SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Mehboob Ali and Others
Vs
Habiban
Appeal (Civil) 4138 of 2006 (Arising Out of S.L.P. (C) No. 21215 of 2005)
(Arijit Pasayat and L. S. Panta, JJ)
14.09.2006
ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.
Leave granted.
Challenge in this appeal is to the legality of the judgment rendered by a
learned Single Judge of the Rajasthan High Court at Jodhpur allowing the Civil
Misc. Appeal filed in terms of Order XLIII Rule 1(U) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (in short the 'C.P.C.'). The
only controversy involved in this appeal is whether the first Appellate Court
could have allowed the application filed under Order VI Rule 17 C.P.C. and
permitted the defendants-tenants to take a plea relating to non-termination of
tenancy by the landlord by serving notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of
Property Act (in short the 'T.P. Act'). The First Appellate Court allowed the
amendment on the basis of the judgment of a learned Single Judge of the High
Court in the case of Prakash Mal & Ors. v. Jaswant Raj Soni reported in
(RLW 2000 (2) Raj. 1227), wherein it was held that if there is a condition in
the rent-deed relating to service of notice, then the suit of eviction can be
maintained only after service of notice under Section 106 of the T.P. Act.
The High Court in the impugned judgment noted that the judgment in Prakash
Mal's case (supra) had been reversed by a Division Bench of the High Court in
Fateh Lal Dak v. Sheshmal 2002 (2) CDR 1686 (Raj.). Following the
Division Bench's judgment and order in Fateh Lal's case (supra) the appeal was
allowed.
In support of the appeal, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the
issue is no longer res integra in view of the judgment of this Court in the
case of Jaswant Raj Soni v. Prakash Mal . It was, therefore, submitted
that the High Court's view is clearly unsustainable.
In response, learned counsel for the respondent submitted that though Prakash
Mal's case (supra) was subject matter of consideration of this Court in Jaswant
Raj Soni's case (supra), the factual scenario is different here.
Paras 5 and 6 in Jaswant Raj Soni's case (supra) reads as follows :
"5. In the second case the requirement as per the rent notice is:
"on being asked to vacate and ... on being told to do so" thus, there
is no requirement of a written notice before institution of an eviction
petition. The case of the landlord in the plaint is that he had intimated to
the tenant to vacate the premises before institution of the eviction petition.
Of course, the tenant denied the same in the written statement. Whether this
condition was actually fulfilled or not is a question of fact to be decided by
the trial court. The counsel for the parties informed that the case has not
gone for trial. Therefore, so far as the second case is concerned, the trial
Court will decide the issue after allowing the parties to lead evidence with
respect thereto. Therefore, the eviction suit must proceed to trial and final
decision.
6. The learned counsel for the respondents- tenants tried to argue that in view
of Section 28 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent & Eviction) Act,
1950, the provisions of Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act will apply
to the facts of the present case and a notice to quit in terms of the said provision
was required to be given. In view of V. Dhanpal's case (supra) we are unable to
accept this argument. There is no legal or statutory requirement for a notice
being given in the facts of the present case. The only requirement regarding
notice, if at all, arises from the condition printed on the back of the rent
receipt which in our view cannot be said to be an agreement between the parties
laying down requirement for issuance of a notice for institution of an eviction
petition. In any case as noticed above, the landlords have tried to meet that
requirement. In Jaswant Raj Soni's case the requirement of notice has been met,
as observed by us above, while in Jabar Lal case the trial Court will consider
whether the requirement has been met on basis of evidence led by the
parties."
It appears that the High Court relied upon the decision in Fateh Lal's case
(supra) to allow the appeal filed by the respondents. In our view, it would be
appropriate for the High Court to re-hear the matter keeping in view the
principles set out in paragraphs 5 and 6 of Jaswant Raj Soni's case (supra), as
quoted above.
Accordingly, we set aside the impugned judgment and order of the High Court and
remit the matter to the High Court for fresh consideration. Since the matter is
pending since long, we request the High Court to explore the possibility of
disposal of the matter as early as practicable and preferably by the end of
March, 2007.
The appeal is allowed to the aforesaid extent. No costs.