SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Ghaziabad Zila Sahkari Bank Limited
Vs
Additional Labour Commissioner and Others
(Dr.Ar.Lakshmanan and Tarun Chatterjee,JJ.,)
17.01.2007
JUDGMENT
Dr.Ar.Lakshmanan, J.
1. The present appeals were filed challenging the final judgment and order dated 04.04.2003 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 12890 of 2003 whereby the High Court dismissed the writ petition.
2. The consequence of the dismissal of the writ petition is that the High Court
has affirmed the order dated 15.03.2003 passed by the Addl. Labour
Commissioner, Ghaziabad, U.P., who according to the appellant has got no power
to pass such an order explaining the scope of the powers of the Registrar under
Section 128 of the U.P. Cooperative Societies Act.
3. According to the appellant under the U.P. Cooperative Societies Act, 1965
(hereinafter called 'the Act') read with U.P. Cooperative Societies Employees
Service Regulation, 1975 framed by U.P. Cooperative Industrial Service Board
and which has also been approved by the Governor and published in the official
gazette under Section 122 of the U.P. Cooperative Societies Act, 1965, a full
fledged remedy and mechanism to agitate the grievances of the employees of
Cooperative Societies are already contained. According to the appellant, the
U.P. Cooperative Societies Act, 1965 being a special enactment will prevail
over the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act and in any view of the matter application
made by the employees of the Bank under Section 6H(1) of the U.P. I.D. Act on
the basis of an agreement improperly entered into is not maintainable.
Therefore, it is submitted that the Addl. Labour Commissioner U.P. Ghaziabad
exceeded his jurisdiction in passing the order dated 15.03.2003.
4. By the said order, the Addl. Labour Commissioner allowed the payment of
Rs.11, 10, 398/- as an ex-gratia payment to the employees of the appellant-Bank
for the year 1999-2000 from the public fund. According to the Bank, if such a
payment is allowed, then there are 50 more such banks and employees of said
Banks who will claim same relief on the ground of parity and discrimination
which will erode the public money running in several crores as similar payments
made were the reasons for liquidation of District Cooperative Bank, Gonda. It
was further contended that if the above payment is allowed, then all credit
Cooperative Societies will crumble down and the cooperative movement shall
vanish in the entire State of U.P.BACKGROUND FACTS:
5. The U.P. Cooperative Societies Employees Service Regulations, 1975 were
framed by the U.P. Cooperative Institutional Service Board constituted by the
State Government. The Government issued a circular prohibiting ex-gratia
payment (over and above pay) by Cooperative Societies. In September, 1989, the
Registrar, Cooperative Societies issued circulars prohibiting payment of
ex-gratia amounts on 11.09.1987, 10.05.1995, 29.10.1997 and 17.02.2000 since
the same was contrary to Rules. Accordingly, ex-gratia payments to employees
were suspended. However, on 13.01.2001, the Board of Directors passed a
resolution for grant of ex-gratia to employees on 13.01.2001. Agreement for
ex-gratia payment for 1999-2000 was entered by the Chairman of the Union
without Registrar's permission under Regulation 42.
Agreement reads thus:
"AGREEMENT
Keeping in view, the position likely to ensue on resorting to total strike,
talks were held, as per programme fixed prior to 24.01.2001, in the interest of
bank, between Sarvashri Mukesh Gaud, Nirdosh Singh, Ghandharva, Satyendra
Singh, and K.P. Singh, on behalf of the Cooperative Bank Employees Union
Ghaziabad as well as Sarvashri S.S. Bhatia, Rakesh Sharma, Vinod Kumar and
Narendra Prasad Sharma on behalf of the Cooperative Bank Staff Association
Union, Ghaziabad both being the organization of Bank employees on one side, and
Shri Krishna Veer Singh Sirohi, the Chairman of the Bank on behalf of the
District Cooperative Bank Ltd. Ghaziabad (The Soil Sahkari Bank Ltd. Ghaziabad)
on the other side, on the subject of the Joint Notice No. C-1 dated 26.12.2000.
After the talks, a consensus was arrived at to the effect that the following
two demands will be met by the Chairman by the 20th of February, 2001.
1. The payment of the ex-gratia amounts pertaining to the year 1999-2000 to the
Bank employees on basis of their character rolls.
2. Payment of one special increment to employees on completion, by them of ten
years, continuous service in accordance with the circular letter of the
Registrar. On the above-mentioned assurance, both the organizations, keeping in
view the interest of the bank, decided that the resorting to the total strike
proposed prior to 24.1.2001 in accordance with the programme fixed after sending
the notice No. C-I dated 26.12.2000 by both the organizations is deferred to
20.02.2001. This consensus also was arrived at that if on account of any
circumstances, the demands are not met satisfactorily within the said fixed
period, the programme proposed on 24.01.2001 under the Notice referred to
above, will be commenced with effect from 21.2.2001, to the legality whereof
the Chairman agreed.
Both the sides, after going through this agreement and after having agreed to
the agreement, signed the same this 23rd day of January, 2001 at 5.00 p.m. at
the Bank Head Quarters R-2/100, Raj Nagar, Ghaziabad.
[Table To Be Clarified With The Original Court Document]
6. According to the Bank, this agreement is not a settlement under Section 2(t)
of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 read with Rule 5(1) and 2
of the U.P. Industrial Dispute Rules, 1967. On 03.02.2001, the Board of
Directors ratified the said agreement and also resolved that Registrar's
concurrence was not required:
RESOLUTION No. 1 passed on the meeting of the Board of Directors of Bank held
on 3.2.2001.
Resolution
Decision
Consideration of the proceedings of last meeting. The Secretary, Bank read over
the proceedings of the last meeting, which are confirmed unanimously with this
decision that the norms prescribed towards the fulfillment of 40 per cent
target of deposit enhancement in respect of the payment of the ex-gratia
amounts vide Resolution No.14 passed on 13.1.2001 and condition of obtaining
Registrar's concurrence thereto are not confirmed. Accordingly, the payment of
ex-gratia amounts be made to the Bank employees.Sd/- Illegible
Secretary/General Manager"
7. On 14/17.02.2001, Secretary wrote to the Chairman to refer to the Board of
Directors resolutions dated 13.01.2001 and 3.2.2001 to the Registrar. The
Chairman failed to do so. Hence, the Secretary himself referred the matter to
the Registrar under Rule 130.
"A true translated copy of the order dated 7.3.2001 passed by the Deputy
Registrar Cooperative Societies, U.P. Meerut Division, Meerut.
ORDER
Whereas "The Ghaziabad Zila Sahkari Bank Ltd." {The Ghaziabad
District Cooperative Bank Ltd.) which is called hereinafter as Bank, is a
Cooperative Society registered under the U.P. Cooperative Societies Act and
rules.
Whereas it has been decided, by the Board of Directors of the Bank, vide
Resolution No. 14 dated 13.1.2001 and in this continuation vide Resolution No.
1 dated 3.2.2001, on the demand of the Bank employees Organisation (Union), to
make the payment of the ex-gratia amount in accordance with the prescribed
norms like the previous year, whereon the Secretary, District Cooperative Bank
Ltd., Ghaziabad has vide his letter No. 18980 dated 17.2.2001, recommended to
annul both the aforesaid Resolutions under Section 128 of the U.P. Cooperative
Societies Act, 1985.
Whereas in the aforesaid context, a divisional meeting was held, vide
Registrar's circular letter No. C-74 dated 29.10.1997 and dated 22.1.2001, in
district Ghaziabad under the Chairmanship of the Hon'ble Minister of
Corporation in which the Registrar and other employees/higher officers as well
as all the Secretaries, Distt. Cooperative Banks Ltd. Of the division
participated and when the Secretary Distt. Cooperative Bank Ltd. Ghaziabad sough
for the directions on the aforesaid payment referred to above, the Registrar
clearly directed that the payment of ex-gratia amount be not made contrary to
the circular letters issued by the Department.
Now, therefore, I Naval Kishore, Deputy Registrar, Cooperative Societies, U.P.
Meerut Division, Meerut, in exercise of powers of the Registrar conferred by
the Government Order No. 3328-C/12. CA 25(1)/67 dated 24.6.1969, do hereby
require the Chairman/Board of Directors, District Cooperative Bank Ltd. Ghaziabad
under Section 128(1) of the U.P. Cooperative Societies Act, 1965, to
re-consider the Resolution No. 14 dated 13.1.2001 and Resolution No...... dated
3.2.2001, which are in respect of the payment of ex-gratia amounts to bank
employees. The said exercise may please be completed within 15 days. Please
ensure the action under reference, within the ambit of the circular letter
issued by the Registrar, Cooperative Societies,
U.P. Lucknow.Sd/- Naval Kishore
Deputy Registrar
Cooperative Societies, U.P. Meerut Division
Meerut."
8. On 25.02.2001, Board of Directors noted the ban on ex- gratia and still
decided to pay the same for 1999-2000 onwards.
"The Ghaziabad District Cooperative Bank Ltd.
Head Office: R-2/100, Raj Nagar, Ghaziabad
RESOLUTION NO. 9: passed under "other Items (1) at the Seventh Annual
General Body Meeting held on 25.2.2001.
Resolution
Decision the consideration of the payment of ex-gratia amount to the bank employees and officers.
The Chairman of the Bank intimated that the the payment of the ex-gratia
amounts to the bank employees and officers for the year 1999-2000 has not been
made as yet, while sanction has already been accorded by the Board of Directors
to the payment of the ex-gratia amounts. The payment of ex-gratia amounts has
been banned at the level of Registrar, Cooperative Societies.
After deliberation, in view of the continuously Enhancing position of the
bank's profitability, this is unanimously decided that the ex-gratia payments
for the year 1999-2000 be made to the bank's Employees/officers.
Sd/- Illegible
General Manager"
9. The Secretary again wrote to the Chairman to refer BOD Resolution dated 25.02.2001 to the Registrar. The Chairman failed to do so. Hence, the Secretary himself referred the matter to the Registrar under Rule 130.
10. On 07.03.2001/19.03.2001, the Registrar acting under Section 128(1)
referred to Secretary's letters to the Chairman under Rule 130 and granted time
to the Bank to reconsider its resolutions dated 13.01.2001, 03.02.2001 and
25.02.2001.
11. On 08.05.2001, 161 employees of the Union moved an application under
Section 6H(1) of the U.P.I.D. Act purporting to be on the basis of rights under
the Agreement dated 23.01.2001. On the same day, the Deputy Labour Commissioner
issued notice to the Bank.
Section 6H(1) reads thus:
"6H. Recovery of money due from an employer- (1) Where any money is due to
a workman from an employer under the provisions of section 6J to 6R or under a
settlement or award, or under an award given by an adjudicator or the State
Industrial Tribunal appointed or constituted under this Act, before the
commencement of the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes (Amendment and
Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1956, the workman may, without prejudice to any
other mode of recovery make an application to the State Government for the
recovery of the money due to him, and if the State Government is satisfied that
any money is so due, it shall issue a certificate for that amount to the
Collector who shall proceed to recover the same as if it were an arrear of land
revenue....."12. An application was filed under Section 6H(1) of the Act
which reads as follows:-
To
The Deputy Labour Commissioner U.P.
Lohiya Nagar, Ghaziabad.
Dated: 8.5.2001
12. We, the undersigned applicants, are entitled to receive a sum of Rs.11, 05, 333/- (Rupees Eleven Lacs Five thousand three hundred thirty three only) from M/s. Ghaziabad Zila Sahakari Bank Ltd., R-2/100, Raj Nagar, Ghaziabad as per the settlement dated 23.01.2001 between the management and their workmen which was affirmed subsequently by the Board of Directors in its meeting held on 03.02.2001. But even after making the repeated requests by the workmen through their union namely Co-operative Bank employees Association and Co-operative Bank Association have not paid one months wages (Basic pay plus Dearness Allowance) to the employees as ex-gratia for the financial year 1999-2000 so far the photocopy of the resolution passed by the Board of Directors related to the aforesaid settlement dated 3.2.2001 are attached only to the original copy of the application for ready reference and marked respectively as Annexure 'A' & 'B'.
Xxx xxxx"
13. The bank filed objections before the Additional Labour Commissioner (hereinafter called 'the ALC;) referring to the ban on ex-gratia and Registrar's directions dated 07.03.2001 and 19.03.2001 to reconsider. On 15.05.2001, the ALC allowed the application under Section 6H and issued recovery certificate on the ground that the employer (Bank) has no objection. The said order reads thus:
"ORDER
Dated 15.5.2001:
The parties are present. On behalf of the employers, written statement has been
filed. The workman-side has to file no records. Hence the proceedings relating
hearing are closed. On behalf of the workmen, a demand has been raised towards
payment of sum of money on the basis of agreement, which has been denied by the
employers. No objection about the amount of money mentioned in the application
has been raised on behalf of the employers. Hence, the recovery certificate for
the ordered sum of money be issued.Sd/- Illegible Endt. Bank's letter No.
Mu.Ka/01-02/Prasha/1137 dated 14.5.2001 has been sent by the undersigned. Sd/-
Illegible
15.5.2001”
14. On 26.05.2001, Board of Directors approved ex-gratia payments again. On 30.05.2001, the Secretary again referred the resolution. On 22.06.2001, the Registrar annulled all Board of Directors resolutions dated 13.01.2001, 03.02.2001, 25.02.2001 and 26.05.2001 in exercise of powers under Section 128 of the U.P.C.S. Act, which reads thus:
"128.
Registrar's power to annual resolution of a co-operative society or cancel
order passed by an officer of a co-operative society in certain cases- The
Registrar may-
(i) annul any resolution passed by the Committee of Management, or the general
body of any co-operative society;or
(ii) Cancel any order passed by an officer of a co-operative society; if he is
of the opinion that the resolution or the order, as the case may be, is not
covered by the objects of the society, or is in contravention of the provisions
of this Act, the rules or the bye-laws of the society, whereupon every such
resolution or order shall become void and inoperative and be deleted from the
records of the society:
Provided that, the Registrar shall, before making any order, require the
Committee of Management, general body or officer of the co-operative society to
reconsider the resolution, or as the case may be, the order, within such period
as he may fix but which shall not be less than fifteen days, and if he deems
fit may stay the operation of that resolution or the order during such
period."
15. It is to be noted that no appeal was filed against the Registrar's Order
under Section 98 (1)(h) before the State Government nor any step was taken for
arbitration under Section 70 and the same became final and conclusive under
Section 102.
16. The Bank filed Writ Petition being No. 22573 of 2001 against the order
passed by the ALC dated 15.05.2001 which was allowed and the matter was
remanded by the High Court for re-decision by the ALC in view of the fact that
(a) the Bank had filed an objection and (b) the Registrar had now passed the
annulment order dated 22.06.2001.17. On remand, the ALC held Registrar's
annulment order was not proper and directed that ex-gratia amount be paid as
per BOD's resolutions. According to the Bank, the ALC performed adjudication of
disputed claims under Section 6H which provides in a legitimate case only
execution of pre-adjudicated rights i.e. a determined sum to be paid. Writ
Petition No. 12890 of 2003 was filed by the Bank against the above order passed
by the ALC dated 15.03.2003 was also dismissed by the impugned order dated
04.04.2003.
18. We heard Mr. Sunil Gupta, learned senior counsel for the appellant and Mr.
Ratnakar Das, learned senior counsel in C.A. No. 5231 of 2004 and Mr. Sandeep
Singh, learned counsel for R1 and Ms. Indira Jaisingh, learned senior counsel
ably assisted by Mr. Bharat Sangal, learned counsel for R2 to R4.
LACK OF JURISDICTION:
19. Mr. Sunil Gupta, learned senior counsel for the appellant submitted that
the ALC's jurisdiction was wrongly invoked and his order dated 15.03.2002 under
Section 6H of the U.P. I.D. Act was without jurisdiction, null and void.
According to Mr. Sunil Gupta, the general legal principle is that, general act
should yield to the subject act. Upon this general principle of law, the
intention of the U.P. Legislature is clear, namely, that the special enactment,
U.P.CS Act, 1965 alone should apply in the matter of employment of cooperative
societies to the exclusion of all labour laws.
20. For this proposition, Mr. Sunil Gupta relied on the following judgments of
this Court:
1) The Co-operative Central Bank Ltd. & Ors. v. The Additional
Industrial Tribunal1, Andhra Pradesh
& Ors. Â (paras 2, 6, 7)
2) R.C.Tiwari v. M.P. State Co-operative Marketing Federation Ltd. & Ors2.
(para 3)
3) Belsund Sugar Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar & Ors3. (paras
16, 17, 48, 49)
4) Allahabad Bank v. Canara Bank & Anr4.
(paras 38-41, 50)
5) State of Punjab v. Labour Court, Jullunder & Ors5.
 (paras 7-10)
6) U.P.State Electricity Board v. Shiv Mohan Singh & Anr6.
 2004 (8) SCC 402 (paras 56, 87-91)The question of Section 135
21. In view of the general legal principle, Mr. Gupta submitted that it is
immaterial whether or not the Government has enforced Section 135 UPCS Act
because in any case the said provision had been included in the Act only by way
of clarification and abundant caution.
22. He further submitted that the enforcement of the entire intent of the
legislature in the form of enforcement of the entire scheme and provisions of
the Act having taken place, is wholly immaterial and that the clarificatory and
cautionary provision of Section 135 has not been given by the Government and an
appointed date for enforcement under Section 1(3) and that such non-appointment
of date makes no difference to the legal consequences of the aforesaid general
principle of law which, in any case, results in exclusion and implied repeal of
the U.P.I.D. Act on first legal principles.
23. Mr. Gupta also submitted that the ingredients of Section 6H are not
satisfied. According to learned senior counsel, there is no money due and no
settlement in the eyes of law. Indeed, there is no adjudicated claim but only a
highly disputed claim of the workmen.
24. In regard to his contention that no money is due, Mr. Gupta relied on
Central Inland Water Transport Corpn. Vs. The Workmen & Anr7.,
 (paras 11 to 16) and Town Municipal Council, Athani vs. The Presiding
Officer8, Labour Courts, Hubli & Ors. Â (para 8).
25. With regard to his contention that there is no settlement in the eyes of
law, learned senior counsel submitted that the agreement dated 23.01.2001
between the Chairman of the Bank and the workmen is not a settlement in the
eyes of law and is not valid or enforceable or binding on the Bank. He relied
on Triveni Glass Ltd. vs. State of U.P9.,
in support of this contention made.
26. In The Alternative, Mr. Gupta Contended That ALC, In Law Is Not Competent
To Declare The Statutory Order Of The Registrar Under Section 128 Of The Act To
Be Not Proper and Thereby The Same Has To Be Disregarded. An Order Under
Section 128 Is Final and Binding and Cannot Be Questioned In Any Court In View
Of Section 102.FINALITY CLAUSE:
27. According to Mr.Gupta, the Registrar's directions and order dated
07.03.2001, 19.03.2001 and 22.06.2001 requiring the Board of Directors to
reconsider its offending resolutions and finally annulling the same in exercise
of his powers under Section 128 are statutory in nature and have become finally
binding under Section 102 as no appeal was filed under Section 98 of the
Cooperative Societies Act.
28. Mr.Gupta then made further submissions with regard to Section 128, Rule 130
and 131. According to the learned senior counsel the ALC and the High Court
wrongly treat the Secretary's functions and procedure under Rule 130 as
substituting rather than merely supplementing the Chairman's power and
procedure, including suo motu power and procedure under Section 128 of the Act,
read with Rule 131. It was further submitted that the Secretary as well as the
Registrar fully complied with the procedure under Section 128 and 130.Res
Judicata:
29. Mr. Gupta submitted that the High Court had by its earlier judgment dated
04.07.2002 already directed the ALC to reconsider the matter keeping in view
the Registrar's order under Section 128. No objection to the propriety or
illegality of that order was taken by the workmen at that time, therefore, he
submitted that the workman are thereafter barred by res judicata from doing so.
C.A. No. 5231 of 2004
30. This appeal was filed by the State of U.P. through its Secretary,
Department of Cooperative Civil Secretariat, Lucknow against the final judgment
and order dated 04.04.2003 passed by the High Court in Writ Petition No. 12890
of 2003 whereby the High Court has been pleased to dismiss the writ petition
filed by the Bank.
31. According to Mr. Ratnakar Das, learned senior counsel the consequences of
the dismissal of the writ petition is that the High Court has virtually
affirmed the order dated 15.03.2003 passed by the ALC. By the said order, the
ALC allowed the payment of 11, 10, 398/- as ex gratia payment to the employees
of the Cooperative Bank for the year 1999-2000 from the public fund.32. Learned
senior counsel for the State - Mr. Ratnakar Das majorly adopted the arguments
of Mr. Sunil Gupta and submitted that the States argument is in tune with the
banks case. He invited our attention to Rules 37, 40, 42, and 98 and also
Sections 64 and 65 of the U.P. Cooperative Societies Act.
33. He also submitted that no ex gratia payment is being made by any other
bank.
34. Ms. Indira Jaisingh, learned senior counsel appearing for respondents 2-4, submitted as follows before us.
U.P. Cooperative Societies Act
35. It was submitted by learned senior counsel that, The U.P. Cooperative
Societies Act, 1965 has been enacted to further the Cooperative movement in the
State of U.P. and for providing for functions and responsibilities of
Cooperative Societies and the authorities invested with their supervision,
guidance and control. Thus the objects and reasons for the enactment of the
said Act is not to regulate the service conditions of the employees of the
cooperative societies and the Act only incidentally provides Sections 121 &
122 to regulate the terms and conditions of all employees of the Cooperative
Societies, Officers, Supervisors and other employees. It was submitted that
only those employees who are not covered by the provisions of the U.P. I.D. Act
would fall within the ambit of Sections 121-122 of the U.P. Cooperative
Societies Act. On the other hand, the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 has
been held to be a special statute in matters of settlement of Industrial disputes
arising out of the terms and conditions of service of employees who fall within
the definition of workmen, provided they are employed in establishments covered
by the said Act. In regard to various establishments which have their own
services rules, the U.P.I.D. Act will still apply to workmen employed therein.
Learned senior counsel cited various decisions of this court in the case of U.P.
State Electricity Board & Anr. vs. Hari Shankar Jain & Ors.10Life
Insurance Corpn. of India vs. D.J. Bahadur & Ors11. ,
Allahabad District Cooperative Ltd. vs. Hanuman Dutt Tiwari11, and The
Premier Automobiles Ltd. vs. Kamlekar Shantaram Wadke of Bombay & Ors.12,
in support of this contention.36. It was then submitted that the U.P. I.D. Act
is a special statute dealing with Industrial Disputes and therefore will
exclude the application of U.P. Cooperative Societies Act which is a general
statute.
U.P. Cooperative Societies Act v/s U.P.I.D. Act
37. It was submitted that it has been placed beyond any doubt that the U.P.
Cooperative Societies Act is an Act dealing with Cooperative Societies and not
industrial disputes and the provisions therein are themselves unambiguous about
the applicability of the various Labour Laws including U.P.I.D. Act.
(i) Section 135 of the Act is as under:
"135. Certain Acts not to apply to co-operative societies - The provisions
contained in the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (Act XIV of 1947) and
the U.P. Industrial Dispsutes Act, 1947 (U.P. Act XVIII of 1947) shall not
apply to Cooperative Societies."
(ii) Regulation 103 of the U.P. Cooperative societies Employees Regulation,
1975 is as under:
"103. The provisions of these Regulations to the extent of their
inconsistency, with any of the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947,
U.P. Dookan Aur Vanijya Adhisthan Adhiniyam, 1962, Workmen's Compensation
Act, 1923 and any other labour laws for the time being in force, if
applicable to any co-operative society or class of co-operative societies,
shall be deemed to inoperative."
38. In the above Act, Section 70 provides for disputes which can be referred to
Arbitration of the Registrar. Clause (1) thereof provides that Section 70
applies to "any dispute relating to the Constitution, management or the
business of a cooperative society." Clause (2) thereof provides for
including in the above disputes any "claims for amounts due" but this
is also for the purposes of sub-Section(1) and therefore would have to be read
along with clause (1). This Court has specifically held that disputes arising
out of terms and conditions of employment of the Society's employees do not
fall within the phrase "any dispute relating to the Constitution,
management or the business of a cooperative society." Thus Registrar
cannot decide such disputes regarding terms and conditions of employment. A
number of decisions of this court were cited on this point by learned senior
counsel, Deccan Merchants Cooperative Bank Ltd. vs. M/s Dalichand Jugraj Jan
& Ors13, Cooperative Central Bank Ltd. & Ors. vs. The Addl.
Industrial Tribunal14, A.P. & Ors., Allahabad District Cooperative Ltd. vs. Hanuman
Dutt Tiwari15, and Morinda Cooperative Sugar Mills Ltd. vs. Morinda
Cooperative Sugar Mills Workers Union16.
Learned senior counsel submitted that Section 128 also does not assist the
Appellant in this regard. The said section clearly provides that the powers of
the Registrar to annul any resolution only applies if the said resolution
"is not covered by the objects of the society or is in contravention of
the provisions of the Act, the Rules or the bye-laws of the society" as
held by this Court terms and conditions of service of employment do not fall
within the expression "objects of the society". The said Section 128
does not grant powers to the Registrar to annul such resolutions if deemed
contrary to the "Regulations", which are excluded by their explicit
absence from Section 128. Hence, the Registrar has no power to annul resolution
dealing with the terms and conditions of employment of the employees of the
Society. In any event there is nothing in the resolutions contrary to the
regulation.
40. This is further strengthened by Rule 130(2) which provides that if the
Resolution is not covered by Section 128 then it becomes operative immediately.
Application of Labour Laws
41. The learned senior counsel submitted that the legislature has specifically
provided in the provisions of the U.P. Cooperative Societies Act itself that
the Labour Laws will apply to the employees of the cooperative societies, in
Regulation 103 and in non-enforcement of Section 135. The fact that Section 135
has not been brought into force indicates clearly that (a) in order to exclude
Labour laws there must be statutory exclusion (b) failing such an exclusion
Labour Law will apply. In this case, there is a fact exclusion however under
Section 135 has not been brought into force.
42. Regulation 103 specifically provides that any provision of 1975 Regulations
which is inconsistent with any of the Labour Laws shall be deemed inoperative
to the extent of such inconsistency.
43. Regulation 42 of 1975 provides that a cooperative society, subject to the
provisions of the Regulations and general or special orders of the Registrar
give other allowances to its employees, but this does not require any
permission or approval from the Registrar, unlike other provisions of
Regulations 37, 40, 41 etc.44. However, if the said Regulation 42 read with
Orders of the Registrar comes in conflict with the enforcement of a settlement
between the Cooperative Bank and its employees under the provisions of the
U.P.I.D. Act, then in terms of Regulation 103, the said Regulation 42 along
with the concerned orders of the Registrar would be inoperative. The decision
in the case of Mathura Zila Sahakari Bank Ltd. Â 1999 AllLJ 628, was
referred to in this regard.
45. These Regulations also make it clear that under all circumstances
industrial relations are governed by the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act and not
by the U.P. Cooperative Societies Act.
46. It was submitted that the Orders of the Registrar in any case have been
admitted by the Registrar himself not to be binding on the Cooperative
societies but being merely advisory. Thus the above orders of the Registrar
would not come in the way of enforcement of the settlement dated 23.1.2001
under Section 6-H.Implied Repeal
47. The learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the argument of the appellants is based on implied repeal of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act by the U.P. Cooperative Societies Act. According to the learned counsel, when the statutes themselves are very clear on the question of applicability, the question of implied repeal does not arise. In this case, the existence of but not having been enforced, Section 135 in the U.P. Cooperative Societies Act makes it clear that Labour Laws apply unless specifically excluded by the U.P. Cooperative Societies Act. Hence the argument of implied repeal is misplaced. A reading of Regulation 103 also makes it clear that Labour Laws will prevail over the Regulations framed under the U.P. Cooperative Societies Act. In this case, the intention of the legislature is clearly expressed in Section 135 i.e. unless excluded by statutes the Labour Laws will apply. The Section actually exclude the application of Labour Laws but the legislation actually has not brought it into force.
48. In any event, there is a presumption against a repeal by implication; and
the reason of this Rule is based on the theory that the Legislature while
enacting a law has a complete knowledge of the existing laws on the same
subject matter, and therefore, when it does not provide a repealing provision,
it gives out an intention not to repeal the existing legislation. The doctrine
of implied repeal is based on the theory that the Legislature, which is
presumed to know the existing law, did not intend to create any confusion by
retaining conflicting provisions and, therefore, when the Court applies the
doctrine, it does not more than give effect to the intention of the Legislature
by examining the scope and the object of the two enactments and by a comparison
of their provisions. This principle was made clear by this court in the case of
Municipal Council Palai vs. T.J. Joseph & Ors17. The
presumption is, however, rebutted and repeal is inferred by necessary
implication when the provisions of the later Act are so inconsistent with or
repugnant to the provisions of the earlier Act "that the two cannot stand
together". But, if the two may be read together and some application may
be made of the words in the earlier Act, repeal will not be inferred. In this
context learned senior counsel referred to the decisions of this court in the
case of R.S. Raghunath vs. State of Karnataka & Anr18.,
 and Municipal Council Palai (supra).
50. It was submitted that the U.P.I.D. Act and the U.P. Cooperative Societies
Act are not inconsistent and hence there is no question of implied repeal.
51. If the later statute by itself provides that the earlier statute will still
be applicable then no reference is required to be made to be General Principle
of Implied Repeal which is applicable only when the statute does not so provide
and further when there is a conflict between the provisions of the two
statutes.
Settlement
52. The learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent submitted that the
settlement dated 23.1.2001 is fully capable of enforcement under Section 6-H of
the U.P.I.D. Act as it falls squarely within the definition of Section 2(t) and
6-B. The said settlement has been arrived at outside the Conciliation
Proceedings and has been signed by the Chairman who under Section 30 of the
U.P. Cooperative Societies Act is responsible for the control, supervision and
guidance of the affairs and business of the Society. Section 31 does not bar
the Chairman from signing the settlement though it grants certain powers to the
Secretary of the Society.
53. Under Section 6-B, the Settlement arrived at outside the Conciliation
Proceedings is binding on the parties to it but need not be registered under
Section 6-B. The registration of such a settlement is optional. Thus the
present settlement cannot be said to be 'not a settlement' as alleged.
54. The present appeal has arisen out of proceedings under the U.P.I.D. Act and
not the U.P. Cooperative Societies Act. The Union on behalf of 167 workmen and
for enforcing a right to receive ex gratia payment, whose payment has,
admittedly continued for more than 23 years and agreed to by the Bank in terms
of the settlement dated 23.1.2001 filed an application under Section 6-H which
provides that where any money is due to a workman from an employer under a
settlement, the workman may make an application to the State Government for the
recovery of the money due to him.55. The present dispute is not "any
dispute relating to the Constitution, management or the business of a cooperative
society" and, therefore, the machinery provided in Section 70 or 128 of
the U.P. Cooperative Societies Act would not be available to the employees of
the Bank to enforce the settlement.
56. The employees are constrained to approach the Additional Labour Commissioner
under Section 6-H(1) of the Act to enforce the payment. It is the Bank which
has sought to introduce the provisions of the Cooperative Societies Act in 6-H
proceedings and not the ALC or the employees as alleged.
57. It is also noteworthy that the respondents are seeking to enforce the
settlement and not any resolution of the Board of Directors of the Bank and the
Registrar Cooperative Societies, UP does not have any power to annul the
settlement even under Regulation 42 of the 1975 Regulations. It was, therefore,
submitted that even if it is accepted for the sake of arguments, without
admitting, that the Registrar had the power under Section 128 to annul a
Resolution of the Board of Directors relating to the terms and conditions of
service of the employees, even on such annulment, the employees would be
entitled to enforce the terms of the settlement, notwithstanding such annulment
as the Resolutions of the Board of Directors are not the subject matter of the
provisions of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act.
58. With regard to Res Judicata it was argued that, the Additional Labour
Commissioner had allowed the application under Section 6-H (1) of the
respondents on 15.5.2001. The Registrar thereafter by his order dated 22.6.2001
during the pendency of Writ Petition No. 22537 of 2001 of the Bank challenging
the said order of the ALC, annulled the Resolutions of the Board of Directors.
Therefore, the order dated 22.6.2001 was not before the ALC at the time of
issuance of his order dated 15.5.2001. It was for this reason the High Court by
its judgment dated 4.7.2002 had merely directed the Additional Labour
Commissioner to reconsider its decision dated 15.5.2001 "in view of this
annulment of the Resolution of the Board of Directors". Thus there is no question
of any res judicata in regard to the order dated 22.6.2001 of the Registrar and
the ALC was fully competent to reject the operation of the said order on the
proceedings before it.59. We have heard all the parties in detail and have
carefully perused through all records placed before us. In our opinion, the
arguments of the appellants deserve favorable consideration for the reasons
stated infra.
60. The general legal principle in interpretation of statutes is that 'the
general Act should lead to the special Act'. Upon this general principle of
law, the intention of the U.P legislature is clear, that the special enactment
UP Co-operative Societies Act, 1965 alone should apply in the matter of
employment of Co-operative Societies to the exclusion of all other Labour Laws.
It is a complete code in itself as regards employment in co-operative societies
and its machinery and provisions. The general Act the UPID Act, 1947 as a whole
has and can have no applicability and stands excluded after the enforcement of
the UPCS Act. This is also clear from necessary implication that the
legislature could not have intended 'head-on-conflict and collision' between
authorities under different Acts. In this regard reference can be made to
decisions of this court in the case of The Co-operative Central Bank Ltd.
& Ors. v. The Additional Industrial Tribunal, Andhra Pradesh & Ors19,
 where this court observed that:
Applying these tests, we have no doubt at all that the dispute covered by the
first issue referred to the Industrial Tribunal in the present cases could not
possibly be referred for decision to the Registrar under Section 61 of the Act.
The dispute related to alteration of a number of conditions of service of the
workmen which relief could only be granted by an Industrial Tribunal dealing
with an industrial dispute. The Registrar, it is clear from the provisions of
the Act, could not possibly have granted the reliefs claimed under this issue
because of the limitations placed on his powers in the Act itself. It is true
that Section 61 by itself does not contain any clear indication that the
Registrar cannot entertain a dispute relating to alteration of conditions of
service of the employees of a registered society; but the meaning given to the
expression "touching the business of the society", in our opinion,
makes it very doubtful whether a dispute in respect of alteration of conditions
of service can be held to be covered by this expression. Since the word
"business" is equated with the actual trading or commercial or other
similar business activity of the society, and since it has been held that it
would be difficult to subscribe to the proposition that whatever the society
does or is necessarily required to do for the purpose of carrying out its
objects, such as laying down the conditions of service of its employees, can be
said to be a part of its business, it would appear that a dispute relating to
conditions of service of the workmen employed by the society cannot be held to
be a dispute touching the business of the society. Further, the position is
clarified by the provisions of Sub-section (4) of Section 62 of the Act which
limit the power to be exercised by the Registrar, when dealing with a dispute
referred to him under Section 61, by a mandate that he shall decide the dispute
in accordance with the provisions of the Act and the Rules and bye-laws. On the
face of it, the provisions of the Act, the rules and the bye-laws could not
possibly permit the Registrar to change conditions of service of the workmen employed
by the society. For the purpose of bringing facts to our notice in the present
appeals, the Rules framed by the Andhra Pradesh Government under the Act, and
the bye-laws of one of the appellant Banks have been placed on the Paper-books
of the appeals before us. It appears from them that the conditions of service
of the employees of the Bank have all been laid down by framing special
bye-laws. Most of the conditions of service, which the workmen want to be
altered to their benefit, have thus been laid down by the bye-laws, so that any
alteration in those conditions of service will necessarily require a change in
the bye-laws. Such a change could not possibly be directed by the Registrar
when, under Section 62(4) of the Act, he is specifically required to decide the
dispute referred to him in accordance with the provisions of the bye-laws. It
may also be noticed that a dispute referred to the Registrar under Section 61
of the Act can even be transferred for disposal to a person who may have been
invested by the Government with powers in that behalf, or may be referred for
disposal to an arbitrator by the Registrar. Such person or arbitrator, when
deciding the dispute, will also be governed by the mandate in Section 62(4) of
the Act, so that he will also be bound to reject the claim of the workmen which
is nothing else than a request for alteration of conditions of service
contained in the bye-laws. It is thus clear that, in respect of the dispute
relating to alteration of various conditions of service, the Registrar or other
person dealing with it under Section 62 of the Act is not competent to grant
the relief claimed by the workmen at all. On the principle laid down by this
Court in the case of the Deccan Merchants Co-operative Bank Ltd., therefore, it
must be held that this dispute is not a dispute covered by the provisions of
Section 61 of the Act. Such a dispute is not contemplated to be dealt with
under Section 62 of the Act and must, therefore, be held to be outside the
scope of Section 61.Further this court observed in R.C.Tiwari v. M.P. State
Co-operative Marketing Federation Ltd. & Ors.that:-
"...He also places reliance on Section 93 of the Societies Act which
states that nothing contained in the Madhya Pradesh Shops and Establishments
Act 1958, the M.P. Industrial Workmen (Standing Orders) Act, 1959 and the M.P.
Industrial Relations Act, 1960 shall apply to a Society registered under this
Act. By necessary implication, application of the Act has not been excluded and
that, therefore, the Labour Court has jurisdiction to decide the matter. We
find no force in the contention. Section 55 of the Societies Act gives power to
the Registrar to deal with disciplinary matters relating to the employees in
the Society or a class of Societies including the terms and conditions of
employment of the employees. Where a dispute relates to the terms of
employment, working conditions, disciplinary action taken by a Society, or
arises between a Society and its employees, the Registrar or any officer
appointed by him, not below the rank of Assistant Registrar, shall decide the
dispute and his decision shall be binding on the society and its employees. As
regards power under Section 64, the language is very wide, viz.,
"Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in
force any dispute touching the constitution, a management or business of a
Society or the liquidation of a Society shall be referred to the Registry by
any of the parties to the dispute." Therefore, the dispute relating to the
management or business of the Society is very comprehensive as repeatedly held
by this Court. As a consequence, special procedure has been provided under this
Act. Necessarily, reference under Section 10 of the Societies Act stands
excluded. The judgment of this Court arising under Andhra Pradesh Act has no
application to the facts for the reason that under that Act the dispute did not
cover the dismissal of the servants of the society which the Act therein was
amended."Similar view was taken by this court in the case of Belsund
Sugar Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar & Ors. (supra), Allahabad Bank v. Canara
Bank & Anr.(supra), State of Punjab v. Labour Court, Jullunder & Ors.
(supra) and U.P.State Electricity Board v. Shiv Mohan Singh & Anr. (supra).
61. Also if we refer to the general principles of Statutory Interpretation as
discussed by G.P.Singh, in his treatise on 'Principles of Statutory
Interpretation', we can observe that, a prior general Act may be affected by a
subsequent particular or special Act if the subject-matter of the particular
Act prior to its enforcement was being governed by the general provisions of
the earlier Act. In such a case the operation of the particular Act may have
the effect of partially repealing the general Act, or curtailing its operation,
or adding conditions to its operation for the particular cases. The distinction
may be important at times for determining the applicability of those provisions
of the General Clauses Act, 1897, (Interpretation Act, 1889 of U.K. now
Interpretation Act, 1978) which apply only in case of repeals.
62. A general Act's operation may be curtailed by a later Special Act even if
the general Act will be more readily inferred when the later Special Act also
contains an overriding non-obstante provision. Section 446(1) of the Companies
Act 1956 (Act 1 of 1956) provides that when the winding up order is passed
or the official liquidator is appointed as a provisional liquidator, no suit or
other legal proceeding shall be commenced, or if pending at the date of winding
up order shall be proceeded with against the company except by leave of the
Court. Under Section 446(2), the company Court, notwithstanding anything
contained in any other law for the time being in force is given jurisdiction to
entertain any suit, proceeding or claim by or against the company and decide
any question of priorities or any other question whatsoever, whether of law or
fact, which may relate to or arise in the course of the winding up. The Life
Insurance Corporation Act, 1956 (Act 31 of 1956) constituted a Tribunal
and section 15 of the Act enabled the Life Insurance Corporation to file a case
before the tribunal for recovery of various amounts from the erstwhile Life
Insurance Companies in certain respects. Section 41 of the LIC Act conferred
exclusive jurisdiction on the tribunal in these matters. On examination of
these Acts, it was held that the provisions conferring exclusive jurisdiction
on the tribunal being provisions of the Special Act i.e. the LIC Act prevailed
over the aforesaid provisions of the general Act, viz., the Companies Act which
is an Act relating to Companies in general and, therefore, the tribunal had
jurisdiction to entertain and proceed with a claim of the Life Insurance
Corporation against a former insurer which had been ordered to be wound up by
the Company Court. This case was followed in giving to the provisions of the Recovery
of Debts due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act 1993 (RDB Act)
overriding effect over the provisions of the Companies Act, 1956. The RDB
Act constitutes a tribunal and by sections 17 and 18 confers upon the tribunal
exclusive jurisdiction to entertain and decide applications from the banks and
financial institutions for recovery of debts (defined to mean any liability
which is claimed as due). The Act also lays down the procedure for recovery of
the debt as per the certificate issued by the tribunal. The provisions of the
RDB Act, which is a special Act, were held to prevail over sections 442, 446,
537 and other sections of the Companies Act which is a general Act, more so
because Section 34 of the RDB Act gives over-riding effect to that Act by
providing that the provisions of this Act shall have effect notwithstanding
anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time being
in force.63. We are therefore of the view that the Asst. Labour Commissioner
(ALC)'s jurisdiction was wrongly invoked and his order dated 15.03.2003 under
section 6H, U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is without
jurisdiction and hence null and void and it can be observed that, in view of
the said general legal principle, it is immaterial whether or not the
government has enforced section135 (UPCS Act) because, in any case the said
provision (S.135) had been included in the Act only by way of clarification and
abundant caution.
64. In the alternative if we are to presume that the ingredients of S.6H are
not satisfied then also there is no adjudicated claim but only a highly
disputed claim of the workman. In this connection, one can refer to the decision
of this court in the case of Central Inland Water Transport Corporation vs. The
Workmen and Another (supra) wherein this court opined that:
"11. The only question which arises for determination in this Court is
whether the Labour Court has jurisdiction to adjudicate on the issues referred
to it under Section 33(C)(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. Sub-section (2),
which is part of Section 33C dealing with "the recovery of money due from
an employer" reads as follows:
(2) Where any workman is entitled to receive from the employer any money or any
benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money and if any
question arises as to the amount of money due or as to the amount at which such
benefit should be computed, then the question may, subject to any rules that
may be made under this Act, be decided by such Labour Court as may be specified
in this behalf by the appropriate Government.
12. It is now well-settled that a proceeding under Section 33(C)(2) is a
proceeding, generally, in the nature of an execution proceeding wherein the
Labour Court calculates the amount of money due to a workman from his employer,
or if the workman is entitled to any benefit which is capable of being computed
in terms of money, the Labour Court proceeds to compute the benefit in terms of
money. This calculation or computation follows upon an existing right to the
money or benefit, in view of its being previously adjudged, or, otherwise, duly
provided for. In Chief Mining Engineer, East India Coal Co. Ltd. v. Rameswar
and Ors. it was reiterated that proceedings under Section 33(C)(2) are
analogous to execution proceedings and the Labour Court called Upon to compute
in terms of money the benefit claimed by workmen is in such cases in the
position of an executing court. It was also reiterated that the right to the
benefit which is sought to be computed must be an existing one, that is to say,
already adjudicated upon or provided for and must arise in the course of and in
relation to the relationship between an industrial workman and his employer.13.
In a suit, a claim for relief made by the plaintiff against the defendant
involves an investigation directed to the determination of (i) the plaintiff's
right to relief; (ii) the corresponding liability of the defendant, including,
whether the defendant is, at all, liable or not; and (iii) the extent of the
defendants liability, if any. The Working out of such liability with a view to
give relief is generally regarded as the function of an execution proceeding.
Determination No. (iii) referred to above, that is to say, the extent of the
defendant's liability may sometimes be left over for determination in execution
proceedings. But that is not the case with the determinations under heads (i)
and (ii). They are normally regarded as the functions of a suit and not an
execution proceeding. Since a proceeding under Section 33(C)(2) is in the
nature of an execution proceeding it should follow that an investigation of the
nature of determinations (i) and (ii) above is, normally, outside its scope. It
is true that in a proceeding under Section 33(C)(2), as in an execution
proceeding, it may be necessary to determine the identity of the person by whom
or against whom the claim is made if there is a challenge on that score. But
that is merely 'Incidental'. To call determinations (i) and (ii) 'Incidental'
to an execution proceeding would be a perversion, because execution proceedings
in which the extent of liability is worked out are just consequential upon the
determinations (i) and (ii) and represent the last stage in a process leading
to final relief. Therefore, when a claim is made before the Labour Court under
Section 33(C)(2) that court must clearly understand the limitations under which
it is to function. It cannot arrogate to itself the functions--say of an
Industrial Tribunal which alone is entitled to make adjudications in the nature
of determinations (i) and (ii) referred to above, or proceed to compute the
benefit by dubbing the former as 'Incidental' to its main business of computation.
In such cases determinations (i) and (ii) are not 'Incidental' to the
computation. The computation itself is consequential upon and subsidiary to
determinations (i) and (ii) as the last stage in the process which commenced
with a reference to the Industrial Tribunal. It was, therefore, held in State
Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur v. R.L. Khandelwal, that a workman cannot put
forward a claim in an application under Section 33(C)(2) in respect of a matter
which is not based on an existing right and which can be appropriately the
subject-matter of an industrial dispute which requires a reference under
Section 10 of the Act.14. The scope of Section 33(C)(2) was illustrated by this
Court in The Central Bank of India Ltd. v. P.S. Rajagopalan etc.. Under the Shastri
Award, Bank clerks operating the adding machine were declared to be entitled to
a special allowance of Rs. 10/- per month. Four clerks made a claim for
computation before the Labour Court. The Bank denied the claim that the clerks
came within the category referred to in the award and further contended that
the Labour Court under Section 33(C)(2) had no jurisdiction to determine
whether the clerks came within that category or not. Rejecting the contention,
this Court held that the enquiry as to whether the 4 clerks came within that
category was purely 'incidental' and necessary to enable the Labour Court to
give the relief asked for and, therefore, the Court had jurisdiction to enquire
whether the clerks answered the description of the category mentioned in the
Shastri Award, which not only declared the right but also the corresponding
liability of the employer bank. This was purely a case of establishing the
identity of the claimants as coming within a distinct category of clerks in
default of which it would have been impossible to give relief to anybody
falling in the category. When the Award mentioned the category it, as good as,
named every one who was covered by the category and hence the enquiry, which
was necessary, became limited only to the clerks' identity and did not extend
either to a new investigation as to their rights or the Bank's liability to
them. Both the latter had been declared and provided for in the Award and the
Labour Court did not have to investigate the same. Essentially, therefore, the
assay of the Labour Court was in the nature of a function of a court in
execution proceedings and hence it was held that the Labour Court had
jurisdiction to determine, by an incidental enquiry, whether the 4 clerks came
in the category which was entitled to the special allowance.
15. It is, however, interesting to note that in the same case the court at page
156 gave illustrations as to what kinds of claim of a workman would fall
outside the scope of Section 33(C)(2). It was pointed out that a workman who is
dismissed by his employer would not be entitled to seek relief under Section
32(C)(2) by merely alleging that, his dismissal being wrongful, benefit should
be computed on the basis that he had continued in service. It was observed
"His ... dismissal may give rise to an industrial dispute which may be
appropriately tried, but once it is shown that the employer has dismissed ...
him, a claim that the dismissal ... is unlawful and, therefore, the employee
continues to be the Workman of the employer and is entitled to the benefits due
to him under a preexisting contract, cannot be made under Section
33(C)(2)". By merely making a claim in a loaded form the workmen cannot
give the Labour Court jurisdiction under Section 33(C)(2). The workman who has
been dismissed would no longer be in the employment of the employer. It may be
that an industrial tribunal may find on an investigation into the circumstances
of the dismissal that the dismissal was unjustified. But when he comes before
the Labour Court with his claim for computation of his wages under Section
33(C)(2) he cannot ask the Labour Court to disregard his dismissal as wrongful
and on that basis compute his wages. In such cases, a determination as to
whether the dismissal was unjustified would be the principal matter for
adjudication, and computation of wages just consequential upon such
adjudication. It would be wrong to consider the principal adjudication as
'incidental' to the computation. Moreover, if we assume that the Labour Court
had jurisdiction to make the investigation into the circumstances of the
dismissal, a very anomalous situation would arise. The Labour Court after
holding that the dismissal was wrongful would have no jurisdiction to direct
reinstatement under Section 33(C)(2). and yet if the jurisdiction to compute
the benefit is conceded it will be like conceding it authority to pass orders
awarding wages as many times as the workman comes before it without being
reinstated. Therefore, the Labour Court exercising jurisdiction under Section
33(C)(2) has got to be circumspect before it undertakes an investigation,
reminding itself that any investigation it undertakes is, in a real sense,
incidental to its computation of a benefit under an existing right, which is
its principal concern.16. Bearing in mind these limitations of a Labour Court
functioning under Section 33(C)(2) we have to approach the question before us.
The old Company closed its business on May 3, 1967. The Corporation, in due
course, appointed a large number of the Company's employees by fresh letters of
appointments, but it could not absorb all of them. The reference was made on
behalf of the employees mentioned in Lists I and II. They were in all 512. Out
of these, it appears, 24 were re-employed by the Corporation later on. The rest
of them virtually claimed re-employment or at least some benefits on the basis
of their alleged right to be re-employed. In actual fact, however, the
Corporation did not employ these workmen after the Company's undertaking was
transferred to it. The scheme of transfer did not compel the Corporation to
employ the workmen. Nor is there any term in the transfer agreement or scheme
which passed over to the Corporation any responsibility in respect of the
workmen. Section 25FF of the Industrial Disputes Act declares what are the
rights of the workmen of an undertaking which is transferred. The right is to
receive compensation as if the workmen are retrenched under Section 25F and is
available only against the owners of the undertaking, that is to say, the
transferor of the undertaking. The liability of the transferor to pay
compensation does not arise only when (i) there has been a change of employers
by reason of the transfer and (ii) the 3 Sub-clauses (a), (b) and (c) of the
proviso of that section come into play. It is pointed out in South Arcot
Electricity Distribution Co. v. N.K. Mohd. Khan that each one of the 3
conditions in Clauses (a), (b) and (c) is to be satisfied before it can be held
that the right conferred by the principal clause does not accrue to the
workmen. In the present case there is no actual change of employers by reason
of the transfer, nor do the 3 sub-clauses apply. Therefore, prima facie, the
claim of the workmen, would be for compensation under Section 25FF, directed,
not against the Corporation, but against the Company of which they were
formerly the employees. As a matter of fact the scheme itself shows that the
employees of the Company who were not taken over by the Corporation were to be
paid by the Company all money due to them under the law. The scheme further
shows that the Company was to be put in possession of funds by the Government
of India for satisfying the liabilities to the workers."Similarly in the
case of Town Municipal Council, Athani vs. The Presiding Officer Labour Courts,
Hubli and Ors, etc, (supra), this court held:
"8.We have examined the application which were presented before the Labour
Court under section 33-C(2) of the Act in these appeals and have also taken
into account the pleadings which were put forward on behalf of the appellant in
contesting those applications and we are unable to find that there was any
dispute relating to the rates. It is true that, in their applications, the
workmen did plead the rates at which the claims had to be computed; but it was
nowhere stated that those rates were being disputed by the appellant. Even in
the pleadings put forward on behalf of the appellant as incorporated in the
order of the Labour Court, there was no pleading that the claims of the workmen
were payable at a rate different from rates claimed by them. It does not appear
that, in one case there was a pleading on behalf of the appellant that no rates
at all had been prescribed by the Mysore Government. That pleading did not mean
that it became dispute as to the rates at which payments were to be made by the
appellant. The only question that arose was whether there were any rates at all
fixed under the Minimum Wages Act for overtime and for payment for work done on
days of rest. Such a question does not relate to a dispute as to the rates
enforceable between the parties, so that the remedy under section 20(1) of the
Minimum Wages Act could not have been sought by the applicants in any of the
applications. No question can, therefore, arise of the jurisdiction of the
Labour Court to entertain these applications under section 33-C (2) of the Act
being barred because of the provisions of the Minimum Wages Act. The first
point raised on behalf of the appellant thus fails."
Also on a perusal of the agreement dated 23.01.2001 between the Chairman of the
Bank and the workmen it can be seen that, there was no settlement in the eyes
of law and is not valid or enforceable or binding for the reason that: It was
not signed by the Secretary (CEO) of the CS under S.31 (2)(d), CS Act. It was
not in accordance even with the requirements of S.2(t) of ID Act or Rules 9(1)
and (2) of the UP ID Rules (e.g. Prescribed Form I, signature of Conciliation
Officer, signature of authorized principal officer viz. Secretary of the
society/Bank, copy to C.O. and/or State government etc.) It was not in
accordance with S.6 B (e.g. lack of registration, lack of scrutiny of
collusion, fraud misrepresentation etc. by the Conciliation Officer/State
Government.) It is contrary to the repeated orders of the Registrar under
S.128 disapproving and disallowing ex-gratia payment and in breach of the
provisions of UPCS Employees Service Regulation, 1975 framed under Ss. 121-122
of the UPCS Act, in particular, Regulation 42.
65. The ALC, in law is not competent to declare the statutory order of the
Registrar, CS, under section 128 of the CS Act to be 'not proper' and thereby
to disregard the same. An order under S.128 is final and binding and cannot be
questioned in any of law in view of S. 102 and even otherwise on general
principles of law, an authority under the UPID Act cannot ignore or wish away
the statutory consequences of the statutory order passed by the Registrar under
sections. 128, 102 etc of the UP Co-operative Societies Act.
66. Also the Registrar's directions and order dated 07.03.2001, 19.03.2001 and
22.06.2001 requiring the BOD to reconsider its (offending) resolutions and
finally annulling the same in exercise of his powers under S.128 are statutory
in nature. They are still valid and occupy the field. They become final and
binding under s102 in because, no appeal was filed under S.98 of the CS Act and
no arbitration reference was made under S.70 and 71 of the CS Act.
67. The ALC and the High Court wrongly appreciated the Secretary's functions
and procedure under Rule 130 as subsisting rather than merely supplementing the
Chairman's power and procedure, including suo moto power and procedure, under
S.128 of the Act r/w Rule 131. This court in this regard has observed in the
case of Nedurimilli Janardhana Reddy vs. Progress of Democratic Students Union
& Ors., Â 7 that:"4. We have referred to the powers and
functions of the competent authority under the Act in extenso, to bring out the
important position which it occupies in the scheme of the Act. It is clear from
the said provisions of the Act, that the scheme of the Act cannot be carried
out without the constitution of the competent authority and in particular, no
educational institution can be established without its formation. In considering
the applications made for establishing educational institutions the prescribed
authority has to have due regard that there is adequate financial provision for
continued and efficient maintenance of the educational institutions as
prescribed by the competent authority under Section 20(3)(b). It is further the
competent authority alone which can grant recognition to the educational
institutions under Section 21 of the Act. Even if under Section 20(1) a private
educational institution is established in accordance with the rules made under
the Act, the said rules cannot displace the competent authority or entrust the
powers and functions of the competent authority to any other authority. It is
true that Section 20(1) of the Act states that no private educational
institution shall be established except in accordance with the provisions of
the Act or the rules made thereunder. However, the rules made under the Act can
only appoint an authority to accept the application for establishment of the
educational institution and to grant permission therefor. But while granting
permission, the prescribed authority has, among other things, to take into
consideration under Section 20(3)(b) as stated above, the requirement of
adequate financial provision for continued and efficient maintenance of the
institution as prescribed by the competent authority. The power granted to the
State Government under clauses (xi) and (xii) of Section 99 to make rules with
regard to the establishment or maintenance and administration of educational
institutions and the grant of recognition to educational institutions and the
conditions therefor cannot again be utilised for displacing the competent
authority and its functions and powers under the Act. Any exercise of such
power will be a fraud upon the statute apart from rendering such rules as ultra
vires the Act. It is against this backdrop of the legal status of the competent
authority and its functions and powers that we have to examine whether the
reliance placed by the State Government on the Andhra Pradesh Unaided Private
Medical and Dental Colleges (Establishment, Management and Admission) Rules,
1992 (hereinafter referred to as the "Rules") for defending its
action in establishing an Expert Committee under the Rules to grant sanction
for medical and dental colleges, is correct or not."Further in the case of
Life Insurance Corporation of India vs. Escorts Ltd. & Ors. Â , this
court observed that,
69. One of the submissions very strenuously urged before us was that the very
authority which was primarily entrusted with the task of administering the
Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, namely, the Reserve Bank of India was, itself,
of the view that the 'permission' contemplated by section 29 (1) (b) of the
Foreign Exchange Regulation Act was 'prior permission'. Our attention was
invited to paragraph 24-A.1 of the Exchange Control Manual where the first
three sentences read as follows:
In the terms of section 29 (1) (b) of Foreign Exchange Regulation Act,
1973, no person resident outside India whether an individual, firm or company
(nor being a banking company) incorporated outside India can acquire shares of
any company carrying on trading, commerce or industrial activity in India
without prior permission of Reserve Bank. Also under section 19 (1) (b) and 19
(1) (d) of the Act, the transfer and issue of any security (which includes
shares) in favour of or to any person outside India require prior permission of
the Reserve Bank of India. When permission has been granted for transfer or
issue of shares to non resident investors under section 19 (1) (b) or 19 (1)
(d), it is automatically deemed to be permission under section 29 (1) (b) for
purchase of shares by him."
The submission of Shri Nariman was two-fold. He urged that paragraph 24-A.l was
a statutory direction issued under Section 73(3) of the Foreign Exchange
Regulation Act and, therefore, had the force of law and required to be obeyed.
Alternately he urged that it was the official and contemporary interpretation
of the provision of the Act and was, therefore, entitled to our acceptance. The
basis for the first part of the submission was the statement in the preface to
the Exchange Control Manual to the effect:
The present edition of the Manual incorporates all the directions of a standing nature issued to authorised dealers in the form of circulars upto 31st May, 1978. The directions have been issued under Section 73(3) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act which empowers the Reserve Bank of India to issue directions necessary or expedient for the administration of exchange control. Authorised dealers should hereafter be guided by the provisions contained in this Manual.There is no force whatever in this part of the submission. A perusal of the Manual shows that it is a sort of guide book for authorised dealers, money changers etc. and is a compendium or collection of various statutory directions, administrative instructions, advisory opinions, comments, notes, explanations suggestions, etc. For example, paragraph 24-A.l is styled as Introduction to Foreign Investment in India. There is nothing in the whole of the paragraph which even remotely is suggestive of a direction under Section 73(3). Paragraph 24-A.1 itself appears to be in the nature of a comment on Section 29(1 )(b), rather than a direction under Section 73(3). Directions under Section 73(3), we notice, are separately issued as circulars on various dates. No Circular has been placed before us which corresponds to any part of paragraph 24-A.l. We do not have the slightest doubt that paragraph 24-A.1 is an explanatory Statement of guideline for the benefit of the authorised dealers. It is neither a statutory direction nor is it a mandatory instruction. It reads as if it is in the nature of and, indeed it is, advice given to authorised dealers that they should obtain prior permission of the Reserve Bank of India, so that there may be no later complications. It is a helpful suggestion, rather than a mandate. The expression 'prior permission' used in paragraph 24-A.l is not meant to restrict the range of the expression 'general and special permission found in Sections 29(1)(b) and 19(1)(b). It is meant to indicate the ordinary procedure which may be followed. Shri Nariman argued that none of the prescribed forms provided for the application and grant of subsequent permission. That may be so for the obvious reason that ordinarily one would expect permission to be sought and given before the act. Surely, the Form cannot control the Act, the Rules or the directions. As one learned judge of the Madras High Court was fond of saying 'it is the dog that wags the tail and not the tail that wags the dog.' We may add what this Court had occasion to say in Vasudev Ranchandra Shelat v. Pranlal Jayanand Thakkar: The subservience of substance of a transaction to some rigidly prescribed form required to be meticulously observed, savours of archaic and outmoded jurisprudence.
70. According to Shri Nariman even if as found by us, the permission to
purchase shares of an Indian company by a non-resident investor of Indian
origin or nationality under Section 29(1)(b) of the FERA could be obtained
after the purchase, the Reserve Bank ceased to have such power after the
formulation of the Portfolio Investment Scheme since it did not reserve to
itself any such power under the Portfolio Investment Scheme promulgated in
exercise of its powers under Section 73(3) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation
Act. We do not see any foundation for this argument in the scheme itself. The
scheme does not talk of any prior or previous permission, nor are we able to
understand how a power possessed by the Reserve Bank under a Parliamentary
legislation can be so cut down as to prevent its exercise altogether. It may be
open to a subordinate legislating body to make appropriate rules and
regulations to regulate the exercise of a power which the Parliament has vested
in it, so as to carry out the purposes of the legislation, but it cannot divest
itself of the power. We are, therefore, unable to appreciate how the Reserve
Bank, if it has the power under the FERA to grant ex-post-facto permission, can
divest itself of that power under the scheme The argument was advanced with
particular reference to the forms prescribed under the scheme. We have already
pointed out that the forms under the scheme cannot abridge the legislation
itself.
68. In any case, the Secretary as well as the Registrar fully complied with the
procedure under S.128 and Rule 130 on facts and the High Court has evidently
misread the records.
Ex-gratia payment
69. In the instant case, the Additional Labour Commissioner allowed the payment
as an ex-gratia payment to the employees of the Cooperative Bank from the
public fund. The meaning of the word 'Bonus' according to the new English
dictionary is a boon or gift, over and above, what is normally due as
remuneration to be received. This imports the concept of some ex-gratia
payment. It was ex-gratia payment on account of which it is not possible to employ
a term of service on the basis of employed contract. In our view, the payment
made as ex-gratia payment would not constitute any precedent for future years.
The ex-gratia payment made in the instant case was neither in the nature of
production bonus nor incentive bonus nor customary nor any statutory bonus. It
cannot be regarded as part of the contract 'employment'. Therefore, the
ex-gratia payment made by the bank cannot be regarded as remuneration paid or
payable to the employees in fulfillment of the terms of the contract of
employment within the meaning of definition under Section 2(22) of the I.D.
Act, 1947.70. We have already noticed the powers of the Registrar to determine
the terms of the employment of the Society from time to time, frame regulations
to regulate the emoluments and other conditions of service etc. under Section
121 of the U.P. Cooperative Societies Act, 1965 (hereinafter called 'the
Societies Act, 1965'). We have also noticed the Registrar's power to annul the
Resolution of the Cooperative Societies or cancel the orders passed by an
officer of the Society in certain cases under Section 128. The Registrar under
the above Section can cancel any order passed by an officer of a Cooperative
Society, if he is of the opinion that the Resolution or the order, as the case
may be, is not covered by the objects of the society or is in contravention of
the provisions of the Act, the Rules or the bye-laws of the Society. Rule 130
gives the power to the Secretary of the Cooperative Society to move the
Chairman of the Society in writing to refer the matter to the Registrar for his
decision. We have already noticed in Section 135, the provisions contained in
the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (Act, 1947) and the U.P. Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947 (U.P. Act, 1947) shall not apply to Cooperative
Societies. The Appellants viz. Ghaziabad Zila Sehkari Bank Ltd. is a
Cooperative Societies registered under the provisions of the U.P. Cooperative
Societies Act, 1965 (Societies Act, 1965). The services of the employees of the
Bank are governed by the provisions of the U.P. Cooperative Societies Employees
Service Regulation, 1975 (Service Regulations, 1975) framed by the U.P.
Cooperative Institutional Service Board. The emoluments and other kinds of
allowances payable to the employees of the Bank are also governed by the
provisions contained in the Service Regulations, 1975. In the instant case, it
is relevant to mention that no agreement or settlement between the bank and its
employees have above been arrived at before the Conciliation Officer nor any
money is due to the employees under the provisions of Section 6-J(2) of the U.P
Act, 1947 or under any settlement or any award given under the provisions of
this Act. Therefore, the application under Section 6-H(1) is an illegal
settlement arrived at between the Chairman and the Employees' Association viz.
Respondent No. 3 and 4.Regulation 42
71. It is relevant to mention here that the Regulation 42 of the Regulations, 1975, which is relevant for the purposes of the controversy involved in the present case is as under:
"42. Other Allowances (i) A cooperative society may, subject to the
provisions of these regulations and general or special orders issued by the
Registrar, gives any other allowances or pecuniary concessions to its
employees.
(ii) A cooperative society may also grant, with the permission of the
Registrar, pecuniary incentive to an employee or class of employees for
outstanding performance;
provided that the payment of travelling and daily allowance shall be governed
by the provisions contained in Regulation 43".
72. In view of the aforesaid provision, it is crystal clear that for giving
pecuniary benefits or allowances to the employees governed by the aforesaid
Regulations, 1975, the Registrar's general or special order is necessary and if
the particular Cooperative Society wants to grant the benefit, then it can be
given only with the permission of the Registrar. Admittedly, in the present
case, no permission was ever sought from the Registrar, rather on the contrary,
action was taken contrary to the circulars issued by the Registrar, Cooperative
Societies, U.P. issued from time to time, prohibiting payment of ex-gratia in
this regard.
73. In view of the aforesaid legal provisions and the reply furnished by the
petitioner, the Respondent No. 1 had no jurisdiction to adjudicate the matter
of employees with regard to the payment of ex-gratia amount which runs contrary
to the Regulation 42 of the Service Regulations, 1975 as well as the Circulars
issued by the Registrar, Cooperative Societies, U.P. and the Additional
Registrar (Banking), Cooperative Societies U.P. and the only forum for
adjudication for sake of arguments and without admitting that the matter ought
to have been referred to the Labour Court for adjudicating the aforesaid
matter, and that too, if the Industrial Laws are made applicable to the
provisions of U.P. Cooperative Societies Act, 1965.74. In our opinion, the
impugned judgment suffers from complete non-application of mind on the merits of
the case in as much as whole pleadings even before the Labour Commissioner or
before the High Court was that the payment of ex-gratia to the employees are
against the objects of the society and it is in contravention of Regulation 42
of the Service Regulations, 1975 and contrary to the provisions of the Act,
1965 and contrary to the provisions of the Rules 1968, Government
orders/circulars of Ld. Registrar and other laws applicable, the Chairman of
the bank suo motu, without there being any power or legal authority
unilaterally entered into a private settlement with the employees of the bank
on 23.1.2001. It is relevant to mention here that to avoid such a situation of
illegal agreements by the Chairman who is an elected representative and to
protect misuse of public fund by the employees amongst themselves, the
cooperative Act Rules and Regulations framed thereunder requires prior
permission of the Registrar Co-operative Societies for grant of any pecuniary
benefits because Regulation 42 of the U.P. Cooperative Societies Employees
Service Regulations 1975 provides that any allowance or pecuniary benefits to
employees shall be given only by the special order of the Registrar Cooperative
Societies, U.P. which order was missing throughout.
75. The present dispute does not relate to said Act, 1947 but it is related to
the provisions contained under the Societies Act, 1965 as well as where a
circular issued by the Registrar of Cooperative Societies and more specifically
Regulation 42 of Service Rules, 1975. Therefore, in our opinion, the private
settlement made on 21.03.2001 does not fall under 6-H(I) of the U.P. Act, 1947.
In other words, the payment of ex-gratia is an incentive for an employee for
his good work. Therefore, it is governed by Regulation 42 (2) that any
cooperative society may also grant pecuniary incentive only with the prior
permission of the Registrar to any employee or a class of employees for
outstanding performance. It clearly provides that for payment of ex-gratia,
permission of the Registrar is must. Regulation 42 is itself very clear and is
not in conflict with any of the provisions of the U.P. Act, 1947. The
respondents themselves admitted in their counter affidavit that the settlement
was not entered into during conciliation proceeding. Therefore, the said
private settlement could not have been legally enforced being an invalid
settlement. No private settlement can give a legal enforceable right. It is
wrong to suggest that payment of ex-gratia amount to the employees over and
above their salary is the matter of U.P. Act, 1947. It is very clear and there
is special provision in Rule 42 to the Service Rules, 1975. The cooperative
society is a State Government subject and every State Government has right to
make laws in their respective States and there are different cooperative
societies acts in different States.76. It was argued by senior counsel for the
respondents that ex-gratia is being paid for several years and therefore the
ex-gratia payment should be continued. Records placed before us reveal that
ex-gratia payment was conditionally paid upto 1999-2000 and in every
resolution, the Board of Directors has been clearly mentioning that if there is
any objection from the Department, audit etc., the amount of ex-gratia will be
recovered from the employees. In the audit reports for several years, the
auditors as well as the department have objected for such payments. We make it
clear that the payments which have already been made even though there is audit
objection need not be recovered from the employees. We make it clear that the
employees will not be entitled for any ex-gratia payment from now onwards.
77. Alongwith the appeal, some appointment orders have been filed as annexures.
The appointment order clearly says that the services were governed by the
Service Regulations, 1975 and the bye-laws of the bank. It is relevant to
mention here that the services of the employees of the Bank are governed by
service regulations 1975 framed under the Act of 1965, which provides complete
machinery and adjudication. Moreover, the provisions under Section 70 of the
U.P. Cooperative Societies Act, 1965 is elaborate in this regard, which
provides complete machinery that if there is any dispute between the employers
and the employees of the Cooperative Society, the matter shall be referred to
the Arbitrator as provided under Section 70 of the U.P. Cooperative Societies
Act, 1965. Section 70 of the U.P. Cooperative Societies Act and Section 64 of
the M.P. Cooperative Societies Act are pari materia and this Court in the
matter of R.C. Tewari vs. M.P. State Cooperative Marketing Federation Ltd.
 held that Labour Court and Industrial Laws are not applicable where
complete machinery has been provided under the provisions of the Cooperative
Societies Act and in such view of the matter the Ld. Additional Labour
Commissioner U.P. has no jurisdiction to pass orders in the nature it has been
passed.78. The relevant legal provisions requiring consideration of this Court
are quoted below:
"Section 70. Disputes which may be referred to arbitration.- (1)
Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force, if
any dispute relating to the constitution, management or the business of a
co-operative society other than a dispute regarding disciplinary action taken
against a paid servant of a society arises-
(a) among members, past members and person claiming through members, past
members and deceased members; or
(b) between a member, past member or any person claiming through a member, past
member or deceased member, and the society, its committee of management or any
officer, agent or employee of the society, including any past officer, agent or
employee; or
(c) between the society or its committee and any past committee, any officer,
agent or employee or any past officer, past agent or past employee or the
nominee, heir or legal representative of any deceased officer, deceased agent,
or deceased employee of the society; or xxx xxxx xxxx
[Provided that a dispute relating to an election under the provisions of this
Act or rules made thereunder shall not be referred to the Registrar until after
the declaration of the result of such election.]
(2) For the purpose of sub-section (1), the following shall be deemed to be
included in dispute relating to the constitution, management or the business of
a co-operative society, namely-
(a) claims for amounts due when a demand for payment is made and is either
refused or not complied with whether such claims are admitted or not by the
opposite party;
(b) a claim by a surety against the principal debtor where the society has
recovered from the surety any amount in respect of any debt or demand due to it
from the principal debtor as a result of the default of the principal debtor or
whether such debt or demand is admitted or not;
(c) a claim by a society for any loss caused to it by a member, officer, agent,
or employee including past or deceased member, officer, agent, or employee,
whether individually or collectively and whether such loss be admitted or not;
and(d) all matters relating to the objects of the society mentioned in the
bye-laws as also those relating to the election of office-bearers.
(3) If any question arises whether a dispute referred to the Registrar under
this section is a dispute relating to the constitution, management or the
business of a co-operative society, the decision thereon of the Registrar shall
be final and shall not be called in question in any court. Section 71.
Reference of dispute to arbitration. - On receipt of a reference under sub-section
(1) of Section 70, the Registrar may, subject to the provisions of the rules,
if any-
(a) Decide the dispute himself, or
(b) Refer it for decision to an arbitrator appointed by him, or
(c) Refer it, if the parties so request in writing, for decision to a board of
arbitrators consisting of the three persons to be appointed in the prescribed
manner.
(2) The Registrar may, for reasons to be recorded, withdraw any reference made
under clause (b) or (c) of sub-section (1) and refer it to another arbitrator
or board of arbitrators or decide it himself.
(3) The Registrar, the arbitrator or the board of arbitrators, to whom a
dispute is referred for decision under this section may, pending the decision
of the dispute make such interlocutory orders including attachment of property
as he or they may deem necessary in the interest of justice.
(4) The decision given by the Registrar, the arbitrator or the board of
arbitrators under this section shall hereinafter be termed as award.
(5) The procedure to be followed by the Registrar, the arbitrator or the board
of arbitrators in deciding a dispute and making an award under this section
shall be as may be prescribed."
79. Since payment of ex-gratia amount of the employees of the bank is a policy matter, the State Government of U.P. has filed Special Leave Petition before this Court questioning the correctness of the orders passed by the High Court for the leave of this Court. The impugned judgment of the High Court suffers from the error of complete non-application of mind on the merits of the case in as much as whole pleadings either before the Commissioner and before the High Court was that the payment of ex-gratia to the employees are against the objects of the society and it is in contravention of the provisions of the U.P. Act, 1947, rules and regulations, we have no other option to set aside the same and allow both the appeals filed by the bank as well as the State of U.P. as already indicated in the paragraphs above. The payments already made need not be recovered at this distance of time from the employees of the bank. However we make it clear that the employees are not entitled to ex-gratia payment from now onwards. In the facts and circumstances, we order no costs.
Judgment Referred.
1(1969) 2 SCC 0043
2(1997) 5 SCC 125
3(1999) 9 SCC 620
4(2000) 4 SCC 406
5(1980) 1 SCC 4
6(2004) 8 SCC 402
7(1974) 4 SCC 696
8(1969) 1 SCC 873
9(2005) Labour and Industrial Cases 494
10(1978) 4 SCC 0016
11(1981) 1SCC 0315
12 (1981) 4 SCC 0431
13(1976) 1SCC 0496
14 (1969) 1 SCR 0887
15( 1969) 2 SCC 0043
16JT 2006(6) SC 0374
17(1964) 2 SCR 0087
18 1992(1) SCC 0335
19(1969) 2 SCC 0043
20 (1997) 5 SCC 0125