IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4506 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 30969 OF 2011)
|SAVITRI DEVI |.....APPELLANT(S) |
|VERSUS | |
|STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ORS. |.....RESPONDENT(S) |
W I T H
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4830 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 27508 OF 2010)
CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 4508-12 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NOS. 33552-33556 OF 2011)
CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 4513-17 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NOS. 33984-33988 OF 2011)
CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 4518-24 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NOS. 36334-36340 OF 2011)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4819 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 333 OF 2012)
CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 4525-26 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NOS. 1082-1083 OF 2012)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4527 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 1104 OF 2012)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4529-30 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 1664-1665 OF 2012)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4531 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 1739 OF 2012)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4532 OF 2015
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CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4533 OF 2015
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CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4534 OF 2015
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CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4535 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 2557 OF 2012)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4536 OF 2015
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CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4539 OF 2015
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CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4543 OF 2015
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CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4544 OF 2015
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CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4545 OF 2015
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CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4546 OF 2015
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CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4547 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 4223 OF 2012)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4548 OF 2015
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CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4549 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 4249 OF 2012)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4550 OF 2015
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CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4551 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 5566 OF 2012)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4552 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 5712 OF 2012)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4553 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 5959 OF 2012)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4554 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 6013 OF 2012)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4555 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 6027 OF 2012)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4556 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 6121 OF 2012)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4557 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 6196 OF 2012)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4558 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 6345 OF 2012)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4559 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 6353 OF 2012)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4560 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 6363 OF 2012)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4561 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 6368 OF 2012)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4563 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 6369 OF 2012)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4564-67 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 6466-6469 OF 2012)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4568-73 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 6489-6494 OF 2012)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4575-76 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 6534-6535 OF 2012)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4577 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 6539 OF 2012)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4578 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 6629 OF 2012)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4579-80 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 6731-6732 OF 2012)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4581-89 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 6748-6756 OF 2012)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4591 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 7146 OF 2012)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4592 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 7436 OF 2012)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4593 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 7539 OF 2012)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4594 OF 2015
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CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4595 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 7541 OF 2012)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4596 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 7815 OF 2012)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4597-98 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 7934-7935 OF 2012)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4599 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 8380 OF 2012)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4600 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 8439 OF 2012)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4601 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 8528 OF 2012)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4602 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 8593 OF 2012)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4603 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 8849 OF 2012)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4604 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 8851 OF 2012)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4605-07 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 8853-8855 OF 2012)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4608 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 9527 OF 2012)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4609 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 9678 OF 2012)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4610 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 9748 OF 2012)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4611 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 9761 OF 2012)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4612 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 10052 OF 2012)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4613-15 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 10056-10058 OF 2012)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4616 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 10315 OF 2012)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4617 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 10597 OF 2012)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4618 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 11303 OF 2012)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4619 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 11304 OF 2012)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4620 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 11879 OF 2012)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4621 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 11993 OF 2012)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4622 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 12299 OF 2012)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4623 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 12461 OF 2012)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4624 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 12844 OF 2012)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4625-30 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 13641-13646 OF 2012)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4631 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 15173 OF 2012)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4632 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 15905 OF 2012)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4633 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 16007 OF 2012)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4634 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 16336 OF 2012)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4635 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 16337 OF 2012)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4636 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 16380 OF 2012)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4637 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 17041 OF 2012)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4638 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 18104 OF 2012)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4639 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 19356 OF 2012)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4640 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO.15370 OF 2015
@ SLP (C) NO.....CC 20540 OF 2012)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4641 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 23723 OF 2012)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4642-4643 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 23724-23725 OF 2012)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4644 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 24203 OF 2012)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4645 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 24720 OF 2012)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4646-4647 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 25551-25552 OF 2012)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4648-4650 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 26874-26876 OF 2012)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4651 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 27023 OF 2012)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4652 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 27139 OF 2012)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4653-4660 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 27389-27396 OF 2012)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4661-4666 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 27502-27507 OF 2012)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4667 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 28140 OF 2012)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4668 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 29279 OF 2012)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4669 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 33860 OF 2012)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4670 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 37492 OF 2012)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4671 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 37989 of 2012)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4672 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 37993 of 2012)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4673 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 38288 OF 2012)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4674 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 38289 OF 2012)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4675 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 38290 OF 2012)
CONTEMPT PETITION (C) NOS. 237-238 OF 2013
IN
SLP (C) NOS. 1082-1083 OF 2012
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4677 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 8631 OF 2013)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4678 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 8635 OF 2013)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4679 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 8887 OF 2013)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4680 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 9168 OF 2013)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4681 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 9297 OF 2013)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4682 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 12784 OF 2013)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4683 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 13017 OF 2013)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4690-4691 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 16722-16723 OF 2013)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4692 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 17635 OF 2013)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4693 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 18090 OF 2013)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4694 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 18735 OF 2013)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4695 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 18866 OF 2013)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4696-4697 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 19200-19201 OF 2013)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4698 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 19922 OF 2013)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4699 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 20329 OF 2013)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4700 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 23276 OF 2013)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4701-702 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 23855-23856 OF 2013)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4703-4704 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 23857-23858 OF 2013)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4705-4706 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 23859-23860 OF 2013)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4707-4709 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 24622-24624 OF 2013)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4710-4711 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 26176-26177 OF 2013)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4712 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 26178 OF 2013)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4713 OF 2015
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CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4714-4715 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 26681-26682 OF 2013)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4716 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 26868 OF 2013)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4717 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 26890 OF 2013)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4718 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 30601 OF 2013)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4719 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 30859 OF 2013)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4720 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 30860 OF 2013)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4721 OF 2015
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CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4722 OF 2015
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CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4723 OF 2015
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CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4724 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 33980 OF 2013)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4726 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 34176 OF 2013)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4727 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 35109 OF 2013)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4728 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 37793 OF 2013)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4729 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 39351 OF 2013)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4730-4731 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 39697-39698 OF 2013)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4732-4733 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 39699-39700 OF 2013)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4734 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 39701 OF 2013)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4735-4736 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 39702-39703 OF 2013)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4737 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 802 OF 2014)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4738 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 2495 OF 2014)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4739 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 4566 OF 2014)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4740-4741 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 5936-5937 OF 2014)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4742-45 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 6024-6027 OF 2014)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4746 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 6682 OF 2014)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4747 OF 2015
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CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4748 OF 2015
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CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4749 OF 2015
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CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4750 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 10065 OF 2014)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4751-53 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 10147-10149 OF 2014)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4754 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 11737 OF 2014)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4755 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 13401 OF 2014)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4756 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 14786 OF 2014)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4757 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 12443 OF 2014)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4758 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 13034 OF 2014)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4759-60 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 22298-22299 OF 2014)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4761-63 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 22329-22331 OF 2014)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4764-65 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 22384-22385 OF 2014)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4766-4768 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 22716-22718 OF 2014)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4769-4770 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 36155-36156 OF 2014)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4771 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 36436 OF 2014)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4772-74 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 36647-36649 OF 2014)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4775 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 12433 OF 2014)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4776 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 32391 OF 2014)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4777 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 23772 OF 2014)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4778 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 26260 OF 2014)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4779 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 17559 OF 2014)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4780 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 36242 OF 2013)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4781 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 29351 OF 2014)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4782 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 18356 OF 2014)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4783 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 19521 OF 2014)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4784 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 19523 OF 2014)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4785 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 19525 OF 2014)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4786 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 19777 OF 2014)
CONTEMPT PETITION (C) NO. 444 OF 2013
IN
SLP (C) NO. 5566 OF 2012
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4787 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 25279 OF 2013)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4788 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 27102 OF 2014)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4789 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 36391 OF 2014)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4790 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 36390 OF 2014)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4791 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 15397 OF 2015
@ SLP (C) NO...CC 21151 OF 2013)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4792 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 36975 OF 2013)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4793 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 9551 OF 2014)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4794-95 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 10049-10050 OF 2014)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4796 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 10051 OF 2014)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4797 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 12434 OF 2014)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4798-99 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 12435-12436 OF 2014)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4800 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 12437 OF 2014)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4801 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 12438 OF 2014)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4802 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 12439 OF 2014)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4803 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 12441 OF 2014)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4804 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 12442 OF 2014)
CONTEMPT PETITION (C) NO. 21 OF 2015
IN
SLP (C) NO. 27023 OF 2012
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4805 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 28167 OF 2014)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4806 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 2057 OF 2015)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4807 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 17686 OF 2014)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4808 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 37126 OF 2012)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4809 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 15636 OF 2012)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4810-18 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 17088-17096 OF 2012)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4837 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 35143 OF 2013)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4807 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 17686 OF 2014)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4809 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 15635 OF 2012)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4808 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 37126 OF 2012)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4809 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 15636 OF 2012)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4810-18 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NOS. 17088-17096 OF 2012)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2197 OF 2013
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2195 OF 2013
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2198 OF 2013
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2199 OF 2013
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2225 OF 2013
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2226 OF 2013
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2704 OF 2013
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2705 OF 2013
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 3022 OF 2013
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4902 OF 2014
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4928 OF 2014
J U D G M E N T
A.K. SIKRI, J.
These matters were heard in detail for few days and
hearing was concluded on 05.02.2015. Thereupon, we communicated the result
in the open Court by pronouncing that appeals were dismissed and the
reasons shall follow. These are, thus, our reasons for dismissing the
appeals.
Leave is granted in all the special leave petitions.
PROLOGUE :
The subject matter of most of these appeals are the Notifications dated 12-
03-2008 issued by the State of U.P. under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition
Act (“Act” for short) read with Section 17 of the Act as well as
declaration issued under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act (hereinafter
referred to as the 'Act') vide Notification dated 30.06.2008. Land situate
in various villages of Noida and Greater Noida in Tehsil Dadri, District
Gautam Budh Nagar was acquired. Some other Notifications under same
provisions of the Act in respect of lands of these villages was also
acquired by earlier Notifications. The purpose stated in the notifications
was 'Planned Industrial Development'. Urgency provisions under Section
17(1) and 17(4) of the Act were invoked thereby dispensing with the right
of objection otherwise given to the land holders under Section 5A of the
Act. The total land which was acquired by these notification was 589.188
hectares. Some writ petitions were initially filed in the High Court of
Allahabad challenging the said Notifications, with primary contention that
invocation of emergency provision and taking away valuable right of the
land holders under Section 5A of the Act was illegal, mala fide, arbitrary
and colourable exercise of power. Some of the writ petitions came up before
the Division Bench of the said High Court. One was Writ Petition (C) 45777
of 2008 in the case of Harish Chand and Others v. State of U.P. and Others
wherein the High Court upholding the very same Notifications, on arriving
at the conclusion that invocation of Section 17 of the Act was justified,
dismissed that writ petition. It so happened that another Division Bench
of the same High Court decided Writ Petition (C) No. 17068 of 2009; titled
Karan Singh v. State of U.P. and others. The Division Bench rendered its
judgment dated 19-07-2011 in the said case accepting the aforesaid
contention of the writ petitioners and holding that invocation of
provisions of Section 17 of the Act was not justified. Accordingly, the
Division Bench quashed these Notifications.
As a sequel, spate of writ petitions came to be filed challenging the lands
acquired not only by the notification dated 12-03-2008 but even by earlier
notifications as well. When these petitions came up before another
Division Bench it noticed the aforesaid two conflicting views expressed by
two different Division Benches. This led the said Division Bench to refer
the matter to the larger Bench and orders dated 26-07-2011 were passed in
this behalf. This is how the matters were placed before the Full Bench and
by that time as many as 471 writ petitions had accumulated. All these writ
petitions were taken up analogously by the Full Bench and disposed of vide
judgment dated 21.10.2011 with leading case known as Gajraj vs. State of
U.P. (W.P. (C) 37443 of 201!). The Full Bench of the High Court has
accepted the plea of the land holders that invocation of emergency clause
contained in Section 17 of the Act was impermissible and unwarranted. At
the same time, the High Court also noticed that in respect of land of many
villages, possession had already been taken and substantial development
work carried out. Even compensation was paid in such cases, the High
Court, instead of quashing the Notifications in respect of those villages,
chose to adopt the middle path in an endeavour to balance the equities of
both sides. Thus, it enhanced the provisional compensation and also
directed allotment of developed Abadi land to the extent 10% of their
acquired land subject to maximum of 2500 sq. mtrs. However, in respect of
three villages, when it found that no development work had been carried out
at all by the Authorities during the intervening period, the High Court
chose to quash the Notifications including consequential actions and
directed restoration of the land to the respective land owners.
It may also be noticed at this stage that when there was flurry of writ
petitions in the High Court challenging the invocation of Section 17 and
the Division Bench of the High Court in Harkaran Singh (supra) had held
invocation of urgency powers to be bad in law, some land owners whose land
was acquired much earlier by invoking clause (some of the Notifications of
such land date back to 1979 or early 1980s as well) took adventurous step
to file the writ petitions in the year 2011 challenging those
Notifications. All these writ petitions, however, have been dismissed by
the impugned judgment of the High Court on the ground that they are filed
with inordinate delay and laches.
From the aforesaid, it is clear that three sets of directions are issued by
the High Court, namely, (I) dismissing writ petitions filed with
unexplained delays and laches; (ii) quashing the Notification in respect of
three villages where no development work had taken place; and (iii) in
respect of other villages, instead of quashing the action of acquisition of
land in spite of accepting the plea that Section 17 was wrongly invoked, it
has enhanced the compensation as well as extent of entitlement for
allotment of developed Abadi plot.
The State Government/U.P. Development Board as well as many land owners
have challenged the said Full Bench decision of the High Court. Insofar as
special leave petitioners/appeals of the Government and Authority are
concerned, they have already been dismissed. In these batches of matters,
thus, we are concerned with the appeals of the land owners.
Most of these appeals are filed against the Full Bench. However, some of
the appeals arise against the earlier Division Bench judgment dated 25-11-
2008 whereby the High Court had upheld the same Notifications and rejected
the challenge to the acquisition of land. Some appeals are filed by the
NOIDA authority where the Division Bench had quashed the notification.
After narrating these preliminaries of the matters, we advert to the facts
and events of the cases. For the sake of convenience, we will refer to the
facts appearing in the writ petition of Gajraj as that was the lead case
before the High Court as well.
FACTUAL MATRIX
This writ petition was filed by 27 writ petitioners claiming themselves to
be Bhumidaars with transferable right and owners of different plots of land
situate in Village Patwari, Pargana, Tehsil – Dadri, District Gautam Budh
Nagar. The Notification dated 12-03-2008 was issued by the State
Government under Section 4(1) read with Section 17 of the Land Acquisition
Act, 1894 notifying that the land mentioned in the schedule is needed for
the public purpose namely, for the “planned industrial development” in
Gautam Buddha Nagar. Inquiry under Section 5A having been dispensed with
vide Notification dated 12-03-2008, State Government proceeded to issue
declaration under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act dated 30-06-2008.
The petitioners had pleaded in the writ petition that dispensation of the
inquiry under Section 5A can only be an exception where the urgency cannot
brook the delay. The respondents, without application of mind, dispensed
with the inquiry. The acquisition proceedings were deprecated as void,
unconstitutional, tainted with malafide, abuse of authority/power and non
application of mind. It was pleaded that the procedure under Section 5A is
mandatory which embodies a just and wholesome principle that a person whose
property is being acquired or intended to be acquired should have occasion
to persuade the authorities that his property be not touched for
acquisition. It was also argued that land use of village Patwari was
changed in the Master Plan 2021 after the issuance of notifications under
sections 4 and 6, which is colourable exercise of powers and entire
exercise is arbitrary, illegal and infringes rights of the petitioners
guaranteed under Articles 14, 19 and 300A of the Constitution of India.
These petitioners also stated in the writ petition that though there was
some delay in filing the writ petition if counted from the date of
notification but the writ petition was filed only when it came to their
knowledge that the land use of village Patwari was changed in the Master
Plan 2021 after the notifications under Sections 4 and 6 and land was
sought to be allotted to the private builders, thereby giving go by to the
objective for which the land was acquired. The petitioners further claimed
that the part of the property of the petitioners is situate in village
Abadi. It was pleaded that the authority had executed a lease deed dated
31-03-2010 in favour of respondent no. 4 M/s. Supertech Ltd, a company
engaged in the construction, allotting 2,40,00 square meters land for
constructing multi-storied complexes. It was also stated that although
land was acquired for industrial development but the same had now been
allotted to the builders by the Authority which clearly indicates that
neither there was any appropriate plan and scheme for industrial
development nor there was any urgency in the matter and the whole
proceeding amounted to colourable exercise of power.
The State Government as well as Authority contested the matter by putting
its justification to the invocation of Section 17 of the Act. It was
pleaded that land was acquired for the purpose of industrial development.
It was also stated that the Authority had been constituted vide
Notification dated 28-01-1998 issued under the U.P. Industrial Area
Development Act, 1976 (hereafter referred to as the '1976 Act') and the
land was to be developed in accordance with the aims and objectives
contained in the said Act included development of the land for residential
and other purposes as well and was not confined to industrial development
alone. Objection was raised to the maintainability of the writ petitions
by contending that except few petitioners, all other had received
compensation on various dates and, therefore, they were estopped from
challenging the acquisition, once the possession of the land was taken,
award was passed and compensation received. The Authorities also stated
that land owner of about 83% of the land area had already been paid the
compensation. In terms of numbers, out of 1605 persons, 1403 persons had
accepted the compensation. Development works had been carried out in the
area in question which had already been demarcated into various sectors.
The nature of development carried out was stated in detail in the
affidavit. Invocation of urgency clause was also sought to be justified.
M/s. Supertech Limited, to whom certain area was allotted for development
of the housing colony was also impleaded as the respondent. On its
impleadment, this respondent also filed its counter affidavit stating the
circumstances under which it was allotted the land for development of
residential units. It also contended that the substantial work had already
been undertaken by the said Company. So much so, out of 6000 residential
units which were proposed to be constructed, 4471 units had already been
booked by the members of public and paid part considerations. It was
pleaded that in this manner third party interest had also been created. It
would be relevant to point out here that apart from M/s. Supertech Limited,
there were at least 10 more such developers who had been allotted the
various chunks of acquired land for similar housing projects etc.
JUDGMENT OF THE HIGH COURT
After noticing the aforesaid facts and the contentions and having regard to
the plethora of writ petitions which were filed pertaining to different
villages, the High Court deemed it appropriate to categorize these writ
petitions in different groups, village wise. 65 village wise categories
were, accordingly, carved out. Out of these group 1-41 pertained to
different villages of Greater NOIDA whereas villages in group 42-65 fell in
NOIDA. Village Patwari was taken up as group 1. The High Court, thereafter,
discussed the factual position in respect of each group which need not be
mentioned, as unnecessary for our purposes. However, wherever this exercise
is deemed proper, we would be referring to such factual details at the
relevant steps.
Keeping in view the various submissions made by the writ petitioners in
their petitions, the High Court framed as many as 17 issues or the points
of consideration which had fallen for its discussion and decision. It
would be apposite to take note of those issues at this juncture:
“(i) Object and Purpose of the 1976 Act: Whether the development of
industries is the dominant purpose and object of U.P. Industrial Area
Development Act, 1976.
(ii) Whether Acquisition Compulsory: Whether for carrying out the
development of industrial area under 1976 Act, it is compulsory and
necessary to acquire the land by the Authority?
(iii) Delay and Laches : Whether the delay and laches in the facts of the
present case can bar the invocation or Constitutional remedy under Article
226 of the Constitution of India.
(iv) National Capital Regional Planning Board Act, 1985, its Consequences:
Whether the Authority can carry out development, utilise the land acquired
as per its Master Plan 2021 without its approval/clearance by National
Capital Regional Planning Board, and what is effect on its function of land
acquisition after enforcement of 1985 Act?
(v) Invocation of Sections 17(1) and 17(4): Whether invocation of
Sections 17(1) and 17(4) of the Land Acquisition Act and dispensation of
inquiry under section 5A was in accordance with law in the cases which are
under consideration?
(vi) Pre-notification and Post-notification delay: Whether delay caused
before issuance of notification under Section 4 and delay caused subsequent
to notification under Section 4 can be relied for determining as to whether
urgency was such that invocation of Section 17(1) and 17(4) was necessary?
(vii) Colourable Exercise of Power: Whether acquisition of land are
vitiated due to mala fide and colourable exercise of powers?
(viii) Taking of possession: Whether the possession of the land
acquired was taken under Section 17(1) of the Land Acquisition Act in
accordance with law?
(ix) Vesting: Whether after taking possession under Section 17(A) of the
Act the challenge to the notifications under Section 4 read with 17(1) and
17(4) and Section 6 cannot be entertained due to the reason that land which
has already been vested in the State cannot be divested?
(x) Section 11A; Whether acquisition under challenge has lap0sed under
Section 11A of the Act due to non-declaration of the award within two years
from the date of publication of the declaration made under section 6?
(xi) Section 17(3A): Whether non payment of 80% of the compensation as
required by Section 17(3A) of the Land Acquisition Act is fatal to the
acquisition o proceedings?
(xii) Waiver: Whether the petitioners who have accepted compensation by
agreement have waived their right to challenge the acquisition proceedings?
(xiii) Acquiescence: Whether the petitioners due to having accepted
the compensation by agreement have acquiesced to the proceedings of land
acquisition and they are estopped from challenging the acquisition
proceedings at this stage?
(xiv) Third Party Rights, Development and Construction: Whether due to
creation of third party rights, development carried out by the Authority
and developments and co0nstructions made by the allottees on the acquired
land subsequent to the acquisition, the petitioners are not entitled for
the relief of quashing the notifications under Section 4 read with Section
17(1) and 17(4) and Section 6 of the Act?
(xv) Effect of Upholding of some of the notifications in some writ
petitions earlier decided: What are the consequences and effect of earlier
Division Bench judgment upholding several notifications which are subject
matter of challenge in some of these writ petitions?
(xvi) Conflicts in views of Division Benches: Which of the Division Bench
decisions i.e. Harkaran Singh's case holding that invocation of Section
17(1) and 17(4) was invalid or earlier Division Bench judgment in Harish
Chand's case holding that invocation of Section 17(1) and 17(4) was in
accordance with law, has to be approved?
(xvii) Relief: To what relief, if any, the petitioners are entitled in
these writ petition?”
We are purposely eschewing the detailed discussion by the High Court on all
the aforesaid issues. Suffice it to state here that after noticing the
object and purpose of 1976 Act and discussing its provisions contained in
this Act with reference to case law explaining the legal position of such
statutory authorities entrusted with the task of development works, the
High Court concluded that the stand of the Authority that unless the land
is acquired by it. It cannot carry out any development works until the 1976
Act was misconceived and incorrect. The High Court remarked that the
Authority was labouring under the aforesaid misconception and, therefore,
concentrated only on acquisition of the land without taking care of other
modes and means of industrial development and excessive acquisition of
fertile agriculture land was due to the above mindset of the Authority.
Insofar as issues pertaining to compulsive acquisition and invocation of
Section 17(1) and 17(4) are concerned, the High Court has arrived at a
finding that such invocation of emergency/urgency clauses, thereby
depriving the land owners of their most invaluable right to file objections
under Section 5A of the Act, was illegal and unwarranted. As this issue is
decided in favour of the land owners and against this finding appeals
preferred by the State as well as the Authority have already been
dismissed, it is not necessary to explain the raison d'etre behind these
findings. We would be proceeding on the basis that invocation of Section
17(1) and Section 17(4) was wrong. Similarly, the findings of the High
Court that exercise of power by the State was colourable and arbitrary need
not be restated in detail, the same reason.
As far as the issue no. 4 pertaining the NCR planning Board Act is
concerned, the High Court has held that land could not be acquired without
the permission of the Board. Opinion of the High Court on this aspect was
questioned by the State of U.P. as well as Authority in its appeals.
However, it was found that as a matter of fact, insofar as these cases are
concerned consent of the Board had been obtained. Having regard to this
position, while dismissing the appeals of the State/Authority, we have left
the said question of law open, namely, whether permission of the deemed
under the Act of 1985 is a pre-condition before acquisition of the land.
Therefore, that aspect also needs no elaboration at our end in these
appeals.
It becomes clear from the above that the High Court arrived at a conclusion
that since invocation of Section 17(1) and 17(4) was uncalled for and
unwarranted, the acquisition of the land of the appellants herein was
illegal. Notwithstanding, the same, the High Court did not grant the
relief of setting aside the entire acquisition and restoring the land to
the appellants. After the aforesaid findings, the High Court observed that
insofar as grant of particular relief to the land owners in land
acquisition proceedings is concerned, it depends on several important
factors. Thus, the issue of 'reliefs' has been discussed specifically and
independently under the aforesaid caption. Here, the High Court has
observed that the creation of third party rights, development undertaken
over the land in dispute as well as the steps taken by the land owners
after declaration made under Section 6 of the Act would be the relevant
consideration in determining the kind of relief that is to be granted to
the land owners. Discussing the aforesaid aspects in the contexts of these
proceedings, the High Court pointed out that in majority of cases third
party rights had been created after issue of declaration under Section 6
and after taking possession of the land, substantial developments including
constructions had been undertaken. Thus, in those cases where substantial
development had taken place and/or third party rights had been created, the
High Court deemed it proper not to interfere with the acquisition. At the
same time in order to balance the equities, it felt that grant of higher
compensation and better share in the developed land to these land owners
would meet the ends of justice. The exact relief given in this behalf
shall be stated at the appropriate stage.
The High Court also found that in three villages no such third party rights
had been created and no developments had taken place. So far as these
villages are concerned, the High Court deemed it apposite to release the
land in favour of the land owners of those villages.
The High Court also found that many writ petitions were filed challenging
the acquisitions in respect of which notifications were issued much
earlier, were totally stale and suffered from laches and delays. In the
opinion of the High Court, all those writ petitions which pertained to
notifications issued prior to the year 2000 and the writ petitions were
filed in the year 2011, these writ petitions deserved to be dismissed on
the ground of inordinate delay and laches.
In nutshell, relief was categorised in three compartments. In the first
instance, those writ petitions which were filed belatedly were dismissed.
In the second category, three villages, namely, Devala (Group 40), village
Yusufpur Chak Sahberi (Group 38) and Village Asdullapur (Group 42) the
acquisition was set aside. Land acquisition in respect of remaining 61
villages is concerned, the acquisition was allowed to remain but the
additional compensation was increased to 64.7% with further entitlement for
allotment of development abadi plot to the extent of 10% of the acquired
land of those land owners subject to maximum of 2500 sq. mtrs.
We now reproduce the exact nature of direction given by the High Court,
which reads as follows:
“In view of the foregoing conclusions we order as follows:
1. The Writ Petition No. 45933 of 2011, Writ Petition No. 47545 of 2011
relating to village Nithari, Writ Petition No. 47522 of 2011 relating to
village Sadarpur, Writ Petition No. 45196 of 2011, Writ Petition No. 45208
of 2011, Writ Petition No. 45211 of 2011, Writ Petition No. 45213 of 2011,
Writ Petition No. 45216 of 2011, Writ Petition No. 45223 of 2011, Writ
Petition No. 45224 of 2011, Writ Petition No. 45226 of 2011, Writ Petition
No. 45229 of 2011, Writ Petition No. 45230 of 2011, Writ Petition No. 45235
of 2011, Writ Petition No. 45238 of 2011, Writ Petition No. 45283 of 2011
relating to village Khoda, Writ Petition No. 46764 of 2011, Writ Petition
No. 46785 of 2011 relating to village Sultanpur, Writ Petition No. 46407 of
2011 relating to village Chaura Sadatpur and Writ Petition No. 46470 of
2011 relating to village Alaverdipur which have been filed with inordinate
delay and laches are dismissed.
2(i). The writ petitions of Group 40 (Village Devla) being Writ Petition
No. 31126 of 2011, Writ Petition No. 59131 of 2009, Writ Petition No. 22800
of 2010, Writ Petition No. 37118 of 2011, Writ Petition No. 42812 of 2009,
Writ Petition No. 50417 of 2009, Writ Petition No. 54424 of 2009, Writ
Petition No. 54652 of 2009, Writ Petition No. 55650 of 2009, Writ Petition
No. 57032 of 2009, Writ Petition No. 58318 of 2009, Writ Petition No. 22798
of 2010, Writ Petition No. 37784 of 2010, Writ Petition No. 37787 of 2010,
Writ Petition No. 31124 of 2011, Writ Petition No. 31125 of 2011, Writ
Petition No. 32234 of 2011, Writ Petition No. 32987 of 2011, Writ Petition
No. 35648 of 2011, Writ Petition No. 38059 of 2011, Writ Petition No. 41339
of 2011, Writ Petition No. 47427 of 2011 and Writ Petition No. 47412 of
2011 are allowed and the notifications dated 26.5.2009 and 22.6.2009 and
all consequential actions are quashed. The petitioners shall be entitled
for restoration of their land subject to deposit of compensation which they
had received under agreement/award before the authority/Collector.
2(ii) Writ petition No. 17725 of 2010 Omveer and others Vs. State of U.P.
(Group 38) relating to village Yusufpur Chak Sahberi is allowed.
Notifications dated 10.4.2006 and 6.9.2007 and all consequential actions
are quashed. The petitioners shall be entitled for restoration of their
land subject to return of compensation received by them under
agreement/award to the Collector.
2(iii) Writ Petition No. 47486 of 2011 (Rajee and others Vs. State of
U.P. and others) of Group-42 relating to village Asdullapur is allowed.
The notification dated 27.1.2010 and 4.2.2010 as well as all subsequent
proceedings are quashed. The petitioners shall be entitled to restoration
of their land.
3. All other writ petitions except as mentioned above at (1) and (2) are
disposed of with following directions:
(a) The petitioners shall be entitled for payment of additional
compensation to the extent of same ratio (i.e. 64.70%) as paid for village
Patwari in addition to the compensation received by them under 1997
Rules/award which payment shall be ensured by the Authority at an early
date. It may be open for Authority to take a decision as to what
proportion of additional compensation be asked to be paid by allottees.
Those petitioners who have not yet been paid compensation may be paid the
compensation as well as additional compensation as ordered above. The
payment of additional compensation shall be without any prejudice to rights
of land owners under section 18 of the Act, if any.
(b) All the petitioners shall be entitled for allotment of developed Abadi
plot to the extent of 10% of their acquired land subject to maximum of 2500
square meters. We however, leave it open to the Authority in cases where
allotment of abadi plot to the extent of 6% or 8% have already been made
either to make allotment of the balance of the area or may compensate the
land owners by payment of the amount equivalent to balance area as per
average rate of allotment made of developed residential plots.
4. The Authority may also take a decision as to whether benefit of
additional compensation and allotment of abadi plot to the extent of 10% be
also given to;
(a) those land holders whose earlier writ petition challenging the
notifications have been dismissed upholding the notifications; and
(b) those land holders who have not come to the Court, relating to the
notifications which are subject matter of challenge in writ petitions
mentioned at direction No.3.
5. The Greater NOIDA and its allotees are directed not to carry on
development and not to implement the Master Plan 2021 till the observations
and directions of the National Capital Regional Planning Board are
incorporated in Master Plan 2021 to the satisfaction of the National
Capital Regional Planning Board. We make it clear that this direction
shall not be applicable in those cases where the development is being
carried on in accordance with the earlier Master Plan of Greater NOIDA duly
approved by the National Capital Regional Planning Board.
6. We direct the Chief Secretary of the State to appoint officers not
below the level of Principal Secretary (except the officers of Industrial
Development Department who have dealt with the relevant files) to conduct a
thorough inquiry regarding the acts of Greater Noida (a) in proceeding to
implement Master Plan 2021 without approval of N.C.R.P. Board, (b)
decisions taken to change the land use, (c) allotment made to the builders
and (d) indiscriminate proposals for acquisition of land, and thereafter
the State Government shall taken appropriate action in the matter.”
We may point out at this stage that in respect of all these three
categories, the High Court has provided its justification for granting
relief in the aforesaid nature. We shall be referring to the same while
discussing the cases of appellants belonging to one or the other category.
In nutshell, it may be pointed out that 65 villages which were the subject
matter of bunch of writ petitions before the Full Bench of the High Court
were grouped in 65 groups, village-wise and facts of acquisition,
possession, if any, payment of compensation, developments, the nature of
utilisation of those lands, and/or creation of third party rights were
taken note of. Out of these 65 villages, 41 villages fall in Greater NOIDA
and 24 in NOIDA. The High Court discussed the issue of laches and delays
under Issue No. 3, as mentioned above, after referring to various judgments
of this Court and culling out the principles contained therein on that
basis. The High Court accepted the plea of inordinate delay insofar as
acquisition of land in respect of village Nithari, Village Chauyra
Sadedpur, Village Khoda, Village Sultanpur are concerned. These writ
petitions are dismissed on the ground of delay. In respect of other
villages, the Court repelled the contention of delay raised by the
department, accepting the explanation given by land owners of those
villages that they did not oppose the acquisition earlier at the time of
issuance of notification as the land was taken for industrial development.
However, it is only when these land owners had come to know that instead of
developing the land for the purpose for which it was acquired, the
acquiring authority had transferred the land to the private persons and
builders, that these land owners felt aggrieved and cheated and, therefore,
there was sufficient explanation for coming to the Court at a time when
these land owners discovered that the acquired land had been transferred to
private persons. The Court, therefore, held that such writ petitions were
to be entertained on merits, ignoring the delay.
Some of the appeals are filed by the land owners in respect of aforesaid
villages where their petitions are dismissed on the ground of delay and
laches. We are of the opinion that their writ petitions were rightly
rejected by the High Court applying the principle of delays and laches. We
are, thus, dismissing these appeals, upholding the order of the High Court.
The Arguments: Appellants
Though many counsel appeared on behalf of appellants and argued the
appeals, Mr. Amarendra Sharan, Mr. Rajiv Shankar Dwivedi, Mr. Jitendra
Mohan Sharma, Mr. Mahabir Singh, Mr. Rakesh Dwivedi, Mr. Vijay Hansaria,
Mr. S.C. Maheshwari, Senior Advocates and Dr. Suraj Singh, Advocate were
the main architects who built the edifice of the appellants' appeals.
Among themselves, they covered almost all the aspects which arise in these
appeals. Other counsel either adopted those submissions or some of them
pointed out some distinctive and peculiar facts of their cases. It is not
necessary to reproduce the submission of each of the aforesaid senior
counsel separately as we think that better course of action would be to
spell out these submissions in consolidated form to avoid any repetition.
The arguments which were advanced by these counsel, in support of their
appeals, are recapitulated hereunder:
(I) In the first instance, the illegalities committed in issuing the
notifications for acquisition of land were pointed out which were even
accepted by the High Court in the impugned judgment, in the following
manner:
(a) No permission of NCR Board was taken before issuing the
notifications.
(b) There was violation of Section 5-A of the Act which goes to the root
of the matter, coupled with the finding that it amounted to colourable
exercise of power.
(c) There was violation of mandatory provision contained in Section 11-A
of the Act as well.
(d) Though, Section 17 (1) and Section 17 (4) of the Act were invoked,
80% of the compensation, which is mandatory requirement, was not paid to
the appellants.
(e) After acquiring the land purportedly for the purpose of industrial
development, it was sold to private developers/real estate agencies for
residential purposes, that too at a much higher rate.
As per the appellants, it would amply demonstrate that the
Government acted more like a property dealer with intention to make money
at the cost of the land owners/agriculturists.
(II) It was further argued that even when status quo orders were passed in
many writ petitions, the Government had violated those orders and in this
manner, third party rights were created, thereby committing contempt of
court. When the third party interest were created in the aforesaid manner,
the High Court should not have influenced itself by the said consideration
in denying the relief to the appellants after holding that acquisition was
illegal.
(III) It was also argued that in a case like this, doctrine of severance
should have been applied by excluding only those portions of land in
respect of which third party rights were created or development had taken
place inasmuch as large chunk of land in these villages have still not been
utilised for any purpose as these are thickly inhabited. By applying the
doctrine of severance, Abadi land should have been included for the purpose
of giving relief, when the acquisition was admittedly bound to be illegal.
It was only, in this manner, equities could be balanced.
(IV) It was sought to be argued that in respect of three villages where
acquisition is set aside on the ground that no development has taken place
and third party rights are not created, this very principle should have
been applied in respect of lands of those appellants in other villages
where no third party rights were created or there was Abadi or where no
possession was taken by the authorities and no compensation taken by the
land owners and the land owners who belong to lower strata of society.
In nutshell, the submission is that such cases are exactly
at par with the cases of 3 villages falling in para 2 of the direction,
where the land acquisition has been quashed even when the compensation was
taken and same treatment be accorded to at least those appellants who fall
in this category.
(V) It was also argued that after holding the acquisition illegal, the
Court had three alternatives namely:
(a) payment of 67.4% compensation plus restoring 10% of the developed
land to the land owners, which is followed by the High Court.
(b) directing restoration of possession in all these cases with liberty
to the Government to negotiate with the land owners.
(c) permitting fresh acquisition.
Submission was that first alternative was not the best
alternative adopted by the High Court and in the interest of justice, the
second or third alternative should have been resorted to, more so, when it
was found to be case of malice in law which can clearly be inferred from
the findings arrived at by the High Court, on the basis of material
established on record.
In support of these submissions, learned counsel for the appellants
referred to the following judgments:
(i) Anand Singh & Anr. v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors.[1]
“50. Use of the power by the government under Section 17 for
'planned development of the city' or `the development of residential area'
or for `housing' must not be as a rule but by way of an exception. Such
exceptional situation may be for the public purpose viz., rehabilitation of
natural calamity affected persons; rehabilitation of persons uprooted due
to commissioning of dam or housing for lower strata of the society
urgently; rehabilitation of persons affected by time bound projects, etc.
The list is only illustrative and not exhaustive. In any case, sans real
urgency and need for immediate possession of the land for carrying out the
stated purpose, heavy onus lies on the government to justify exercise of
such power.
xxx xxx xxx
55. In the facts and circumstances of the present case, therefore, the
Government has completely failed to justify the dispensation of an enquiry
under Section 5A by invoking Section 17(4). For this reason, the impugned
notifications to the extent they state that Section 5A shall not apply
suffer from legal infirmity. The question, then, arises whether at this
distance of time, the acquisition proceedings must be declared invalid and
illegal.
56. In the written submissions of the GDA, it is stated that subsequent to
the declaration made under Section 6 of the Act in the month of December,
2004, award has been made and out of the 400 land owners more than 370 have
already received compensation. It is also stated that out of the total cost
of Rs. 8,85,14,000/- for development of the acquired land, an amount of Rs.
5,28,00,000/- has already been spent by the GDA and more than 60% of work
has been completed. It, thus, seems that barring the appellants and few
others all other tenure holders/land owners have accepted the `takings' of
their land. It is too late in the day to undo what has already been done.
We are of the opinion, therefore, that in the peculiar facts and
circumstances of the case, the appellants are not entitled to any relief
although dispensation of enquiry under Section 5A was not justified.
57. On behalf of the appellants, it was vehemently argued that the
government may be directed to release their land from proposed acquisition.
It was submitted by the appellants that houses/structures and buildings
(including educational building) are existing on the subject land and as
per the policy framed by the State Government, the land deserves to be
exempted from acquisition. The submission of the appellants has been
countered by the respondents and in the written submissions filed by the
GDA, it is stated that the houses/structures and buildings which are
claimed to exist, have been raised by the appellants subsequent to the
notification under Section 4(1) of the Act and, therefore, they are not
entitled to release of their land from acquisition.
58. In our view, since the existence of houses/structures and buildings as
on November 22, 2003/February 20, 2004 over the appellants' land has been
seriously disputed, it may not be appropriate to issue any direction to the
State Government, as prayed for by the appellants, for release of their
land from acquisition. However, as the possession has not been taken, the
interest of justice would be subserved if the appellants are given liberty
to make representation to the State authorities under Section 48(1) of the
Act for release of their land. We, accordingly, grant liberty to the
appellants to make appropriate representation to the State Government and
observe that if such representation is made by the appellants within two
months from today, the State Government shall consider such representation
in accordance with law and in conformity with the State policy for release
of land under Section 48(1) without any discrimination within three months
from receipt of such representation.”
In support of the arguments that the equities were to be balanced on the
facts of the case which according to the appellant were in their favour,
following judgments were referred:
(ii) H.M.T. Housing Building Co-operative Society v. Syed Khader & Ors.[2]
“22. In the present case there has been contravention of Section 3(f)(vi)
of the Act inasmuch as there was no prior approval of the State Government
as required by the said section before steps for acquisition of the lands
were taken. The report of Shri G.K.V. Rao points out as to how the
appellant-Society admitted large number of persons as members who cannot be
held to be genuine members, the sole object being to transfer the lands
acquired for “public purpose”, to outsiders as part of commercial venture,
undertaken by the office- bearer of the appellant-Society. We are in
agreement with the finding of the High Court that the statutory
notifications issued under Sections 4(1) and 6(1) of the Act have been
issued due to the role played by M/s S.R. Constructions, Respondent 11. On
the materials on record, the High Court was justified in coming to the
conclusion that the proceedings for acquisition of the lands had not been
initiated because the State Government was satisfied about the existence of
the public purpose but at the instance of agent who had collected more than
a crore of rupees for getting the lands acquired by the State Government.
23. The appeals are accordingly dismissed. But in the circumstances of
the case there shall be no orders as to costs.
24. We direct that as a result of quashing of the land acquisition
proceedings including the notifications as aforesaid, the possession of the
lands shall be restored to the respective landowners irrespective of the
fact whether they had challenged the acquisition of their lands or not. On
restoration of the possession to the landowners they shall refund the
amounts received by them as compensation or otherwise in respect of their
lands. The appellant, the respondents and the State Government including
all authorities/persons concerned shall implement the aforesaid directions
at an early date.”
(iii) H.M.T. House Building Cooperative Society v. M. Venkataswamappa and
others[3]
(iv) Bangalore City Cooperative Housing Society Limited v. State of
Karnataka and others[4]
“87. The three Judge Bench also approved the view taken by the High Court
that the acquisition of land was vitiated because the decision of the State
Government was influenced by the Estate Agent with whom the Appellant had
entered into an agreement. Paras 21 and 22 of the judgment, which contain
discussion on this issue are extracted hereunder: (1st H.M.T. House
Building Coop. Society v. Syed Khader and others, (1995) 2 SCC 677
“21. Mr. G. Ramaswamy, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the
appellant, submitted that merely because the appellant Society had entered
into an agreement with Respondent 11, M/s S.R. Constructions, in which the
latter for the consideration paid to it had assured that the lands in
question shall be acquired by the State Government, no adverse inference
should be drawn because that may amount to a tall claim made on behalf of
M/s S.R. Constructions in the agreement. He pointed out that the
notifications under Sections 4(1) and 6(1) have been issued beyond the time
stipulated in the agreement and as such, it should be held that the State
Government has exercised its statutory power for acquisition of the lands
in normal course, only after taking all facts and circumstances into
consideration. There is no dispute that in terms of agreement dated 1-2-
1985 payments have been made by the appellant Society to M/s S.R.
Constructions. This circumstance alone goes a long way to support the
contention of the writ Petitioners that their lands have not been acquired
in the normal course or for any public purpose. In spite of the repeated
query, the learned counsel appearing for the appellant Society could not
point out or produce any order of the State Government under Section
3(f)(vi) of the Act granting prior approval and prescribing conditions and
restrictions in respect of the use of the lands which were to be acquired
for a public purpose. There is no restriction or bar on the part of the
appellant Society on carving out the size of the plots or the manner of
allotment or in respect of construction over the same. That is why the
framers of the Act have required the appropriate Government to grant prior
approval of any housing scheme presented by any cooperative society before
the lands are acquired treating such requirement and acquisition for public
purpose. It is incumbent on the part of the appropriate Government while
granting approval to examine different aspects of the matter so that it may
serve the public interest and not the interest of few who can as well
afford to acquire such lands by negotiation in open market. According to
us, the State Government has not granted the prior approval in terms of
Section 3(f)(vi) of the Act to the housing scheme in question. The power
under Sections 4(1) and 6(1) of the Act has been exercised for extraneous
consideration and at the instance of the persons who had no role in the
decision-making process - whether the acquisition of the lands in question
shall be for a public purpose. This itself is enough to vitiate the whole
acquisition proceeding and render the same invalid.
22. In the present case there has been contravention of Section 3(f)(vi)
of the Act inasmuch as there was no prior approval of the State Government
as required by the said section before steps for acquisition of the lands
were taken. The report of Shri G.K.V. Rao points out as to how the
appellant-Society admitted large number of persons as members who cannot be
held to be genuine members, the sole object being to transfer the lands
acquired for “public purpose”, to outsiders as part of commercial venture,
undertaken by the office- bearer of the appellant-Society. We are in
agreement with the finding of the High Court that the statutory
notifications issued under Sections 4(1) and 6(1) of the Act have been
issued due to the role played by M/s S.R. Constructions, Respondent 11. On
the materials on record, the High Court was justified in coming to the
conclusion that the proceedings for acquisition of the lands had not been
initiated because the State Government was satisfied about the existence of
the public purpose but at the instance of agent who had collected more than
a crore of rupees for getting the lands acquired by the State Government.
xx xx xx
95. The Division Bench of the High Court in Subramani, ILR 1995 Kant
3139, noted that the terms of the agreement entered into between the
Society and M/s. Devatha Builders was not for the acquisition of land but
only for development of the acquired land. The Division Bench also noted
that the agreement was entered into between the Society and the owners in
1985, whereas the Government gave approval for acquisition in 1985 and the
agreement with the developer was of 1986. The Division Bench also noted
that no stranger had been inducted as a member of the society. However, the
acquisition which was under challenge in Writ Petition No. 28707 of 1995
was declared illegal because the House Building Cooperative Society
concerned has not framed any housing scheme and obtained approval thereof
from the State Government. The Division Bench also expressed the view that
remedy under Article 226 was discretionary and it was not inclined to
nullify the acquisition made for the society because the petitioners had
approached the Court after long lapse of time and there was no explanation
for the delay.
xx xx xx
132. Before concluding we consider it necessary to observe that in view of
the law laid down in the 1st H.M.T. case (paragraphs 19, 21 and 22), which
was followed in 2nd H.M.T. case and Vyalikawal House Building Cooperative
Society's case, the view taken by the Division Bench of the High Court in
Narayana Raju's case that the framing of scheme and approval thereof can be
presumed from the direction given by the State Government to the Special
Deputy Commissioner to take steps for issue of notification under Section
4(1) cannot be treated as good law and the mere fact that this Court had
revoked the certificate granted by the High Court cannot be interpreted as
this Court's approval of the view expressed by the High Court on the
validity of the acquisition.
133. In the result, the appeals are dismissed. However, keeping in view the
fact that some of the members of the appellant may have built their houses
on the sites allotted to them, we give liberty to the appellant to
negotiate with the respondents for purchase of their land at the prevailing
market price and hope that the landowners will, notwithstanding the
judgments of the High Court and this Court, agree to accept the market
price so that those who have built the houses may not suffer.
134. At the same time, we make it clear that the appellant must return the
vacant land to the respondents irrespective of the fact that it may have
carved out the sites and allotted the same to its members. This must be
done within a period of three months from today and during that period the
appellant shall not change the present status of the vacant area/sites. The
members of the appellant who may have been allotted the sites shall also
not change the present status/character of the land. The parties are left
to bear their own costs.”
In support of the proposition that it was a case of malice in law,
reference was made to the judgment in the case of S. Partap Singh v. State
of Punjab[5].
Countering the arguments of delay and laches putforth by the respondents
even in appellants cases, the reference was made to the judgment in the
case of S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu v. Jagannath and others[6], in support of
the plea that fraud vitiates all action and it was a case of fraud where
land was acquired for one purpose but thereafter the Government sought to
utilise it for some other purpose. In this behalf, reliance was also
placed in the case of Vyalikaval Housebuilding Coop. Society v. V.
Chandrappa and others[7]:
“3. This writ petition was contested by the appellant society as the
respondent and it was alleged that it was hopelessly barred by time being
delayed by 14 years and it was also submitted that the writ petitioners had
participated in the inquiry under Section 5A of the Act and have also
received substantial amount from the appellant society pursuant to the
agreement executed in their favour. Learned Single Judge dismissed the writ
petition on the ground of being hopelessly barred by time and the writ
petitioners participated in the proceedings therefore they have acquiesced
in the matter. Aggrieved against this order passed by learned Single
Judge, a writ appeal was filed by the respondents which came to be allowed
by the Division Bench for the reasons mentioned in another writ appeal
decided by the same Division Bench headed by the Chief Justice of the High
Court on 17.1.2000. In that writ appeal the Division Bench held that the
entire acquisition on behalf of the appellant society was actuated with
fraud as held in Narayana Reddy v. State of Karnataka ILR 1991 Kar. 2248.
In that case it was held as follows:
“As seen from the findings of G.V.K. Rao Inquiry Report, in respect of five
respondent societies and the report of the Joint Registrar in respect of
Vyalikaval House Building Co-operative Society, these societies had
indulged in enrolling large number of members illegally inclusive of
ineligible members and had also indulged in enrolling large number of bogus
members. The only inference that is possible from this is that the office-
bearers of the societies had entered into unholy alliance with the
respective agents for the purpose of making money, as submitted for the
petitioners otherwise, there is no reason as to why such an agreement
should have been brought about by the office-bearers of the society and the
agents. Unless these persons had the intention of making huge profits as
alleged by the petitioners, they would not have indulged in enrolment of
ineligible and bogus members. The circumstance that without considering all
these relevant materials the Government had accorded its approval, is
sufficient to hold that the agents had prevailed upon the Government to
take a decision to acquire the lands without going into all those relevant
facts. The irresistible inference flowing from the facts and circumstances
of these cases is, whereas the power conferred under the Land Acquisition
Act is for acquiring lands for carrying out housing scheme by a housing
society, in each of the cases the acquisition of lands is not for a bona
fide housing scheme but is substantially for the purpose of enabling the
concerned office-bearers of respondent-societies and their agents to
indulge in sale of sites in the guise of allotment of sites to the members/
associate members of the society to make money as alleged by the
petitioners and therefore it is a clear case of colourable exercise of
power. Thus the decision of the Government to acquire the lands
suffers from
legal mala fides and therefore the impugned notifications are liable to be
struck down.”
Judgment in the case of Royal Orchid Hotels Limited and Anr. v. G. Jayarama
Reddy and Ors.[8] also relied upon to counter the plea of delay and laches,
wherein this Court held:
“24. The first question which needs consideration is whether the High
Court committed an error by granting relief to Respondent 1 despite the
fact that he filed the writ petition after a long lapse of time and the
explanation given by him was found unsatisfactory by the learned Single
Judge, who decided the writ petition after remand by the Division Bench.
25. Although the Framers of the Constitution have not prescribed any period
of limitation for filing a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution
of India and the power conferred upon the High Court to issue to any person
or authority including any Government, directions, orders or writs
including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo
warranto and certiorari is not hedged with any condition or constraint, in
the last 61 years the superior courts have evolved several rules of self-
imposed restraint including the one that the High Court may not enquire
into belated or stale claim and deny relief to the petitioner if he is
found guilty of laches. The principle underlying this rule is that the one
who is not vigilant and does not seek intervention of the Court within
reasonable time from the date of accrual of cause of action or alleged
violation of constitutional, legal or other right is not entitled to relief
under Article 226 of the Constitution. Another reason for the High Court's
refusal to entertain belated claim is that during the intervening period
rights of third parties may have crystallized and it will be inequitable to
disturb those rights at the instance of a person who has approached the
Court after long lapse of time and there is no cogent explanation for the
delay. We may hasten to add that no hard-and-fast rule can be laid down
and no straightjacket formula can be evolved for deciding the question of
delay/laches and each case has to be decided on its own facts.
xx xx xx
31. In the light of the above, it is to be seen whether the discretion
exercised by the Division Bench of the High Court to ignore the delay in
filing of writ petition is vitiated by any patent error or the reasons
assigned for rejecting the appellants' objection of delay are irrelevant
and extraneous. Though it may sound repetitive, we may mention that in the
writ petition filed by him, Respondent 1 had not only prayed for quashing
of the acquisition proceedings, but also prayed for restoration of the
acquired land on the ground that instead of using the same for the public
purpose specified in the notifications issued under Sections 4(1) and 6,
the Corporation had transferred the same to private persons. Respondent 1
and the other landowners may not be having any serious objection to the
acquisition of their land for a public purpose and, therefore, some of them
not only accepted the compensation, but also filed applications under
Section 18 of the Act for determination of market value by the court.
However, when it was discovered that the acquired land has been transferred
to private persons, they sought intervention of the Court and in the three
cases, the Division Bench of the High Court nullified the acquisition on
the ground of fraud and misuse of the provisions of the Act.”
The Arguments : Respondents
Mr. L.N. Rao, learned senior counsel appearing for the official
respondents, emphatically countered the aforesaid submissions. He argued
that in most of these appeals, writ petitions were filed in the High Court
challenging the acquisition after passing of the award and taking
possession of the land and in most of the cases, the land owners had even
received the compensation. Therefore, these writ petitions were not
maintainable and should have been dismissed on the ground of laches and
delay inasmuch as acquisition cannot be challenged after the award is
passed and compensation is received. He sought to distinguish the
judgments cited by the appellants' counsel. He submitted that the High
Court has wrongly fixed the cut-off date as 06.07.2011. He also submitted
that the High Court was in error in rejecting the arguments of acquiescence
as acceptance of compensation clearly meant that these land owners had
acquiesced into the action of the authorities in acquiring the land. His
submission was that case should have been examined keeping in view the
aforesaid factors and the plea taken by the writ petitioners that they felt
aggrieved only when they came to know land was allotted/sold to private
builders, was totally irrelevant and could not have been the ground to
entertain the writ petitions on merits.
It was also argued by Mr. Rao that the High Court could not have enhanced
the compensation by 64.7% in writ petition filed under Article 226 as it
was not a public law remedy. His plea in this behalf was that Land
Acquisition Act provided for complete machinery for determination of the
compensation and reference by the land owners under Section 18 of the Act
had already been sought and present way to matters are pending before the
Reference Court to determine the market value of the land. He argued that
merely because in the case of Patwari village, the Government had entered
into an agreement with some of the villagers for payment of compensation by
increasing it by 64.70%, would not mean that High Court could extend that
to all villages in the absence of any agreement with those parties. In the
same wave length, he challenged the direction for allotment of developed
Abadi plot to the extent of 10% of the acquired land subject to maximum of
2500 square metres by pointing out that the aforesaid allotment was under
the scheme of the Government which provided for allotment of 5% developed
Abadi plot in respect of Noida land and 6% of developed Abadi plot where
the land acquired was situated in Greater Noida. Here again, it was
pleaded, the High Court could not tinker with the said policy by enhancing
the entitlement for allotment to 10%. It was also argued that in any case
once the compensation was enhanced, there was no reason to give allotment
of larger area of land and it amounted to giving double benefit to the land
owners.
Without prejudice to the aforesaid contentions, Mr. Rao submitted that in
spite of these serious infirmities in the judgment of the High Court,
insofar as Government authorities are concerned, they were ready to pay the
higher compensation and even allot land to the extent of 10% subject to the
condition that quietus is given to all these cases with no further
benefits. He pointed out that 64.7% additional compensation had already
been given to about ninety percent land owners. Further, 6% of land/flats
had already been allotted to ninety percent farmers. He further argued
that care was taken at the time of acquisition itself not to touch the
Abadi land.
Mr. Rakesh Dwivedi and Mr. Pramod Swarup, senior advocates, who appeared
for private respondents/builders to whom the land was allotted, supported
the aforesaid submissions of Mr. Rao and submitted that substantial justice
had been done by the High Court in these cases and, therefore, in exercise
of its power under Article 136 of the Constitution of India, the Court
should not interfere with the exercise done by the High Court.
Our Analysis of the subject matter:
We have bestowed our serious consideration to the submissions made by
learned counsel for parties on both sides. No doubt, the High Court has
held that it was wrong exercise in law on the part of the Government to
invoke the provisions of Sections 17(1) and 17(4) of the Act, thereby
dispensing with the enquiry under Section 5A of the Act which amounted to
taking away the valuable right of the land owners. That is a finding on
merit. However, it is subject to the caveat that the writ petitions filed
by the appellants herein could be considered on merits and were not to be
dismissed on the grounds of laches and delay. Such a contention was indeed
taken by the respondents/ authorities before the High Court. However, the
same has been repelled. Primary reason given by the High Court in this
behalf is that the delay was explained satisfactorily inasmuch as the land
acquired for the purposes of industrial development was, at a later period
of time, allotted to private builders for development of residential units
and when this was done it came to the knowledge of the appellants.
Aggrieved by this step taken by the Noida authorities, the appellants filed
the writ petitions. Thus, in nutshell, allotment of the land by the Noida
authorities at a subsequent point of time has weighed with the High Court.
In other words, it is clear that the appellants did not challenge the
acquisition per se inasmuch as when the land was acquired even after
invoking urgency provisions contained in Section 17 of the Act and
dispensing with the requirement of Section 5A of the Act, this position was
accepted by the land owners. They even allowed the authorities to proceed
further in passing the award and taking possession from many of these land
owners and even paying compensation to them. It is a matter of record that
before coming to the Court and filing the writ petitions, most of these
appellants had received the compensation. They also sought reference under
Section 18 of the Act for higher compensation. Physical possession of land
of many of these appellants have also been taken. In many other cases,
paper possession had been taken before filing of the writ petition. A
great deal of argument was made as to whether such physical
possession/paper possession should be treated as taking possession in the
eyes of law, it would be a debatable point inasmuch as in various
judgments, this Court has held that whenever there is large scale of
acquisition and possession of large chunk of land belonging to number of
persons is to be taken, paper possession would be a permissible mode,
particularly when it is Abadi land. We are not going into this controversy
since the ultimate outcome is not influenced by the aforesaid factor, as
would be noticed in the later part of judgment. However, what we
highlight and reiterate is that these appellants were not aggrieved by the
acquisition per se in the manner it was done by the respondents. As per
their own case, they became aggrieved only when they found that land was
not utilised for the purpose for which it was acquired namely industrial
development but a large portion thereof was sought to be given away to the
builders for development of the land as residential. The High Court, while
accepting such a plea of the land owners on the ground of laches and delay,
has referred to certain judgments which were relied upon before us as well
and taken note of above.
This leads to an incidental issue as to whether development of land for
residential purposes is impermissible and could have given a fresh cause of
action to the land owners to approach the Court. Here, we would like to
refer to the judgment of this Court in Nand Kishore Gupta and Ors. v. State
of U.P. and Ors.[9] which concerns the same Act viz. U.P. Industrial Area
Development Act, 1976. In that case, for Yamuna Express Project, the land
was acquired setting it to be 'public purpose'. The land was utilised for
construction of Yamuna Expressway and along therewith development of the
part of the land was undertaken for commercial, amusement, industrial,
institutional and residential purposes as well. It was accepted that
construction of Yamuna Expressway was work of public importance. However,
the utilisation of land for development of other purposes, namely,
commercial, amusement, industrial, institutional and residential etc. was
challenged, as not amounting to acquisition for 'public purpose'. There
was another feature namely for the development of the land in the aforesaid
manner Public Private Partnership (PPP) was formed and private parties were
asked to undertake the development on BOT (Built, Operate and Transfer)
basis. Such PPP on BOT basis was also challenged as colourable exercise of
power in which private parties were involved. The challenge was repelled
by this Court holding that acquisition of land along Yamuna Express for
development of the same for commercial, amusement, industrial,
institutional and residential purposes was complimentary to creation of
Expressway. Such complimentary purpose was also treated as 'public
purpose'. It was also contended by the land owners that the acquisition
was not for “public purpose” because: (a) its object was not covered by
Section 3(f) of the Act, (b) it really fell not under Part II of the Act
but under Part VII thereof as it virtually amounted to acquisition of land
for the contractor Company J, (c) the compensation was coming wholly from J
and not from the Government or YEIDA, (d) the acquisition for so-called
interchange was not at all necessary and was a colourable exercise of
power. They further contended that the application of Sections 17(1) and
17(4) of the Act was wholly unnecessary and therefore, the enquiry under
Section 5-A could not have been dispensed with. All the aforesaid
contentions were rejected. Going by the dicta in the aforesaid judgment,
it is contended by the authorities that merely because the part of the land
is utilised for residential purpose, it cannot be said that the respondents-
authorities have not adhered to the purpose for which the land is acquired.
As per them, this would be complimentary purpose to the main purpose.
We have to keep in mind that in all these cases, after the land was
acquired, which was of very large quantity and in big chunks, further steps
were taken by passing the award, taking possession and paying compensation.
In many cases, actual possession was taken and in rest of the cases, paper
possession was taken where because of the land under Abadi, actual
possession could not be taken on spot immediately. Fact remains that in
many such cases where possession was taken, these land owners/appellants
even received compensation. All these petitions have been filed only
thereafter which may not be maintainable stricto sensu having regard to the
law laid down by the Constitution Bench of this Court in Aflatoon and Ors.
v. Lt. Governor of Delhi and Ors.[10] and the dictum of this judgment is
followed consistently by this Court in various cases [See Murari and Ors.
v. Union of India and Ors.[11], Ravi Khullar and Anr. v. Union of India and
Ors.[12], Anand Singh and Anr. v. State of U.P. and Ors.[13]]
Once we look into the matter from the aforesaid prospective, the argument
of the appellants that giving away of the land by allotment to the private
developers for construction of residential units gave them the fresh cause
of action, gets dented to a great extent. No doubt, following Royal Orchid
Hotels Limited case and other similar cases, the High Court has not
dismissed the writ petitions filed by the appellants on the ground of delay
and laches accepting the plea of the appellants that they felt aggrieved on
coming to know that the land was sought to be given to the private persons
for development. In this way, discretion is exercised by the High Court in
entertaining the writ petitions on merits. Since such a discretion is
exercised, we would not like to interfere with that discretion, more so,
when a very fair stand is taken by Mr. Rao, learned senior counsel
appearing for the Noida authority, as mentioned above. However, the
aforesaid position in law is stated to highlight that it was equally
possible to dismiss these writ petitions as the same were filed belatedly
after passing of the award and when in most of the cases, possession was
taken and compensation paid. When we examine the matter from the aforesaid
angle, we reach an irresistible conclusion that the High Court has gone an
extra mile in finding the solution to the problem and balancing the
equities in a manner which is favourable to the land owners.
We have also to keep in mind another important feature. Many residents of
Patwari village had entered into agreement with the authorities agreeing to
accept enhanced compensation at the rate of 64.7%. This additional
compensation was, however, agreed to be paid by the authorities only in
respect of land owners of Patwari village. The High Court has bound the
authorities with the said agreement by applying the same to all the land
owners thereby benefiting them with 64.7% additional compensation. There
could have been argument that the authorities cannot be fastened with this
additional compensation, more particularly, when machinery for
determination for just and fair compensation is provided under the Land
Acquisition Act and the land owners had, in fact, invoked the said
machinery by seeking reference under Section 18 thereof. Likewise, the
scheme for allotment of land to the land owners provides for 5% and 6%
developed land in Noida and Greater Noida respectively. As against that,
the High Court has enhanced the said entitlement to 10%. Again, we find
that it could be an arguable case as to whether High Court could grant
additional land contrary to the policy. Notwithstanding the same, the
Noida authority have now accepted this part of the High Court judgment
after the dismissal of the appeals filed by the Noida authority, and a
statement to that effect was made by Mr. Rao. We may point out that while
dismissing the appeals of Noida authority, following remarks were made:
“9. Insofar as allotment of 10 per cent of the plots is concerned, the
High Court, in exercise of its discretionary power, has thought it fit,
while sustaining the notification issued by the authority for protecting
them for allotting 10 per cent of the developed plots; and, there again
they have put a cap of 2,500 sq.mtrs. In fact, in the course of the order,
the High Court has taken into consideration the agreement that was entered
into by the authority with the villagers of Patwari and, in some cases, the
authority itself has agreed to raise 6 to 8 per cent of the developed plots
to the agriculturists. The High Court has also taken into consideration
the observations made by this Court in the case of Bondu Ramaswamy Vs.
Bangalore Development Authority, 2010 (7) SCC 129, where this Court has
gone to the extent of directing the authorities to allot 15 per cent of the
developed plots. In our view and in the peculiar facts and circumtances of
these cases, since the relief that is given to the
respondents/agriculturists is purely discretionary relief by the Court in
order to sustain the notification issued by the authorities, we do not find
any good ground to interfere with the impugned judgment(s) and order(s)
passed by the High Court, at the instance of the petitioners/appellants/
authorities, namely, NOIDA and Greater NOIDA.
10. This order shall not be treated as a precedent in any other case.”
Thus, we have a scenario where, on the one hand, invocation of urgency
provisions under Section 17 of the Act and dispensing with the right to
file objection under Section 5A of the Act, is found to be illegal. On the
other hand, we have a situation where because of delay in challenging these
acquisitions by the land owners, developments have taken in these villages
and in most of the cases, third party rights have been created. Faced with
this situation, the High Court going by the spirit behind the judgment of
this Court in Bondu Ramaswamy and Others (supra) came out with the solution
which is equitable to both sides. We are, thus, of the view that the High
Court considered the ground realities of the matter and arrived at a more
practical and workable solution by adequately compensating the land owners
in the form of compensation as well as allotment of developed Abadi land at
a higher rate i.e. 10% of the land acquired of each of the land owners
against the eligibility and to the policy to the extent of 5% and 6% of
Noida and Greater Noida land respectively.
Insofar as allegation of some of the appellants that their abadi land was
acquired, we find that this allegation is specifically denied disputing its
correctness. There is specific averment made by the NOIDA Authority at so
many places that village abadi land was not acquired. It is mentioned that
abadi area is what was found in the survey conducted prior to Section 4
Notification and not what is alleged or that which is far away from the
dense village abadi. It is also mentioned that as a consequence of the
acquisition, the Authority spends crores and crores of rupees in developing
the infrastructure such as road, drainage, sewer, electric and water lines
etc. in the unacquired portion of the village abadi. During the course of
hearing, Chart No. 2 in respect of each village of Greater Noida was handed
over for the consideration of this Court, wherein the amount spent by the
Authority on the development, including village development (which is the
unacquired village abadi), has been given in Column No. 4 thereof. It has
been the consistent stand of the NOIDA Authority that prior to the issuance
of Section 4 Notification under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, survey was
conducted and the abadi found in that survey was not acquired. In fact,
affidavits in this respect have also been filed not only in this Court but
also in the High Court. We have mentioned that there has been a long gap
between acquisition of the land and filing of the writ petitions in the
High Court by these appellants challenging the acquisition. If they have
undertaken some construction during this period they cannot be allowed to
take advantage thereof. Therefore, it is difficult to accept the argument
of the appellants based on parity with three villages in respect of which
the High Court has given relief by quashing the acquisition.
To sum up, following benefits are accorded to the land owners:
(a) increasing the compensation by 64.7%;
(b) directing allotment of developed abadi land to the extent of 10% of
the land acquired of each of the land owners;
(c) compensation which is increased at the rate of 64.7% is payable
immediately without taking away the rights of the land owners to claim
higher compensation under the machinery provided in the Land Acquisition
Act wherein the matter would be examined on the basis of the evidence
produced to arrive at just and fair market value;
This, according to us, provides substantial justice to the
appellants.
Conclusion
Keeping in view all these peculiar circumstances, we are of the opinion
that these are not the cases where this Court should interfere under
Article 136 of the Constitution. However, we make it clear that directions
of the High Court are given in the aforesaid unique and peculiar/specific
background and, therefore, it would not form precedent for future cases.
We may record that some of the appellants had tried to point out certain
clerical mistakes pertaining to their specific cases. For example, it was
argued by one appellant that his land falls in a village in Noida but
wrongly included in Greater Noida. These appellants, for getting such
clerical mistakes rectified, can always approach the High Court.
The Full Bench judgment of the High Court is, accordingly, affirmed and all
these appeals are disposed of in terms of the said judgment of the Full
Bench.
In view of the aforesaid, the contempt petitions also stand disposed of.
.............................................CJI
(H.L. DATTU)
.............................................J.
(A.K. SIKRI)
.............................................J.
(ARUN MISHRA)
NEW DELHI;
MAY 14, 2015.
-----------------------
[1] (2010) 11 SCC 242
[2] (1995) 2 SCC 677
[3] (1995) 3 SCC 128
[4] (2012) 3 SCC 727
[5] AIR 1964 SC 72
[6] (1994) 1 SCC 1
[7] (2007) 9 SCC 304
[8] (2011) 10 SCC 608
[9] (2010) 10 SCC 282
[10] AIR 1974 SC 2077
[11] (1997) 1 SCC 15
[12] (2007) 5 SCC 231
[13] (2010) 11 SCC 242