SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Ram Biraji Devi and Another
Vs
Umesh Kumar Singh and Another
Appeal (Crl.) 632 of 2006 (Arising Out of S. L. P. (Crl.) No.3840 of 2005)
(Ashok Bhan and L. S. Panta, JJ)
11.05.2006
LOKESHWAR SINGH PANTA, J.
Special leave granted.
This appeal arises out of the judgment dated 13.1.2005 passed by the High Court
of Judicature at Patna in Criminal Misc. No. 11930 of 2004 dismissing the
petition filed by the appellants under Section 482 of the Cr. P.C. seeking quashing
of the order dated 8.8.2003 of the Judicial Magistrate, Gaya, in Complaint Case
No.298/2003 T.R. No.808/2003.
Briefly stated the facts of the case are that the Complainant Umesh Kumar Singh
- respondent No.1 herein, filed a complaint against the appellants before the
Chief Judicial Magistrate, Gaya, inter alia alleging that Smt. Ram Biraji Devi
appellant No.1 herein, was allotted MIG Plot No. M-27 situated in Housing Board
Colony, Gaya. In July 2002, both the appellants represented to the complainant
that they were badly in need of money and wanted to transfer the allotted plot
to some person interested to purchase the said plot. The complainant expressed
his willingness to purchase the plot. It was alleged that the parties orally
agreed that the complainant would pay to the appellants a sum of Rs. 4 lakhs as
price of the plot and on payment of the said amount, the appellants would
transfer the plot in favour of the complainant.
It was also alleged that the complainant paid a sum of Rs.80, 000/- to the
appellants as consideration amount of the sale price of the plot on different
dates between 15.7.2000 and 15.12.2002. The appellants alleged to have made
promises to the complainant that they would execute a written agreement in
favour of the complainant on 15.1.2003, but since they failed to execute the
agreement on 20.1.2003, the complainant along with three other persons went to
the house of the appellants and enquired about the reason for delay in
execution of the agreement. The appellants flatly denied acceptance of Rs.80,
000/- and refused to transfer the plot in favour of the complainant. On the
basis of the above premise, a criminal complaint dated nil came to be filed in
the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Gaya, against the appellants.
It appears from the record that Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Gaya,
recorded the statements of the complainant and his witnesses on 19.4.2003 and
thereupon took cognizance of the offences under Sections 406, 419, 420 and
120-B of Indian Penal Code vide order dated 8.8.2003.
Being aggrieved against the order of taking of the cognizance by the Judicial
Magistrate the appellants approached the High Court of Patna under Section 482
of the Cr. P.C. praying for quashing of the cognizance taken by the Magistrate.
The High Court by the impugned order dated 13.1.2005 dismissed the said
petition. Hence, this appeal by way of special leave.
We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material on
record. The learned counsel for the appellants contended that the Hon'ble High
Court has failed to appreciate that on bare perusal of the contents of the
complaint, no offence is made out against the appellants and the complaint
filed by the complainant is mala fide, false and frivolous against appellant
No.1, who is stated to be about 70 years old lady and is suffering from heart
disease, whereas the appellant No.2 was working in New Delhi at the relevant
time and had gone to Bombay to look after his ailing sister, Manju Tripathi,
who was suffering from cancer, on the date of occurrence as alleged in the
complaint. According to the learned counsel, the dispute involved in the
alleged complaint is of civil nature and none of the acts allegedly committed
by the appellants gave rise to any criminal liability.
Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent- complainant contended that the
contents of the complaint would disclose the commission of the cognizable
offence and this Court at the preliminary stage would not be justified in
embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness of the
allegations made in the complaint. He also contended that mere fact that a
dispute is of civil nature could not be made a ground for quashing the
complaint or FIR. In support of this submission, reliance is placed upon a
decision of this Court in Trisuns Chemical Industry Vs. Rajesh Agarwal &
Ors. (Distinguished).
We have given our anxious and thoughtful consideration to the respective
contentions of the learned counsel for the parties. On examination of the
contents of the complaint, we find that there is not even a whisper of
allegation or averment made therein constituting an offence for which
cognizance has been taken by the learned Magistrate against the appellants. On
the one hand, the complainant himself has stated in the complaint that oral
agreement to sell the plot took place in July 2002 and on the other hand, he
has alleged that he started paying the consideration amount for the purchase of
the plot between 15.7.2000 and 15.12.2002. The version of the complainant is
self-contradictory and, therefore, no prima facie case is made out against the
appellant involving them in the commission of the alleged offences.
The learned Magistrate in his order has categorically stated that the perusal
of the complaint would make it clear that there was a dispute in respect of
sale and purchase of land between the parties. In our view even if the
allegations made in the complaint are accepted to be true and correct, the
appellants cannot be said to have committed any offence of cheating or criminal
breach of trust. Neither any guilty intention can be attributed to them nor
there can possibly be any intention on their part to deceive the complainant.
No criminal case is made out by the complainant against the appellants in his
complaint and in the statements of the complainant and his witnesses recorded
by the Magistrate before taking of the cognizance of the alleged offences. The
averments of the complaint and the statements of the complainant and his
witnesses recorded by the Magistrate would amount to civil liability inter se
the parties and no criminal liability can be attributed to the appellants on
the basis of the material on record. In Trisuns Chemical Industry's case
(supra), relied upon by the complainant, this Court held as under:
"Quashing of FIR or a complaint in exercise of the inherent powers of
the High Court should be limited to very extreme exceptions. Merely because an
act has a civil profile is not sufficient to denude it of its criminal outfit.
The provision incorporated in the agreement for referring the disputes to
arbitration is not an effective substitute for a criminal prosecution when the
disputed act is an offence. Arbitration is a remedy for affording reliefs to
the party affected by breach of the agreement but the arbitrator cannot conduct
a trial of any act which amounted to an offence albeit the same act may be
connected with the discharge of any function under the agreement. Hence, those
are not good reasons for the High Court to axe down the complaint at the
threshold itself. The investigating agency should have had the freedom to go
into the whole gamut of the allegations and to reach a conclusion of its own.
Pre-emption of such investigation would be justified only in very extreme
cases."
There cannot be any disagreement to the well-settled proposition of law that
the High Court should exercise its inherent powers in extreme exceptions to
quash an FIR or a complaint. The ratio as laid down in Trisuns Chemical
Industry's case (supra) is of no help and assistance to the complainant in the
facts and circumstances of the present case. The complaint instituted does not
disclose that an offence under Section 420 is made out. Cognizance taken by the
Magistrate thereon against the appellants for offences u/Ss. 406/419/420 and
120-B IPC are clearly an abuse of the process of court and interference by this
Court is expedient in the interest of justice. This is a case of extreme
exception where the High Court ought to have exercised its inherent jurisdiction
and power to set aside the unwarranted and unjustified order of the Magistrate
impugned before it by the appellants.
For the aforementioned reasons, we quash the impugned order of the High Court
of Judicature at Patna dated 13.01.2005 passed in Criminal Misc. No.11930 of
2004. Consequently, the complaint filed by the Complainant and subsequent order
dated 8.8.2003 of the Judicial Magistrate, Gaya, in Complaint Case No.298 of
2003 T.R. 808/03 whereby and whereunder cognizance of offence under Sections
406, 419, 420, 120-B, IPC, has been taken against the appellants and summons
have been ordered to be issued against them for facing trial for the above-said
offences shall also stand quashed.
The appeal stands allowed accordingly.