SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Ravi Khullar & Anr.
Vs.
Union of India & Ors.
(B.P.Singh and Altamas Kabir,JJ.,)
30.03.2007
JUDGMENT
B.P.Singh, J.,
1. Special leave granted.
2. In the appeals arising out of SLP (C) Nos. 6093 of 2003; 6095 of 2003 and
6384 of 2003 the appellants have impugned the common judgment and order of the
High Court of Delhi dated February 13, 2003 disposing of Civil Writ Petition
Nos. 2672 of 1996 ; 1851 of 1986 and 2003 of 1986.
3. In the appeal arising out SLP ) No. 8574 of 2003, M/s. Punjab Potteries has
assailed the judgment and order of the High Court of Delhi in C.W.P. No.2168 of
2003 dated 26th March, 2003.
4. The High Court dismissed all the writ petitions preferred by the appellants
herein.
5. A few broad facts may be noticed at the threshold to appreciate the
contentions urged on behalf of the parties in these appeals.
6. A Notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter
referred to as 'the Act') was issued by the Lieutenant Governor of Delhi on
January 23, 1965 for acquisition of lands measuring 6241 bighas 12 biswas in
village Mahipalpur which was required for a public purpose, namely - Planned
Development of Delhi. A declaration under Section 6 of the Act relating to 4759
bighas 1 biswa was made on December 12, 1966 and another declaration relating
to 1459 bighas 18 biswas was made on December 26, 1968. Another Notification
under Section 4 of the Act was published on December 3, 1971 for acquisition of
land in Village Nangal Dewat for a public purpose, namely - Development of
Palam Airport. A declaration under Section 6 of the Act was made with respect
to the said lands on July 16, 1972.
7. The case of the appellants is that the matter remained pending for a
considerable period and it appears from various documents which have been
brought on record that the lands acquired were really for the benefit of the
International Airport Authority of India (IAAI). Reliance is placed on a Resolution
dated September 10, 1981 of the Delhi Development Authority regarding change of
land user from "Green Belt and Agriculture Cultivable Land" to
"Circulation Airport". The Resolution recites that the Delhi
Development Authority had approved the change of land user so that the land
could be utilized for the purpose of development of the Palam Airport. This was
subject to the condition that the IAAI prepared a detailed plan which should
include the proposal for rehabilitation/resettlement of the villagers to be
affected by the proposed expansion of the Airport, and the plan be discussed
with the Municipal Corporation of Delhi and the Delhi Electric Supply
Undertaking. It also appears from the record that the notice issued under
Section 9(1) of the Act on June 22, 1983 was challenged in several writ
petitions filed before the High Court in which an interim order was passed
directing maintenance of status quo with regard to possession of the lands but
permitted the acquisition proceeding to continue. Reliance has been placed on
the correspondence exchanged between the various statutory authorities to
indicate that it was really for the purpose of IAAI that the lands were being
utilised. The letter of the Land Acquisition Officer dated July 1, 1986
indicates that IAAI had supplied details of khasra numbers to be acquired for
the expansion of the Delhi Airport which had been discussed. A statement
enclosed with the aforesaid communication showed that the lands to be acquired
were in villages Mahipalpur, Nangal Dewat and Nangal Dewat Village abadi
measuring 69 bighas 11 biswas, which included some of the khasra numbers
belonging to some of the appellants herein. A communication from the Secretary,
Department of Civil Aviation, addressed to the Lieutenant Governor of Delhi
dated September 15, 1986 emphasised the need to acquire immediately the
industrial structures in the Mahipalpur and Nangal Dewat area in the overall
interest of security and development of Delhi Airport. The IAAI was said to be
willing to accept the suggestion for provision of land for land, provided
alternative land was acquired by the Delhi Administration/Delhi Development
Authority and no further liability was imposed on IAAI for payment of
additional compensation for acquired industrial structures.
8. On September 19, 1996 an Award under Section 11 of the Act was declared by
the Land Acquisition Collector.
9. On December 23, 1986 a Notification was issued under Section 4 of the Act
for acquisition of land for a public purpose, namely for rehabilitation of the
persons displaced or affected due to the expansion/development of the Palam
Airport. The lands mentioned therein are in village Malikpur Kohi Rangpuri.
10. Since the challenge to the acquisition failed and the appellants were not
provided alternative sites under the rehabilitation package, they approached
the High Court for relief which, as noticed earlier, has been refused by the
High Court. It will, however, be necessary to deal with each writ petition
separately since the facts of each case are different as also the pleas raised
therein.
APPEAL ARISING OUT OF SLP ) NO. 6093 OF 2003
11. The appellants before us are the son and daughter of Late Balraj Khullar.
The lands in question in village Mahipalpur measuring 23 bighas and 18 biswas
(approximately 5 acres) devolved upon the appellants after the death of their
father. Late Balraj Khullar had constructed a factory over the lands in
question in the year 1955 which went into production later after obtaining
registration on July 27, 1960. He carried on the business of manufacture of
ceramic goods in the name and style of M/s. Pelican Ceramic Industries. On
January 23, 1965 the aforesaid lands of the appellants were notified for
acquisition under Section 4 of the Act for the public purpose of planned development
of Delhi. According to the appellants, when the factory was established and
became functional, there was no Master Plan of Delhi, which came into existence
only in the year 1962 in which the lands were shown as 'green area'. Late
Balraj Khullar objected to the acquisition but without considering his
objections, a declaration under Section 6 was made on December 26, 1968. A
notice under Section 9(1) of the Act was issued on June 23, 1983. Upon receipt
of the notice late Balraj Khullar challenged the acquisition by filing a writ
petition before the Delhi High Court, being Civil Writ Petition No. 1550 of
1983 primarily on the ground of inordinate delay in completing the acquisition
proceeding and other illegalities in Section 4 Notification. Notice was issued
in the said writ petition on July 26, 1983 and an interim order was passed for
maintenance of status quo with regard to possession. The interim order dated
July 26, 1983 was modified on August 30, 1983 directing maintenance of status
quo with regard to possession but the acquisition proceedings were allowed to
continue. During the pendency of the writ petition, the award was announced on
September 19, 1986 which was followed by notices under Sections 12(2) and 13(1)
of the Act. The total area acquired measured 23 bighas and 18 biswas.
Ultimately the writ petition filed by late Balraj Khullar was dismissed by the
High Court by its order dated December 14, 2005. On coming to know about the
dismissal of the said writ petition, the petitioners (appellants herein) filed
a special leave petition before this Court being SLP ) No. 7821 of 1996. The
same was, however, withdrawn on a statement being made on behalf of the
petitioners that they would file a review petition before the High Court. It
appears from the special leave petition filed by the petitioners that a
contention was raised before this Court that the lands having been acquired for
the planned development of Delhi, could not be given to the IAAI since the
development of the Palam Airport was not within the contemplation of the
notification under Section 4 of the Act. Accordingly the petitioners filed the
review petition being Review Petition No.42 of 1996 before the High Court in
which several fresh grounds were also urged but the said review petition was
dismissed by the High Court by its order of May 24, 1996 observing that the new
points sought to be raised in the review petition had not been pleaded in the
original writ petition. The High Court also rejected the contention of the
petitioners that on discovery of new facts a review petition was maintainable.
No appeal was preferred against the order dismissing the review petition and
hence the proceeding initiated by filing of C.W.P. No. 1550 of 1983 challenging
the acquisition proceeding got a quietus by dismissal of the review petition by
the High Court. Apparently, therefore, the petitioners cannot be permitted to
challenge the same acquisition proceeding.
12. However, the petitioners filed another writ petition, being Writ Petition
No. 2672 of 1986 again questioning the acquisition proceeding. The said writ
petition was dismissed by order dated July 4, 1996. It appears from the record
that the point sought to be urged in the aforesaid writ petition was that the
acquisition proceeding was bad for non compliance with the provision of Chapter
VII of the Act. The submission proceeded on the basis that the acquisition was
for the purposes of a Company within the meaning of that term in the Act,
namely the International Airport Authority of India (IAAI). The same submission
has been urged before us as well.
13. We are of the view that the High Court was justified in rejecting this
contention. As noticed by it, the Notification under Section 4 was issued on
January 23, 1965. The public purpose for which the acquisition was made was
stated to be "planned development of Delhi". Admittedly at the
relevant time when Section 4 Notification was published, the management of the
airport vested with the Department of Civil Aviation. It cannot be denied that
the words used in the Notification, namely "the planned development of
Delhi" are wide enough to include the expansion and development of the
airport. That is also a "public purpose." Since the IAAI came
into existence much later only on December 8, 1971 and was vested with the
power to manage the airports, there was no question of the acquisition being
made for the purpose of the IAAI since that body did not exist in the year
1965. The acquisition was for the planned development of Delhi and, as observed
earlier, the expansion and modification of the airport is a "public
purpose". It so happened that after the constitution of the IAAI, the
power of management of airports, was vested in it and, therefore, the
development work which otherwise would have been undertaken by the concerned
competent authority in the year 1965, was to be executed by the IAAI. The
submission that the provisions of Chapter-VII of the Act were not complied with
must, therefore, be rejected because the acquisition purported to be for the
planned development of Delhi and it is no one's case that the Notification had
been issued mala fide. The procedure laid down in Chapter-VII of the Act was
not attracted since the acquisition was not for any "Company" within
the meaning of Chapter-VII of the Act.
14. The High Court has also rejected the submission on the ground that it was
barred by the principle of constructive res judicata. It is not necessary for
us to express any opinion on this issue, in view of our earlier finding, but
the appellants have themselves drawn the attention of this Court to the fact
that the land was being acquired for the purpose of the IAAI as was evident
from the Resolution of the Delhi Development Authority dated September 10,
1981. The appellants, therefore, admit that they had knowledge of the fact that
the land was to be utilized by the IAAI for its own purposes, which according
to the appellants, was not a part of the planned development of Delhi. Such
being the factual position, the father of the appellants who filed Writ Petition
No.1550 of 1983 ought to have challenged the acquisition on the ground of non
compliance with the provisions of Chapter VII of the Act since all the relevant
facts were within his knowledge. He not having done so, we do not find that the
High Court was in error in holding that the writ petition was barred also by
the principle of constructive res judicata.
15. The question which survives consideration is whether in view of the public
purpose declared in the Notification under Section 4 of the Act, the lands can
be utilized for any other public purpose. While considering this question it
would be useful to remember that the Notification under Section 4 of the Act
was issued in January, 1965 and the declaration made in the following year. The
IAAI came into existence in December, 1971, six years later, whereafter the
task of developing and extending the Palam Airport was entrusted to the said
authority. When the said authority was constituted, the acquisition proceeding
had already been initiated.
16. The learned Additional Solicitor General appearing on behalf of the
respondents submitted that having regard to the authorities on the subject the
question is no longer res integra. It is not as if lands acquired for a
particular public purpose cannot be utilized for another public purpose. He
contended that as long as the acquisition is not held to be mala fide, the
acquisition cannot be invalidated merely because the lands which at one time
were proposed to be utilized for a particular public purpose, were later either
in whole or in part, utilized for some other purpose, though a public purpose.
He, therefore, submitted that some change of user of the land, as long as it
has a public purpose, would not invalidate the acquisition proceeding which is
otherwise valid and legal.
17. In Gulam Mustafa and others vs. The State of Maharashtra and others1 ,
this Court noticing the submission of learned counsel for the petitioner that
the excess land out of the lands which were acquired for a country fair was
utilized for carving out plots for the housing colony, held that it did not
invalidate the acquisition. This Court observed:-
"Apart from the fact that a housing colony is a public necessity, once the
original acquisition is valid and title has vested in the Municipality, how it
uses the excess land is no concern of the original owner and cannot be the
basis for invalidating the acquisition. There is no principle of law by which a
valid compulsory acquisition stands voided because long later the requiring
authority diverts it to a public purpose other than the one stated in the
Section 6(3) declaration."
18. The same principle has been reiterated in Mangal Oram and others vs.
State of Orissa2: Â .
In Union of India and others vs. Jaswant Rai Kochhar and others3:,
lands which had been acquired for public purpose of housing scheme were sought
to be utilized for a commercial purpose, namely for locating a district center.
It was contended before this Court that since the acquisition was for a housing
scheme, the land cannot be used for commercial purposes. The submission was
rejected in the following words:-
".We find no force in the contention. It is conceded by the learned Counsel that the construction of the District Centre for commercial purpose itself is a public purpose. No doubt it was sought to be contended in the High Court that in a housing scheme, providing facilities for commercial purpose is also one of the composite purpose and that, therefore, acquisition was valid in law. However, the contention was rejected by the High Court. We need not go to that part. Suffice it to state that it is a well-settled law that land sought to be acquired for public purpose may be used for another public purpose. Therefore, when the notification has mentioned that the land is sought to be acquired for housing scheme but it is sought to be used for District Centre, the public purpose does not cease to be public purpose and the nomenclature mentioned in the notification under Section 4(1) as housing scheme cannot be construed to be a colourable one. The notification under Section 4(1) could not have been quashed on the ground that the land is sought to be used for District Centre, namely, for commercial purpose. It is obvious that the lands acquired for a public purpose should serve only the public purpose of providing facilities of commercial purpose, namely, District Centre as conceded by the learned Counsel in fairness to be a public purpose. The notification under Section 4(1) cannot be quashed on the ground of change of user. The High Court was wholly wrong in quashing the notification on the ground of change of user."
4. Though not directly in point, the observations of this Court in State of
Maharashtra vs. Mahadeo Deoman Rai alias Kalal and others4: are
significant to determine the approach of courts in such matters. In that case a
Notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 was
issued for the purpose of establishing a 'tonga' stand. The respondent applied
for permission to raise a construction which was denied on the ground that the
land was reserved for road widening under a Town Planning Scheme which was
being implemented. Since the respondent was prevented from continuing with the
construction work undertaken by him, he initially field a writ petition before
the High Court which was withdrawn and subsequently filed a suit claiming
damages etc. The Municipal Council took a decision to accord permission to the
respondent as asked for, and the suit was withdrawn. When the State Government
came to know about it, it asked the Municipal Council to explain the
circumstances under which such permission had been granted. A High Powered
Committee was appointed to examine the entire matter. The resolution of the
Municipal Council granting permission to the respondent was rescinded. Another
application filed by the respondent was kept in abeyance which compelled the
respondent to file another writ petition which was allowed by the High Court.
The plea of the Municipal Council was that it had passed a fresh resolution inter
alia deciding to re-plan the scheme with respect to the area in question in the
light of the recommendations made by the Committee. Consequently the matter was
re-opened and the objections from the affected persons were invited. Even the
respondent filed his objections. This fact was not brought to the notice of the
High Court which allowed the writ petition. This Court, set aside the judgment
and order of the High Court and observed :-
"Besides, the question as to whether a particular Scheme framed in
exercise of statutory provisions is in the public interest or not has to be
determined according to the need of the time and a final decision for all times
to come cannot be taken. A particular scheme may serve the public purpose at a
given point of time but due to change of circumstances it may become essential
to modify or substitute it by another scheme. The requirements of the community
do not remain static; they indeed, go on varying with the evolving process of
social life. Accordingly, there must be creative response from the public
authority, and the public scheme must be varied to meet the changing needs of
the public. At the best for the respondent, it can be assumed that in 1967 when
the resolution in his favour was passed, the acquisition of the land was not so
urgently essential so as to call for his dispossession. But for that reason it
cannot be held that the plots became immune from being utilised for any other
public purpose for ever. The State or a body like the Municipal Council
entrusted with a public duty to look after the requirements of the community
has to assess the situation from time to time and take necessary decision
periodically. We, therefore, hold that the Resolution dated 13- 2-1967 was not
binding on the Municipal Council so as to disable it to take a different
decision later."
5. In Bhagat Singh vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and others5 this
court upheld an acquisition even when the public purpose to which the land was
put was contrary to the permitted user under the Master Plan. This Court held
that the acquisition was valid but it was for the beneficiary of the
acquisition to move the competent authority and obtain the sanction of the said
authority for change of user. That it could do only after it got possession of
the land in question.
6. The learned Additional Solicitor General also relied upon the decision of
this Court in Northern Indian Glass Industries vs. Jaswant Singh and others6: wherein
this Court has held that the High Court was not right in ordering restoration
of land to the respondents on the ground that the land acquired was not used
for the purpose for which it was acquired. It was held that after passing of
the Award and possession taken under Section 16 of the Act the acquired land
vests with the Government free from all encumbrances. Even if the land is not
used for the purpose for which it is acquired, the landowner does not get any
right to ask for restoration of possession.
7. Referring to the facts of the instant case, it cannot be disputed that the
planned development of Delhi for which purpose the land was acquired under
Section 4 of the Act is wide enough to include the development and expansion of
an airport within the city of Delhi. Thus it cannot be said that the land is
actually being utilized for any purpose other than that for which it was
acquired. The only difference is that whereas initially the development work
would have been undertaken by the D.D.A. or any other agency employed by it,
after the constitution of the IAAI, the said development work had to be
undertaken by the newly constituted authority. Thus there has been no change of
purpose of the acquisition. All that has happened is that the development work
is undertaken by another agency since constituted, which is entrusted with the
special task of maintenance of airports. Since the said authority was
constituted several years after the issuance of the Notification under Sections
4, the acquisition cannot be invalidated only on the ground that the public
purpose is sought to be achieved through another agency. This, as we have
noticed earlier, was necessitated by change of circumstances in view of the
creation of the authority i.e. IAAI. Moreover since there is no change of
public purpose for which the acquired land is being utilized, the acquisition
cannot be invalidated on that ground. The purpose for which the lands are being
utilized by a governmental agency is also a public purpose and as we have
noticed earlier, would come within the ambit of the public purpose declared in
Section 4 Notification. Therefore, the acquisition cannot be challenged on the
ground that the acquired lands are not being utilized for the declared public
purpose. Having regard to the facts of the case it cannot be contended,
nor has it been contended, that the Notification under Section 4 of the Act was
issued mala fide.
8. We, therefore, find no merit in the appeal arising out of SLP (C) No.6093 of
2003 and the same is accordingly dismissed.
APPEAL ARISING OUT OF SLP No. 6384/2003
9. In this appeal the lands belonging to the appellant in village Mahipalpur
were notified for acquisition under Section 4 of the Act on January 23, 1965 A
declaration under Section 6 followed on December 7, 1966. Ultimately an Award
was pronounced under Section 11 of the Act on September 19, 1986. Thereafter
the appellant filed Civil Writ Petition No.2003 of 1986 before the High Court
challenging the acquisition proceeding. The High Court by the impugned judgment
and order dismissed the appeal on the ground of delay and latches
10. It will be noticed that the appellants filed the writ petition challenging
the acquisition proceeding which was initiated in 1965 as late as on September
25, 1986, after the Award had been declared under Section 11 of the Act. The
High Court, in our view, has rightly noticed that the acquisition was
challenged almost 21 years after the issuance of the Notification under Section
4 of the Act. Indeed the writ proceeding was initiated after the Award was
declared. The High Court has relied upon the decisions of this Court in Aflatoon
vs. Lt. Governor of Delhi7
; Tilockchand Motichan vs. H.B. Munshi 8; Indrapuri
Griha Nirman Sahakari Samiti Ltd. vs. The State of Rajasthan and others9; Pt.
Girharan Prasad Missir and another vs. State of Bihar and another10 and H.D.
Vora vs. State of Maharashtra and others11 .
Following the principles laid down therein the High Court dismissed the writ
petition on the ground of delay and latches. In the facts and circumstances of
the case no exception can be taken to the order of the High Court dismissing
the writ petition. There was no good reason explaining the delay in moving the
High Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction. It is not necessary to refer
to the large number of authorities on the subject since the law is so well
settled that there is no need for a further reiteration.
11. We, therefore, find no merit in this appeal and the same is accordingly
dismissed.
12. The appellant in this appeal is M/s. Punjab Potteries whose lands were
notified for acquisition under Section 4 of the Act on December 3, 1971 and the
declaration under Section 6 was published on July 10, 1972. The petitioner had
earlier filed a writ petition being C.W.P. No. 432 of 1987. It appears from the
order passed in the said writ petition dated February 18, 1987 that a prayer
was made for leave to withdraw the petition. The order notices the fact that in
the aforesaid writ petition there was no prayer for mandamus directing the
respondents to allot any alternative site. It merely questioned the acquisition
and validity of the Notifications under Sections 4 and 6 of the Act. The High
Court recorded a finding that it found nothing wrong with the acquisition so
far as the validity of the Notifications under Sections 4 and 6 was concerned.
It accordingly dismissed the writ petition as withdrawn but with liberty to
file a fresh petition for claiming any alternative site, if it had any such
right. Whereafter the petitioner filed the instant writ petition on March 7,
2003. In the instant petition as well the acquisition proceedings were
challenged but the same was dismissed by the High Court on March 26, 2003. The
High Court noticed the order passed by the Court earlier on February 18, 1987
and also the fact that the writ petition was being filed after a lapse of 16
years. It did not entertain the challenge to the Notifications issued under
Sections 4 and 6 of the Act since challenge to the aforesaid Notifications
stood rejected by order of February 18, 1987. It noticed the earlier common
judgment delivered in the writ petitions preferred by other appellants in this
batch of writ petitions and held that the inordinate delay in filing the writ
petition challenging the validity of the Notifications was not condonable.
13 It then proceeded to consider the submission urged on behalf of the
appellant that in any event it was entitled to the allotment of alternative
land in lieu of the lands acquired. The High Court after noticing the Full
Bench decision of the High Court in Ramanand vs. Union of India12 and
the judgment of this Court in New Reviera Cooperative Housing Society vs.
Special Land Acquisition Officer & others 13 observed
that if there was a scheme promulgated by the State to provide alternative
sites to persons whose lands had been acquired, the Court could give effect to
the Scheme. However, it could not be argued as a matter of principle that in
each and every case of acquisition the land owners must be given an alternative
site because such a principle, if adopted, would result in the State being
unable to acquire any land for public purpose. In the instant case the High
Court dismissed the writ petition in view of the fact that there was nothing on
record to indicate that any application was made to the competent authority for
allotting an alternative site within a reasonable period. Reliance placed on
the decision of the learned Single Judge of the Delhi High Court in Daryao
Singh and others vs. Union of India and others14 (Civil
Writ Petition No. 481/1982) dated 2nd August, 2001 was rightly rejected. That
case related to a different award and the land owners concerned in that case
gave up the challenge to the acquisition proceedings in view of the assurance
given that an alternative plot under the Scheme to be formulated shall be given
to them. Those facts do not exist in the instant case. Moreover the Government
had agreed to allot the plots to the land owners and there was no question of
recognizing any right of the land owners to an allotment of alternative plots.
In view of these findings the writ petition preferred by the appellant was
rejected.
14. The appellants in the other appeals as well have contended that an
alternative site should be allotted to them in view of the lands acquired. We
may at the threshold notice that the Notification under Section 4 of the Act
was issued in the cases of the other appellants on January 23, 1965. The lands
were located in village Mahipalpur which were required for the public purpose
of planned development of Delhi.
15. So far as the case of Punjab Potteries is concerned the Section 4
Notification was issued on December 3, 1971. It related to lands located in
Nangal Dewat acquired for public purpose, namely the development of Palam
Airport.
16. It was submitted by Mr. Andhyarujina, leaned senior counsel appearing for
the appellant Ravi Khullar in appeal arising out of SLP No. 6093 of 2003 that
in view of the Notification of December 23, 1986 the appellants are entitled to
the benefit of rehabilitation in view of the acquisition of their lands for the
expansion/development of the Palam airport. According to him the lands which
were subject matter of Notification under Section 4 dated January 23, 1965 for
the planned development of Delhi were owned by the appellants over which they
had been carrying on business of ceramic industries for over 15 years. It is
his contention that a Notification under Section 4 of the Act was issued on
December 23, 1986 for acquisition of lands in village Malikpur Kohi Rangpuri measuring
713 bigha and 0.2 biswa for the rehabilitation of those displaced or affected
due to the expansion/development of Palam airport. He, therefore, submitted
that regardless of the fact that their lands were acquired under a different
Notification than the lands of Ravi Khullar, in view of the issuance of the
Notification dated December 23, 1986, it made no difference since all of them
were displaced or affected due to the expansion/development of the Palam
airport. The generality of the aforesaid notification could not be limited by
administrative decision to only certain beneficiaries as a matter of policy.
17. Learned counsel for the respondents on the other hand contended that though
the matter relating to rehabilitation package was considered, no decision was
taken nor any scheme formulated for the rehabilitation of industries. Only
those displaced from village Nangal Dewat, pursuant to the Notification under
Section 4 dated December 3, 1971 for acquisition of land for development of the
Palam airport, were to be allotted lands in village Rangpuri and that too for
residential purposes. Succinctly stated the State contended that the
acquisition of land in village Rangpuri was meant for rehabilitation of persons
from village Nangal Dewat and that too for residential purpose, and that the
other land owners, whose lands were acquired for the planned development of
Delhi could not claim such benefit. The State has relied upon three decisions
taken in this regard.
18. We shall, therefore, consider the material placed on record by the parties
on the question of rehabilitation.
19. The first document to be considered is a letter dated December 5, 1986
written by the Joint Director of Industries to the Deputy Commissioner, Delhi,
informing him that the position regarding acquisition of land occupied by the
industrial units in Mahipalpur- Nangal Dewat area and providing of alternate
plots to the land owners was to be reviewed by the Chief Secretary shortly. An
enquiry was made as to whether awards had been announced in respect of affected
industrial units in that area. The Deputy Commissioner was also requested to
intimate regarding the steps taken to provide alternative lands to the affected
units so that the whole position was brought to the notice of the Chief Secretary.
This letter does not refer to any decision taken by the Government to provide
alternate site. At best the matter was to be reviewed by the Chief Secretary.
20. It appears that earlier a Joint Survey Report had been submitted sometime
in August, 1983 with a view to assess the needs of the different ceramic
industries located on the Mehrauli-Mahipalpur Road which had to be shifted in
view of the expansion of Palam airport. On the basis of the survey conducted by
the Committee the industries were classified in three groups. The appellants
fell in the first category, namely those who had a turnover of Rs. 15 lakhs and
above with an area of 5 acres in their possession on ownership basis. The
Committee recommended that they be allowed 25000 sq. yards each. The Committee
also made its recommendations with regard to other two categories of industries
and assessed that the total requirement of land would be about 20.86 acres if
such allotments were to be made. It also noticed the fact that the aforesaid
factories were located over an area of 25.70 acres.
21. No document has been produced to show that the recommendations contained in
the said survey report were at any time accepted by the Government. The
appellants also relied upon the letter written by the Secretary, Civil
Aviation, to the Lieutenant Governor of Delhi on September 15, 1986 wherein a
view was firmly expressed that in the over all interest of security and development
of Delhi Airport, the industrial structures in Mahipalpur and Nangal Dewat area
need to be acquired immediately. The letter also stated that the IAAI will be
willing to accept the suggestion for provision of land for land, provided
alternative land is acquired by the Delhi Administration/D.D.A. and no further
liability is imposed on them for payment of additional compensation for the
acquired industrial structures. Though this letter records the willingness of
the IAAI to provide land for land subject to the condition that it shall incur
no additional liability for payment of compensation for the acquired industrial
structures, it does not refer to any firm decision taken in this regard.
22. Mr. Rakesh Dwivedi, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant in
Punjab Potteries also placed reliance on a decision of the High Court of Delhi
dated August 2, 2001 in CWP No. 481 /1982 : Daryao Singh (supra) and submitted
that the aforesaid judgment supports the case of the appellants that the lands
acquired in village Rangpuri were meant for rehabilitation of the persons
displaced from village Nangal Dewat, such as the appellants. As noticed
earlier, the High Court has considered this decision and distinguished the same
on the ground that it related to another award. Moreover a mere perusal of the
judgment discloses that the plea of the petitioners before the High Court was
that they were not interested in challenging the acquisition but they were only
interested in allotment of an alternative piece of land for the purpose of
their residence. In reply counsel appearing for the respondents stated that for
allotment of land to the persons whose lands had been acquired a scheme was
being formulated. Such persons whose names appear in the Award shall be
allotted land in terms of the Scheme within 6 months. In this view of the
matter the writ petition was dismissed.
23. It will be seen that in the aforesaid writ petition the question of
rehabilitating an industrial unit did not come up for consideration. So far as
the allotment of residential site is concerned, counsel appearing for the
respondents submitted before us that if the appellant was eligible for
allotment in terms of the scheme formulated for the purpose, it could as well
have asked for allotment of alternative site, but the appellant was not
interested in allotment of alternative plot for residence. Its demand was that
a site should be given to it for establishing an industry, which was not
contemplated under the scheme. There is substance in the contention of the
respondents that so far as the aforesaid decision goes it only related to
allotment of alternative sites for residence of the displaced persons and not
for relocation of an industry. The respondents on the other hand relied on
atleast 3 documents and contended that at no time any decision was taken to
allot alternative sites with a view to relocate the displaced industrial units.
24. The first document is the Minutes of the Meeting held by the Lieutenant
Governor of Delhi on June 16, 1982 to consider issues connected with
acquisition of lands in village Nangal Dewat etc. for the International Airport
Authority of India (IAAI). At the meeting were present the Lieutenant Governor
of Delhi and officers of the concerned department; the Vice Chairman of the Delhi
Development Authority and its officers as also the representatives of the
Municipal Corporation of Delhi; Ministry of Tourism and Civil Aviation and
IAAI. The relevant part of the Minutes reads as under:-
"After further discussions, Lt. Governor directed that in the special
circumstances obtaining in Delhi, there was no alternative to IAAI undertaking
t he responsibility for the rehabilitation of the village abadi. The cost of
rehabilitation would have to be borne by IAAI over and above the compensation to
be paid by them for the land and structures. International Airport Authority of
India would also bear the cost of acquiring, if necessary, the alternative area
where the abadi would be shifted. The cost of rehabilitation would include
provision of developed and serviced plots to the residents and also provision
for community facilities such as schools, tube wells, electricity, community
hall and dispensaries etc. However, the cost of construction of houses would be
borne by the villagers themselves. Lt. Governor felt that early selection of
the alternative plots where the village abadi would be shifted and announcement
of the facilities to be offered, would be helpful in inducing people to shift
to the new site. This would be the responsibility of Delhi Administration.
It was pointed out that there were other villages in the neighbourhood where
there were certain other industrial structures. The owners of these industrial
structures would not be provided any assistance beyond what they may be
entitled to by way of the usual compensation under the Land Acquisition
Act, 1894."
25. It would thus appear that after considering all aspects of the matter, the IAAI was burdened with the cost of rehabilitation of the displaced persons from the village abadi, meaning thereby to provide them land for residence over which the villagers could construct houses at their own cost. So far as industrial structures are concerned, it was clearly decided that the owners of industrial structures would not be provided any assistance beyond what they may be entitled to as compensation under the Act.
26. The second document is the letter of April 16, 1986 written to the Chief
Secretary, Delhi Administration which refers to a meeting held on April 4, 1986
wherein it was decided that a site may be selected for shifting the residents
of village Nangal Dewat. The letter discloses that the site had been selected
in village Rangpuri and the same may be acquired on priority basis so that the
village abadi may be shifted to this alternative site. This letters also refers
to the rehabilitation of villagers displaced from village Nangal Dewat and for
the purpose of providing them an alternative plot for residence.
27. The last document on which reliance has been placed by the respondents is
of August 21, 1991 which is the Minutes of the Meeting held in the room of the
Chief Secretary, Delhi Administration on July 30, 1991 regarding acquisition of
land for IAAI. The Minutes disclose that the representatives of the various
departments put forwards their points of view and though the Delhi
Administration suggested that the agency for which the land was being acquired
should pay not only for the land but also for meeting cost of rehabilitation of
the concerned industrial units, the Ministry of Civil Aviation, Government of
India, was not agreeable to pay any amount over and above the cost of land and
super-structures. Paragraph 3.1 of the Minutes is relevant which reads as
follows:-
"Reverting to the specific question of acquiring land under the above said
five industrial units the Chief Secretary remarked that linking obligation of
re-location with the acquisition of their land would not be advisable as
neither DDA nor Delhi Administration could undertake such an obligation
especially as units were now required to shift out of UT of Delhi. The Delhi
Administration could at best assist in the allotment of the land by the
concerned states. The affected units should therefore be discouraged from
expecting any special concession. At the same time it would be necessary for
the IAAI to pay rehabilitation cost to these units and not merely the cost of
acquisition of land and super structures. He advised the Land Acquisition
Collector to keep this in view while determining award for acquisition. The LAC
said that award in 4 of the cases had already been announced. The Chief
Secretary advised the LAC that in case it was not possible to revise the award
the LAC should determine the additional compensation on above lines and
intimate t he same to IAAI. He also advised the IAAI representatives that in
case they wanted this land urgently they should be prepared to pay the said
additional cost."
28. The documents relied upon by the respondents do establish that though at different stages the question of rehabilitation of the affected persons as a result of the acquisition was considered, no firm decision was ever taken to rehabilitate the industries affected thereby. The decision taken was only to provide alternative sites for residence of the oustees from village Nangal Dewat in village Rangpuri. The proposal to allot lands for setting up the displaced industrial units was always turned down and it was decided that owners of such industries would only be entitled to compensation under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. Having regard to the material on record we are satisfied that no scheme was ever framed for rehabilitation of industrial units. The scheme was framed only for the affected villagers of village Nangal Dewat and that too for residential purpose alone.
29. Learned counsel for the appellants strenuously urged before us that the
land in village Rangpuri is still available and even if the three industries
with which we are concerned in the instant batch of appeals are allotted land
to the extent of 25, 000 sq. yards each, as recommended in the Joint Survey
Report, their purpose will be served. We are afraid we cannot accede to the
request because that is a matter of policy and it is for the government to take
appropriate decision in that regard. In law we find no justification for the
claim that even in the absence of a scheme for rehabilitation of displaced
industries alternative sites should be allotted to them for relocating the
industrial units. It is no doubt true that the acquisition of land in village
Rangpuri by issuance of Notification under Section 4 of the Act on December 23,
1986 was for the public purpose, namely for rehabilitation of the persons
displaced or affected due to the expansion/development of the Palam airport.
Learned counsel appearing for the State contended that this public purpose has
been achieved and the persons who were displaced from village Nangal Dewat in
view of the acquisition of their lands for the development of Palam airport
have been allotted plots in village Rangpuri for their residence. There is
nothing in the Notification which obliges the State to provide equal
alternative site to the industries for their rehabilitation.
30. We find substance in the stand of respondents.
Civil Appeal Arising Out of SLP) No. 6095 Of 2003
31. In this appeal apart from other questions which have been raised in this
batch of appeals, a question of limitation has been raised. It is submitted on
behalf of the appellant that the award made by the Collector in the instant
case was barred by limitation under Section 11A of the Act inasmuch as it was
not made within a period of 2 years from the date of the publication of the
declaration after excluding the period during which an order of stay granted by
the High Court operated. The facts are not in dispute and since this plea
became available to the appellant only after the dismissal of the writ petition
by the High Court, we permitted the appellant to raise this plea after giving
an opportunity to the respondents to reply to the same. Since the facts are not
in dispute, we proceed to decide the question of limitation in this appeal.
32. It is not in dispute that the Notification under Section 4 of the Act was
issued on January 23, 1965. A declaration under Section 6 of the Act was
published on December 26, 1968. The appellant filed the writ petition before
the High Court on September 12, 1986 in which an order for maintenance of
status quo was made on September 18, 1986. It is the case of the respondents
that in view of the status quo order the award could not be pronounced. While
the awards were pronounced in other cases on September 19, 1986, it was not
pronounced in the case of the appellant in view of the status quo order. The
High Court by the impugned judgment dismissed the writ petition filed by the
petitioner on February 13, 2003 whereafter the award was pronounced on March 1,
2003.
33. We may notice that the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 came into force w.e.f. September 24, 1984.
34. Keeping in view these dates it will be seen that award ought to have been
made within a period of 2 years from the date of the publication of the
declaration under Section 6 of the Act. However, in a case where the said
declaration was published before the commencement of the Land Acquisition
(Amendment) Act, 1984 the award must be made within a period of two years from
such commencement. This is the mandate of Section 11A of the Act. In the
instant case the declaration under Section 6 of the Act was published on
December 26, 1968 i.e. before the commencement of the Amendment Act of 1984. Thus
the proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 11A applied and the award was
required to be made within a period of two years from such commencement. So
calculated the award ought to have been made on or before the 23rd September,
1986 when the period of 2 years from the commencement of the Amendment Act,
1984 expired. It is not disputed that an order of status quo was made on 18th
September, 1986 which prevented the Land Acquisition Officer from pronouncing
the award. The aforesaid order of status quo operated till February 13, 2003
which period, as rightly submitted by the learned Additional Solicitor General,
had to be excluded in calculating the period of 2 years. Thus after excluding
the aforesaid period the award should have been pronounced on or before
February 18, 2003. However, the award was pronounced on March 1, 2003. Ex
facie, therefore, the award having not been made within the period prescribed
by Section 11A of the Act, the entire proceeding for acquisition of the land
lapsed on February 18, 2003, the last date for pronouncement of the award.
35. The learned Additional Solicitor General, however, submitted that the
judgment in the writ petition was pronounced on February 13, 2003 and an
application was made for certified copy of the same on February 14, 2003. The
certified copy was ready on February 27, 2003. It is his contention that the
period between February 14, 2003 and February 27, 2003 must be excluded and if
that period is excluded, time to make the award was available upto March 4,
2003 whereas the award was pronounced on March 1, 2003. He submitted that the
period taken by a public authority to obtain the authentic copy of the order,
which is evidence of the contents thereof, must in all cases be excluded and
the period taken to obtain a certified copy cannot cause any prejudice in the
matter of calculation of the period of limitation. Since the Land Acquisition
Officer, who is a public functionary, had to look into the contents of the
order passed by the court before taking any action including the pronouncement
of the award, the said period ought to have been excluded. In effect the
learned Additional Solicitor General contended that the rule incorporated in
Section 12 of the Limitation Act, 1963 must apply in computing the
period of limitation under Section 11A of the Act. He also relied on judgments
of this Court reported in N. Narasimbhaiah and others vs. State of Karnataka15 and
others; General Manger, Department of Communications vs. Jacob 16and Shakuntala
Devi Jain vs. Kuntal Kumari and others17. He
submitted that since the authority had taken immediate steps in applying for
certified copy and since the explanation to Section 11A prescribed a principle
of limitation, it is necessary that analogous principles contained in the Limitation
Act, 1963 must necessarily be applied. Applying the principle underlined
under sub-section (1) of Section 11 A of the Act read with Sections 76 and 77
of the Indian Evidence Act and also based on the principle actus curaie neminem
gravabit, the period during which the certified copy was not obtained has to be
excluded.
36. Shri K.K. Venugopal, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the
intervener also reiterated the same submission and contended that the Land
Acquisition Officer could not have proceeded to make the award unless he had
seen the authenticated copy of the order which had the effect of vacating the
order of status quo passed as an interim measure. Learned counsel for the
appellants on the other hand contended that Section 11A of the Act does not provide
for extension of time to make an award or condonation of delay in making the
award. Though it provides for exclusion of the period during which any action
or proceeding to be taken in pursuance of the declaration is stayed by an order
of the court, it does not exclude the time taken for obtaining a certified copy
of the judgment or order vacating or having the effect of vacating the order of
stay. He further submitted that the Land Acquisition Collector was a party in
the writ petition and had, therefore, knowledge of the fact that the writ
petition had been dismissed which resulted in vacation of the interim order of
status quo. In the absence of any provision in the Land Acquisition Act,
1894 for exclusion of time taken to obtain a certified copy of the
judgment of the High Court, the Land Acquisition Collector, ought to have
proceeded to make the award having come to know that the writ petition filed by
the appellant had been rejected by the High Court.
37. In the matter of computing the period of limitation three situations may be
visualized, namely (a) where the Limitation Act, 1963 applies by its
own force ; (b) where the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963with or
without modifications are made applicable to a special statute ; and (c) where
the special statue itself prescribes the period of limitation and provides for
extension of time and or condonation of delay. The instant case is not one
which is governed by the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963. The Land
Acquisition Collector in making an award does not act as a Court within the
meaning of the Limitation Act, 1963. It is also clear from the provisions
of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 that the provisions of the Limitation
Act, 1963 have not been made applicable to proceedings under the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894 in the matter of making an award under Section 11A
of the Act. However, Section 11A of the Act does provide a period of limitation
within which the Collector shall make his award. The explanation thereto also
provides for exclusion of the period during which any action or proceeding to
be taken in pursuance of the declaration is stayed by an order of a court. Such
being the provision, there is no scope for importing into Section 11A of the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894 the provisions of Section 12 of the Limitation
Act, 1963. The application of Section 12 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is
also confined to matters enumerated therein. The time taken for obtaining a
certified copy of the judgment is excluded because a certified copy is required
to be filed while preferring an appeal/revision/review etc. challenging the
impugned order. Thus a court is not permitted to read into Section 11A of the
Act a provision for exclusion of time taken to obtain a certified copy of the
judgment and order. The court has, therefore, no option but to compute the
period of limitation for making an award in accordance with the provisions of
Section 11A of the Act after excluding such period as can be excluded under the
explanation to Section 11A of the Act.
38. Our conclusion finds support from the scheme of the Land Acquisition
Act, 1894 itself. Section 11A of the Act was inserted by Act 68 of 1984
with effect from 24.09.1984. Similarly, Section 28A was also inserted by the
Amendment Act of 1984 with effect from the same date. In Section 28A the Act
provides for a period of limitation within which an application should be made
to the Collector for re-determination of the amount of compensation on the
basis of the award of the Court. The proviso to sub-section 1 of Section 28A
reads as follows:-
"Provided that in computing the period of three months within which an
application to the Collector shall be made under this sub-section, the day on
which the award was pronounced and the time requisite for obtaining a copy of
the award shall be excluded."
39. It will thus be seen that the legislature wherever it considered necessary
incorporated by express words the rule incorporated in Section 12 of the Limitation
Act, 1963. It has done so expressly in Section 28A of the Act while it has
consciously not incorporated this rule in Section 11A even while providing for
exclusion of time under the explanation. The intendment of the legislature is
therefore unambiguous and does not permit the Court to read words into Section
11A of the Act so as to enable it to read Section 12 of the Limitation
Act, 1963 into Section 11A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.
40. The judgments cited at the Bar are also of no help to the respondents. In
Shakuntala Devi Jain (supra) this Court held that an appeal is incompetent
unless the memorandum of appeal is accompanied by a certified copy of the
decision. It condoned the delay in that case giving the benefit of Section 5 of
the Limitation Act, 1963 in the facts and circumstances of the case.
The applicability of the Limitation Act, 1963 was not in dispute in
that case.
41. In N. Narasimhaiah and others (supra) the order under Section 17(4) of the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894 dispensing with the enquiry under Section 5-A was
quashed by the court with liberty to the State to proceed further in accordance
with law. In such circumstances it was held that running of the limitation
should be counted from the date of the order of the court received by he Land
Acquisition Officer. The limitation prescribed in clause (ii) of the first
proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 6 would apply to publication of
declaration under Section 6(1) afresh. If it was published within one year from
the date of the receipt of the order of the court by Land Acquisition Officer,
the declaration published under Section 6(1) would be valid. The principle laid
down therein does not help the respondents because by an order of the court the
limitation prescribed for publication of a declaration under Section 6(1) stood
extended. That is how this Court construed the order of the High Court giving
liberty to the State to proceed further in accordance with law. In the instant
case no such question arises. The situation that arises in the instant case is
fully governed by the provisions of Section 11A of the Act which does not give
any discretion to the court to exclude any period in computing limitation other
than that provided in the explanation to Section 11A of the Act.
42. In General Manager, Department of Telecommunications (supra) a question
arose as to whether the High Court by directing the passing of the award by
certain date, irrespective of the provisions contained in the Act, could
prevent the Collector from passing an award at any time beyond the specified
date. In that case the facts were that the High Court had directed the passing
of the award by December 3, 1992 irrespective of the provisions contained in
the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. This was done with a view to avoid further
delay and ensure expeditious conclusion of the proceedings. This Court found
that there was nothing to indicate in the order of the High Court stipulating
or extending the time for passing the award, that beyond the time so permitted,
it cannot be done at all and the authorities are disabled once and for all even
to proceed in the matter in accordance with law, if it is so permissible for
the authorities under the law governing the matter in issue. This Court held
that the court cannot be imputed with such an intention to stifle the
authorities from exercising powers vested with them under statute, or to have
rendered an otherwise enforceable statutory provision, a mere dead letter. This
Court considered the decision in N. Narasimhaiah and others (supra) and
observed:-
"This decision is of no assistance whatsoever to the respondents in the
present case. Notwithstanding the statutory period fixed, further time came to
be granted due to intervention of Court proceedings in which a direction came
to be issued to proceed in the matter afresh, as directed by the Court, apparently
applying the well-settled legal maxim - Actus curiae neminem gravabit : an act
of the Court shall prejudice no man. In substance what was done therein was to
necessitate afresh calculation of the statutory period from the date of receipt
of the copy of the order of the Court. Granting of further time than the one
stipulated in law in a given case as a sequel to the decision to carry out the
dictates of the Court afresh is not the same as curtailing the statutory period
of time to stultify an action otherwise permissible or allowed in law.
Consequently, no inspiration can be drawn by the respondents in this case on
the analogy of the said decision."
43. In our view the principle laid down in this judgment is of no help to the
respondents and if at all it supports the contention of the appellant that the
period of limitation prescribed cannot be curtailed by order of the Court. As a
necessary corollary it cannot be extended contrary to the statutory provisions.
We have, therefore, no doubt in holding that so far as the acquisition of the
lands belonging to Palam Potteries is concerned, the proceedings lapsed for
failure of the Collector to make an award within the prescribed period of
limitation under Section 11A of the Act.
44. Before parting with this matter we may notice the fact that in the award
made by the Collector three khasra numbers belonging to the appellant were not
included. It was, therefore, submitted before us that in any view of the matter
the acquisition proceedings in relation to those 3 khasra numbers must lapse.
This was indeed not contested by the respondents. However, in view of the fact
that we have reached the conclusion that the acquisition proceeding as against
the lands of the appellant lapsed for failure to make an award within the
period prescribed by Section 11A of the Act, this aspect of the matter lose its
significance.
45. In the result Civil Appeals arising out of SLP ) Nos. 6093/2003; 6384/2003
and 8574 of 2003 are dismissed. Civil Appeal arising out of SLP ) No. 6095 of
2003 is allowed and it is declared that the award made by the Collector on
March 1, 2003 was barred by limitation prescribed by Section 11A of the Act and
as such the acquisition proceeding in relation thereto lapsed on February 18,
2003, which was the last date for making the award. Parties shall bear their
own costs.
Judgment Referred.
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