NON-REPORTABLE

 

                         IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                          CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

 

                        CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4370 OF 2015

                 (Arising Out of SLP (C) No. 29960 of 2014)

 

RAJ KUMAR DIXIT                           …APPELLANT

 

                                       Vs.

 

M/S.VIJAY KUMAR GAURI SHANKER,

KANPUR NAGAR                             …RESPONDENT

 

 

 

                               J U D G M E N T

 

 

V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.

 

    Leave granted.

 

 This appeal is directed against  the  impugned  final  judgment  and  order

dated 02.07.2014 passed by the High Court of  Judicature  at  Allahabad,  in

Writ Petition No.19573 of 2010, whereby the High Court quashed the  judgment

and order of the Labour Court, Kanpur, in Adjudication Case  No.66  of  2009

dated 03.07.2009, wherein the Labour Court  directed  the  reinstatement  of

the appellant-workman in his post along with 50% back wages. The High  Court

modified the Award by granting compensation of Rs. 2 lakhs  to  be  paid  to

the appellant-workman in place of the Award passed by the Labour Court.

 

  The factual matrix and the rival legal contentions urged on behalf of  the

parties are briefly stated hereunder with a view to  find  out  whether  the

impugned judgment and order of the High Court warrants interference by  this

Court in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction  and  for  what  relief  the

appellant is entitled to?

 

  M/s.Vijay Kumar Gauri Shanker, the respondent-firm  herein,  was  carrying

on the business of transporting caustic  soda  from  M/s.Modi  Alkalies  and

Chemicals Ltd. in Alwar, Rajasthan. For the said  purpose,  the  respondent-

firm was in possession of seven tankers which  were  used  for  transporting

caustic soda from Alwar to the place of supply.

 

   It is the case of the appellant that he was working as an accounts  clerk

in the respondent-establishment from the year 1994  and  was  looking  after

all the factories of the respondent-establishment. Apart from  that  he  was

in charge of maintenance  of  all  the  seven  tankers  in  the  respondent-

establishment and was also looking after  the  transport  office  and  court

work of the respondent-employer and in return he was being  paid  Rs.1,800/-

per month along with bonus as  was  being  paid  to  other  workmen  of  the

respondent-establishment.

 

  On 11.6.2001, when the  appellant  who  had  fallen  sick  approached  the

respondent-firm for his outstanding salary, the  respondent-firm  terminated

him from his services.  However, the workmen who were  junior  to  him  were

still  working  in  the  respondent-establishment.   The   appellant-workman

requested for reinstatement of his services in his post but the  respondent-

establishment refused the same which action amounts to retrenchment as  they

have done so without following the mandatory conditions  as  provided  under

Section 6N of the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes Act, 1947  (hereinafter,

“the Act”). Aggrieved by the order of termination, the appellant  raised  an

industrial dispute  before  the  Labour  Court,  Kanpur  narrating  all  the

relevant facts and grounds in support of his claim.

 

        The Labour Court on the basis of the pleadings of  the  parties  and

in accordance with the claim and written statements  of  the  appellant  and

the respondent and on re-appreciation of the evidence on record  adjudicated

the existing  industrial  dispute  between  the  parties  and  recorded  its

finding on the points of dispute referred to it in favour of  the  appellant

which are extracted in the narration of the facts and based on the  evidence

and circumstances of the case, it held that  the  appellant  was  under  the

employment of the respondent-firm and terminating him from his  services  by

the respondent-firm is in contravention to the provisions of Section 6N  and

other provisions of the Act which is improper and illegal. The Labour  Court

directed the respondent-firm to reinstate him in the said post and  pay  him

50% back wages from the date of termination till the date of passing of  the

Award.

 

   The correctness of the said  Award  was  challenged  by  the  respondent-

establishment before the High Court by filing writ petition  urging  various

legal grounds. The High Court, based on the findings  and  reasons  recorded

on the points of dispute, held that the  termination  order  passed  against

the appellant-workman is not legal.  The  High  Court  in  exercise  of  its

judicial review power  under  Article  227  of  the  Constitution  of  India

modified the Award passed by the Labour Court, holding that the workman  has

neither stated anything with  regard  to  his  gainful  employment  nor  any

averments were made by him in  this  regard  during  the  aforesaid  period.

Therefore, awarding 50% back wages in favour of the workman  by  the  Labour

Court in its Award is held to be not justified and the High  Court  modified

the Award by awarding Rs.2 lakhs compensation in lieu of reinstatement  with

50% back wages as awarded by the Labour Court.

 

  The appellant-workman aggrieved by the judgment  and  order  of  the  High

Court has filed this appeal by special leave, urging various  legal  grounds

in support of his claim and prayed this Court  to  set  aside  the  impugned

judgment and order of the High Court  and  restore  the  Award  and  further

direct the respondent to reinstate him in his post and  pay  him  full  back

wages from the date of the Award passed by the Labour Court.

 

It has been contended by the learned counsel on  behalf  of  the  appellant-

workman that the services  of  the  workman  have  been  terminated  without

complying with the mandatory provisions  of  Section  6N  of  the  Act.  His

juniors  are  still  continuing  in  the  employment  of   the   respondent-

establishment while  his  services  were  arbitrarily  terminated  which  is

contrary to the law laid down by this  Court  in  a  catena  of  cases.  The

learned  counsel  has  further  contended  that  the   respondent-firm   has

erroneously claimed that the appellant-workman is not  an  employee  of  the

firm as he was carrying out the work  of  advocacy  in  the  courts  on  its

behalf whenever the tankers of the respondent-firm met with an accident.  It

has been further contended by him that the maintenance of  the  tankers  was

done by the appellant-workman  in  the  capacity  of  the  employee  of  the

respondent-firm as the said work could be carried out by an employee of  the

respondent-firm only. It has been further contended by the  learned  counsel

on behalf of the appellant-workman that the High  Court  has  erred  in  its

decision in holding that the  reinstatement  of  the  appellant-workman  was

unjustified since the respondent-firm has  closed  down  its  business.  The

High Court has further erred in its decision  in  holding  that  the  Labour

Court was not justified in passing an Award of reinstatement of the  workman

in his post with 50%  back  wages  as  the  Labour  Court  in  another  case

involving the driver working at the  establishment  of  the  respondent-firm

has not ordered his reinstatement which fact of  the  case  could  not  have

applied to the fact situation of the present  case  as  only  the  transport

business of the respondent-firm has closed down  and  its  other  businesses

are still continuing and the appellant-workman was working in  the  capacity

of an accounts clerk of the respondent-firm which does  not  disqualify  him

from reinstatement in his post.

 

On the other hand, it has been contended by the learned  counsel  on  behalf

of the  respondent-firm  that  the  appellant-workman  has  not  placed  any

evidence on record, either oral or documentary to the effect that he was  an

accounts clerk employed in the respondent-firm  and  as  such  there  is  no

master-servant relationship between him and the respondent-firm. Hence,  the

provisions of Section  6N  of  the  Act  are  not  applicable  to  the  fact

situation of the present case. It has been further  submitted  by  him  that

the management of the respondent-firm gave special power of Attorney to  the

appellant-workman for the purpose of getting the tankers released  from  the

custody of the police or the court and he has worked in that  capacity  only

and nothing more. For the said work the respondent-firm  used  to  give  him

fee for all the necessary expenses that he would incur with  regard  to  the

release of the tankers of  the  respondent-firm  from  the  custody  of  the

police or the court.

 

It has been further contended by the learned counsel that  since  M/s.  Modi

Alkalies and Chemicals Ltd. has been closed down in the year  2000  and  the

work of transporting caustic soda  from  the  said  factory  was  completely

stopped, therefore, the tankers of the respondent-firm  were  sold  off  and

all  the  licenses  of  the  tankers  were  surrendered  to  the  respective

authority. Hence, the Labour Court has erred in  directing  the  respondent-

firm to reinstate the workman with 50% back wages  and  the  same  has  been

rightly quashed by the High Court and modified the Award  by  awarding  Rs.2

lakhs towards compensation in lieu of reinstatement and back  wages  awarded

by the Labour Court.

 

We have heard both the learned counsel on behalf  of  the  parties.  On  the

basis of the aforesaid rival  legal  contentions  urged  on  behalf  of  the

parties and on perusal of the findings recorded by the Labour Court  in  its

Award, we have to answer the points of dispute  on  the  basis  of  evidence

produced on record. We are of the view that the  conclusion  arrived  at  by

the High Court is erroneous in law in holding  that  the  appellant  workman

was not in employment under  the  respondent-firm  and  it  has  erroneously

quashed the Award of reinstatement of the appellant-workman  passed  by  the

Labour Court along with 50%  back  wages.  In  support  of  the  above  said

conclusion arrived at by us, we record our reasons hereunder:-

 

    It is an admitted fact that the respondent-firm used  to  authorise  the

appellant-workman on its behalf to do the work of releasing of  the  tankers

of the respondent-firm from the custody of police or the court whenever  the

tankers met with an accident and a special power of  Attorney  was  executed

by the respondent-firm in this regard  to  the  appellant-workman.  Further,

the respondent-firm also used to give him advance amount  for  the  expenses

that he would incur for carrying out the said  work.  The  appellant-workman

was also given bonus every year and the same has been recorded in the  cash-

book of the respondent-firm. The fact  that  the  respondent-firm  is  still

continuing with its business of trading betel nut and the new plea that  the

transport business of the respondent-firm has been shut down has  also  been

considered by us. The question that arises for  our  consideration  in  this

case, keeping in view the relevant facts, circumstances and the evidence  on

record is that whether the appellant-workman was gainfully employed  in  the

capacity of the clerk in the establishment of the respondent  firm  or  not.

The same is answered by the Labour Court in the positive, on  the  basis  of

the evidence on record in favour of the appellant for the  reason  that  one

would not simply authorize a person who is  not  even  an  employee  of  its

establishment for carrying on with the work of getting the tankers  released

from the custody of the police or the court. Further, the bonus received  by

the workman is only given in the case where he  would  be  employed  in  the

establishment of the respondent-firm. Thus, the contention  of  the  learned

counsel on behalf of the respondent-firm that the appellant-workman  is  not

the  employee  of  the  respondent-firm  and  there  is  no   master-servant

relationship between them, was rightly  rejected  by  the  Labour  Court  by

recording its reasons and holding that the concerned  workman  was  employed

in the establishment of the respondent-firm. Further, the payment of  labour

charges for the repair of the tankers was given to the workman through  bill

or voucher separately,  instead  of  it  being  mentioned  directly  in  the

invoices of the repair of the tankers, which evidence was  produced  by  him

before the Labour Court, the same  is  rightly  accepted  by  it  on  proper

appreciation in exercise of its original jurisdiction.

 

Further, various records such as court orders or the  report  given  at  the

police station were placed on record before the  Labour  Court  which  would

clearly  show  that  the  appellant-workman  worked  in  the   capacity   of

Munim/Clerk/Manager in the establishment of the  respondent-firm.  Even  the

power of Attorney executed by the respondent-firm clearly  states  that  the

appellant-workman was authorised to carry out whatever action  necessary  in

connection with the release of the tankers  of  the  respondent-firm  either

from the police custody or the court. Thus,  it  is  clear  from  the  above

evidence produced on record by the appellant before the  Labour  Court  that

he has worked in the capacity of not only a mechanic  in  the  establishment

of the respondent-firm but also as  an  accounts  clerk.  The  witnesses  on

behalf of the respondent-firm had further deposed before  the  Labour  Court

that the appellant-workman used to carry out the repair work of the  tankers

of the respondent-establishment on a regular basis and  the  said  work  was

done by the appellant-workman only.  Therefore, in the light  of  the  facts

and circumstances of the case and the evidence  admitted  on  record  before

the Labour Court and produced before this Court, it is amply clear that  the

appellant-workman was employed in the establishment of  the  respondent-firm

and he used to  carry  out  the  business  of  the  respondent-firm  in  the

capacity of an employee/clerk  and  not  just  a  third  party  agent  or  a

mechanic. Therefore, the High Court has gravely erred in quashing the  Award

of reinstatement of  the  appellant-workman  with  50%  back  wages  in  the

establishment of the respondent-firm by  awarding  a  compensation  of  Rs.2

Lakhs in lieu of the same which modification of  the  Award  of  the  Labour

Court is not  only  erroneous  but  also  suffers  from  error  in  law  and

therefore, the same is liable to be quashed by this Court.

 

Awarding compensation to an amount of Rs. 2 lakhs  to  the  workman  by  the

High Court in lieu of reinstatement of the appellant-workman along with  50%

back wages is once again contrary to the well settled principles of  law  as

has been laid down by this Court in a catena  of  cases,  particularly,  the

case of  Punjab  Land  Development  and  Reclamation  Corporation.  Ltd.  v.

Presiding Officer, Labour Court,[1]  wherein  the  Constitution  Bench  held

that the order of termination simpliciter has to be held bad in law for non-

compliance of the mandatory requirements provided under the Act and  further

held that the order of termination will be rendered  void-ab-initio  in  law

and therefore, the workman is entitled for all  benefits  for  which  he  is

legally entitled to in law.

 

The High Court has exceeded in its jurisdiction in setting aside  the  Award

passed by the Labour Court  in  awarding  reinstatement  of  the  appellant-

workman in his post along with 50% back wages which is erroneous in  law  as

the High Court has not noticed the fact that the appropriate Government  has

referred the dispute to the Labour Court for its adjudication on the  points

of dispute referred to it. Since, there was non-compliance of the  mandatory

requirements as provided under the provisions of the Act by the  respondent-

firm at the time of passing an order of termination against  the  appellant-

workman, therefore, the same has been held to be bad in law and as  such  it

should have awarded full  back  wages  to  the  workman  from  the  date  of

termination till the date of passing the Award unless  the  employer  proves

that the workman was gainfully employed during the  aforesaid  period  which

fact is neither pleaded nor proved before the Labour Court.

 

Therefore, the impugned judgment of the High Court is  bad  in  law  as  the

normal rule to be  followed  by  the  respondent-firm  with  regard  to  the

termination of the services of the workman has not been done in the  present

case and further, the High Court has once again exceeded in its  supervisory

jurisdiction in exercise of its judicial review power under Article  227  of

the Constitution of India by setting aside the Award of  reinstatement  with

50% back wages passed by the Labour  Court  and  has  instead  awarded  Rs.2

lakhs as compensation to the appellant-workman which is contrary to the  law

laid down by this Court. The High  Court  cannot  exercise  its  supervisory

jurisdiction and act as either original court  or  appellate  court  to  set

aside the finding of fact recorded on the points of dispute referred to  the

Labour Court on proper appreciation of pleadings and evidence on  record  in

favour of the workman as has been done in the instant  case.  The  Award  of

compensation of Rs.2 Lakhs awarded in place of reinstatement with  50%  back

wages as awarded by the Labour Court has been modified  by  the  High  Court

without assigning any cogent and valid reason which is  not  only  erroneous

in law but suffers from error in law as well, as the  same  is  contrary  to

the catena of decisions of this Court. On this ground itself,  the  impugned

judgment of the High Court is liable to be set aside and we  pass  an  order

to restore the Award passed by the Labour Court. Reliance  has  been  placed

in  the  case  of  Syed  Yakoob  v.  K.S.  Radhakrishan[2]  which  has  been

elaborately considered by this Court in  the  case  of  Harjinder  Singh  v.

Punjab State Warehousing Corporation[3], the relevant para  of  which  reads

thus:

 

“12. In Syed Yakoob case, this Court delineated the scope  of  the  writ  of

certiorari in the following words:

 

“7. The question about the limits of the  jurisdiction  of  High  Courts  in

issuing  a  writ  of  certiorari  under  Article  226  has  been  frequently

considered by this Court and the true legal position in that  behalf  is  no

[pic]longer in doubt. A writ of certiorari  can  be  issued  for  correcting

errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals: these  are

cases where orders are  passed  by  inferior  courts  or  tribunals  without

jurisdiction, or is in excess of it, or as a result of failure  to  exercise

jurisdiction.  A  writ  can  similarly  be  issued  where  in  exercise   of

jurisdiction conferred on it,  the  court  or  tribunal  acts  illegally  or

improperly, as for  instance,  it  decides  a  question  without  giving  an

opportunity to be heard to the party affected by the  order,  or  where  the

procedure adopted in dealing with the dispute is opposed  to  principles  of

natural justice. There is, however, no doubt that the jurisdiction to  issue

a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the court  exercising

it  is  not  entitled  to  act  as  an  appellate  court.  This   limitation

necessarily means that findings of fact reached by  the  inferior  court  or

tribunal as result of the appreciation of evidence  cannot  be  reopened  or

questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which  is  apparent  on  the

face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not  an  error  of  fact,

however grave it may appear to be. In regard to a finding of  fact  recorded

by the tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued if it is shown  that  in

recording the said finding, the tribunal had erroneously  refused  to  admit

admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously  admitted  inadmissible

evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. Similarly, if a  finding

of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error  of  law

which can be corrected by  a  writ  of  certiorari.  In  dealing  with  this

category of cases, however, we must always bear in mind that  a  finding  of

fact recorded by the tribunal cannot be  challenged  in  proceedings  for  a

writ of certiorari on the ground that the  relevant  and  material  evidence

adduced before the tribunal was insufficient or inadequate  to  sustain  the

impugned finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence  led  on  a  point

and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are  within  the

exclusive jurisdiction of the  tribunal,  and  the  said  points  cannot  be

agitated  before  a  writ  court.  It  is  within  these  limits  that   the

jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Article 226 to issue a  writ

of certiorari can be legitimately exercised  (vide  Hari  Vishnu  Kamath  v.

Ahmad Ishaque, Nagendra Nath Bora v. Commr. of Hills Division and  Kaushalya

Devi v. Bachittar Singh).

 

8. It is, of course, not easy to  define  or  adequately  describe  what  an

error of law apparent  on  the  face  of  the  record  means.  What  can  be

corrected by a writ has to be an error of law; but it must be such an  error

of law as can be regarded as one which  is  apparent  on  the  face  of  the

record. Where it is manifest or clear that the conclusion  of  law  recorded

by an inferior court or tribunal is based on  an  obvious  misinterpretation

of the relevant statutory provision, or sometimes in  ignorance  of  it,  or

may be, even in disregard of it, or is expressly founded  on  reasons  which

[pic]are wrong in law, the said conclusion can be corrected  by  a  writ  of

certiorari. In all  these  cases,  the  impugned  conclusion  should  be  so

plainly  inconsistent  with  the  relevant  statutory  provision   that   no

difficulty is experienced by the High Court in holding that the  said  error

of law is apparent on the face of the record. It may also be  that  in  some

cases, the impugned error of law may not be obvious or patent  on  the  face

of the record as such and the court may need an  argument  to  discover  the

said error; but there can be no doubt that what can be corrected by  a  writ

of certiorari is an error of law and the said error must, on the  whole,  be

of such a character as would satisfy the test that it is  an  error  of  law

apparent on the face of the record. If a statutory provision  is  reasonably

capable of two constructions and one construction has been  adopted  by  the

inferior court or tribunal, its conclusion may not necessarily or always  be

open to correction by a writ of certiorari. In our opinion,  it  is  neither

possible  nor  desirable  to  attempt  either  to  define  or  to   describe

adequately all cases of errors  which  can  be  appropriately  described  as

errors of law apparent on  the  face  of  the  record.  Whether  or  not  an

impugned error is an error of law and an error of law which is  apparent  on

the face of the record, must always depend upon the facts and  circumstances

of each case and upon the nature and scope of the legal provision  which  is

alleged to have been misconstrued or contravened.””

 

 

 

The findings and reasons recorded by the High  Court  in  its  judgment  and

setting aside the award of the Labour Court is contrary to the  decision  of

this Court. Further, in the case of Deepali Gundu Surwase v.  Kranti  Junior

Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya[4], this Court, after adverting to  the  three  Judge

Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Surendra Kumar Verma v.  Central

Govt. Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court[5], has categorically  held  that

the termination order passed by  the  employer  is  the  subject  matter  of

dispute either before the Tribunal or before the Labour Court and it is  for

the employer to show that the workman was gainfully employed from  the  date

of the termination till the date of passing of the Award so as to  deny  him

back wages and this Court further held that if the termination order is  set

aside, the award of reinstatement is the normal rule  and  awarding  of  the

back wages must follow, the same need not  be  awarded  if  the  workman  is

either gainfully employed during  the  period  of  adjudication  or  if  the

employer is facing any financial crunch. The said decision of this Court  in

the Deepali Gundu Surwase’s case reads thus:

 

“24. Another three-Judge Bench considered the same issue in  Surendra  Kumar

Verma v. Central Govt. Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court and observed:

 

“6. … Plain common sense dictates that the removal of an  order  terminating

the services of workmen must ordinarily lead to  the  reinstatement  of  the

services of the workmen. It is as if the order has never  been,  and  so  it

must ordinarily lead to  back  wages  too.  But  there  may  be  exceptional

circumstances which make it impossible or wholly inequitable  vis-à-vis  the

employer and workmen to direct  reinstatement  with  full  back  wages.  For

instance, the industry  might  have  closed  down  or  might  be  in  severe

financial doldrums; the workmen concerned might [pic]have secured better  or

other employment elsewhere and  so  on.  In  such  situations,  there  is  a

vestige of discretion left in the court to  make  appropriate  consequential

orders. The court may deny the relief of reinstatement  where  reinstatement

is impossible because the industry has closed down. The court may  deny  the

relief of award of full back wages where  that  would  place  an  impossible

burden on the employer. In such and other exceptional cases  the  court  may

mould the  relief,  but,  ordinarily  the  relief  to  be  awarded  must  be

reinstatement with full back wages. That relief must  be  awarded  where  no

special impediment in the way of  awarding  the  relief  is  clearly  shown.

True, occasional hardship may be caused to an employer but we must  remember

that, more often than not, comparatively far greater hardship is certain  to

be caused to the workmen if the relief is denied than  to  the  employer  if

the relief is granted.”

 

 

 

The contention urged on behalf of the  respondent-firm  that  the  Award  of

compensation of Rs.2 Lakhs in lieu of the reinstatement and 50%  back  wages

by the High Court is on account of the alleged  closure  of  the  respondent

establishment is neither supported by any  pleading  nor  any  evidence  has

been adduced before the Labour Court or this Court in  that  regard  by  the

respondent-establishment. If any additional material is produced before  the

High Court, the same would be impermissible in law for the reason  that  the

respondent-employer was  required  to  plead  with  regard  to  the  alleged

closure and substantial evidence must be produced in  support  of  the  same

before the Labour Court at the first instance, and no  such  plea  has  been

taken before the Labour Court by them. In absence of such a plea,  producing

additional documents by the respondent-establishment before the  High  Court

is totally impermissible in  law  for  the  reason  that  the  High  Court’s

jurisdiction is to examine the  correctness  of  the  Award  passed  by  the

Labour Court in exercise of its judicial review power under Article  227  of

the Constitution of India which is very limited. In the present  case,  even

if we consider the facts, there is no additional material evidence  produced

on record before the High Court and it has no jurisdiction  to  receive  the

same and render its findings. Apart from the said  reason  no  other  reason

has been assigned by the High Court in its judgment and order for  modifying

the Award passed by the Labour Court. Therefore, the legal contention  urged

in this regard on behalf of  the  respondent-establishment  is  misconceived

and the same is liable to be rejected.

 

The High Court has erred in its decision,  both  on  facts  and  in  law  in

setting aside the  order  of  reinstatement  with  50%  back  wages  to  the

workman. It is the workman  who  was  aggrieved  with  regard  to  the  non-

awarding of 50% back wages and this  aspect  of  the  matter  has  not  been

considered by the High Court while interfering with the Award of the  Labour

Court and awarding compensation  in  lieu  of  the  reinstatement  and  back

wages. Therefore, the appeal must succeed in this case. The  High  Court  in

awarding compensation to the workman has erroneously held that the order  of

reinstatement passed in favour of the appellant-workman is illegal and  void

ab initio in law without assigning valid and cogent reasons  and  therefore,

the same is liable to be set aside  as  there  has  been  a  miscarriage  of

justice. The grounds urged by the appellant in this case  are  well  founded

and we accordingly pass the following order:

 

 

 

The Appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment and order passed  by  the  High

Court of Judicature at Allahabad in Writ Petition No. 19573  of  2010  dated

02.07.2014 is hereby set aside and the Award passed by the Labour  Court  in

awarding reinstatement with 50% back wages  from  the  date  of  termination

till the date of passing the Award by the Labour Court is restore We further direct the respondent-firm to pay full back wages to the  workma from the date of passing of the Award by the Labour Court till the  date  of his reinstatement in service. The  order  shall  be  complied  with  by  th respondent-firm within six weeks from the date of receipt of  copy  of  this

order.

 

 

 

 

              ……………………………………………………………………………………J.

              [FAKKIR MOHAMED IBRAHIM KALIFULLA]

 

 

 

 

                            ……………………………………………………………………………………J.

 

              [V. GOPALA GOWDA]

 

 

New Delhi,

  May 12, 2015

-----------------------

[1]

 

 

       (1990) 3 SCC  682

[2]    (1964)  AIR SC 477

[3]    (2010) 3  SCC 192

[4]    (2013) 10 SCC 324

[5]    (1980) 4 SCC 443