payment thereof.
Therefore, all these petitioners filed joint petitions in the High Court for
redressal of their grievances. On February 12, 1989 the Chandigarh
Administration auctioned a godown site No. 290, Sector 26, Chandigarh. The
petitioner, along with two brothers gave a bid for a premium of Rs. 22, 10,
000/-It was accepted and they deposited 25% of the bid money, viz. Rs. 5, 52,
500/-. The letter of allotment was issued on March 16, 1989. The site was given
for 99 years on lease-hold basis. As per the terms of allotment, the petitioner
had to pay the amount along with interest @ 7% in three equal yearly
installments of Rs. 6, 31, 590/-. This payment had to commence from the date of
auction. Besides that, the allottee had also to pay an annual ground rent @ 55,
250/- for the first 33 years. The petitioner commenced the construction, but he
found that there were high voltage electric wires passing over the site.
The sewerage system had not been laid on the site. There were a large number of
Jhuggies adjacent to the place. The petitioner submitted representation to the
Estate Officer with a request to remove the unauthorized Jhuggies and to take
necessary steps for providing the amenities. But no amenities such as roads,
water supply, landscaping etc. were provided. It was alleged that since the
petitioner had paid the entire premium as provided under the Act and Rules,
therefore, no interest or ground rent can be charged till all the amenities, as
required under the Act and Rules, are provided. Hence, with this grievance, the
petitioner approached the High Court. The High Court examined all the
provisions and came to the conclusion that Chandigarh Administration cannot
charge interest @ 18%. Though, initially the interest was charged as 7%, but
ultimately by notification it was increased to 10%. It was held by the Division
Bench that there was no notification for charging the interest @ 18% and it was
conceded before us that so far as this part of the order is concerned, the
Administration does not challenge and the petitioner will be charged @ 10%.
The other aspect was also examined by the Division Bench and they gave an
extended meaning to the definition as provided under Section 2(b) 'amenities'
of the Capital of Punjab (Development and Regulation) Act,
1952 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act'). As against this, another
Division Bench in the case of DLG Builders (supra) took a contrary view and
held that no extended meaning of 'amenities' as defined in Section 2(b) of the
Act can be given that providing of facilities is a condition precedent for
charging of the interest.
In order to appreciate the whole controversy involved in these cases, it will
be useful to refer to the necessary provisions of the Act and Rules bearing on
the subject. The allotment of the site in question was given under the Act and
the Rules framed thereunder known as 'Chandigarh Lease-Hold of Sites and Buildings
Rules, 1973. These provisions are applicable to both sets of cases i.e.
allotment of commercial sites as well as residential, made by the Chandigarh
Administration and Chandigarh Municipal Corporation. Section 2 of the Act deals
with definition. Section 2(b) defines 'amenity' as under:
"2(b). 'amenity' includes roads, water-supply, street lighting,
drainage, sewerage, public building, horticulture, landscaping and any other
public utility service provided at Chandigarh."
Section 2(f) defines 'erect a building' which reads as under:
"2(f). 'erect a building' has the same meaning as 'erect or re-erect
any building' in the Punjab Municipal Act, 1911 (Punjab Act III of 1911)."
Section 2(i) defines 'prescribed' which means prescribed by rules made under
this Act. Section 2(j) defines 'site' which means any land which is transferred
by the Central Government under Section 3. Section 2(k) defines 'transferee',
which reads as under:
"2(k). 'transferee' means a person (including a firm or other body of
individuals, whether incorporated or not) to whom a site or building is
transferred in any manner whatsoever, under this Act and includes his
successors and assigns."
Section 5 of the Act provides a bar to erection of buildings in contravention
of buildings rules. Section 6 lays down power to require proper maintenance of
site or building which reads as under:
"6. Power to require proper maintenance of site or building. If it
appears to the Chief Administrator that the condition or use of any site or building
is prejudicially affecting the proper planning of, or the amenities in, any
part of Chandigarh or the interest of the general public there, he may serve on
the transferee or occupier of that site or building a notice requiring him to
take such steps and within such period as may be specified in the notice and
thereafter to maintain it in such a manner as may be specified therein."
Section 7 provides for Levy of fee or tax for amenities which reads as under:
"7. Levy of fee or tax for amenities. (1) For the purposes of providing
maintaining or continuing any amenity at Chandigarh the [Central Government]
may levy such fees or taxes as it may consider necessary which shall be in
addition to any fee or tax for the time being leviable under any other law in
respect of any site or building on the transferee or occupier thereof."
Section 8 provides for imposition of penalty and mode of recovery of arrears.
Section 8-A provides for resumption and forfeiture for breach of conditions of
transfer which reads as under:
"8-A. Resumption and forfeiture for breach of conditions of transfer.
(1) If any transferee has failed to pay the consideration money or any
instalment thereof on account of the sale of any site or building or both,
under section 3 or has committed a breach of any other conditions of such sale,
the Estate Officer may, by notice in writing, call upon the transferee to show
cause why an order of resumption of the site or building, or both, as the case
may be, and forfeiture of the whole or any part of the money, if any, paid in
respect thereof which in no case shall exceed ten per cent of the total amount
of the consideration money, interest and other dues payable in respect of the
sale or the site or building, or both should not be made.
(2) After considering the cause, if any, shown by the transferee in pursuance
of a notice under sub- section (1) and any evidence he may produce in support
of the same and after giving him a reasonable opportunity of being heard in the
matter, the Estate Officer may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, make an
order resuming the site or building or both, as the case may be, so sold and
directing the forfeiture as provided in sub- section (1), of the whole or any
part of the money paid in respect of such sale."
The relevant rules which have been framed in exercise of this Act under power
conferred by Sections 3 and 22 by the Act of 1952 are known as 'Chandigarh
Lease-Hold of Sites and Buildings Rules, 1973' (hereinafter referred to as the
'Rules'). Rule 3(2) defines 'premium' which reads as under:
"3(2). 'Premium' means the price paid or promised for the transfer of a
right to enjoy immovable property under these rules"
Some of the relevant Rules are quoted as under:
"4. The Chandigarh Administration may demise sites and buildings at
Chandigarh on lease for 99 years. Such leases may be given by allotment or by
auction in accordance with these rules.
5. For the purpose of proper planning and development and for the
implementation of any scheme framed by the Chandigarh Administration, the Chief
Administrator may reserve sites/buildings for groups of individuals or for
persons practicing any profession or carrying on any occupation, trade or
business, or for the implementation of any scheme framed by the Chandigarh
Administration.
6. Commencement and period of lease. The lease shall commence from the date of
allotment or auction as the case may be, and shall be for a period of 99 years.
After the expiry of said period of 99 years the lease may be renewed for such
further period and on such terms and conditions as the Government may decide.
8. Lease by allotment, Procedure for. (1) In case of allotment of site of
building the intending lessee shall make an application to the Estate Officer
in Form 'A'. (2) No application under sub-rule (1) shall be valid unless it is
accompanied by 10 per cent of the premium as earnest money in the prescribed
mode of payment. (3) When 10 per cent of the premium has been so tendered the
Estate Officer shall, subject to such directions as may be issued by the Chief
Administration in this behalf, allot a site of the size applied for or a
building of which particulars are given in the application and shall intimate,
by registered post the number, sector, approximate area, premium and the rent
of the site or building allotted to the applicant.
(4) The applicant shall, unless he refuses to accept the allotment within 30
days of the date of the receipt of the allotment order, deposit within that
period and in the prescribed mode of payment, further 15 per cent of the
premium. The remaining 75 per cent of the premium shall be paid as provided in
rule 12.
(5) If the applicant refuses to accept the allotment within said period of 30
days, he will be entitled to the refund of the amount paid by him. The refusal
shall be communicated to the Estate Officer by a registered letter
(acknowledgement due). The refund shall be made by means of a cheque payable at
the State Bank of India at Chandigarh and the applicant shall bear the
collection charges for the same.
(6) If the applicant fails to communicate his refusal to accept the allotment
within 30 days and also fails to deposit 15 per cent of the premium under
sub-rule (4) the Estate Officer may forfeit the whole or part of the earnest
money.
9. Lease by auction, Procedure for.In case of auction at least 25 per cent of
the bid accepted by the Auctioning Officer shall be paid on the spot by the
intending lessee in the prescribed mode of payment in accordance with Rule 12.
Provided that the Estate Officer may, in his absolute discretion, allow the
successful bidder to deposit in the prescribed mode or payment not less than 10
per cent of the bid on the condition that the difference between the amount
deposited and 25 per cent of the bid shall be deposited in the same manner
within 30 days of auction.
10. Delivery of Possession. Actual possession of the site/building shall be
delivered to the lessee on payment of 25 per cent of the premium in accordance with
rule 8 or rule 9 as the case may be. Provided that no ground rent payable under
rule 13 and interest on the instalments of premium payable under sub-rule (2)
of the Rule 12 shall be paid by the lessee till the actual and physical
possession of the site/building is delivered or offered to be delivered to him,
whichever is earlier.
11. Premium. (1) In case of allotment, the premium shall be such amount as may
be determined by Chandigarh Administration.
(2) In case of auction, the premium shall be the bid accepted by the Estate
Officer, as a result of bidding in open auction.
12. Payment of premium and consequences of non-payment or late payment (1) In
addition to payment of 25 per cent premium under rule 8 or 9 as the case may
be, the remaining 75 per cent premium may be paid in lump sum within 30 days
from the date of allotment/auction without any interest.
(2) If payment is not made in accordance with sub- rule (1) of this rule, the
balance of the 75 per cent premium shall be paid in three annual equated
instalments or more as the Chief Administrator may in exceptional circumstances
of a case fix within prior approval of the Chief Commissioner along with
interest at the rate of 10 per cent per annum or at such higher rate of
interest as may be fixed by the Chief Administrator by a notification in the
official Gazette before the commencement of the lease. The first instalment
shall become payable after one year from the date of allotment/auction.
Provided that in the case of allotment of site or building of Small Scale
Industries as defined by Chandigarh Administration from time to time in the
Industrial area, the balance of the 75 per cent of the premium may be paid in
ten annual equated instalments or such other number of annual equated
instalments as may from time to time be fixed by the Chief Administrator along
with interest at the rate of 10 per cent per annum or such higher rate of
interest as may be fixed by the Chief Administrator by a notification before
the commencement of the lease.
(3) In case any instalment is not paid by the lessee by the date on which it is
payable, a notice may be served on the lessee calling upon him to pay the
instalment within a period of 3 months together with a penalty which may extend
upto 10 per cent of the amount due. If the payment is not made within the said
period, the Estate Officer may cancel the lease and or forfeit the whole or any
part of the money if paid in respect thereof which, in no case, shall exceed 10
per cent of the total amount of the consideration money, interest and other
dues payable in respect of the lease: Provided that forfeiture will not be made
in addition to penalty.
Provided further that no order of cancellation or forfeiture shall be made
without giving the lessee reasonable opportunity of being heard. If the order
of cancellation is for non- payment of penalty, the lessee may show cause why
the penalty should not have been levied.
(3-A) In case any equated instalment or ground rent or part thereof is not paid
by the lessee by the date on which it became payable he shall be liable to pay
in respect of that instalment or ground rent or part thereof as the case may
be, interest calculated at the rate of twenty four per cent per annum from the
date on which the instalment or ground rent became payable till such date it is
actually paid.
(4) Each instalment shall be remitted to the Estate Officer by the prescribed
mode of payment. Every such remittance shall be accompanied by a letter showing
full particulars of the site or building to which the payment pertains or a
statement giving reference to the number and date of the allotment referred to
in rule 8. In the absence of these particulars, the amount remitted shall be
deemed to have been received only on the date when the remitter supplies
correct and complete information.
13. Rent and consequences of non-payment.In addition to the premium, whether in
respect of site or building, the lessee shall pay rent as under:
(i) Annual rent shall be 2-1/2 per cent of the premium for the first 33 years
which may be enhanced by the Chandigarh Administration to 3-3/4 per cent of the
premium for the next 33 years and to 5 per cent of the premium for the
remaining period of the lease.
(ii) Rent shall be payable annually on the due date without any demand from the
Estate Officer. Provided that the Estate Officer may for good and sufficient
reasons extend the time for payment of rent upto six months on the whole on
further payment of 6 per cent per annum interest from the due date upto the
date of actual payment.
(iii) If rent is not paid by the due date, the lessee shall be liable to pay a
penalty not exceeding 100 per cent of the amount due which may be imposed and
recovered in the manner laid down in section 8 of the Capital
of Punjab (Development and Regulation) Act, 1952, as amended by Act No.
17 of 1973.
14. Execution of lease deed. (1) After payment of 25 per cent premium the
lessee shall execute a lease deed in Form B, B-I, B-II, or C, as the case may be,
in such manner as may be directed by the Estate Officer within six months of
the date of allotment/auction or within such further period as the Estate
Officer may, for good and sufficient reasons, allow.
(2) If the lessee fails to execute a lease deed in accordance with sub-rule (1)
of this rule, the State Officer may cancel the lease and forfeit a sum up to 25
per cent of the premium. Provided that before taking action under sub-rule (2)
of this rule, the Estate Officer shall afford a reasonable opportunity to the
lessee of being heard."
In this background of the Act and the Rules, the question before us is whether
the grant of amenities is a condition precedent or not. Learned counsel for the
respondents contended that Rule 12(2) of the Rules should be interpreted in the
sense that when staggering instalment has been paid, then the allottee is
required to deposit the balance 75 per cent of the premium in three annual
equated instalments and the first instalment falling due after one year from
the date of allotment, it should be construed that the authorities were
supposed to provide all the necessary amenities in the meantime. In that
connection, learned counsel has submitted that it was legitimate expectation of
the allottee that within one year all the basic amenities shall be provided. It
was further submitted by learned counsel that Rule 12(2) of the Rules should be
interpreted to mean that there is implied covenant that the authorities will
provide all the amenities within one year. In this connection, learned counsel
referred to a decision of this Court in the case of Kumari Shrilekha Vidyarthi
& Ors. V. State of U.P. & Ors. reported in and in the case of
Jamshed Hormusji Wadia v. Board of Trustees, Port of Mumbai & Anr. reported
in It was also contended that the authorities should not charge compound
interest. It was also contended that the word "amenities" should be
given extended meaning and "amenities" as defined in Section 2(b)
read with Rule 11, that the amenities should be provided first otherwise the
expression " enjoy" appearing in Rule 3(2) will be redundant. In this
connection, learned counsel has referred to Section 67 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 that promisee has failed to
perform its promise and further submitted that by virtue of Section 2(a) of the
Specific Relief Act, 1963; when the property had
been leased out it presupposes that the amenities should be provided when the
premium is paid. In this connection, learned counsel for the respondents has
invited our attention to Sections 105 and 108 of the Transfer
of Property Act, 1882 with specific reference to rights and liabilities
of lessor and lessee. It was contended that both should be co-terminus. In this
connection, the following decisions of this Court were cited by learned
counsel.
1. [ Commissioner of Income Tax v. Sun Engineering Works (P) Ltd]
2. [ Divisional Cotroller, KSRTC v. Mahadeva Shetty & Anr.]
3. [ Megh Singh v. State of Punjab]
4. [ Collector of Central Excise, Calcutta v. Alnoori Tobacco Products
& Anr.]
It was also contended that the statute should be interpreted in the manner
which advanced the cause of the public. In this connection, the following
decisions of this Court were cited by learned counsel for the respondents.
1. [ K.P.Varghese v. Income Tax Officer, Ernakulam & Anr]
2. [ State of Haryana & Ors. V. Bhajan Lal & Ors.]
3. 3 [ C.B.Gautam v. Union of India &
Ors.] As against this learned counsel appearing for the appellant submitted
that in fact the expression, "amenities" cannot be given extended
meaning and the consistent case of the Administration was that necessary
amenities had already been provided and in some of the plots, the buildings had
been constructed. In some cases, the premises had been let out. Therefore, it
was the case of the appellant throughout before the High Court as well as
before this Court that providing amenities was never a condition precedent and
whatever necessary facilities/ amenities which were required in the matter had
already been provided. Learned counsel for the Chandigarh Administration and
for the Municipal Corporation submitted that the Corporation/ Administration
are not running away from their legal obligation to provide necessary
facilities, which have already been provided and whatever remains to be
provided, shall be provided. It was contended that tar road could not be
constructed because on most of the places construction was in progress and the
construction materials were lying on the road. Therefore, it was not possible
to proceed with the construction of tar road. However, the Administration is
under obligation to provide necessary facilities as per the provisions of the
Act and the Rules. It was also submitted that in the case of M/s.DLG Builders,
the High Court has already dismissed large number of writ petitions holding
that providing of amenities is not a condition precedent. In this connection,
learned counsel for the appellant-Administration has invited our attention to a
decision of this Court in the case of Sector-6, Bahadurgarh Plot Holders'
Association (Regd.) & Ors. V. State of Haryana & Anr. reported in
wherein a three Judge Bench of this Court in no uncertain terms has held
that providing of the amenities is not a condition precedent. Therefore, it was
contended by learned counsel for the appellant- Administration that it cannot
be constructed to be a condition precedent in the matter.
We have bestowed our best of the attention to the provisions of the Act and the
Rules. On a plain reading of the definition "amenities" read with
Rule 11(2) and Rule 12, it cannot be construed to mean that the allottees could
take upon themselves not to pay the lease amount and take recourse to say that
since all the facilities were not provided, therefore, they are not under any
obligation to pay the instalment, interest and penalty, if any, as provided
under the Act and the Rules. It is not possible to accept a sweeping
proposition that if all the facilities or amenities are not provided, then the
allottees/ lessees can take upon themselves not to pay the lease amount,
interest and penalty would be going too far. It has never been the condition
precedent. It is true that in order to fully enjoy the allotment, proper
linkage is necessary. But to say that this is a condition precedent, that is not
the correct approach in the matter. "Amenity" has been defined under
Section 2(b) of the Act which includes roads, water-supply, street lighting,
drainage, sewerage, public building, horticulture, landscaping and any other
public utility service provided at Chandigarh. That is a statutory obligation
but it is not a condition precedent as contended by learned counsel for the
respondents. It is true the word, "enjoy" appearing in the definition
of the word "premium" in Rule 3(2) of the Rules, means the price paid
or promised for the transfer of a right to enjoy immovable property under the
Rules. It was very seriously contended before us that the word, enjoy immovable
property necessarily means that the Administration should provide all the basic
amenities as appearing under Section 2(b) of the Act for enjoying that
allotment. The expression "premium" appearing in the present context
does not mean that the allottees/ lessees cannot enjoy the immovable property
without those amenities being provided. The word "enjoy" here in the
present context means that the allottees have a right to use the immovable
property which has been leased out to them on payment of premium i.e. the
price. This is only the price to enjoy that allotted/leased property. Otherwise,
walking over to that property will mean to trespass.
This is only a permissive possession. Since the allottees had paid the price or
promised to pay after the transfer of the right to enjoy the immovable
property, this cannot be construed that the property cannot be enjoyed without
providing the basic amenities. It is the common experience that for full
development of an area it takes years. It is not possible in every case that
the whole area is developed first and allotment is served on a platter.
Allotment of the plot was made, as is where is basis and the Administration
promised that the basic amenities will be provided in due course of time. It
cannot be made a condition precedent. This has never been a condition of the
auction or of the lease. As per the terms of allotment upon payment of the 25
per cent, possession will be handed over and rest of the 75 per cent of the
leased amount to be paid in a staggered manner i.e. in three annual equated
instalments along with interest at the rate of 10 per cent. If someone wants to
deposit the whole of the 75 per cent of the amount he can do so. In that case,
he will not be required to pay any interest. But if a party wants to make
payment within a period of three years then he is under the obligation to pay
10 per cent interest on the amount of instalment. This is the obligation on the
part of the allottee as per the condition of lease and he cannot get out of it
by saying that the basic amenities have not been provided for enjoying the
allotted land, therefore he is not entitled to pay the interest. This
construction is not borne out from the scheme of the Act and the Rules. It is
true that the Administration has an obligation but it is not a condition
precedent in the present case. "Amenity" has been interpreted in the
Advanced Law Lexicon (3rd Edition, 2005 at page 237) as follows:
" IN REAL PROPERTY LAW, such circumstances, in regard to situation,
view, location, access to a water course, or the like, as enhance the pleasantness
or desirability of the property for purposes of residence, or contribute to the
pleasure and enjoyment of the occupants, rather than to their indispensable
needs. Extras or intangible items often associated with property. They may be
tangible. Often amenities in a condominium include swimming pools, landscaping,
and tennis court."
Therefore, the term amenity in the context of real estate is to mean the
facilities as provided under Section 2(b) of the Act but it can never be
treated to mean that this is a condition precedent. It is for the better use of
the allotted piece of land but that does not mean that it should be provided
first as a condition precedent in the matter in the present case. Learned
counsel invited our attention to the expression , " enjoy" as per the
Webster's Dictionary, which means as follows:
" to have, possess, and use with satisfaction; to have, hold, or
occupy, as a good or profitable thing, or as something desirable; as, we enjoy
many privileges."
It is true that once allotment of the land has been made in favour of the
allottee, he can take possession of the property and use the same in accordance
with the Rules. That does not mean that all the facilities should be provided
first for so called enjoyment of the property this was not the condition of
auction. Party knew the location & condition prevailing thereon. The
interpretation given by the Division Bench of the High Court of Punjab &
Haryana and contended before us cannot be accepted as a settled proposition of
law. In the present case, as per the Act and the Rules it is never a condition
precedent of the auction or as per the lease that all the facilities like,
road, water-supply, street lighting, drainage, sewerage, public building,
horticulture, landscaping shall be a condition precedent. Nowhere in the
conditions of lease or in the auction it is provided that this will be done
first though it had been contended by the Administration that the basic
amenities have already been provided. Be that as it may, in the present context
it cannot be construed that it is a condition precedent. In this connection,
our attention was drawn to a decision of this Court in the case of Sector-6,
Bahadurgarh Plot Holders' Association (Regd.) & Ors. V. State of Haryana
& Ors reported in (relied on), which has an important bearing. In
this case, the Punjab Urban Estates (Sales of Sites) Rules, 1965, Punjab Urban
Estates (Development and Regulation)Act, 1964 and Haryana Urban Development
Authority ( Disposal of Land and Buildings) Regulations, 1978, came up for
consideration and in that context, a three Judge Bench of this Court
categorically held as follows:
"To decide the aforesaid submission of Shri Bhandare we would really be
required to find out as to whether the offer was of developed plots or
undeveloped plots. As the offer had stated that modern amenities noted above
" will be provided", it cannot be held that till the amenities as
mentioned have become fully functional, the offer is incomplete. It is for this
reason that the fact that full development has not yet taken place, even if
that be the position as contended by Shri Bhandare, cannot be a ground to hold
that interest has not become payable. It is true that the applicants were given
to understand that the amenities noted above would become available (and within
reasonable time), the fact that the same did not become available to the
desired extent could not be a ground not to accept delivery of possession. From
the order of the High Court which we have quoted above, we find that the offer
of possession of the undeveloped plot was not accepted by the counsel of the
appellant.
That order being of 17-10-1980, we are of the view that interest did become
payable from that date. The fact that the plot has not yet been fully developed,
as is the case of the appellant, has, therefore, no significance insofar as
charging of interest is concerned. We are not in a position to accept the
submission of Shri Bhandare that equity would not demand charging of interest,
even though the plots are yet to be fully developed. When parties enter into
contract, they are to abide by the terms and conditions of the same, unless the
same be inequitable. In the present case, question of equity does not really
arise inasmuch as the condition relating to interest is founded on a statutory
rule, vires of which has not been challenged. The provision in a cognate rule
cannot alter the consequence which has to follow from the rule which holds the
field. In the present case, it being the Punjab Rules under which the allotment
was made, we are not in a position to agree with Shri Bhandare, despite his
forceful submissions, that the appellants may not be asked to pay interest,
despite their having been no offer of delivery of possession of fully developed
plots."
Similar is the position here also though the Rules are not almost identical but
somewhat similar. In the present case, the effort of learned counsel to
interpret this provision to mean that the amenity was sine qua non is far from
correct. All the forceful efforts made by learned counsel does not persuade us
to take the view, in the present auction notice and the general terms and
conditions of the lease that providing of all the amenities as appearing in
Section 2(b) of the Act was a condition precedent. In this connection, learned
counsel referred to necessary provisions of Section 67 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. Section 67 of the Act provides
that if any promisee neglects or refuses to afford the promisor reasonable
facilities for the performance of his promise, the promisor is excused by such
neglect or refusal as to non-performance caused thereby. This provision has no
application in the present case. There was no specific promise on the part of
the Administration that providing of facilities shall be condition precedent.
Therefore, Section 67 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872
has no application in the present case. Learned counsel for the respondents
referred to Section 2(a) of the Specific Relief Act,
1963Transfer of Property Act, 1882. Section 105 of the Act defines lease
and Section 108 lays down the rights and liabilities of lessor and lessee. We
asked learned counsel for the parties to tell us which is the obligation of the
lessor in the lease deed which says that they will not charge interest on the
instalements before providing the amenities. There is neither any condition in
the lease nor any obligation under the auction. If the parties have given their
bids and with their eyes wide open they have to blame themselves. It cannot be
enforced by any mandamus as there is no obligation contained in the lease deed
or in the auction notice. It is true that according to the provisions of the
Act, the Administration is under the obligation to provide the amenities but
there is no such condition precedent for that matter. In this connection, our
attention was also invited that the provisions of the Act should be interpreted
in a manner which advances the cause of the public. There is no two opinion in
the matter that the statute should be interpreted in the manner which advance
the cause of the public. But when the issue comes where there is any statutory
obligation then certainly this Court will not hesitate to do so. But in the
absence of such, to lay down that this was a condition precedent and allow the
allottees to waive their obligation to pay the instalments with interest, that
is not correct. In the case of K.P.Varghese (supra), under the Income-tax Act, 1961, Their Lordships have considered the
matter and have held that Circular issued under Section 119 of the Act by the
Central Board of Direct Taxes explaining the scope and object of a provision,
is binding because it gives contemporanea exposition and hence the provision
must be construed in accordance with the terms of the circulars. Thus, the rule
of construction by reference to contemporanea exposition is a well-established
rule of interpretation of statute by reference to the exposition it has
received from contemporary authority, though it must give way where the
language of the statute is plain and unambiguous. This is not the case here.
In the case of State of Haryana & Ors. V. Bhajan Lal & Ors reported in
(distinguished), the question of invoking inherent power under Section
482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure came up for consideration before this
Court. This case is also of no help for the respondents in any manner. In the
case of C.B.Gautam v. Union of India & Ors. Reported in 3 (distinguished), the provisions of Section 269-UD (1)
came up for interpretation before this Court and this Court held that the
provision does not give any unfettered discretion to appropriate authority for
pre-emptive purchase of the property which was agreed to be sold by assessee on
a consideration significantly lower than the fair market value and they further
considered one of the methods for interpretation of the statute i.e. reading
down provision if necessary. This also does not help the respondent in any
manner as there is no need of reading down the provisions in any manner, as
provisions are very clear.
It was next contended by learned counsel for the respondents that the decision
rendered in the case of Sector-6, Bahadurgarh Plot Holders' Association (Regd.)
(supra) should be read in the context in which it has been given & should
not be read as laying down a universal proposition. In this connection a
reference was made to the decision of this Court in the case of Commissioner of
Income Tax v. Sun Engineering Works (P) Lrd. Reported in . In that case,
this Court observed as follows :
"It is neither desirable nor permissible to pick out a word or a
sentence from the judgment of the Court, divorced from the context of the
question under consideration and treat it to be the complete 'law' declared by
the Supreme Court."
This is not the case here. We have considered the matter independent of the
facts of the case Sector-6 Bahadurgarh Plot Holders' Association (Regd.)
(Supra) and we have come to the conclusion that the amenities cannot be made a
condition precedent. In the case of Sector-6, Bahadurgarh Plot Holders'
Association (Regd.) (supra) similar argument was raised that the allottee could
refuse to take possession of the plot and deny payment of interest because the
plot had not been developed. Similar provision appears in the present case i.e.
the balance of the 75 pr cent premium may be paid in three annual equated
instalments along with interest without condition of providing amenities in
advance.
Similarly, in the case of Divisional Controller, KSRTC v. Mahadeva Shetty &
Anr reported in , this Court observed as follows :
"The decision ordinarily is a decision on the case before the court,
while the principle underlying the decision would be binding as a precedent in
a case which comes up for decision subsequently."
Therefore the decision in the case of Sector-6, Bahadurgarh Plot Holders'
Association (Regd.) (supra) fully applies in the case as the situation is
analogous. Learned counsel further invited our attention to a decision of this
Court in the case of Megh Singh v. State of Punjab reported in . This was
a case under the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances
Act, 1985. In that context, their Lordships held as follows:
"Circumstantial flexibility, one additional or different fact may make
a world of difference between conclusions in two cases or between two accused
in the same case."
It is true that in criminal matters even one single significant detail may
alter the decision. But that is not the case here.
A reference was made to a decision of this Court in the case of Collector of
Central Excise, Calcutta v. Alnoori Tobacco Products & Anr reported in
. In this case, it was held that observations in judgments should be read
in the context in which it is stated and the same should not be construed as
statutes. There is no doubt about this proposition of law. Therefore, this
decision also does not advance the case of the respondents. In the case of
Kumari Shrilekha Vidyarthi & Ors. V. State of U.P. & Ors. Reported in
, their Lordships propounded the theory of legitimate expectation.
Legitimate expectation does not mean illegitimate flight of fancy. Legitimate
expectation means that what has been held out in the terms and conditions of
the auction and the lease deed. Legitimate expectation and the provisions of
the Act cannot be read together to mean that the terms of the auction and the
lease deed should be ignored.
Learned counsel invited our attention to a decision of this Court in the case
of Jamshed Hormusji Wadia v. Board of Trustees, Port of Mumbai & Anr
reported in This was a case where the question was whether the Board of
Trustees, Port of Mumbai is a State within the meaning of Article 12 of the
Constitution or not. Their Lordships have observed that the instrumentality of
the State cannot act in an arbitrary or capricious manner. All the State action
must be for public good for which it exists. This does not mean that public can
take up on itself to ignore to abide by condition of auction & refuse to
pay State its dues.
In this background, we are of the opinion that the interpretation of the Act
and the Rules given by the Division Bench of the Punjab & Haryana High
Court in the impugned judgment (M/s Shanti Kunj Investment Pvt. Ltd.) cannot be
sustained. It has been contended by the counsel for the Chandigarh Administration
that all necessary facilities have been provided and some of the allottees have
already constructed their buildings and have rented out the same and some
allottees have applied for construction of Hotels also. It is not possible for
us to examine all these facts individually. Some of the sectors have been fully
developed and some sectors have been less developed. Therefore, it is not
possible to work out that in one case it has been fully developed and in the
other case it is still not developed. However, in some cases full payment has
been made, in some cases two instalments have been made. Therefore, all these
disputed facts have to be adequately dealt with by the High Court. We make it
clear that though it was not a condition precedent but there is obligation on
the part of the Administration to provide necessary facilities for full
enjoyment of the same by the allottees. We therefore, remit the matter to the
High Court for a very limited purpose to see that in cases where facilities
like kutcha road, drainage, drinking water, sewerage, street lighting have not
been provided, then in that case, the High Court may grant the allottees some
proportionate relief. Therefore, we direct that all these cases be
remitted to the High Court and the High Court may consider that in case where
Kutcha road, drainage, sewerage, drinking water facilities have been provided,
no relief shall be granted but in case, any of the facilities had not been
provided, then the High Court may examine the same and consider grant of
proportionate relief in the matter of payment of penalty under Rule 12(3) and
delay in payment of equated instalment or ground rent or part thereof under
Rule ( 12(3A) only. We repeat again that in case the above facilities had not
been granted then in that case consider grant of proportionate relief and if
the facilities have been provided then it will be the open on the part of the
allottees to deny payment of interest and penalty. So far as payment of
instalment is concerned, this is a part of the contract and therefore, the
allottees are under obligation to pay the same. However, so far as the question
of payment of penalty & penal interest is concerned, that shall depend on
facts of each case to be examined by the High Court. The High Court shall
examine each individual case and consider grant of the proportionate relief.
SLP(Civil) No. 22517/2002. No allotment was made and no payment was deposited
except the initial payment of 10%. Therefore, this petition is misconceived and
the same is accordingly dismissed.
In S.L.P.(c) No.23738 of 2002, the lease has been cancelled. Therefore, whether
such cancellation was legal or otherwise, the High Court will examine the same
in the light of the above observations. In S.L.P.(c) No.23941 of 2002, in fact
the possession of the plot had been given on 17.1.2000. The allottee had a
grievance that there was a mango tree on his plot which was to be removed. The
High Court may decide as to what extent the relief should be granted.
In S.L.P.(c) No.14289 of 2003, S.L.P.(c) No.2948 of 2003 and S.L.P.(c)
Nos.13640-13641 of 2004, the grievance of the writ petitioners was that
sewerage line was passing through the allottees' building. Therefore,
possession could not be handed over and the same was handed over only after
removal of that sewerage line from the allotted plot. This aspect may also be
examined by the High Court.
This Court also called for a report by appointing a Commission. The report of
the Commissioner has been placed on record. The High Court while deciding the
question of facilities provided may look into the aforesaid report. As a result
of our above discussion, the order dated 2.2.2001 passed by the Division Bench
of the High Court of Punjab & Haryana in C.W.P. No.959 of 1999 [ M/s.Shanti
Kunj Investment (Pvt) Ltd. vs. U.T.Administration Chandigarh & Ors.] which
has been followed in C.W.P. 960 & 5874 of 1999 and C.W.P. No. 5009 of 1998
is set aside and orders dated 10.5.2001, 13.11.2000 & 13.9.2001 passed in
C.W.P.No.5561 of 2000, W.P.No. 19356 of 1998 & C.W.P. No. 10233 of 2000 are
also set aside. Consequently, the appeals arising out of S.L.P.(c) Nos. 12794,
12987, 12935& 13449 of 2001; S.L.P.(c) No. 12995 of 2002, S.L.P.(c)
No.16503 of 2001 and S.L.P.(c) No.18911 of 2002 are allowed and the cases are
remitted back to the High Court for deciding each case on its own merit. Rest
of the cases excepting S.L.P.(c) No.22517 of 2002 i.e. appeals arising out of
S.L.P.(c) Nos. 22515, 18978, 18353, 23941, 23737 & 23738 of 2002; S.L.P.(c)
Nos. 14289, 2948, 3601, 9178& 5748 of 2003 and S.L.P.(c) Nos.13640-13641 of
2004 are accordingly disposed of and are also remitted back to the High Court
for being decided in the light of the observations made above. No costs.