SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Uttar Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation
Vs
Babu Ram
Appeal (Civil) 2103 of 2004
(Arijit Pasayat and R.V. Raveendran, JJ)
04.07.2006
ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.
Challenge in this appeal is to the order passed by a learned Single Judge of
the Allahabad High Court dismissing the writ petition filed by the appellant.
The background facts as projected by the appellant are as follows:
The respondent was appointed on purely temporary basis in the year 1980 to meet
the urgent needs during the Khumbh Festival. It was clearly mentioned in the
appointment letter that service of the respondent, as well as the similar
situated persons, was purely of temporary nature and can be terminated at any
time without prior intimation. The respondent was engaged from time to time to
meet the need for specific time bound work. As there was no further need for
engaging the respondent and others, their services were terminated by order dated
19.9.1983. By order dated 29.8.1998 the Deputy Labour Commissioner referred
following dispute for adjudication under U.P. Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947 (in short 'the Act'):
"Whether termination of service/retrenchment of workman Sh. Baburam, S/o
Nathhu Singh, Chawkidar by his employers w.e.f. 19.09.1983 is legal and/or
valid? If not, then to what relief/compensation the concerned workman is
entitled?"
By order dated 11.11.2002 the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Allahabad,
Rampur held that the termination/retrenchment of the respondent w.e.f.
19.9.1983 was illegal and invalid. Consequently the Labour Court directed that
respondent should be reinstated with continuity of service and be paid back
wages and other benefits.
One of the contentions of the appellant before the Labour Court was that the
reference was based on a belated claim. There was no specific finding recorded
by the Labour Court in this regard. A writ petition was filed before the
Allahabad High Court. Before the learned Single Judge, the appellant submitted
that the respondent has not offered any explanation for the belated claim
raised after 15 years in view of the fact that the grievance of the respondent
was raised in the conciliation proceedings initiated in 1998. The High Court dismissed
the writ petition.
Learned counsel for the appellant in this appeal re- iterated the contentions
urged before the High Court. Learned counsel for the respondent on the other
hand submitted that the delay of about 15 years has been condoned by the Assistant
Commissioner/Deputy Commissioner. It cannot therefore be said that there was
any delay.
So far as delay in seeking the reference is concerned, no formula of universal
application can be laid down. It would depend on facts of each individual case.
However, certain observations made by this Court need to be noted. In Nedungadi
Bank Ltd. v. K.P. Madhavankutty and Ors. it was noted at paragraph 6 as
follows:
"6. Law does not prescribe any time-limit for the appropriate Government
to exercise its powers under Section 10 of the Act. It is not that this power
can be exercised at any point of time and to revive matters which had since
heel) settled. Power is to be exercised reasonably and in a rational manner.
There appears to us to be no rational basis on which the Central Government has
exercised powers in this case after a lapse of about seven years of the order
dismissing the respondent from service. At the time reference was made no
industrial dispute existed or could be even said to have been apprehended. A
dispute which is stale could not be the subject-matter of reference under
Section 10 of the Act. As to when a dispute can be said to be stale would
depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. When the matter has become
final, it appears to us to be rather incongruous that the reference be made
under Section 10 of the Act in the circumstances like the present one. In fact
it could be said that there was no dispute pending at the time when the
reference in question was made. The only ground advanced by the respondent was
that two other employees who were dismissed from service were reinstated. Under
what circumstances they were dismissed and subsequently reinstated is nowhere
mentioned. Demand raised by the respondent for raising an industrial dispute
was ex-facie bad and incompetent."
In S.M. Nilajkar and Ors. v. Telecom District Manager, Karnataka the
position was reiterated as follows: (at para 17)
"17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay
in raising the dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in
denying relief to the appellants. We cannot agree. It is true, as held in M/s.
Shalimar Works Ltd. v. Their Workmen (supra) , that merely because the
Industrial Disputes Act does not provide for a limitation for raising the
dispute it does not mean that the dispute can be raised at any time and without
regard to the delay and reasons therefor. There is no limitation prescribed for
reference of disputes to an industrial tribunal, even so it is only reasonable
that the disputes should be referred as soon as possible after they have arisen
and after conciliation proceedings have failed particularly so when disputes
relate to discharge of workmen wholesale. A delay of 4 years in raising the
dispute after even reemployment of the most of the old workmen was held to be
fatal in M/s. Shalimar Works Limited v. Their Workmen (supra) 1993
AIR(SCW) 2214, it was held that a casual labourer retrenched by the employer
deprives himself of remedy available in law by delay itself, lapse of time
results in losing the remedy and the right as well. The delay would certainly
be fatal if it has resulted in material evidence relevant to adjudication being
lost and rendered not available. However, we do not think that the delay in the
case at hand has been so culpable as to disentitle the appellants for any
relief. Although the High Court has opined that there was a delay of 7 to 9
years in raising the dispute before the Tribunal but we find the High Court
factually not correct. The employment of the appellants was terminated sometime
in 1985-86 or 1986-87. Pursuant to the judgment in Daily Rated Casual Employees
Under P&T Department v. Union of India (supra) , the department was
formulating a scheme to accommodate casual labourers and the appellants were
justified in awaiting the outcome thereof. On 16-1-1990 they were refused to be
accommodated in the scheme. On 28-12-1990 they initiated the proceedings under
the Industrial Disputes Act followed by conciliation proceedings and then the
dispute was referred to the Industrial Tribunal cum-Labour Court. We do not
think that the appellants deserve to be non suited on the ground of
delay."
The above position was highlighted recently in Employers in relation to the
Management of Sudamdih Colliery of M/s Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. v. Their Workmen
represented by Rashtriya Colliery Mazdoor Sangh (2006 (1) Supreme 282).
It is to be noted that the High Court has very cryptically disposed of the writ
petition. The workman has not placed any material to show that it had raised
dispute within a reasonable time, and/or that he was not responsible for
delayed decision if any in the conciliation proceedings. It was for him to show
that the dispute was raised within a reasonable time and that he was not
responsible for any delay. The High Court, on a hypothetical basis has assumed
that the dispute might have been raised promptly but delayed by the State
Government and he cannot be penalized for delay in finalizing the conciliation
proceedings and the reference. But neither the Labour Court nor the High Court
has even noted the factual position. The conclusion was based on surmises and
conjectures.
That being so, the order of the High Court is clearly unsustainable. We,
therefore, set aside the order of the High Court and remit the matter to the
High Court to consider the question of delay in seeking reference and decide
the matter afresh in accordance with law.
The appeal is accordingly disposed of. No costs.
J