SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Prabhat Kumar Sharma
Vs
Union Public Service Commission and Others
Appeal (Civil) 5483 of 2000 (Writ Petition (C) No. 173 of 2002 and Writ Petition (C) No. 488 of 2000)
(Ashok Bhan and Markandeya Katju, JJ)
19.10.2006
MARKANDEY KATJU, J.
This judgment shall dispose of Civil Appeal No. 5483 of 2000 and Writ Petition
Nos. 173 of 2002 and 488 of 2000 filed under Article 32 of the Constitution of
India. Point involved in all these cases being the same, they are disposed of
by a common judgment.
The facts are taken from Civil Appeal No. 5483 of 2000.
This appeal has been filed by a member of "Lohar" community from the
State of Bihar. "Lohars" are being treated as Other Backward Classes
whereas he claims to be a member of Scheduled Tribes under the Scheduled Castes
and Scheduled Tribes Order. The point in issues is concluded against the
appellant by a judgment of this Court in Nityanand Sharma and Another Vs. State
of Bihar and Others, 9. The appellant seeks
to get the judgment in the case of Nityanand (supra) referred to a larger Bench
by contending that the said judgment is wrong and needs reconsideration.
Prabhat Kumar Sharma, the appellant herein, was a candidate for the Civil
Services Examinations held during the years 1991, 1992, 1993 & 1994. He
claimed to belong to "Lohar" community, which according to him was a
Scheduled Tribe in the State of Bihar. While considering the candidature of the
appellant and while verifying his claim as belonging to Scheduled Tribe in the
State of Bihar, the Union Public Service Commission prime facie came to the
conclusion that the "Lohar" community was not included in the list of
Scheduled Tribes for the State of Bihar issued by the Government of India. The
Commission addressed a communication to the Deputy Commissioner, Ranchi to
ascertain if "Lohar" community was recognized as a Scheduled Tribe in
Bihar. The Deputy Commissioner in his reply indicated that "Lohar"
community in the Bihar was recognized as "Backward Class" only and
not as 'Schedule Tribe". In the light of this, the appellant was asked by
the Commission to clarify the latest position in respect of the community
claim.
The appellant thereafter filed Writ Petition No. 2600 of 1992 in the High Court
of Patna at Ranchi for a direction to the State Government to issue him a caste
certificate as 'Scheduled Tribe' on his being a member of "Lohar"
community. The Court directed the Deputy Commissioner, Dhanbad to issue a
provisional caste certificate describing the appellant as "Lohar"
belonging to the Scheduled Tribe with the stipulation that the same shall be
subject to the final result of the writ petition pending in the High Court. The
Bench issued an interim direction on 18.02.1993 directing the Commission to
permit the appellant to appear in the examination provisionally as a member of
the "Lohar" community as a 'Scheduled Tribe'. As per interim
directions issued by the High Court, the Commission treated the appellant along
with 4 other candidates similarly placed as belonging to Scheduled Tribe
provisionally, subject to proving their claim. The performance of these
candidates including the appellant in the Civil Services (Main) Examination,
1994 was assessed on relaxed standards meant for Scheduled Tribe candidates. The
result of the written part of the Civil Services (Main) Examination, 1994 was
declared by the Commission on 27.04.1995 and none of the five candidates
including the appellant could qualify the written examination on the basis of
their performance even as Scheduled Tribe candidates. The appellant had earlier
failed to qualify the Civil Services (Main) Examination for the year 1993 even
though he was treated as Scheduled Tribe candidate provisionally.
Writ Petition came up for final hearing in July, 1999. The Single Judge of the
High Court in its judgment dated 5.7.1999 held that the question, as to whether
"Lohar" was a Scheduled Tribe in the State of Bihar stands concluded
by a judgment of this Court in Nityanand's case (supra) and accordingly held
that "Lohar" community is "Other Backward Class" (OBC) and
not a Scheduled Tribe.
The appellant being aggrieved filed letters patent appeal in the High Court
which has been dismissed by the impugned order.
Under the Constitution (Scheduled Tribes) Order, 1950 issued in exercise of
powers conferred under Article 342 (a) of the Constitution of India, at S. No.
20 the tribe "Lohara" was mentioned as a Scheduled Tribe for the
State of Bihar. The first Backward Classes Commission was set up in the year 1953
known as the Kaka Kalelkar Commission. According to the report of the Kaka
Kalelkar Commission, amongst the list of Backward Classes, "Lohar"
was shown at S. No. 60. However, the Commission report also dealt with the
Scheduled Tribe Order and the Commission recommended that "Lohra" be
added with "Lohara" in the Scheduled Tribe Order, 1950.
After the Kaka Kalelkar Commission report, the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled
Tribes Order (Amendment) Act, 1956 was enacted which was brought into force
with effect from 25.09.1956 and for Bihar, entry 20 was substituted to read as
"Lohara" or "Lohra". Thus, right upto 1976 there was no
ambiguity in the Scheduled Tribe Order as only "Lohara" was initially
considered as a Scheduled Tribe and with effect from 1956 "Lohara" as
well as "Lohra" were mentioned as Scheduled Tribe.
In the year 1976 the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes Order (Amendment)
Act, 1976 was passed and in the English version of the same, viz. entry 22 the
position as existing from 1956 was maintained. "Lohara" and
"Lohra" were stated to be Scheduled Tribes. However, in the Hindi
translation of the said entry "Lohara" was translated as
"Lohar". Thus the Hindi translation had "Lohar" and
"Lohra" as two Scheduled Tribes. After the 1976 Amendment, members of
the "Lohar" community started claiming themselves to be members of
Scheduled Tribe even though they had been identified as a backward class as
early as in the year 1955 by Kaka Kalelkar Commission. Because of the ambiguity
in the Hindi translation of the 1976 Scheduled Tribe Order, members of
"Lohar" community claimed themselves to be members of Scheduled
Tribe. The first litigation which came to the Supreme Court on this subject was
Civil Appeal No. 4631 of 1990 in the case of Shambhu Nath Vs. Union of India &
Another. This came up for hearing before three Judges of this Court. This Court
disposed of the appeal on 12.9.1990 by passing the following order:-
Special Leave granted.
The short point raised in this appeal is as to whether the Central
Administrative Tribunal was right in holding that the appellant did not belong
to the Lohar community which has now been declared as a Scheduled Tribe in
Chapra District of Bihar. It is not in dispute that from 1976 onwards the
community has been so included but according to the Postal Department of Union
of India, at the time when the appellant entered service, the community had not
been so included and, therefore, the recruitment on the footing that he was a
member of a scheduled Tribe entitled to reservation was bad. We have looked
into the record and have heard counsel for the parties. In view of the accepted
position that Lohar community is included in the Scheduled Tribe from the date
of amendment of the list in 1976 and the dispute as to whether the community was
known as "Lohar" or "Lohra" and if it was the latter, it
has been so included from before, we do not think the Tribunal was justified in
holding the view it has taken.
The appeal is allowed and the order of the Tribunal is vacated. The appellant
shall now return to duty. The period between 16.12.1986 when the order removing
him was made and the date when he would join in terms of our declaration now he
shall be entitled to 50% of his salary. In regard to all other service
benefits, his service shall be treated to be continuous. This decision may not
be taken as a precedent. No costs."
[Emphasis supplied]
It may be noted that at that point this Court did not notice the discrepancy between
the English and the Hindi translation of the Scheduled Tribes Order and
proceeded on the premise that "Lohar" being mentioned in the Hindi
version of the Order, the appellant was entitled to get the benefit of being a
Scheduled Tribe. Even the counsel appearing on behalf of the Union of India did
not point out to the Court the discrepancy and the order was passed treating
the "Lohars" as members of the Scheduled Tribe. Rather the Union of
India accepted the position that "Lohar" community is included in the
Scheduled Tribe. This order was passed by the Court without any contest.
The question regarding the claim of "Lohar" community to be
considered as Scheduled Tribe came up before this Court in Nityanand Sharma's
case (supra), which was initially listed before the two Judge-Bench which upon
being showen the case of Shambhu Nath (supra) thought it fit to refer the
matter to three Judges. Incidentally, one of the Judges in the case of
Nityanand Sharma (supra) was also a party to the decision in the case of
Shambhu Nath (supra). The Court in Nityanand Sharma's case (supra) examined in
detail as to whether there were three castes/tribes by the nomenclature of
"Lohar", "Lohara" and "Lohra" or whether
"Lohar" and "Lohara" were one and the same thing and if
"Lohar" and "Lohara" were two different castes/tribes then
which one of them would qualify as a tribe or whether both will qualify as
Scheduled Tribe. The Court after noticing the ambiguity existing in the Hindi
translation of 1976 Scheduled Tribe Order held that whereas "Lohara"
and "Lohra" belonged to the Scheduled Tribe, the "Lohars"
in State of Bihar belonged to the Other Backward Classes. The Court was called
upon to declare as to whether the Hindi translation was correct or original
English text was correct. For this limited purpose the Bench looked into the
authoritative ethnographic survey conducted in India by H.H. Risley. From the
said survey the Court observed that "Lohar" is a sub-caste of Barhai
who work in iron. In Risley's Ethnographic Glossary the "Lohar"
community has been dealt with in great detail. In the same Glossary
"Lohara" and "Lohra" are mentioned as tribe of Chota
Nagpur. The Court took notice of Article 348 (1)(b) of the Constitution of
India which provides that the authoritative text of all bills to be introduced
or amendments thereof to be moved in either House of the Parliament shall be in
English language. The Bench after a detailed and considered judgment held that
the original version which was in English was the authoritative text whereas
the Hindi was the translated version. It was concluded that in the Hindi
version there was some defect in the translation because of which the
"Lohar" community had been claiming the advantage of being a
"Scheduled Tribe" when actually they were only a backward class and
thus could not be given the benefit of reservation as a Scheduled Tribe. It was
further held by that Sambhu Nath's case (supra) could not be treated as
authoritative in point as the same was based on concession.
After Nityanand Sharma's judgment (supra), an effort was made by the members of
the "Lohar" community to claim themselves as Scheduled Tribe and the
matter came up to the Supreme Court. A bench of two judges in Vinay Prakash
& Ors. Vs. State of Bihar, , by a speaking order reaffirmed the view
taken in the Nityanand Sharma's case (supra) and held that there was no
question of the "Lohar" community being given the benefit of being
Scheduled Tribe. The bench refused to refer the case of Nityanand Sharma's (supra)
to a larger bench. This is the second attempt being made by the members of the
"Lohar" community to get the decision in Nityanand Sharma's case
(supra) re- opened and referred to a larger bench for reconsideration. There is
no dispute on the proposition that if the Presidential Notification does not
contain any specific class or tribe or a part of, then it is for the Parliament
to amend the law and the Schedule and include in and exclude from the Schedule,
a tribe or tribal community or part of or group within any tribe or tribal
community for the State. The Courts must read the lists of Schedule Castes and
Schedule Tribes under Article 341 and 342 read with Article 366 ( 24) and (25)
as they find them and accept their ordinary meaning. Neither the Government nor
the judiciary can add or subtract to the List of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled
Tribes. But, the Court would have the limited jurisdiction to the extent of
finding out whether the Community which claims the status as Scheduled Caste or
Scheduled Tribe, was, in fact, included in the Schedule concerned. To that
limited extent, the court would have the jurisdiction but, otherwise, the court
is devoid of power to include in or exclude from or substitute or declare
synonyms to the Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe or parts thereof or group of
such castes or tribes.
Shri Rajeev Dhavan, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant has
contended that Nityanand's case (supra) was wrongly decided because:
(a) Nityanand's case was relied on social data selected by the Judges whereas
such selection was prohibited by law;
(b) Nityanand's case failed to take into consideration the Hindi Text which was
authoritative in its own language.
We do not find any substance in the submissions made by Shri Rajeev Dhavan. In Nityanand's
case this Court examined in detail as to whether there were three casts/tribes
by the nomenclature Lohra, Lohara and Lohar or whether Lohar and Lohara were
one and the same thing and if Lohar and Lohara were two different castes/tribes
then which one of them would qualify as a tribe or whether both will qualify as
a tribe. This Court after detailed consideration came to the conclusion that
the ambiguity was caused because of Hindi translation of the 1976 Scheduled
Tribe Order. The Court was called upon to declare as to whether the Hindi
translation was correct or the original English text was correct. For this
limited purpose the Court looked at the Ethnographic Survey conducted in India
by H.H. Risley. After taking into consideration the said survey, the Court
observed that Lohar is a sub-caste of Barhai who works in iron. In Risley's
Ethnographic Glossary the Lohar Community has been dealt with in great detail.
In the same Glossary Lohara and Lohra are mentioned as tribes of Chota Nagpur.
The Court did not refer to or rely upon the text of Risley to include or
exclude a caste in the Presidential Order or amend or alter the Presidential
Order. Risley's survey was examined to remove the ambiguity which had crept in
because of the contradictory entries in English and Hindi versions of the
Presidential Order.
The Court after taking notice of Article 348 (1) (b) of the Constitution of
India which provides that the authoritative text of all Bills to be introduced
or amendments thereof to be moved in either House of the Parliament shall be in
English language came to the conclusion that the Hindi version was a translated
version and the original version was the authoritative text and in the Hindi
version there was some defect in translation because of which Lohar Community
had been claiming the advantage of being a Scheduled Tribe when actually they
were only a backward class and thus could not be given the benefit of
reservation as a Scheduled Tribe. It was observed in Nityanand's case (supra)
"19. Article 348(1)(b) of the Constitution provides that notwithstanding
anything in Part II (in Chapter II Articles 346 and 347 relate to regional
languages) the authoritative text of all bills to be introduced and amendments
thereto to be moved in either House of Parliament ..of all ordinances
promulgated by the President.....and all orders, rules, regulations and bye
laws issued under the Constitution or under any law made by the Parliament,
shall be in the English language. By operation of sub-article (3) thereof with
a non obstante clauses, where the Legislature of a State has prescribed any
language other than the English language for use in Bills introduced in, or
Acts passed by, the legislature of the State or in Ordinances promulgated by
the Governor of the State or in any order, rule regulation or bye-law referred
to in paragraph (iii) of that sub- clause, a translation of the same in the
English language published under the authority of the Governor of the State in
the official Gazette of that State shall be deemed to be the authoritative text
thereof in the English language under this article. Therefore, the Act and the
Schedule thereto are part of the Act, as enacted by the Parliament in English
language. It is the authoritative text. When the Schedules were translated into
Hindi, the translator wrongly translated Lohara as Lohar omitting the letter
'a' while Lohra is written as mentioned in English version. It is also clear
when we compare Part XVI of the Second Schedule relating to the State of West
Bengal, the word Lohar both in English as well as in the Hindi version was not
mentioned. Court would take judicial notice of Acts of Parliament and would
interpret the Schedule in the light of the English version being an
authoritative text of the Act and the Second Schedule."
We are in the respectfully agreement with the view taken in Nityanand's case.
Learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant contends that after the
coming into force of the Official Languages Act, 1963
the Hindi version was the authoritative text and in the case of ambiguity
between Hindi and English versions, the Hindi version would prevail. Article
348 of the Constitution clearly provides English to be the authoritative text
in respect of Acts of Parliament, amendment to Acts subject to any law made by
the Parliament. The Official Languages Act, 1963
vide Section 3 thereof provides for continuance of English language for
official purposes of Union and for use in Parliament. Section 5 provides for a
Hindi translation of all Central Acts and Ordinances promulgated by the
President or if any order or rule or regulation or bye-laws issued under the
Constitution or under any Central Act. Section 6 deals with State Act with
which we are not concerned in the instant case. From the conjoint reading of
Article 348 of the Constitution and Sections 3 and 5 of the Official Languages Act, 1963, English continues to remain
the authoritative text in respect of the Acts of Parliament.
An attempt was made to get the judgment in Nityanand's case re-opened and
considered by the larger Bench in Vinay Prasad's case (supra). Shri Rajeev
Dhavan, learned Senior counsel appearing for the appellant in the instant case
incidentally was the counsel in the said case as well. Submission similar to
the one which has been made before us had been made in Vinay Prasad's case
(supra) case as well. The Division Bench rejected the said contention. We are
in agreement with the view taken in the Vinay Prasad's case (supra) as well.
For the reasons stated above we do not find any merit in the civil appeal and
the writ petitions and dismiss the same with costs throughout.