SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Om Prakash
Vs
State of Uttar Pradesh
Appeal (Crl.) 629 of 2006 (Arising Out of Slp (Crl.) No. 6111 of 2005)
(Arijit Pasayat and S. H. Kapadia, JJ)
11.05.2006
ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.
Leave granted.
Appellant calls in question legality of the judgment rendered by a learned
Single Judge of the Allahabad High Court, Lucknow Bench upholding the
appellant's conviction for offence punishable under Section 376(2)(e) of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short the 'IPC') as recorded
by learned VI Additional Sessions Judge, Hardoi and the sentence of 10 years
imprisonment as awarded.
We do not propose to mention name of the victim. Section 228-A IPC makes
disclosure of identity of victim of certain offences punishable. Printing or
publishing name of any matter which may make known the identity of any person
against whom an offence under Sections 376, 376-A, 376-B, 376-C or 376-D is
alleged or found to have been committed can be punished. True it is, the
restriction does not relate to printing or publication of judgment by High
Court or Supreme Court. But keeping in view the social object of preventing
social victimisation or ostracism of the victim of a sexual offence for which
Section 228-A has been enacted, it would be appropriate that in the judgments,
be it of this Court. High Court or lower Court, the name of the victim should
not be indicated, we have chosen to describe her as 'victim' in the judgment.
The above position was highlighted in State of Karnataka v. Puttaraja 1. Prosecution version as unfolded during trial is
essentially as follows:
One day prior to the occurrence i.e. 9.3.1985 the police of Sursa arrested Ram Saran, husband of the informant (PW-1) and the challan was brought to the concerned Court on the day of the occurrence. Om Prakash @ Chhotey (hereinafter referred to as the 'accused') who was related to the parents of the informant, met then in the Court premises. Jaipal (PW-2) brother of Ram Saran was also there along with the informant and she was talking to him about bail of her husband. After sometime, accused Om Prakash sent PW-2 to find out whether the challan had come or not. Then at about 3.00 p.m. accused overpowered the informant and he started raping her in the veranda of Zila Parishad near the Court. When the informant raised alarm, PW-2 and one Ram Lal came there and they assaulted Om Prakash who was raping her and they apprehended him and the accused was taken to the police station. The informant gave oral information and then Chik number 126 Exhibit A-1 was recorded and the entry was made in the general diary and the case was registered. Internal examination of the body of the informant was done by Dr. Purnima Srivastava (PW-3) and the medical report is Exhibit A-2 and the supplementary report is Exhibit A-3. The medical examination of the accused was done by Dr. P.K. Gangwar (PW-4) and the report is Exhibit A-4. The underwear of accused was seized in the police station and the seizure memo is Exhibit A-6 and the petticoat of the informant was seized and the seizure memo is Exhibit A-7. The charge of investigation of the case was given to Shri Mahesh Lal Vadhuria (PW-6), who prepared the site plan of the place of occurrence (Exhibit A-8). The underwear of the accused and the petticoat of Ramwati were sent for chemical examination and the report is Exhibit A-21. After completion of investigation, charge sheet was filed against the accused and cognizance of the offence was taken and thereafter the case was committed to the Sessions Court by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Hardoi.
Charge was framed against accused Om Prakash @ Chhotey under Section 376 IPC.
The accused did not admit the charge and demanded trial.
To substantiate its version, prosecution examined the victim (informant), eye-witness
Jaipal (PW-2), Dr. Smt. Purnima Srivastava (PW-3), Dr. P.K. Gangwar (PW-4),
Shri Uttam Kumar (PW-5), Shri Mahesh Lal Vadhuria (PW-6) and head constable
Shri Jitendra Singh (PW-7).
The statement of accused Om Prakash was recorded under Section 313 of the
Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (in short 'Cr.P.C.'). The accused alleged that he
was implicated due to the enmity. It was stated by him that he had come from
the village along with the brother of the victim and other persons for taking
steps. He even made some attempts in the police station in the night. He had
taken some money for the purpose. When the challan came, they got down at
Bilgram Chungi and then a quarrel took place amongst the accused, PW-2 and
father of the victim on the question of refund of the money. They assaulted him
and he was implicated in the criminal case.
Considering the evidence more particularly that of the victim (PW-1) and PW-2
the brother-in-law of the victim and the evidence of the doctor PW-3, the Trial
Court held that the accusations have been established. Taking note of the
evidence of PW-3, it was held that accused must have known, and that there is
full possibility that victim is pregnant. Accordingly, by applying the
provisions of Section 376(2)(e) accused was convicted and sentenced to undergo
RI for 10 years which is the minimum sentence prescribed. The Trial Court held
that there was no reason to reduce the minimum prescribed sentence.
In appeal before the High Court it was submitted that the prosecution version
is incredible and the trial Court should not have convicted the accused. The
High Court by the impugned judgment affirmed the conviction and sentence. It
noted that the FIR was lodged immediately, without any delay. The evidence of
the victim was credible and cogent. That itself was sufficient to record
conviction. In addition was the evidence of PW-2 an eye-witness. It was,
therefore, held that the prosecution has clearly established that the offence
was committed by the accused. With reference to the background facts, it was
noted that the accused was in a position to dominate will of the prosecutrix.
Therefore, the conviction as recorded was maintained and the appeal was
dismissed.
In support of the appeal, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the
prosecution version is clearly unbelievable. It is not believable that the
accused who had gone to help the victim's husband to be released on bail would
commit rape on her, that too in broad day light. In any event, it was submitted
that the requirements of Section 376(2)(e) were not proved.
Per contra, learned counsel for the State submitted that prosecution version
has been clearly established by the cogent evidence not only by prosecution but
also by PW-2 an eye- witness. It is to be noted that the appellant was caught
red - handed and was taken to police station where immediately FIR was lodged.
So far as the applicability of Section 376(2)(e) is concerned, it is submitted
that the doctor has clearly stated that the victim was six months pregnant, and
it could be known from the external appearance. The Trial Court had rightly
observed that the accused must have known the victim was pregnant and there is
full possibility in that regard. Though the High Court has not dealt with this
aspect, it has clearly noted that the accused was in a position to dominate the
will of the victim.
It is settled law that the victim of sexual assault is not treated as
accomplice and as such, her evidence does not require corroboration from any
other evidence including the evidence of a doctor. In a given case even if the
doctor who examined the victim does not find sign of rape, it is no ground to
disbelieve the sole testimony of the prosecutrix. In normal course a
victim of sexual assault does not like to disclose such offence even before her
family members much less before public or before the police. The Indian women
has tendency to conceal such offence because it involves her prestige as well
as prestige of her family. Only in few cases, the victim girl or the family
members has courage to go before the police station and lodge a case. In the
instant case the suggestion given on behalf of the defence that the victim has
falsely implicated the accused does not appeal to reasoning. There was no
apparent reason for a married woman to falsely implicate the accused after
scatting her own prestige and honour.
Of late, crime against women in general and rape in particular is on the
increase. It is an irony that while we are celebrating women's rights in all spheres,
we show little or no concern for her honour. It is a sad reflection on the
attitude of indifference of the society towards the violation of human dignity
of the victims of sex crimes. We must remember that a rapist not only violates
the victim's privacy and personal integrity, but inevitably causes serious
psychological as well as physical harm in the process. Rape is not merely a
physical assault -- it is often destructive of the whole personality of the
victim. A murderer destroys the physical body of his victim, a rapist degrades
the very soul of the helpless female. The Court, therefore, shoulder a great
responsibility while trying an accused on charges of rape. They must deal with
such cases with utmost sensitivity. The Courts should examine the broader
probabilities of a case and not get swayed by minor contradictions or
insignificant discrepencies in the statement of the prosecutrix, which are not
of a fatal nature, to throw out an otherwise reliable prosecution case. If
evidence of the prosecutrix inspires confidence, it must be relied upon without
seeking corroboration of her statement in material particulars. If for some
reason the Court finds it difficult to place implicit reliance on her
testimony, it may look for evidence which may lend assurance to her testimony,
short of corroboration required in the case of an accomplice. The testimony of
the prosecutrix must be appreciated in the background of the entire case and
the trial Court must be alive to its responsibility and be sensitive while
dealing with cases involving sexual molestations. This position was highlighted
in State of Punjab v. Gurmeet Singh 7.
A prosecutrix of a sex-offence cannot be put on par with an accomplice. She is in fact a victim of the crime. The Evidence Act nowhere says that her evidence cannot be accepted unless it is corroborated in material particulars. She is undoubtedly a competent witness under Section 118 and her evidence must receive the same weight as is attached to an injured in cases of physical violence. The same degree of care and caution must attach in the evaluation of her evidence as in the case of an injured complainant or witness and no more. What is necessary is that the Court must be conscious of the fact that it is dealing with the evidence of a person who is interested in the outcome of the charge levelled by her. If the Court keeps this in mind and feels satisfied that it can act on the evidence of the prosecutrix. There is no rule of law or practice incorporated in the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (in short 'Evidence Act') similar to illustration (b) to Section 114 which requires it to look for corroboration. If for some reason the Court is hesitant to place implicit reliance on the testimony of the prosecutrix it may look for evidence which may lend assurance to her testimony short of corroboration required in the case of an accomplice. The nature of evidence required to lend assurance to the testimony of the prosecutrix must necessarily depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. But if a prosecutrix is an adult and of full understanding the Court is entitled to base a conviction on her evidence unless the same is own to be infirm and not trustworthy. If the totality of the circumstances appearing on the record of the case discloses that the prosecutrix does not have a strong motive to falsely involve the person charged, the Court should ordinarily have no hesitation in accepting her evidence. This position was highlighted in State of Maharashtra v. Chandraprakash Kewalchand Jain.
Sub-section (2) of Section 376 makes some special case of rape punishable with
more stringent punishment. Sub- section (2) Section 376 reads as follows:
"376(2) Whoever, --
(a) being a police officer commits rape
(i) within the limits of the police station to which he is appointed; or
(ii) in the premises of any station house whether or not situated in the police
station to which he is appointed; or
(iii) on a woman in his custody or in me custody of a police officer
subordinate to him; or
(b) being a public servant, takes advantage of his official position and
commits rape on a woman in his custody as such public servant or in the custody
of a public servant subordinate to him; or
(c) being on the management or on the staff of a jail, remand home or other place
of custody established by or under any law for the time being in force or of a
woman's or children's institution lakes advantage of his official position and
commits rape on any inmate of such jail, remand home, place or institution; or
(d) being on the management or on the staff of a hospital, takes advantage of
his official position and commits rape on a woman in that hospital; or
(e) commits rape on a woman knowing her to be pregnant; or
(f) commits rape on a woman when she is under twelve years of age; or
(g) commits gang rape, shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment for a term
which shall not be less than ten years but which may be for life and shall also
be liable to fine."
One of the categories which attracts more stringent punishment is the rape on a
woman who is pregnant. In such cases where commission of rape is established
for operation of Section 376(2)(e) the prosecution has to further establish
that accused knew the victim to be pregnant. In the instant case there was no
such evidence led. The Trial Court came to the conclusion that there was
"full possibility" of the accused knowing it. There is a gulf of
difference between possibility and certainty. While considering the case
covered by Section 376(2)(e) what is needed to be seen is whether evidence
establishes knowledge of the accused. Mere possibility of knowledge is not
sufficient. When a case relates to one where because of the serious nature of
the offence, as statutorily prescribed, more stringent sentence is provided, it
must be established and not a possibility is to be inferred. The language of
Section 376(2)(e) is clear. It requires prosecution to establish that the
accused knew her to be pregnant. This is clear from the use of the
expression "knowing her to be pregnant". This is conceptually
different that there is a possibility of his knowledge or that probably he knew
it. Positive evidence has to be adduced by the prosecution about the knowledge.
In the absence of any material brought on record to show that the accused knew
the victim to be pregnant Section 376(2)(e) IPC cannot be pressed into service.
To that extent the judgment of the Courts below are unsustainable. However,
minimum sentence prescribed under Section 376(1) IPC is clearly applicable.
With the modification of sentence by reduction from 10 years to 7 years, the
appeal is dismissed.