SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CEAT Limited
Vs
Murphy India Employees Union
Civil Appeal No. 2249 of 2006 -[Arising Out of S.L.P. (Civil) No. 6897 of 2005]
(S. B. Sinha and P. K. Balasubramanyan, JJ)
25.04.2006
S. B. SINHA, J.
Leave granted.
Interpretation of a settlement arrived at by and between the parties herein is in question in this appeal which arises out of a judgment and order dated 11.01.2005 passed by a learned Single Judge of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay in Writ Petition No. 1785 of 2001.
ADMITTED FACTS:
2. Murphy India Ltd. (Murphy) was a manufacturer of Radio and Television sets. Norwest Electronics Ltd. (for short, 'Norwest'), which was running a servicing centre, was a sister concern of Murphy India Ltd. It had been carrying out maintenance and repair works of the products of Murphy at its Thane factory. It was an establishment within the meaning of the provisions of the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946, (1946 Act). The concerned workmen were on the rolls of Norwest. The Provident Fund and E.S.I.C. Code Number of both the companies were the same. Some workmen working in the said Norwest were its permanent employees. Murphy became a sick company. It was referred to the Board of Industrial and Financial Reconstruction (BIFR). Pursuant to a scheme made by it on or about 31.08.1990 Murphy merged with the appellant- company. It undertook the maintenance and repair works carried out at the factory of Murphy situated at Parel. Some of the workmen of Norwest, who were represented by the Union herein, had been assured that they would be provided with employment on permanent basis by the appellant herein. 45 workmen had applied for employment with its Electronics Division. They were issued fresh appointment letters with effect from 01.02.1991. They were initially appointed on temporary basis at Parel Unit of the appellant, wherein sales and service of the Radios and Televisions used to be carried out. Indisputably, the said establishment was registered under the Bombay Shops and Commercial Establishment Act, 1948 (for short, 'the 1948 Act').
3. Although initially existence of the Certified Standing Orders was denied by the appellant, a copy thereof was produced before the High Court, in terms whereof, the employees appointed on probation were to get the permanent status on the expiry of six months from the date of joining the service; whereas in terms of the Model Standing Orders, such permanent status was to be conferred on the workmen on the expiry of three months of their being placed on probation.
4. After Murphy, was referred to the BIFR and its consequent merger with the appellant, appointments had been given to 45 workmen on and from 01.02.1991.
Although they had been appointed on temporary basis, they were put on probation
by an order dated 01.05.1991 with effect from 1.2.1991. They had been kept on
probation till 1996 and their services had been terminated thereafter.
Termination of the services of the said workmen had given rise to another
industrial dispute and it is stated at the bar that an award has been passed in
favour of the workmen. The said matter, however, is pending adjudication before
the Bombay High Court and the execution of the award has been stayed.
PROCEEDINGS:
5. On or about 29.04.1991, a Memorandum of Settlement was entered into between
the Electronics Division of the appellant herein and the respondent Union,
which was recognized in terms of the Maharashtra
Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971
(for short, 'the 1971 Act') for resolution of the disputes arising out a
Charter of Demands made on 27.10.1989 in respect of the workmen working in the
shop floor and office of the company situated at Thane and Parel.
6. On or about 06.10.1992, a complaint was filed by the respondent- Union about the violation of the terms of the said settlement, alleging unfair labour practices as contained in Item Nos. l(a) and 4(g) of the Second Schedule and Item Nos. 6 and 9 of the Fourth Schedule appended to the said Act. A prayer for payment of the same wages as are paid to the permanent workmen of the company as also a declaration that the said workmen had become the permanent workmen of the company from their respective dates of joining or with effect from 01.02.1991, was also made. The appellant denied and disputed that it had committed any unfair labour practice.
7. In view of the rival contentions raised before the Industrial Tribunal, the following issues were framed :
"(i) Does the Complainant prove that they are permanent employees since
joining Norwest Electronics Ltd. and/or Ceat Ltd. and they are entitled to full
back wages and continuity of service w.e.f.01.02.1991?
(ii) Whether the Respondent has committed Unfair Labour Practice under Items
l(a), 4(a) of Schedule II and Item 3, 6 and 9 of Schedule IV of the MRTU &
PULP Act?"
8. Before the Industrial Court, reliance was placed by the respondent on the
said settlement dated 29.04.1991.
9. By reason of an award dated 29.03.2001, the Industrial Court held that the
benefits under the said settlement must be held to have been rendered to the
concerned workmen, in terms whereof they became entitled to the status of
permanent workmen on the expiry of the period of probation of three months, and
were, thus, also entitled to the other benefits envisaged thereunder . Monetary
benefits were directed to be paid to the workmen with compound interest @ 12%
p.a.
10. The legality or otherwise of the said award came to be questioned by the
appellant by filing a writ petition before the Bombay High Court. The said writ
petition has been dismissed by reason of the impugned judgment.
SUBMISSIONS :
11. Mr. T.R. Andhyarujina, the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of
the appellant, would submit that the Industrial Court as also the High Court
overlooked the fact that in terms of Section 18(3)(c) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short, 'the 1947 Act'),
the benefits of the said settlement dated 29.04.1991 having been given only to
the permanent workmen who were appointed with effect from 01.02.1991, benefits
thereof could not have been directed to be given to the concerned workmen who
joined the establishment on a temporary basis and/or on probation only with
effect from 01.02.1991.
12. It was submitted that the High Court fell into an error in holding that
despite the fact that the number of workmen had fallen to less than 50, the
provisions of Model Standing Orders framed under the 1946 Act would not apply
in the case of the concerned workmen.
13. Ms. Jane Cox, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent- Union, on the other hand, submitted that the said settlement dated 29.04.1991 must be read in its entirety and so read it would be evident that the same would also apply to such workmen who joined the services of the appellant's establishment on and from 01.02.1991. It was further submitted that applicability of the provisions of the Model Standing Orders or the Certified Standing Orders framed under the 1946 Act having been made a part of the settlement, it matters little as to whether the status of the permanent workmen was to be given to the concerned workmen on the expiry of three moths or six months from the date of their joining service.
SETTLEMENT :
14. It is also not in dispute that a Memorandum of Settlement within the meaning of Sec. 2(p), read with Sec. 18(1) of the 1947 Act and Rule 62 of the Industrial Disputes (Bombay) Rules, had been arrived at between the parties on or about 29.04.1991, the relevant clauses whereof are as under:
"Whereas the President, MAHARASHTRA SHRAMIC SENA, a recognized Union under the Provisions of the MRTU & PULP Act. 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the Union) representing the workmen of M/s. CE AT LIMITED, ELETRONICS DIVISION (hereinafter referred to as the Company) served the Charter of Demands on 27lh February, 1989 on the Company in respect of the workmen working on the Shop floor and the office of the company situated at Thane and Parel under cover of their letter dated 27th February, 1989 relating to wage Scale, Classifications, Dearness Allowance, Leave Facilities, Leave Travel Allowance, Transports etc. and have also forwarded supplementary demands in relation to Lunch Allowance, Five days week working, etc. as contained in their supplementary Charter dated 9th March, 1989.and whereas the negotiations were held between the representatives of the Company and the representatives of the Union from time to time on the said set of Charter of Demands parties have reached a package settlement covering the service conditions and terms of employment applicable to the workmen at Thane and Head Office establishment. Parties therefore have agreed to sign the settlement in full and final satisfaction of all the demands in accordance with Sec. 2(p) read with Section 18(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and under the Rules 62 of the Industrial Disputes (Bombay) Rules, 1957.
NOW THIS SETTLEMENT WITNESS AS FOLLOWS’
This settlement shall cover al] terms and conditions of service of various categories of permanent workmen and shall apply to all permanent workmen (hereinafter referred to as "workmen") who are on the rolls of the Company as on 31s' December, 1990 at the Company's Head Office and other Factories, establishments situated at Bombay and Thane.
"Year" means from 1st of January to 31SI December of any year."
15.Under the heading 'Code of Conduct', it provided that the Code of Conduct
shall operate concurrently with the Company's Standing Orders and not in derogation
thereof. The said Code of Conduct was evolved to repress the hardship arising
out of the implementation of the Standing Orders.
16.Clause 4 of the said settlement provides for period of apprenticeship, inter
alia, stating :
"...Upon successful completion of three years apprenticeship subject to
the availability of vacancies having due regard to suitability to the post the
apprentices will be offered employment and will be absorbed with due regard to
seniority in regular employment under such terms and conditions prevailing for
regular employees and shall be issued regular appointment letters."
17.Provision has been made to pay stipend to the apprentices and other benefits
and facilities arising therefor. Probation of the employees was to be governed
by the Standing Orders. The matter relating to confirmation of employees has
been provided for in clause 8 of the settlement stating that the same would be
as per the Standing Orders. Clause 11 provides for fitment in the regular
grades after successful completion of three years period.
STATUTORY PROVISIONS:
18.Section 18(1) of the 1947 Act provides as under:
"18. Persons on whom settlement and awards are binding.- (1) A settlement
arrived at by agreement between the employer and workman otherwise than in the
course of conciliation proceeding shall be binding on the parties to the
agreement."
19.The State of Maharashtra indisputably has made an amendment in sub-section
(1) of Section 18 of the 1947 Act, in terms whereof, the following proviso was
added :
"Provided that, where there is a recognized union for any undertaking
under any law for the time being in force, then such agreement (not being an
agreement in respect of dismissal, discharge, removal, retrenchment,
termination of service, or suspension of an employee) shall be arrived at
between the employer, and the recognized union only; and such agreement shall
be binding on all persons referred to in clause (c) and clause (d) of
sub-section (3) of this section." 20. Section 18(3) of the 1947 Act reads
as under:
'"18(3). A settlement arrived at in the course of conciliation proceedings under this Act or an arbitration award in a case where a notification has been issued under sub-section (3A) of Section 10A or an award of a Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal which has become enforceable shall be binding on –
(a)all parties to the industrial dispute;
(b)all other parties summoned K> appear in the proceedings as parties to the
dispute, unless the Board, arbitrator, Laour Court, Tribunal or National
Tribunal, as the case may be, records the opinion that they were so summoned
without proper cause;
(c)where a party referred to in clause (a) or clause (b) is an employer, his
heirs, successors or assigns in respect of the establishment to which the
dispute relates;
(d)where a party referred to in clause (a) or clause (b) is composed of
workmen, all persons who were employed in the establishment or part of the
establishment, as the case may be, to which the dispute relates on the date of
the dispute and all persons who subsequently become employed in that
establishment or part."
21.The 1971 Act was enacted, inter alia, to provide for recognition of trade
unions inter alia for facilitating collective bargaining for certain
undertakings.
Section 4 thereof provides for constitution of the Industrial Court. Chapter
III provides for recognition of Unions. Chapter IV provides for obligations and
rights of recognized Unions, other Unions and certain employees. Sub-section
(2) of Section 20 of the 1971 Act reads as under :
"(2) Where there is a recognized union for any undertaking, -
(a)that union alone shall have the right to appoint its nominees to represent
workmen on the Works Committee constituted under Section 3 of the Central Act;
(b)no employee shall be allowed to appear or act or be allowed to be
represented in any proceedings under the Central Act (not being a proceeding in
which the legality or propriety of an order or dismissal, discharge, removal,
retrenchment, termination of service, or suspension of an employee is under
consideration), except through recognized union and the decision arrived at, or
order made, in such proceeding shall be binding on all the employees in such
undertaking;and accordingly, the provisions of the Central Act, that is to say,
the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, XIV of 1947,
shall stand amended in the manner and to the extent specified in Schedule
I."
22. Section 21 of the 1971 Act provides that no employee in an undertaking to
which the provisions of the Central Act for the time being apply, shall be
allowed to appear or act or allowed to be represented in any proceeding
relating to unfair labour practices specified in items 2 and 6 of Schedule IV
of this Act except through the recognized union.
UNFAIR LABOUR PRACTICE :
23. Chapter VI of the 1971 Act deals with Unfair Labour Practices, which term has been defined in Section 26 thereof to mean any of the practices listed in Schedules II, III and IV of the Act, unless the context otherwise requires.
Item Nos.l(a), 4(a) of Schedule II, and Item Nos.3, 6 and 9 of Schedule IV, which are relevant for the purpose of the case, read as under:
" 1 .To interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their right to organize, form, join or assist a trade union and to engage in concerted activities for the purposes of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, that is to say –
(a) threatening employees with discharge or dismissal, if they join a
union;"
"4. To encourage or discourage membership in any union by discriminating
against any employee, that is to say –
(a) discharging or punishing an employee because he urged other employees to
join or organize a union;"
"3. To transfer an employee mala fide from one place to another, under the
guise of following management policy."
"6. To employ employees as "badlis", casuals or temporaries and
to continue them as such for years, with the object of depriving them of the
status and privileges of permanent employees."
"9. Failure to implement award, settlement or agreement."
24. Section 28 of the 1971 Act provides for procedure for dealing with
complaints relating to unfair labour practices, in the following terms :
"28. Procedure for dealing with complaints relating to unfair labour
practices : (1) Where any person has engaged in or is engaging in any unfair
labour practice, then any union or any employee or any employer or any
Investigating Officer may, within ninety days of the occurrence of such unfair
labour practice, file a complaint before the Court competent to deal with such
complaint either under Section 5, or as the case may be, under Section 7, of
this Court.
Provided that, the Court may entertain a complaint after the period of ninety
days from the date of the alleged occurrence, if good and sufficient reasons
are shown by the complainant for the late filing of the complaint.
(2)The Court shall take a decision on every such complaint as far as possible
within a period of six months from the date of receipt of the complaint.
(3) On receipt of a complaint under sub-section (1), the Court may, if it so
considers necessary, first cause an investigation into the said complaint to be
made by the Investigating Officer, and direct that a report in the matter may
be submitted by him to the Court, within the period specified in this
direction.
(4)While investigating into any such complaint, the Investigating Officer may
visit the undertaking, where the practice alleged is said to have occurred, and
make such enquiries as he considers necessary. He may also make efforts to
promote settlement of the complaint.
(5)The Investigating Officer shall, after investigating into the complaint
under sub-section (4) submit his report to the Court, with in the time specified
by it, setting out the full facts and circumstances of the case, and the
efforts made by him in settling the complaint. The Court shall, on demand and
on payment of such fee as may be prescribed by rules, supply a copy of the
report to the complaint and the person complained against.
(6) If, on receipt of the report of the Investigating Officer, the Court finds
that the complaint has not been settled satisfactorily, and that facts and
circumstances of the case require, that the matter be further considered by it,
the Court, shall proceed to consider it, and give its decision.
(7)The decision of the Court, which shall be in writing, shall be in the form
of an order. The order of the Court shall be final and shall not be called in
question in any civil or criminal court.
(8)The Court shall cause its order to be published in such manner as may be
prescribed. The order of the Court shall become enforceable from the date
specified in the order.
(9)The Court shall forward a copy of its order to the State Government and such
officers of the State Government as may be prescribed."
25.We have noticed hereinbefore that the establishment in question is governed
by the provisions of the 1948 Act. Section 38-B whereof reads as under :
"38-B. Application of Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act to
establishments. The provisions of the Industrial Employment
(Standing Orders) Act, 1946, in its application to the State of
Maharashtra (hereinafter in this section referred to as "the said
Act"), and the rules and standing orders (including model standing orders)
made thereunder from time to time, shall mutatis mutandis, apply to all
establishment wherein fifty or more employees are employed and to which this
Act applies, as if they were industrial establishment within the meaning of the
said Act."
26.It is, however, not in dispute that the establishment had its own certified
standing orders.
INTERPRETATION OF TERMS OF SETTLEMENT :
27.The preamble of the settlement refers to the Charter of Demands served upon
the appellant on 27.02.1989 in respect of the shop floor and office of the
company situated at Thane and Parel relating to wage scale, classification,
dearness allowance, leave facilities, leave travel allowance, transports etc.
Supplementary demands were also raised. The parties reached a package
settlement covering the service conditions and terms of employment applicable
to the workmen at Thane and Head Office. The said settlement was to cover all
terms and conditions of service of various categories of permanent workmen; and
was to apply to all permanent workmen who were on the rolls of the company as
on 31.12.1990. The said Memorandum of Settlement, indisputably, was entered
into on 29.04.1991.
28.Does it apply only to those workmen who were on the rolls of the company as
on 31.12.1990 is the question.
29.If the said settlement was only to apply to the permanent workmen, who were
on the rolls of the company as on 31.12.1990, evidently it would not have
contained any provision for appointment of apprentices, payment of stipend and
probation or confirmation or their fitment.
30.A Memorandum of Settlement must be read in the context in which the same was
made.
31.If the said settlement is given a narrow meaning, as has been contended by
Mr. Andhyarujina, the same would defeat the purpose thereof. It may be true
that by reason of a settlement, a cut-off date may be provided or the benefits
be given only to a class of employees but with a view to give a proper meaning
to the terms of the settlement, the court would be entitled to notice the
source of the dispute. The workmen of Norwest were not on the rolls of the
company; they became its employees only with effect from 01.02.1991. Their
terms and conditions were already governed by the Certified Standing Orders. A
Code of Conduct was required to be evolved only as regard the workmen who came
on the rolls of the company after 31.12.1990.
32.The said Code of Conduct was evolved to repress the hardships which had
already been confronted by the use of the Standing Orders of the company. It
was to operate concurrently with the Certified Standing Orders. Some of the
provisions in the Code of Conduct expected of the employees evidently were not
governed by the Certified Standing Orders. The settlement not only provides for
appointment of apprentices, who would be governed by the provisions of the Apprentices Act, 1961 but also for the eligibility
criteria therefor in terms whereof the first preference was to be given to the
sons and daughters of the employees and the ex-employees of the company, had
either retired from service or accepted Voluntary Retirement Scheme, or expired
during service. The eligibility criteria also provides that the applicant
should complete 18 years of age as on the date of application. Indisputably, in
terms of the provisions of the Apprentices Act, no apprentice would have a
right of a job or promotion. The Memorandum of Settlement, however, provides
for their absorption on successful completion of three years' apprenticeship.
It provides for seniority and furthermore lays down criteria for determination
thereof.
33 The provisions relating to probation and confirmation of the workmen would
not fit in with the concept of applicability of the settlement only to those
who were on the permanent rolls of the company as on 31.12.1990. Evidently,
thus, the said settlement not only covers those who were permanent workmen as
on the said date and had ceased to be workmen but also those who were to be
appointed at a later date.
CERTIFIED STANDING ORDERS :
34.Applicability of the provisions of the 1948 Act is not in question. The
only contention raised is the applicability of the Model Standing Orders. The
fact that the company had its Certified Standing Orders is not in dispute. The
same finds reference in the Memorandum of Settlement itself.
35. The period of probation as also confirmation in the services were to be in
terms of the Standing Orders. It has not been disputed before us that whereas
the Model Standing Orders provided for a successful period of probation of
three months; under the Certified Standing Orders, the period thereof was to be
six months.
36.We have noticed hereinbefore that the appellant at one stage denied and
disputed the applicability of the Model Standing Orders and only at a latter
stage, in a proceeding before the High Court, they produced a xeroxed copy of
the Certified Standing Orders, evidently with a view to show that the
successful period of probation was not three months as per the Model Standing
Orders but in fact was six months.
37.In this case, whether the period of probation was three months or six months
is not of much significance; as the workmen had been kept on probation by an
order dated 01.05.1991 with retrospective effect from 01.02.1991. Evidently
they were, thus, entitled to the status of permanent workmen on completion of
six months' period if not three months. They were kept on probation till 1996
and, thus, they had admittedly completed the period of six months. Once they
had successfully completed the period of probation, they were entitled to the
status of permanent workmen, the consequences whereof would be that they became
entitled to all the benefits and privileges in terms of the settlement as
permanent employees.
APPLICABILITY OF 1948 ACT
38.Mr. Andhyarujina's submission that having regard to the fact that the
number of workmen in the said establishment was less than 50 as is provided for
in Sec. 38-B of 1948 Act, is again of not much significance.
39.It may be true that provisions of the Payment of
Gratuity Act, 1972 and the Employees' Provident
Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 specifically provide that
in the event an establishment becomes liable thereunder, it would continue to
be so despite the fact that the number of workmen goes below the prescribed
limit, but in this case, we are not beset with such a question.
40.We need not enter into the controversy as to whether such a contingency
would ensue even in respect of the employees governed by the 1948 Act; inasmuch
as in the instant case, the Certified Standing Orders forms part of the
settlement itself. The Certified Standing Orders, therefore, govern the terms
and conditions of the service of the workmen apart from those which were
specifically mentioned in the Settlement.
41.We, thus, do not find any force in the said submission.
INTEREST:
42.Mr. Andhyarujina would submit that the rate of interest awarded by the High Court being 12% p.a. is on a high side. We, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case and having regard to the current rate of interest prevailing in the market, direct that the rate of interest would be 9% p.a.
43.Subject to the modification aforementioned, this appeal is dismissed. The
appellant shall pay and bear the costs of the respondent in this appeal.
Counsel fee assessed at Rs. 5, 000/-.
J