SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Ramji Rai and Another
Vs
Jagdish Mallah (Dead) Through Lrs and Another
Appeal (Civil) 5353 of 2006 (Arising Out of Slp (C)No.19322 of 2004)
(Arijit Pasayat and S. H. Kapadia, JJ)
04.12.2006
S. H. KAPADIA, J.
Leave granted.
Plaintiff (appellant no.1 herein) instituted Civil Suit No.202/77 for permanent
injunction in the court of Additional Munsif Magistrate-VII, Ballia, against
defendants-respondents. In the said suit appellant sought permanent injunction
restraining the defendants from interfering in the possession of the land in
dispute or from raising boundary wall. In the suit it was alleged that the
appellants owned a house from the time of their ancestors; that their sehan was
towards the south of the said house; that the said sehan was in their
possession even prior to the enactment of U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land
Reforms Act, 1950; and that their cattle, palanis and troughs etc. existed on
the said land which was utilized by the appellants for different household
purposes. The appellants further alleged that the disputed land was unbounded
and that they had started construction of the boundary wall after leaving a
small passage between their house and the sehan. The appellants further stated
that they could not complete the boundary wall as they had to go to Bombay
where they were employed; that when they came back from Bombay to the village
they started the work of reconstruction which was obstructed by the respondents
and, therefore, they were compelled to file the suit for a permanent injunction
restraining the respondents from interfering in the possession of the land in
dispute as also from interfering in the construction of the boundary wall.
The respondents denied the above allegations. They contended that the disputed
land belonged to them; that the disputed land was used by them for different
household purposes; that they had been in possession of the land in dispute for
several years; that there was a passage between the house of the appellants and
the disputed land in question; that the respondents had constructed a wall
which could not be completed on account of the temporary injunction order
obtained by the appellants in the present suit. The respondents further
contended that the appellants were not tilling their agricultural land; that
the appellants had let out their agricultural land to others and, therefore,
there was no need of keeping any cattle or agricultural equipment on the
disputed land as claimed by the appellants.
After framing the issues the trial court decreed the suit. The trial court held
that the appellants were the owners and they were in possession of the disputed
land.
Aggrieved by the decree passed by the trial court, the respondents herein
carried the matter in appeal vide Civil Appeal No.84 of 1979 in the court of
Additional District Judge, Ballia.
By judgment and order dated 21.9.1981, A.D.J. came to the conclusion that the
plaintiff-appellants had failed to prove that the disputed land was his sehan
land; that appellant no.1 had admitted in his statement that one Raghunath Rai
was the real brother of his father; that separation had taken place in the
family between the appellants and Raghunath Rai; that prior to the separation,
the appellants and Raghunath Rai were joint; that at that time they had a
common sehan land and that the appellants sehan, at the time when the family
was joint, was towards the east of his house. The lower appellate court further
found that both the appellants and the respondents were claiming the disputed
land as an area appurtenant to their building. However, the lower appellate
court came to the conclusion that the boundary wall was constructed by the
respondents and not by the appellants. The lower appellate court further found
that the appellants had no direct access to the land in question; that there
was a lane running between the appellants' house and the disputed land in
question; that the appellants were not using the disputed land as his sehan
from the time of their ancestors; that the appellants had admitted that before
the partition the present house of the appellants was used for keeping cattle
and that the sehan of the appellants before the partition was towards the east
and not towards the south of the house as claimed by the appellants. The lower
appellate court further found that the respondents were using the land in
dispute; they were keeping their cattle on the disputed land; they were keeping
fodder and other agricultural equipments on the disputed land and in the
circumstances the lower appellate court came to the conclusion that the suit
land was being used by the respondents for their household purposes and they
were in possession of the said land. In the circumstances, the suit was
dismissed by the lower appellate court.
Aggrieved by the judgment delivered by the lower appellate court, the
appellants carried the matter in second appeal to the High Court. By the
impugned judgment, Second Appeal No.2839 of 1981 was dismissed on 2.4.2004.
Hence this civil appeal.
As stated above, the lower appellate court vide judgment dated 21.9.1981
dismissed the suit filed by the appellants. While dismissing the suit the lower
appellate court held as follows:
"On consideration on the entire materials on record, as discussed
above, I find that the plaintiff has totally failed to establish that the
disputed land was ever possessed by him as his sahan land. He has also failed
to establish that the construction upto the time of the filing of the suit was
got raised by him. That being so, the plaintiff is not proved to be the owner
of the disputed land. Therefore, he is not entitled to get any relief as
claimed. In the result, the appeal succeeds and it must be allowed with
costs." $ (underlined by us)
Dr. R.G. Padia, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants,
submitted that the lower appellate court and the High Court had erred in
holding that the appellants were not in possession of the suit land as their
sehan land. It was further argued that the boundary wall was under construction
by the appellants and not by the respondents. Learned counsel submitted that in
any event the lower appellate court had erred in stating that the appellants
have failed to prove that they were the owners of the disputed land. It was
urged that the present suit was only for permanent injunction. It was urged
that the appellants had never sought a declaration of ownership and, therefore,
lower appellate court had erred in holding that the appellants had failed to
prove their title to the disputed land.
On the finding of facts, we do not wish to interfere. There is no reason to
reverse the concurring findings. However, suffice it to state that the lower
appellate court should have dismissed the suit filed by the appellants only on
the ground that the appellants had failed to prove that they were in possession
of the disputed lands. Under Section 38 of the Specific
Relief Act, 1963 an injunction restraining disturbance of possession
will not be granted in favour of the plaintiff who is not found to be in
possession. In the case of a permanent injunction based on protection of
possessory title in which the plaintiff alleges that he is in possession, and
that his possession is being threatened by the defendant, the plaintiff is
entitled to sue for mere injunction without adding a prayer for declaration of
his rights [See: Mulla's Indian Contract and Specific Relief Acts, 12th
Edn., page 2815]
In the case of A.L.V.R. Ct. Veerappa Chettiar v. Arunachalam Chetti and others
1936 AIR(Mad) 200, it has been held that mere fact that the question of
title may have to be gone into in deciding whether an injunction can be given
or not is not any justification for holding that the suit is for a declaration
of title and for injunction. There can be a suit only for an injunction. The
present suit is only for permanent injunction and, therefore, the lower
appellate court should have, on the facts and circumstances of this case,
confined itself to its dismissal only on the ground that the appellants have
failed to show that they were in possession. This has been done but the
declaration that the appellants are not the owners, was not necessary.
Subject to above clarification, the appeal stands dismissed with no order as to
costs.