SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Kalegura Padma Rao & Anr.
Vs.
State of Andhra Pradesh
(Arijit Pasayat and S.H.Kapadia,JJ.,)
19.02.2007
JUDGMENT
Dr.Arijit Pasayat, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. Appellant along with 14 others was convicted for offences punishable under Sections 148, 448 read with Section 149, Section 302 read with Section 149 and Section 324 read with Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 . The III Additional Sessions Judge, Karimnagar found all the accused persons guilty of the charged offences. For the offence under Section 302 read with Section 149 Indian Penal Code, 1860 each of the accused persons was sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of Rs.500/- each with default stipulation. Similarly, for the offences relatable to Sections 148, 448, 149 and 324 Indian Penal Code, 1860 different sentences were imposed. In appeal, the High Court confirmed the conviction and sentence as imposed by the Trial Court on the present appellants and accused nos. 7 to 9, 12 and 13. The High Court directed acquittal of rest of the accused persons of all charges.
3. The factual position in a nutshell is as follows :
“PW-1 is the wife, PW-2 is the father, PW-3 is the mother, PW-4 is the brother
and PW-5 is the sister-in-law of Pogula Jasan (hereinafter referred to as the
'deceased'). The accused, deceased and the material witnesses are residents of
Neerukulla village. The deceased purchased an Auto and was plying the same
between Sulthanabad and Neerukulla. On 02.07.2003 at about 9.00 P.M., the
deceased returned to his house from Sulthanabad and informed PWs.1 to 3 that
when he requested A-1 and A-2 to travel in his Auto as per the serial number,
they refused to travel in his Auto and beat him.
On 03.07.2003 morning, PW-1 and the deceased went to the house of the Sarpanch
and told him about the incident. The Sarpanch called A-1 and enquired from him
as to why he had assaulted the deceased. A-1 admitted his guilt in the presence
of PWs. 9 and 10. On the same day at about 6.00 P.M., A-l to A-16 came to the
house of the deceased and attacked him. A-1 beat the deceased with a stick. The
deceased ran into the house and bolted the door. In the meantime, when PW-2
intervened to rescue the deceased, A-1 beat him with a stick. A-3 broke the doors
and all the accused entered the house and beat the deceased. Some of the
accused were armed with iron rods and axes. They beat the deceased
indiscriminately. Then the deceased ran out from the house. The accused chased
and beat him indiscriminately. Finally, the deceased fell down near the Gram
Panchayat office on receipt of the injuries. Later, the deceased was taken in
an Auto to the Government Hospital, Sulthanabad. On the advice of the Doctor,
the persons who carried the deceased to the hospital went to the Police Station
and gave Ex.P-1 report. On the basis of Ex.P-1, the police registered a crime
for the offences punishable under Sections 147, 148, 448, 307, 327 read with
149 of I.P.C. Thereafter, the deceased and PW-2, who received injuries, were referred
to the Government Hospital, Karimnagar. The deceased, while undergoing
treatment, succumbed to the injuries. The Inspector of Police took up
investigation, prepared the rough sketch, observed the scene of offence, held
inquest over the dead body of the deceased, seized M.Os.1 and 2 and later sent
the dead body for postmortem examination. The accused were arrested and weapons
were recovered. After completion of the investigation, the police laid the
charge sheet. The accused denied the charges and claimed for trial.
4. In order to further the prosecution version the prosecution examined 22
witnesses. On behalf of the accused persons no oral evidence was adduced, but
part of the statement of PW-3 recorded under Section 161 of the Code Of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short the 'Code') was marked as Ext.D-1. On
consideration of the material on record the Trial Court as noted above recorded
conviction. The convicted accused persons preferred appeals before the High
Court and by common judgment in four appeals the impugned judgment was passed.
5. In support of the appeal, learned counsel for the accused persons submitted
that the conviction is based primarily on the evidence of witnesses who were
related to the deceased. Further the accusations even if accepted in to do not
make out the case relatable to Section 302 Indian Penal Code, 1860.
6. Learned counsel for the respondent-State on the other hand supported the
impugned judgment submitting that on analysis of evidence on record the Courts
below have come to the right conclusion.
7. In regard to the interestedness of the witnesses for furthering the
prosecution version, relationship is not a factor to affect the credibility of
a witness. It is more often than not that a relation would not conceal the
actual culprit and make allegations against an innocent person. Foundation has
to be laid if a plea of false implication is made. In such cases, the court has
to adopt a careful approach and analyse evidence to find out whether it is
cogent and credible.
8. In Dalip Singh and Ors. v. The State of Punjab1 it
has been laid down as under:-
"A witness is normally to be considered independent unless he or she
springs from sources which are likely to be tainted and that usually means
unless the witness has cause, such as enmity against the accused, to wish to
implicate him falsely. Ordinarily a close relation would be the last to screen
the real culprit and falsely implicate an innocent person. It is true, when
feelings run high and there is personal cause for enmity, that there is a
tendency to drag in an innocent person against whom a witness has a grudge
along with the guilty, but foundation must be laid for such a criticism and the
mere fact of relationship far from being a foundation is often a sure guarantee
of truth. However, we are not attempting any sweeping generalization. Each case
must be judged on its own facts. Our observations are only made to combat what
is so often put forward in cases before us as a general rule of prudence. There
is no such general rule. Each case must be limited to and be governed by its
own facts."
9. The above decision has since been followed in Guli Chand and Ors. v.
State of Rajasthan2 in which Vadivelu
Thevar v. State of Madras3 was
also relied upon.We may also observe that the ground that the witness being a
close relative and consequently being a partisan witness, should not be relied
upon, has no substance. This theory was repelled by this Court as early as in
Dalip Singh's case (supra) in which surprise was expressed over the impression
which prevailed in the minds of the Members of the Bar that relatives were not
independent witnesses. Speaking through Vivian Bose, J. it was observed:
"We are unable to agree with the learned Judges of the High Court that the
testimony of the two eyewitnesses requires corroboration. If the foundation for
such an observation is based on the fact that the witnesses are women and that
the fate of seven men hangs on their testimony, we know of no such rule. If it
is grounded on the reason that they are closely related to the deceased we are
unable to concur. This is a fallacy common to many criminal cases and one which
another Bench of this Court endeavoured to dispel in 'Rameshwar v. State of
Rajasthan4'at p.59). We find, however,
that it unfortunately still persists, if not in the judgments of the Courts, at
any rate in the arguments of counsel."
10. Again in Masalti and Ors. v. State of U.P5. this
Court observed: (p. 209-210 para 14):
"But it would, we think, be unreasonable to contend that evidence given by
witnesses should be discarded only on the ground that it is evidence of
partisan or interested witnesses.......The mechanical rejection of such
evidence on the sole ground that it is partisan would invariably lead to
failure of justice. No hard and fast rule can be laid down as to how much
evidence should be appreciated. Judicial approach has to be cautious in dealing
with such evidence; but the plea that such evidence should be rejected because
it is partisan cannot be accepted as correct."
11. To the same effect is the decision in State of Punjab v. Jagir Singh 6
and Lehna v. State of Haryana7
Stress was laid by the accused-appellants on the non-acceptance of evidence
tendered by some witnesses to contend about desirability to throw out entire prosecution
case. In essence prayer is to apply the principle of "falsus in uno falsus
in omnibus" (false in one thing, false in everything). This plea is
clearly untenable. Even if major portion of evidence is found to be deficient,
in case residue is sufficient to prove guilt of an accused, notwithstanding
acquittal of number of other co-accused persons, his conviction can be
maintained. It is the duty of Court to separate grain from chaff. Where chaff
can be separated from grain, it would be open to the Court to convict an
accused notwithstanding the fact that evidence has been found to be deficient
to prove guilt of other accused persons. Falsity of particular material witness
or material particular would not ruin it from the beginning to end. The maxim "falsus
in uno falsus in omnibus" has no application in India and the witnesses
cannot be branded as liar. The maxim "falsus in uno falsus in
omnibus" has not received general acceptance nor has this maxim come to
occupy the status of rule of law. It is merely a rule of caution. All that it
amounts to, is that in such cases testimony may be disregarded, and not that it
must be disregarded. The doctrine merely involves the question of weight of
evidence which a Court may apply in a given set of circumstances, but it is not
what may be called 'a mandatory rule of evidence'. (See Nisar Ali v. The
State of Uttar Pradesh8
12. The above position was elaborately discussed in Sucha Singh and Anr. v.
State of Punjab9 and
Israr v. State of U.P10. In S. Sudershan Reddy v. State
of A.P11. it was observed;
Relationship is not a factor to affect credibility of a witness. It is more
often than not that a relation would not conceal actual culprit and make
allegations against an innocent person. Foundation has to be laid if plea of
false implication is made. In such cases, the court has to adopt a careful
approach and analyse evidence to find out whether it is cogent and credible.
13. This brings us to the crucial question as to which was the appropriate
provision to be applied. In the scheme of Indian Penal Code, 1860 culpable
homicide is the genus and "murder", its specie. All
"murder" is "culpable homicide" but not vice versa.
Speaking generally, "culpable homicide" sans "special characteristics
of murder is culpable homicide not amounting to murder". For the purpose
of fixing punishment, proportionate to the gravity of the generic offence, Indian
Penal Code, 1860 practically recognizes three degrees of culpable
homicide. The first is, what may be called, "culpable homicide of the
first degree". This is the gravest form of culpable homicide, which is
defined in Section 300 as "murder". The second may be termed as
"culpable homicide of the second degree". This is punishable under
the first part of Section 304. Then, there is "culpable homicide of the
third degree". This is the lowest type of culpable homicide and the
punishment provided for it is also the lowest among the punishments provided
for the three grades. Culpable homicide of this degree is punishable under the
second part of Section 304.
14. The academic distinction between "murder" and "culpable
homicide not amounting to murder" has always vexed the courts. The
confusion is caused, if courts losing sight of the true scope and meaning of the
terms used by the legislature in these sections, allow themselves to be drawn
into minute abstractions. The safest way of approach to the interpretation and
application of these provisions seems to be to keep in focus the keywords used
in the various clauses of Sections 299 and 300.
15. The following comparative table will be helpful in appreciating the points of distinction
between the two offences:
“Section 299
Section 300
A person commits culpable homicide if the act by which the death is caused is done
Subject to certain exceptions culpable homicide is murder if the act by which the death is caused is done
INTENTION
(a) With the intention of causing death
(1) With the intention of causing death;
(2) With the intention of causing such bodily injuries as the offender knows to be likely to cause the death of the person to whom the harm is caused;
(b) With the intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death
(3) With the intention of causing bodily injury to any person and the bodily injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death;
KNOWLEDGE
(c) With the knowledge that the act is likely to cause death
(4) With the knowledge that the act is so imminently dangerous that it must in all probability cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, and without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing death or such injury as is mentioned above.”
16. Clause (b) of Section 299 corresponds with clauses (2) and (3) of Section
300. The distinguishing feature of the mens rea requisite under clause (2) is
the knowledge possessed by the offender regarding the particular victim being
in such a peculiar condition or state of health that the internal harm caused
to him is likely to be fatal, notwithstanding the fact that such harm would not
in the ordinary way of nature be sufficient to cause death of a person in
normal health or condition. It is noteworthy that the "intention to cause
death" is not an essential requirement of clause (2). Only the intention
of causing the bodily injury coupled with the offender's knowledge of the
likelihood of such injury causing the death of the particular victim, is
sufficient to bring the killing within the ambit of this clause. This aspect of
clause (2) is borne out by Illustration (b) appended to Section 300. Clause (b)
of Section 299 does not postulate any such knowledge on the part of the
offender. Instances of cases falling under clause (2) of Section 300 can be
where the assailant causes death by a fist-blow intentionally given knowing
that the victim is suffering from an enlarged liver, or enlarged spleen or
diseased heart and such blow is likely to cause death of that particular person
as a result of the rupture of the liver, or spleen or the failure of the heart,
as the case may be. If the assailant had no such knowledge about the disease or
special frailty of the victim, nor an intention to cause death or bodily injury
sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, the offence will
not be murder, even if the injury which caused the death, was intentionally
given. In clause (3) of Section 300, instead of the words "likely to cause
death" occurring in the corresponding clause (b) of Section 299, the words
"sufficient in the ordinary course of nature" have been used.
Obviously, the distinction lies between a bodily injury likely to cause death
and a bodily injury sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death.
The distinction is fine but real and if overlooked, may result in miscarriage
of justice. The difference between clause (b) of Section 299 and clause (3) of
Section 300 is one of degree of probability of death resulting from the
intended bodily injury. To put it more broadly, it is the degree of probability
of death which determines whether a culpable homicide is of the gravest, medium
or the lowest degree. The word "likely" in clause (b) of Section 299
conveys the sense of probability as distinguished from a mere possibility. The
words "bodily injury ... sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to
cause death" mean that death will be the "most probable" result
of the injury, having regard to the ordinary course of nature.
17. For cases to fall within clause (3), it is not necessary that the offender
intended to cause death, so long as the death ensues from the intentional
bodily injury or injuries sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of
nature. Rajwant Singh v. State of Kerala  is an apt illustration of this
point.
18. In Virsa Singh v. State of Punjab12 Vivian
Bose, J. speaking for the Court, explained the meaning and scope of clause (3).
It was observed that the prosecution must prove the following facts before it
can bring a case under Section 300 "thirdly". First, it must
establish quite objectively, that a bodily injury is present; secondly, the
nature of the injury must be proved. These are purely objective investigations.
Thirdly, it must be proved that there was an intention to inflict that
particular injury, that is to say, that it was not accidental or unintentional
or that some other kind of injury was intended. Once these three elements are
proved to be present, the enquiry proceeds further, and fourthly, it must be
proved that the injury of the type just described made up of the three elements
set out above was sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature.
This part of the enquiry is purely objective and inferential and has nothing to
do with the intention of the offender.
19. The ingredients of clause "thirdly" of Section 300 Indian
Penal Code, 1860 were brought out by the illustrious Judge in his terse
language as follows:
"12. To put it shortly, the prosecution must prove the following facts
before it can bring a case under Section 300 'thirdly'; First, it must
establish, quite objectively, that a bodily injury is present; Secondly, the
nature of the injury must be proved; These are purely objective investigations.
Thirdly, it must be proved that there was an intention to inflict that
particular bodily injury, that is to say, that it was not accidental or
unintentional, or that some other kind of injury was intended. Once these three
elements are proved to be present, the enquiry proceeds further and, Fourthly,
it must be proved that the injury of the type just described made up of the
three elements set out above is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary
course of nature. This part of the enquiry is purely objective and inferential
and has nothing to do with the intention of the offender."
20. The learned Judge explained the third ingredient in the following words (at
page 468):
"The question is not whether the prisoner intended to inflict a serious injury or a trivial one but whether he intended to inflict the injury that is proved to be present. If he can show that he did not, or if the totality of the circumstances justify such an inference, then, of course, the intent that the section requires is not proved. But if there is nothing beyond the injury and the fact that the appellant inflicted it, the only possible inference is that he intended to inflict it. Whether he knew of its seriousness, or intended serious consequences, is neither here nor there. The question, so far as the intention is concerned, is not whether he intended to kill, or to inflict an injury of a particular degree of seriousness, but whether he intended to inflict the injury in question; and once the existence of the injury is proved the intention to cause it will be presumed unless the evidence or the circumstances warrant an opposite conclusion."
21. These observations of Vivian Bose, J. have become locus classicus. The test
laid down by Virsa Singh case (supra) for the applicability of clause
"thirdly" is now ingrained in our legal system and has become part of
the rule of law. Under clause thirdly of Section 300 Indian Penal Code,
1860, culpable homicide is murder, if both the following conditions are
satisfied i.e. (a) that the act which causes death is done with the intention
of causing death or is done with the intention of causing a bodily injury; and (b)
that the injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course
of nature to cause death. It must be proved that there was an intention to
inflict that particular bodily injury which, in the ordinary course of nature,
was sufficient to cause death viz. that the injury found to be present was the
injury that was intended to be inflicted. Thus, according to the rule laid down
in Virsa Singh case (supra) even if the intention of the accused was limited to
the infliction of a bodily injury sufficient to cause death in the ordinary
course of nature, and did not extend to the intention of causing death, the
offence would be murder. Illustration (c) appended to Section 300 clearly
brings out this point. Clause (c) of Section 299 and clause (4) of Section 300
both require knowledge of the probability of the act causing death. It is not
necessary for the purpose of this case to dilate much on the distinction
between these corresponding clauses. It will be sufficient to say that clause
(4) of Section 300 would be applicable where the knowledge of the offender as
to the probability of death of a person or persons in general as distinguished
from a particular person or persons - being caused from his imminently
dangerous act, approximates to a practical certainty. Such knowledge on the
part of the offender must be of the highest degree of probability, the act
having been committed by the offender without any excuse for incurring the risk
of causing death or such injury as aforesaid. The above are only broad
guidelines and not cast-iron imperatives. In most cases, their observance will
facilitate the task of the court. But sometimes the facts are so intertwined
and the second and the third stages so telescoped into each, that it may not be
convenient to give a separate and clear cut treatment to the matters involved
in the second and third stages.
22. The position was illuminatingly highlighted by this Court in State of
A.P. v. Rayavarapu Punnayya13
and Abdul Waheed Khan alias Waheed and ors. v. State of A.P 14.
23.If the evidence on record is considered on the touchstone principles set out
above the inevitable conclusion is that the proper conviction would be Section
304 Part I Indian Penal Code, 1860 instead of Section 302 Indian
Penal Code, 1860. The conviction of the appellants is accordingly altered from
Section 302 read with Section 149 to Section 304 Part I read with Section 149 Indian
Penal Code, 1860. Custodial sentence of 10 years would meet the ends of
justice. The findings of the guilt in respect of other offences and the
sentences imposed do not warrant interference. The sentence shall run
concurrently.
24. The appeal is allowed to the aforesaid extent.
Judgment Referred.
1AIR 1953 SC 0364
2 (1974) 3 SCC 0698
3AIR 1957 SC 0614
4AIR 1952 SC 0054
5AIR 1965 SC 0202
6AIR 1973 SC 2407
7(2002) 3 SCC 0076
8AIR 1957 SC 0366
9(2003) 6 JT SC 0348
10(2005) 9 SCC 0616
11AIR 2006 SC 2716
12AIR 1958 SC 0465
13(1976) 4) SCC 0382
14(2002) 7SCC 0175