SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Hamida
Vs
Rashid @ Rasheed and Others
(G. P. Mathur and A. K. Mathur, JJ)
Appeal (Crl.) 632 of 2007
27.04.2007
JUDGMENT
G. P. MATHUR, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. This appeal, by special leave, has been filed by the complainant Hamida
widow of Balla against the judgment and order dated 1.7.2005 of Allahabad High
Court, by which the petition under Section 482 Code Of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 filed by the accused respondents herein was
disposed of with certain directions. By the impugned order it was directed that
the accused respondents, who had been initially granted bail in offences under
Sections 324, 352 and 506 Indian Penal Code, 1860 by
the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Muzaffarnagar, would continue to remain on bail
even after the offence had been converted to one under Section 304 Indian Penal Code, 1860, if they furnished the requisite
personal bonds and sureties before the concerned Court.
3. The appellant Hamida lodged an FIR at P.S. Kotwali, Muzaffarnagar at 00.10
hours on 13.6.2005 alleging that when her husband Balla was participating in a
Panchayat of the Biradari (community) the four accused respondents lodged an
attack upon him with licensed and illegal arms, exhorting that they would kill
him. Naushad accused assaulted him with a 'chhuri' (long knife) due to which
Balla received serious injuries. The other accused fired from their respective
weapons and thereafter ran away from the scene of occurrence. On the basis of
the FIR lodged by the appellant, a case was registered as Crime No. 792 of 2005
under Sections 324, 352 and 506 Indian Penal Code, 1860
at P.S. Kotwali, Muzaffarnagar. The injured Balla was rushed to the District
Hospital, where he was medically examined at 11.10 p.m. on 12.6.2005. He had
sustained serious stab wound in his abdomen from which loops of intestines were
coming out.
4. Two accused respondents were arrested by the police and were produced before
the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate on 13.6.2005 for the purpose of seeking
remand. The accused also moved a bail application seeking bail in Case Crime
No.792 of 2005 which had been registered against them. The
complainant-appellant Hamida also put in appearance through a counsel and filed
an affidavit stating that as a serious injury had been caused to the injured
Balla and accused had resorted to firing, the offence committed by them was one
under Section 307 Indian Penal Code, 1860, but the
police in collusion with the accused had registered the case only under
Sections 324, 352 and 506 Indian Penal Code, 1860.
It was also submitted that on account of the serious injuries received by the
injured Balla, he had been referred to the Medical College, Meerut, and the
bail application should be heard after summoning the medical examination
report. The learned CJM, however, observed that remand of the accused had been
sought only in the offences in which the case had been registered against them
and as the offences were bailable, they were entitled to bail. He accordingly
passed an order on the same day i.e. 13.6.2005 granting bail to the accused
Rashid and Arshad. It was, however, made clear in the order that if the case
was converted into a more serious offence, the accused would not get any
benefit of the bail being granted to them. Subsequently, the remaining two
accused were also released on bail. Balla succumbed to his injuries in the
night intervening 16th and 17th of June, 2005. Thereafter, the offence was
converted into one under Section 304 Indian Penal Code,
1860. It was at this stage that the four accused respondents filed a
petition under Section 482 Code Of Criminal Procedure, 1973
before the High Court seeking a direction to the Chief Judicial Magistrate,
Muzaffarnagar, to permit them to remain on same bail even after conversion of
the offence into one under Section 304 Indian Penal Code,
1860. The only submission made before the High Court was that on the
same facts and circumstances, the accused had been granted bail by the learned
Chief Judicial Magistrate and they had not misused the privilege of the bail
and, therefore, they should be allowed to remain on bail even after conversion
of offence. The High Court accepted the prayer made on behalf of the accused
respondents and the relevant part of the order, which is under challenge, is
being reproduced below :- "In view of the facts and circumstances of the
case and the submissions made by the learned counsel for the applicants, it is
directed that if the applicants appear before the court concerned and furnish
their personal bonds and two sureties each in the like amount to the
satisfaction of the court concerned the same shall be accepted under Section
304 I.P.C.
With these observations, the application is disposed of finally."
5. We have heard learned counsel for the parties. The principal submission of
learned counsel for the appellant (complainant) is that the power under Section
482 Code Of Criminal Procedure, 1973 could not have
been exercised by the High Court in granting bail to the accused respondents as
there is a specific provision in the Code of Criminal Procedure viz. Section
439 under which the accused could approach the appropriate Court for grant of
bail to them. It has been further submitted that while exercising power under
Section 482 Code Of Criminal Procedure, 1973 the
High Court has committed grave error in issuing the direction that the bail
granted to the accused for an offence under Sections 324, 352 and 506 Indian Penal Code, 1860 will enure to their benefit even
after conversion of the case which was registered against them into one under
Section 304 Indian Penal Code, 1860. The submission
is that the accused respondents ought to have surrendered and after they had
been taken into custody, they should have applied afresh for bail in the
offence under Section 304 Indian Penal Code, 1860.
6. We are in agreement with the contention advanced on behalf of the
complainant appellant. Section 482 Code Of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 saves the inherent powers of the High Court and its
language is quite explicit when it says that nothing in the Code shall be
deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court to make such
orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under the Code, or to
prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of
justice. A procedural Code, however exhaustive, cannot expressly provide for
all time to come against all the cases or points that may possibly arise, and
in order that justice may not suffer, it is necessary that every court must in
proper cases exercise its inherent power for the ends of justice or for the
purpose of carrying out the other provisions of the Code. It is well
established principle that every Court has inherent power to act ex debito
justitiae to do that real and substantial justice for the administration of
which alone it exists or to prevent abuse of the process of the Court. As held
by the Privy Council in Emperor v. Khwaja Nazir Ahmad  with regard to
Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (Section 482 Code Of Criminal Procedure, 1973 is a verbatim copy of the
said provision) gives no new powers. It only provides that those which the
Court already inherently possesses shall be preserved and is inserted, lest it
should be considered that the only powers possessed by the Court are those
expressly conferred by the Code and that no inherent power had survived the
passing of the Act.
7. It is well established principle that inherent power conferred on the High
Courts under Section 482 Code Of Criminal Procedure, 1973
has to be exercised sparingly with circumspection and in rare cases and that
too to correct patent illegalities or when some miscarriage of justice is done.
The content and scope of power under Section 482 Code Of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 were examined in considerable detail in Madhu
Limaye v. State of Maharashtra  and it was held as
Under:
"The following principles may be stated in relation to the exercise of the
inherent power of the High Court –
(1) That the power is not to be resorted to if there is a specific provision in
the Code for the redress of the grievance of the aggrieved party;
(2) That it should be exercised very sparingly to prevent abuse of process of
any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice;
(3) That it should not be exercised as against the express bar of law engrafted
in any other provision of the Code."
8. In State v. Navjot Sandhu  (para 29), after a review of large number of
earlier decisions, it was held as under :
"29. The inherent power is to be used only in cases where there is an
abuse of the process of the Court or where interference is absolutely necessary
for securing the ends of justice. The inherent power must be exercised very
sparingly as cases which require interference would be few and far between. The
most common case where inherent jurisdiction is generally exercised is where
criminal proceedings are required to be quashed because they are initiated
illegally, vexatiously or without jurisdiction. Most of the cases set out
herein above fall in this category. It must be remembered that the inherent
power is not to be resorted to if there is a specific provision in the Code or
any other enactment for redress of the grievance of the aggrieved party. This
power should not be exercised against an express bar of law engrafted in any
other provision of the Criminal Procedure Code. This power cannot be exercised
as against an express bar in some other enactment."
9. In Arun Shankar Shukla v. State of U.P. Â 2
the High Court had entertained a petition under Section 482 Code Of Criminal Procedure, 1973 after an order of
conviction had been passed by the Sessions Judge and before the sentence had
been awarded and further proceedings in the case had been stayed. In appeal
this Court set aside the order of the High Court after reiterating the
principle that it is well settled that inherent power is not to be invoked in
respect of any matter covered by specific provisions of the Code or if its
exercise would infringe any specific provision of the Code. It was further
observed that the High Court overlooked the procedural law which empowered the
convicted accused to prefer statutory appeal against conviction of the offence
and intervened at an uncalled for stage and soft-pedalled the course of justice
at a very crucial stage of the trial. The order of the High Court was
accordingly set aside on the ground that a petition under Section 482 Code Of Criminal Procedure, 1973 could not have been
entertained as the accused had an alternative remedy of an appeal as provided
in the Code. It is not necessary to burden this judgment with other decisions
of this Court as the consistent view throughout has been that a petition under
Section 482 Code Of Criminal Procedure, 1973 cannot
be entertained if there is any other specific provision in the Code of Criminal
Procedure for redress of the grievance of the aggrieved party.
10. In the case in hand, the accused respondents could apply for bail afresh
after the offence had been converted into one under Section 304 Indian Penal Code, 1860. They deliberately did not do so
and filed a petition under Section 482 Code Of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 in order to circumvent the procedure whereunder they would
have been required to surrender as the bail application could be entertained
and heard only if the accused were in custody. It is important to note that no
order adverse to the accused respondents had been passed by any Court nor there
was any miscarriage of justice or any illegality. In such circumstances, the
High Court committed manifest error of law in entertaining a petition under
Section 482 Code Of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and
issuing a direction to the subordinate court to accept the sureties and bail
bonds for the offence under Section 304 Indian Penal Code,
1860. The effect of the order passed by the High Court is that the
accused after getting bail in an offence under Section 324, 352 and 506 Indian Penal Code, 1860 on the very day on which they were
taken into custody, got an order of bail in their favour even after the injured
had succumbed to his injuries and the case had been converted into one under
Section 304 Indian Penal Code, 1860 without any
Court examining the case on merits, as it stood after conversion of the
offence. The procedure laid down for grant of bail under Section 439 Code Of Criminal Procedure, 1973, though available to the
accused respondents, having not been availed of, the exercise of power by the
High Court under Section 482 Code Of Criminal Procedure,
1973 is clearly illegal and the impugned order passed by it has to be
set aside.
11. Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that charge under Section
302 Indian Penal Code, 1860 has been framed against
the accused respondents by the trial court and some subsequent orders were
passed by the High Court by which the accused were ordered to remain on bail
for the offence under Section 302 read with Section 34 Indian
Penal Code, 1860 on furnishing fresh sureties and bail bounds only on
the ground that they were on bail in the offence under Section 304 Indian Penal Code, 1860. These orders also deserve to be
set aside on the same ground.
12. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The impugned order dated 1.7.2005 passed by the High Court and all other subsequent orders whereby the accused respondents were directed to remain on bail for the offence under Section 302 read with Section 34 Indian Penal Code, 1860 on furnishing fresh sureties and bail bonds are set aside. The accused respondents shall be taken into custody forthwith. It is, however, made clear that it will be open to the accused respondents to apply for bail for the offences for which they are charged before the appropriate Court and in accordance with law.
13. Before parting with the case, we feel constrained to observe that in spite
of repeated pronouncements of this Court that inherent power under Section 482 Code Of Criminal Procedure, 1973 should be exercised
sparingly with circumspection in rare cases and that too when miscarriage of
justice is done, the High Court entertained the petition under Section 482 Code Of Criminal Procedure, 1973, the ultimate result
whereof was that the order of bail granted in favour of the accused for an
offence under Sections 324, 352 and 506 Indian Penal Code,
1860 enured to their benefit even after the offence had been converted
into one under Section 304 Indian Penal Code, 1860
and also subsequently when charge had been framed against them under Section
302 read with Section 34 Indian Penal Code, 1860.
The accused did not remain in custody even for a single day nor did they
approach the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate or Sessions Judge for being
granted bail under Section 304 or 302 Indian Penal Code,
1860, yet they got the privilege of bail under the aforesaid offences by
virtue of the order passed by the High Court. The dockets of the High Courts
are full and there is a long pendency of murder appeals in the High Court from
which this case has arisen. Ends of justice would be better served if valuable
time of the Court is spent in hearing those appeals rather than entertaining
petitions under Section 482 Code Of Criminal Procedure,
1973 at an interlocutory stage which are often filed with some oblique
motive in order to circumvent the prescribed procedure, as is the case here, or
to delay the trial which will enable the accused to win over the witnesses by
money or muscle power or they may become disinterested in giving evidence,
ultimately resulting in miscarriage of justice.