REPORTABLE

 

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

 

                        CIVIL APPEAL NO.4394 OF 2015

                (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No. 38611 of 2012)

 

Director General of Income Tax

(Investigation) Pune & Ors.                  .  ..   Appellants

 

                                   Versus

 

M/s. Spacewood Furnishers Pvt. Ltd. & Ors.   ...  Respondents

 

 

 

                               J U D G M E N T

 

RANJAN GOGOI, J.

Leave granted.

 

The block assessment of the respondent-assessee  for  the  assessment  years

2004-05 to 2009-10 was sought  to  be  initiated  by  notices  issued  under

Section 153A of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (hereinafter  referred  to  as  the

‘Act’) following a search made under the provisions of  the  Act.  The  same

has been interdicted by the High Court of  Delhi  by  interfering  with  the

warrant of authorization for the search issued under Section 132 of the  Act

and the consequential search made between 19th  June,  2009  to  21st  July,

2009. Aggrieved, the Revenue has filed this appeal by  special  leave  under

Article 136 of the Constitution.

 

We have heard Shri Guru  Krishna  Kumar,  learned  senior  counsel  for  the

appellants and Shri Krishnan Venugopal,  learned  senior  counsel  appearing

for the respondents.

 

The  issues  that  arise  in  the  present  appeal  lie   within   a   short

circumference. As the warrant of authorization under Section 132,  which  is

required to be founded on a reasonable belief  of  the  authorized  official

regarding the existence of the conditions precedent to the exercise  of  the

power to issue the same, has been  interdicted  under  Article  226  of  the

Constitution, the ambit of the power of the High  Court  to  do  so  may  be

noticed at the outset.

 

The “classical” notion of the extent of power  that  the  High  Court  would

have in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction to cause such interference  is

formulated in ITO vs. Seth  Brothers[1]  and  Pooran  Mal  vs.  Director  of

Inspection (Investigation), Income Tax[2].  The  parameters  of  permissible

interference as laid down in the aforesaid  two  decisions  have  stood  the

test of time and continue to hold the field even today. We  may,  therefore,

advert to ITO vs. Seth Brothers (supra) in the first instance.

 

Considering the scope of Section 132 of the Act in  ITO  vs.  Seth  Brothers

(supra), this Court at page 843 held that :-

 

“The section does not  confer  any  arbitrary  authority  upon  the  Revenue

Officers. The Commissioner or the  Director  of  Inspection  must  have,  in

consequence of information, reason to believe that the statutory  conditions

for the exercise of the power to order search exist. He must record  reasons

for the belief and he must issue an authorisation in favour of a  designated

officer to search the premises and exercise the powers set out therein.  The

condition for entry into and making search of any building or place  is  the

reason to believe that any books of account or other  documents  which  will

be useful for, or relevant to, any proceeding under the Act  may  be  found.

If the Officer has reason to believe that any  books  of  account  or  other

documents would be useful for, or relevant to,  any  proceedings  under  the

Act, he is authorised by law to  seize  those  books  of  account  or  other

documents, and to place marks of identification therein,  to  make  extracts

or copies therefrom and also to make a note or an inventory of any  articles

or other things found in the course of the search. Since by the exercise  of

the power a serious invasion is made upon the rights,  privacy  and  freedom

of the tax-payer, the power must be exercised strictly  in  accordance  with

the law and only for the purposes for which the  law  authorizes  it  to  be

exercised. If the action of the officer issuing  the  authorization,  or  of

the designated officer is challenged the officer concerned must satisfy  the

Court about the regularity of his  action.  If  the  action  is  maliciously

taken or power under the section is exercised for a collateral  purpose,  it

is liable to be struck down by the Court. If the conditions for exercise  of

the power are not satisfied the proceeding is  liable  to  be  quashed.  But

where power is exercised bona fide, and  in  furtherance  of  the  statutory

duties of the tax officers  any  error  of  judgment  on  the  part  of  the

Officers will not vitiate the exercise of the power. Where the  Commissioner

entertains the requisite belief and for reasons recorded by  him  authorises

a designated officer to enter and search premises for books of  account  and

documents relevant to or useful for any proceeding under the Act, the  Court

in a petition by an aggrieved person cannot be asked to substitute  its  own

opinion whether an order authorising search should have been issued.  Again,

any irregularity in the course of entry, search  and  seizure  committed  by

the officer acting in pursuance of the authorisation will not be  sufficient

to vitiate the action taken, provided  the  officer  has  in  executing  the

authorisation acted bona fide.

 

The Act and the Rules do not  require  that  the  warrant  of  authorisation

should specify the particulars of documents and books of accounts a  general

[pic]authorisation to search for and seize documents and  books  of  account

relevant to or useful for any proceeding complies with the  requirements  of

the Act and the Rules. It is for the officer making the search  to  exercise

his judgment and seize or not to seize any documents or  books  of  account.

An error committed by the Officer in seizing documents which may  ultimately

be found not to be useful for or relevant to the proceeding  under  the  Act

will not by itself vitiate the search, nor will  it  entitle  the  aggrieved

person to an omnibus order releasing all documents seized.”

 

7.    In Pooran Mal vs. Director of Inspection  (supra)  the  constitutional

validity of Section  132  was  under  challenge.  While  negating  the  said

challenge, this Court at page 515 of its report had held that:

 

 

“Dealing first with the challenge under Article  19(1)(f)  and  (g)  of  the

Constitution it is to be noted that the impugned  provisions  are  evidently

directed against persons who are believed on good grounds to have  illegally

evaded the payment of tax on their income and property.  Therefore,  drastic

measures to get at such income and property  with  a  view  to  recover  the

government dues would  stand  justified  in  themselves.  When  one  has  to

consider the reasonableness of the  restrictions  or  curbs  placed  on  the

freedoms mentioned in Article 19(1)(f) and (g), one cannot  possibly  ignore

how such  evasions  eat  into  the  vitals  of  the  economic  life  of  the

community. It is a well-known fact of our economic life that  huge  sums  of

unaccounted money are in circulation  endangering  its  very  fabric.  In  a

country which has adopted high rates of taxation  a  major  [pic]portion  of

the unaccounted money should normally fill the Government  coffers.  Instead

of doing so it distorts the economy.  Therefore,  in  the  interest  of  the

community  it  is  only  right  that  the  fiscal  authorities  should  have

sufficient powers to prevent tax evasion.”

 

 

 

8.    What is significant and, therefore, must be noticed is  that  in  both

the aforesaid two decisions while this Court has  emphasized  the  necessity

of recording of reasons in support of the ‘reasonable  belief’  contemplated

by Section 132, nowhere, in either  of  the  decisions  any  view  had  been

expressed that the reasons recorded prior to authorizing  the  search  needs

to be disclosed or communicated to the person against whom  the  warrant  of

authorization is issued. The same is the view expressed  by  this  Court  in

Dr. Pratap Singh vs. Director of Enforcement[3]  while  considering  a  pari

material provision in the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act.

 

      “The material on which the officer has reasons  to  believe  that  any

documents will be useful for or relevant to any investigation  need  not  be

disclosed in the search warrant; such material may be secret, may have  been

obtained through intelligence, or even conveyed  orally  by  informants.  In

the said case, the petitioner contended that, if the court is going to  look

into the file produced on behalf of the officer who authorized  the  search,

it must  be  disclosed  to  the  petitioner  so  that  the  petitioner  “can

controvert any false or wholly unreasonable material set out in  the  file”,

but the Supreme Court did not accept  this  submission.  The  Supreme  Court

also referred to an earlier decision in S. Narayanappa v. CIT [1967] 63  ITR

219 (SC), to hold that whether grounds for ordering search  were  sufficient

or not is not a matter for the court to investigate. However, the court  may

examine the question whether the reasons for  the  belief  have  a  rational

connection or a relevant bearing to the formation of the belief and are  not

extraneous or irrelevant for the purpose of the section.”

 

 

 

9.    The principles that can be deduced from  the  aforesaid  decisions  of

this Court which continue to hold the field without  any  departure  may  be

summarized as follows :

 

The authority must have information in its possession on the basis of  which

a reasonable belief can be founded that-

 

the concerned person has omitted or failed to produce books  of  account  or

other documents  for production of which summons  or notice had been  issued

 

 

                                                 OR

 

such person will not produce such books of account or other  documents  even

if summons or notice is issued to him.

 

                                                 OR

 

        (b)   such person is in possession of any money, bullion,  jewellery

or other valuable article which represents either wholly  or  partly  income

or property which has not been or would not be disclosed.

 

 

 

(ii)  Such information must be in  possession  of  the  authorized  official

before the opinion is formed.

 

(iii)       There must be application  of  mind  to  the  material  and  the

formation of opinion must be  honest  and  bonafide.  Consideration  of  any

extraneous or irrelevant material will vitiate the belief/satisfaction.

 

(iv)  Though  Rule  112(2)  of  the  Income  Tax  Rules  which  specifically

prescribed the necessity of recording of reasons before  issuing  a  warrant

of authorization had been  repealed  on  and  from  1st  October,  1975  the

reasons for the belief found should be recorded.

 

(v)   The reasons, however, need not be communicated to the  person  against

whom the warrant is issued at that stage.

 

(vi)  Such reasons, however, may have to be placed before the Court  in  the

event of a challenge to formation of the belief of the  authorized  official

in which event the court (exercising jurisdiction under Article  226)  would

be entitled to examine the relevance of the reasons  for  the  formation  of

the belief though not the sufficiency or adequacy thereof.

 

 

 

10.     Before proceeding further it will  be  necessary  to  take  note  of

certain other facts that may have a bearing to the issues at hand.

 

By Notification No.354 of 2001 dated 3.12.2001 in  exercise  of  the  powers

conferred by Section 120(1) & (2) of the Act, the Central  Board  of  Direct

Taxes had directed the Directors of Income Tax (Investigation) specified  in

Column (2) of the Schedule to the said Notification to  exercise  the  power

vested in them under Section 132 of the Act in relation to  the  territorial

areas specified in Column (3)  of  the  Schedule.  By  virtue  of  the  said

notification  the  Director  of  Income  Tax  (Investigation),  Nagpur  i.e.

Appellant No.2 was authorized to exercise the power  under  Section  132  of

the Act in respect of the territorial areas falling within the  jurisdiction

of the CCIT Nagpur and CCIT Nasik in the State of Maharashtra.

 

 

 

11.   Notice must also be had of certain provisions contained in the  Search

and Seizure Manual published by the Directorate of Income  Tax  with  regard

to  the  preparation  of  satisfaction  note  and  issuing  of  warrant   of

authorization under Section 132 of the  Act.  Para  2.38  of  the  aforesaid

Manual being relevant may be usefully extracted :

 

 

 

 “2.38 The “satisfaction note” should ordinarily be initiated  by  the  ADIT

(Investigation)/DDIT (Investigation).  It  should  be  put  up  to  the  DIT

(Investigation) through  the  Joint/Additional  DIT  (Investigation),  along

with the detailed comments of the latter. The note must be recorded  in  the

secret file, already prepared for this purpose,  containing  material  like,

the secret information collected from various sources, statement(s), if  any

of  the  informant(s),  reference  to  tax  evasion  petition(s),  if   any,

surveillance reports and information relating to assessment(s),  returns  of

income, wealth, etc, where available.”

 

 

 

12.   It will also be required to be  noticed  that  by  Notification  dated

7.3.2001 administrative approval of  the  Director  General  of  Income  Tax

(investigation) was made mandatory before an  authorization  for  search  is

issued. The said requirement appears  to  have  been  brought  in  order  to

obviate a malafide search and to avoid undue harassment of the taxpayers.

 

 

 

13.   In the present case the satisfaction note(s) leading  to  the  issuing

of the warrant of authorization against the respondent-assessee were  placed

before the High Court.  As it would  appear  from  the  impugned  order  the

contents thereof were  exhaustively reproduced by the High Court.  The  said

satisfaction note(s) have also been placed before us. A perusal of the  file

containing the satisfaction note(s) indicate that on 8.6.2009 the  Assistant

Director of Income Tax (Investigation), Nagpur  had  prepared  an  elaborate

note containing several reasons as to why he had  considered  it  reasonable

to believe that if summons or  notice  were  issued  to  the  respondent  to

produce the necessary books of account and documents, the same would not  be

produced. The Assistant Director  also  recorded  detailed  reasons  why  he

entertains reasons to believe that the promoters of the  respondent-assessee

company would be found to be in  possession  of  money,  bullion,  jewellery

etc. which represents partly or wholly income which has not  been  disclosed

for the purposes of the Act

 

 

 

14.   The said note was put  up  for  consideration  before  the  Additional

Director (Investigation) who on perusal of the same once again proceeded  to

record elaborate reasons for his belief that the  conditions  precedent  for

issuing warrant of  authorization  under  Section  132  does  exist  in  the

present case. Accordingly, the file  was  put  up  before  the  Director  of

Income Tax (Investigation), Nagpur for issuing of warrant  of  authorization

for search of the residential as well as business premises of  the  assessee

and its Directors, if the Director of Income Tax (Investigation), Nagpur  is

so satisfied. The aforesaid note of the Additional Director  (Investigation)

is dated 8.6.2009.

 

 

 

15.   The notes of the two officers i.e. Assistant Director  (Investigation)

and Additional Director (Investigation) were perused and considered  by  the

Director (Investigation). The matter  was  also  discussed.  Thereafter  the

Director (Investigation) recorded the relevant facts of the  case  and  came

to the following conclusion:

 

 

 

“On an overall appreciation of the facts of the case  I  am  satisfied  that

M/s. Spacewood Furnishers P Ltd is suppressing its income  substantially.  I

am also satisfied that the company is not likely to produce the  details  of

such unaccounted income and the books of accounts and  documents  containing

details of such unaccounted incomes and assets if notices were to be  issued

to it u/131 or u/s.142(1) of the I T Act. It is also  reliably  learnt  that

the Directors  S/Shri.  Kirit  Joshi  and  Vivek  Deshpande  and  associated

concerns M/S. i3Space Systems (India) P  Ltd.,  Spacewood  Exports  P  ltd.,

Spacewood Hongkong P Ltd., i3space Hongkong Ltd. and Spacewood  Nest  P  Ltd

are also in possession of undisclosed income / assets and  books,  documents

containing  details  of  such  unaccounted  incomes.  It  appears   that   a

substantial portion of such unaccounted money is being held  in  cash  also.

The Directors are maintaining luxurious life styles out of such  unaccounted

income. I am also satisfied that these companies and the directors  are  not

likely to furnish the details of such  unaccounted  incomes  and  assets  if

notices were to be issued to them u/s.131 or 142(1) of the I.T.  Act.  I  am

therefore satisfied that this is a fit case for exercise  of  powers  vested

u/s.132 of the Act to search the persons (M/S. Spacewood Furnishers  P  Ltd,

its associated concerns and Directors  mentioned  above)  and  the  premises

mentioned in the note of the ADIT to seize unaccounted assets and  documents

and evidences relating undisclosed income.”

 

 

 

            The Director of Income Tax  (Investigation),  Nagpur  thereafter

put his signature dated 9.6.2009 on the said note.

 

 

 

16.   There is an endorsement to the following effect at the bottom  of  the

said note again under the signature of the Director (Investigation) –

 

      “DGIT (Inv) Pune may kindly peruse the  above  satisfaction  note  and

grant administrative approval for the search and seizure action.”

 

 

 

17.   On 11.6.2009 the matter was considered  by  the  Director  General  of

Income Tax (Investigation) Pune who recorded the following view :

 

 

 

“I have gone through the notes of ADIT (Inv), Nagpur  and  Addl.DIT  (Inv.),

Nagpur. The satisfaction note of DIT (Inv.) Nagpur has also been perused.  I

find that DIT (Inv.) Nagpur has got adequate information to  arrive  at  his

satisfaction that search and seizure action is required to be undertaken  in

the case of M/s. Spacewood Furnishers P. Ltd. promoted by Shri  Kirit  Joshi

and Vivek Deshpande. Accordingly, the proposal of the DIT (Inv.)  Nagpur  to

take action u/s 132(1) of the Act is approved.”

 

 

 

18.   The High Court by the impugned order dated  9.12.2011  has  taken  the

view that in the present case there are  four  satisfaction  notes  of  four

different authorities. One of the said authority i.e. Assistant Director  is

not the competent authority under Section 132 of  the  Act.  The  Additional

Director and the  Director  who  are  competent  authorities  to  issue  the

warrant of authorization, though had recorded their satisfaction,  have  not

taken the final decision to issue the authorization and each such  authority

had passed on the file to his immediate  superior,  namely,  the  Additional

Director to the Director and the Director to the Director General. The  High

Court further held that it is eventually the Director General who  took  the

decision to issue the search warrant but the said decision was  not  on  the

basis of its own satisfaction but on the basis of the satisfaction  recorded

by the Director of Income Tax (Investigation). Consequently, the High  Court

held that the satisfaction mandated by Section 132 of the Act was  not  that

of the authority who has issued the search warrant,  thereby  vitiating  the

authorization issued.

 

 

 

19.   The High Court further held that each of the  satisfaction  notes  was

in loose sheets of paper and not a part  of  a  single  file  maintained  in

proper sequence and order with due pagination. Therefore, according  to  the

High Court, it  is  possible  that  the  file  containing  the  satisfaction

note(s) was manipulated and thus is of doubtful credibility.

 

 

 

20.   The  High  Court  also  held  that  the  materials  indicated  by  the

department in the counter  affidavit  and  the  additional  affidavit  filed

before it were at variance  with  what  was  revealed  by  the  satisfaction

note(s) placed before the Court. Even if the satisfaction  notes  alone  are

to be gone by, the essential details with regard to source  of  information;

the persons who were interrogated and  with  whom  discreet  enquiries  were

made  are  not  disclosed.  The  necessary  information  revealed  by   such

interrogation and discreet enquiries with regard to over  invoicing,  market

information etc. are  not  indicated.   Materials  like  high  growth,  high

profit margins, doubts about international brand and  details  thereof  etc.

as mentioned in the satisfaction note(s) are admitted and  known  facts  and

therefore  could  not  have  induced  the  requisite   belief.   The   above

constitutes the broad basis on which the High Court  thought  it  proper  to

cause inference with the measures undertaken  by  the  Revenue  against  the

assessee.

 

 

 

21.   Before we advert to the specific reasoning  of  the  High  Court,  one

specific aspect of the opinion expressed by  the  High  Court  needs  to  be

taken note of inasmuch as the precise position in law in this  regard  needs

to  be  clarified.  The  above  aspect  is  highlighted  by  the   following

observations of the High Court expressed in  paragraph  6  of  the  impugned

order:-

 

 

 

“We, however, express that when the satisfaction  recorded  is  justiciable,

the documents pertaining to such satisfaction  may  not  be  immune  and  if

appropriate prayer  is  made,  the  inspection  of  such  documents  may  be

required to be allowed.”

 

 

 

 

 

22.   In the light of the views expressed by this  Court  in  ITO  vs.  Seth

Brothers (supra) and Pooran Mal (supra), the above opinion expressed by  the

High Court is plainly incorrect. The  necessity  of  recording  of  reasons,

despite the amendment of Rule 112 (2) with effect from  1st  October,  1975,

has  been  repeatedly  stressed  upon  by  this  Court  so  as   to   ensure

accountability and  responsibility  in  the  decision  making  process.  The

necessity of recording of reasons also acts as a cushion in the event  of  a

legal challenge being made to the satisfaction reached.   Reasons  enable  a

proper judicial assessment of the decision taken by  the  Revenue.  However,

the above,  by  itself,  would  not  confer  in  the  assessee  a  right  of

inspection of the documents or to a communication of  the  reasons  for  the

belief at the stage of issuing of the authorization. Any such view would  be

counter productive of the entire exercise contemplated  by  Section  132  of

the Act. It  is  only  at  the  stage  of  commencement  of  the  assessment

proceedings after completion of the search and seizure,  if  any,  that  the

requisite material may have to be disclosed to the assessee.

 

23.   At this stage we would like to say that the High Court  had  committed

a serious error  in  reproducing  in  great  details  the  contents  of  the

satisfaction note (s) containing the reasons for  the  satisfaction  arrived

at by the authorities under the Act. We have already indicated the time  and

stage at which the reasons recorded may be required to  be  brought  to  the

notice of the assessee. In the light of the above, we cannot approve of  the

aforesaid part of the exercise undertaken by the High Court  which  we  will

understand to be highly premature; having the  potential  of  conferring  an

undue advantage to the assessee thereby  frustrating  the  endeavor  of  the

revenue, even if the High Court is eventually not to intervene in favour  of

the assessee.

 

 

 

 

 

24.   Having clarified the above issue in the manner indicated, we may  turn

to the reasons assigned by  the  High  Court  for  its  decision.  The  view

expressed by the High Court with regard to  the  satisfaction  note(s);  the

alleged absence of a final decision to issue the authorization at the  level

of  the  Additional  Director  and  the  Director;  the   absence   of   any

satisfaction of the Director General who, according to the High  Court  took

the decision to issue  the  authorization  are  all  seriously  flawed.  The

different steps in the decision making process is lucidly laid down  in  the

instructions contained in the search and seizure  manual  published  by  the

department, relevant part of which  has  been  extracted  above.  The  steps

delineated have been scrupulously followed. Besides we may take note of  the

fact that the Additional Director was not one of the  competent  authorities

under Section 132 on 8.6.2009 (date of his note) inasmuch as it  is  by  the

Finance Act, 2009 effective from  19th  August,  2009  that  the  Additional

Director came to be included amongst the authorized  officials  though  with

retrospective effect from 1.10.1998. The reading of  the  relevant  part  of

the satisfaction note of the Director goes to show  that  on  the  basis  of

materials produced satisfaction was duly recorded by him that  authorization

for search should be issued.  The  file  was  put  up  before  the  Director

General (Investigation) for accord of administrative  approval  as  required

by  Notification  dated  7.3.2001.  In  fact,  the  requirement  to   obtain

administrative approval is prompted by the need  to  provide  an  additional

safeguard to the tax payer. A careful reading of the order of  the  Director

General would go to show that all that he did was      to  record  the  view

that the satisfaction  of  the  Director,  Income  Tax  (Investigation)  was

reasonable and therefore administrative approval  should  be  accorded.  The

view taken by the High Court, therefore, cannot be sustained.

 

 

 

 

 

25.   The possibility of manipulation of the records as found  by  the  High

Court also does not commend  to  us  for  acceptance.  There  is  no  basis,

whatsoever, for coming to any such conclusion. Suspicion  ought  not  to  be

the basis of any judicial order and this is where the High  Court  seems  to

have erred.

 

 

 

 

 

26.    The  remaining  findings  of  the  High  Court  with  regard  to  the

satisfaction recorded by the authorities appear to be in the  nature  of  an

appellate exercise  touching  upon  the  sufficiency  and  adequacy  of  the

reasons and the authenticity and acceptability of the information  on  which

satisfaction had been reached by the authorities. Such an exercise is  alien

to the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.

 

 

 

 

 

27.   In view of the foregoing discussions and for the reasons  alluded  to,

the order of the High Court dated 9.12.2011passed in W.P. No. 2150  of  2010

is set aside. The  proceedings  against  the  respondent-assessee  will  now

commence from the stage at which the same was interdicted by the High  Court

by its impugned order. Consequently, the appeal  filed  by  the  Revenue  is

allowed.

 

                                  ……………………………J.

 

      [Ranjan Gogoi]

 

 

 

 

 

      …………………..…………J.

 

                                                    [Pinaki Chandra Ghose]

 

New Delhi;

 

May 13, 2015.

-----------------------

[1]    1969 (74) ITR 836 (SC)

[2]    (1974) 93 ITR 505 (SC)

[3]    (1985 (155) ITR 166 (SC)