IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA                           CIVIL APPELLATE

                                JURISDICTION

                      CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 5769-5770 OF 2015

              (Arising Out of SLP (C) Nos.30942-30943 of 2014)

RAJENDRA SHANKAR SHUKLA & ORS.ETC.     …APPELLANTS

                                     Vs.

STATE OF CHHATTISGARH & ORS.ETC.       …RESPONDENTS

                                      WITH

                    CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 5771-5775  OF 2015

              (Arising Out of SLP (C) Nos.30049-30053 of 2014)

                                 J U D G M E N T

V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.

Leave granted.

The  appellants-land  owners  have  filed  the  present  group  of   appeals

challenging the common impugned judgment and order  dated  16.6.2014  passed

by the Division Bench of the High Court  of  Chhattisgarh  at  Bilaspur,  in

Writ Appeal Nos.379, 380, 381, 382, 389 and 393 of  2013  wherein  the  High

Court upheld the order dated 15.4.2013 passed by the  learned  single  Judge

of the High Court of Chhattisgarh, Bilaspur, upholding the validity  of  the

Town Development Scheme, namely, ‘Kamal Vihar  Township  Development  Scheme

No. 4’ (for short ‘the KVTDS’).

The facts of the case are stated hereunder:-

The appellants herein are the landowners of  portions  of  land  (with  some

construction  thereon)  situated  in  the  villages  Dumartarai,  Tikrapara,

Boriya Khurd, Deopuri and Dunda of Raipur District  in  Chhattisgarh  State.

The respondent  No.2-Raipur  Development  Authority  (RDA)  was  established

under Section 38(1) of the M.P. (C.G.) Nagar Thatha Gram  Nivesh  Adhiniyam,

1973 (for short ‘the Act of 1973’). The KVTDS was planned by the  respondent

No.2 - RDA while discharging its functions under Section 38(2)  of  the  Act

of 1973. Though the KVTDS initially started  as  a  small  Town  Development

Scheme, it subsequently included  the  aforesaid  five  villages  in  Raipur

within its Scheme.

As per the evidence on record produced before  us,  which  are  the  written

communications between the State Government,  respondent  No.2-RDA  and  the

Director of Town and Country Planning, the KVTDS was initially  planned  and

proposed for an area of 416.93 acres only. The Chief  Executive  Officer  of

the  respondent  No.2-RDA  had  issued  public  notification  declaring  its

intention of coming up with an integrated township  of  416.93  acres  only.

However, a month after the publication of said notification,  the  Board  of

respondent No.2-RDA, increased the area of the  integrated  Township  Scheme

from 416.93 acres to 2300 acres which  resulted  in  the  inclusion  of  the

lands of the appellants herein.

At present, the said Scheme has a total project area of  647.84  Hect.,  out

of which the area available for development is  610.46  Hect.  While  482.29

Hect. of the total land is private land, 128.17 Hect. is government land.

According to the development plan,  in  the  above  area  of  647.84  Hect.,

further areas have been marked for recreational land, roads  and  lanes  and

other miscellaneous infrastructure like educational,  hygienic  and  various

public purpose amenities. The broad features of the Scheme would  show  that

there shall  be  15  Sectors  and  the  estimated  cost  of  development  of

infrastructure would be Rs.1085 crores. The Government agreed to  hand  over

its land to the respondent No.2-RDA and the land belonging  to  the  private

owners were to be taken over by the consent or by acquisition under  Section

56 of the Act of 1973.

The RDA planned to  develop  the  land  and  hand  over  about  35%  of  the

developed   plot   to    the    land    owners    without    charging    any

contribution/incremental cost from them in return for  their  acquired  land

for the development of the KVTDS under Section 56 of the Act  of  1973.  The

remaining  area  of  their  undeveloped   plot   would   be   retained   and

subsequently, may go to the  other  land  owners  or  may  be  utilized  for

constructing other facilities under the  development  Scheme.  According  to

respondent No.2-RDA, 15% of the developed plots have also been reserved  for

economically weaker sections which come to about 32.15 Hect.

Out of the total 4969 private land owners, 39 land owners did not  agree  to

the Scheme/procedure adopted and preferred  23  writ  petitions  on  various

grounds which were dismissed by the learned single Judge of the  High  Court

of Chhattisgarh, Bilaspur. Aggrieved by the  same,  six  Writ  Appeals  were

filed  by  13  land  owners.  The  Division  Bench  of  the  High  Court  of

Chhattisgarh at Bilaspur, after considering  the  facts,  circumstances  and

evidence on record of the cases, upheld the validity of  the  KVTDS  planned

by the RDA and dismissed the appeals  on  the  ground  that  the  same  were

devoid of merit. Hence, the present appeals.

We have heard the learned senior counsel for both the parties. On the  basis

of the factual circumstance and evidence on record produced  before  us  and

also in the light of the rival  legal  contentions  raised  by  the  learned

senior counsel for both the parties, we have broadly  framed  the  following

points which require our attention. The main legal  issues  which  arise  in

this case are :-

  Whether the KVTDS provide the authority to the Director of the  respondent

No.2-RDA, to formulate Town Development Scheme and is  it  in  contravention

to the 73rd and 74th Amendments to the Constitution of India?

  Whether the Town Development Scheme in the present case is  formulated  as

per the provision mentioned in Section 50(1) of the  Act  of  1973?  Whether

the subsequent alteration of  land  acquired,  is  in  consonance  with  the

provisions of the Act?

  Whether the Town Development Scheme framed in  the  present  case  by  the

respondent No.2-RDA, in the absence of a zonal plan, is legal and valid?

  Whether the Act of 1973  authorises  the  Town  Planning  and  Development

Authority to reconstitute the plots and  change  the  land  use  apart  from

public utility?

  Whether the proposal of the RDA to return 35% of  the  area  of  the  land

taken away from the land owners/appellants is legally permissible?

  While planning the KVTDS, whether the respondents ensured compliance  with

EIA clearance procedure from the competent authority?

Answer to Point No. 1

As per Part IX and Part IX-A of the Constitution, a zonal  plan  has  to  be

framed by democratic institutions as prescribed  under  its  provisions.  On

the other hand, the Respondent No. 2- RDA, has framed the  Town  Development

Scheme without consulting or taking into account the views of the  Panchayat

and the District Planning Committee which  are  constitutionally  authorized

to undertake the task  of  framing  Scheme.  It  was  argued  by  Mr.  Gopal

Subramaniam, learned senior counsel on behalf of  the  appellants  that  the

Respondent No. 2- RDA had assumed the role of  town  planning  authority  by

proposing and framing KVTDS with land use which is different  from  the  one

prescribed in the Raipur Master Plan (Revised) 2021. In fact,  the  proposal

made by Respondent No. 2- RDA defined spaces that  are  meant  for  business

Districts, public use, schools, house and parks etc. This task taken  up  by

the Respondent No. 2- RDA of allocation of spaces is by statute vested  with

the ‘local authority’ under its power to make zonal plans.  It  was  further

contended by  the  learned  senior  counsel  that  the  Raipur  Master  Plan

(Revised) 2021, on the basis of  which the KVTDS claims to  be  implementing

the Scheme has also amended  the  same  without  the  participation  of  the

District Planning Committee which is the constitutionally empowered body  to

carry out social and economic planning for a District.

 The 73rd and 74th Amendments were inserted in  the  Constitution  of  India

with the avowed object  and  intention  of  strengthening  the  local  self-

governance both at the village and District level.  It  was  argued  by  the

learned senior counsel Mr. Gopal Subramaniam that self-governance  was  very

much  a  part  of  the  Indian  society  historically.  In  support  of  his

contention, he relied upon the words of Sir  Charles  Metcalfe,  the  Acting

Governor General of India from 1835 to  1836,  on  the  functioning  of  the

village panchayats made during  the  19th  century  which  are  recorded  as

under:

“The village communities are  little  republics,  having  nearly  everything

they can want  within  themselves,  and  most  independent  of  any  foreign

relations. They seem  to  last  where  nothing  else  lasts.  Dynasty  after

dynasty tumbles down; revolution succeeds after revolution; but the  village

community remains the same. The union of the village communities,  each  one

forming a separate little state, in  itself,  has  I  conceive,  contributed

more than any other cause to  the  preservation  of  the  people  of  India,

through all the revolutions and changes which they have suffered, and is  in

a high degree conducive to their enjoyment of a  great  portion  of  freedom

and independence”[1]

It is imperative to note here that the Constitution, initially did not  vest

with power on villages or communities as units. It rather  vested  power  on

individual as units of the society. It was proposed by  Dr.  B.R.  Ambedkar,

Chairman  of  the  Drafting  Committee  of  the   Constitution,   that   the

administration of India should not be carried out  at  village  level  since

they are ignorant units of communities immune from the progress of the  city

and are also influenced by social biases and prejudices.  With  this  biases

and prejudices, it was apprehended  that  India,  at  the  time  during  the

drafting of the Constitution, were not suited to be  ruled  at  village  and

panchayat level. On the other hand, Dr. Ambedkar proposed that there  should

be a strong Centre governed by the Rule of Law  for  the  administration  of

the country. Formal  inclusion  of  the  panchayats  in  the  constitutional

system was deferred for a later time since the framers of  the  Constitution

deemed  it  fit  to  introduce  social  reforms  in  the  village  prior  to

conferring upon them the power of  self-governance,  in  the  light  of  the

constraints faced by the new republic of India. Article 40,  therefore,  was

inserted in the Constitution in the form of Directive  Principles  of  State

Policy in Part IV of the Constitution so as to move towards  the  vision  of

introducing local governance when the time seems fit.

Though, this was the decision taken at the  time  of  the  drafting  of  the

Constitution, most of the framers in the Constituent Assembly reposed  their

faith on the potential of village panchayats and were of  the  opinion  that

self-governance at local level is the only way  forward  to  realize  Swaraj

for  our  country.  Shri  Ananthasayanam  Ayyangar,  the   member   of   the

Constituent Assembly, presented his opinion  on  village  panchayats  before

the Assembly which is recorded as under:

“But  who  are   these   republics?   They   have   to   be   brought   into

existence…..Therefore, I would advise that in the directives, a clause  must

be added, which would insist upon the  various  governments  that  may  come

into  existence  in  future  to  establish  village  panchayats,  give  them

political autonomy also economic independence in their  own  way  to  manage

their own affairs.”[2]

It is further to be noted that Entry 5 in the list-II to the VIIth  Schedule

of the Constitution enables the State Legislature to  make  laws  pertaining

to local government which also include  the  powers  to  be  vested  on  the

Municipal corporations, Improvement Trusts, Authorities,  Mining  Settlement

Authorities, District Boards and other local authorities for the purpose  of

village administration and the  local  self-governance.  The  constitutional

amendment in 1992-93 through the 73rd and 74th Amendment  Act  provided  for

uniformity in the structure in terms of three-tier local governments at  the

District (Zila Parishads- ZPs), Block  (Panchayat  Samitis-PS)  and  Village

levels  (Gram  Panchayats-GPs).  With  the  constitutional  amendment,   the

panchayats  are  constitutionally  expected  to   move   away   from   their

traditional role of simply executing the programs handed  down  to  them  by

higher levels of government.  They  are  on  the  other  hand,  expected  to

implement their own programs of economic  development  and  social  justice.

The amendments further confer power upon the States in the form of  Schedule

XI to enlarge the  domain  of  panchayats  and  to  include  functions  with

distributional consequences. This schedule includes key  functions  such  as

agriculture, drinking water,  education,  irrigation,  poverty  alleviation,

primary, secondary and adult education, roads and rural electrification  and

maintenance of community assets.

It  is  further  submitted  by  the  learned  senior  counsel,   Mr.   Gopal

Subramaniam that as per Article 243 G(1), the  authority  to  prepare  plans

for economic development and social justice has been vested  with  the  Gram

Panchayat. Articles 243W and 243ZF have  also  been  inserted  to  vest  the

local authority with the power to prepare plans  for  economic  development.

The 12th Schedule inserted into the Constitution specifically  lists  “urban

planning including town planning” as an entry  on  which  local  authorities

have full power under Article 243W of the Constitution.

Further, Article 243ZD was inserted into the Constitution wherein the  power

to prepare a draft development plan is vested  with  the  District  Planning

Committee (DPC). The  above  mentioned  provision  of  the  Constitution  is

extracted hereunder:

“243ZD. (1) There shall be constituted in every State at the district  level

a District Planning Committee to  consolidate  the  plans  prepared  by  the

Panchayats and the Municipalities in the district and  to  prepare  a  draft

development plan for the district as a whole.

(2) The Legislature of a State may, by law, make provision with respect to—

(a) the composition of the District Planning Committees;

(b) the manner in which the  seats  in  such  Committees  shall  be  filled:

Provided that not less than four-fifths of the total number  of  members  of

such Committee shall be elected by, and from amongst,  the  elected  members

of the Panchayat at the district level and  of  the  Municipalities  in  the

district in proportion to the ratio between  the  population  of  the  rural

areas and of the urban areas in the district;

(c) the functions relating to district planning which  may  be  assigned  to

such Committees;

(d) the manner in  which  the  Chairpersons  of  such  Committees  shall  be

chosen.

(3)  Every  District  Planning  Committee  shall,  in  preparing  the  draft

development plan,—

(a) have regard to— (i) matters of common interest  between  the  Panchayats

and the Municipalities including spatial  planning,  sharing  of  water  and

other  physical  and  natural  resources,  the  integrated  development   of

infrastructure and environmental conservation;

(ii) the extent  and  type  of  available  resources  whether  financial  or

otherwise;

(b) consult such institutions and organisations  as  the  Governor  may,  by

order, specify.

(4) The Chairperson of every District Planning Committee shall  forward  the

development plan, as recommended by such Committee,  to  the  Government  of

the State.”

Also, under Article 243 ZF, any law inconsistent with the provisions of  the

Constitution will be held void. Article 243 ZF reads as under:

“243 ZF. Continuance of existing laws and  municipalities.-  Notwithstanding

anything in this Part, any provision of any law relating  to  Municipalities

in force in a State immediately before the commencement of the  Constitution

(Seventy-fourth  Amendment)  Act,  1992,  which  is  inconsistent  with  the

provisions of this Part, shall continue to be  in  force  until  amended  or

repealed by a competent Legislature or other competent  authority  or  until

the expiration of one year from such commencement, whichever is earlier:

Provided  that  all  the  Municipalities  existing  immediately  before  the

commencement shall continue till the expiration of  their  duration,  unless

sooner dissolved by a resolution passed to that effect  by  the  Legislative

Assembly of that State or, in the case  of  a  State  having  a  Legislative

Council, by each House of the Legislative of that State.”

Similar provision exists for the Gram Panchayats under Article 243 N of  the

Constitution.

In the  present  case,  the  District  Planning  Committee  (DPC)  has  been

constituted under Section 3 of the Chhattisgarh Zila Yojna Samiti Act,  1995

(for short ‘the Act of 1995’) with an  intention  to  democratize  the  town

planning process to give effect to the legislative intendment. Section 7  of

the Act of 1995 provides for functions of the DPC as has been prescribed  by

the Constitution. The Constitution under Article 243ZD  directs  setting  up

of a DPC to consolidate the plans prepared by Panchayats and  Municipalities

in the Districts and to prepare a draft development plan for district  as  a

whole and the Director of every DPC shall forward such development plans  as

recommended by the Committee to the government of the State.

After the insertion of part IX-A in the Constitution, development  plan  for

a District can only be drawn by the  democratically  elected  representative

body i.e. DPC, by taking  into  account  the  factors  mentioned  in  Clause

(3)(a) (i), (ii) of Article 243ZD. As per Clause (4) of Article  243ZD,  the

Chairman of other DPC shall forward the development plan as  recommended  by

the committee to the Government of the State.

To support his contention further, the  learned  senior  counsel  Mr.  Gopal

Subramaniam, relied upon a decision of the Bombay High Court in the case  of

Charan v. State of Maharashtra[3] wherein it was held as under:

“22. Article 243 of the Constitution  of  India  defines  -  District,  Gram

Sabha,  Panchayat,  Panchayat  Area  and  Village.  Article  243G   requires

legislature of State to  make  Law  to  bestow  upon  Panchayat  powers  and

authority to enable them to function, as institutions of  self-  government.

It may inter-alia provide for preparation of plans for economic  development

and social justice, for implementation of schemes for  economic  development

and social justice, as may be entrusted to Panchayats,  including  those  in

relation to  matters  listed  in  Eleventh  Schedule  to  the  Constitution.

Panchayat has been defined as an institution [by whatever name  called],  of

self- government, constituted under Article 243B for  Rural  Areas.  Article

243ZD  provides  for  constitution  at  District  level  in  every  State  a

Committee,  known  as  District  Planning  Committee.  It's  purpose  is  to

consolidate the plans prepared by the Panchayats and the  Municipalities  in

Districts and to prepare a draft development plan for district as  a  whole.

Article 243P defines Municipalities.  Definition  of  District  in  Articles

243P and 243, as also definition of  Panchayat  in  both  the  Articles  is,

identical. The purpose  of  Article  243ZD  therefore,  appears  to  have  a

committee to effectively amalgate together separate plans  prepared  by  the

Panchayats  and  Municipalities,  and  on  its  basis  to  prepare  a  draft

development plan for District as a whole. That Article may  also  mean  that

DPC can consolidate these plans and also in addition, independently  prepare

a draft development plan for district as a whole. As per Article  243-ZD[2],

the State Legislature has to provide for composition of DPC and  filling  in

of the seats. 4/5th of the total number of members of  such  committee  need

to be elected by and from amongst the elected members of  the  Panchayat  at

district level and of the municipalities in districts. The law made  by  the

State Legislature  may  assign  to  such  committees  function  relating  to

district planning. Article 243-ZD [3] obliges the DPC  to  prepare  a  draft

development plan having regard to the matters  of  common  interest  between

the Panchayats and Municipalities, including spatial  planning,  sharing  of

water and other physical and natural resources,  integrated  development  of

infrastructure and environment conservation. For that  purpose,  extent  and

type of resources needs to be looked into and  such  resources  may  include

finance or other resources. The Legislature of State has been  empowered  to

make law requiring the DPC  to  discharge  functions  relating  to  district

planning as may be assigned to it. Under Sub-Article [4] the Chairperson  of

every District Planning  Committee  has  to  forward  the  development  plan

recommended by such committee to Government of State. Obviously, it  is  the

draft development plan referred to in  earlier  part.  Perusal  of  Eleventh

Schedule shows 29 entries,  which  include  Agriculture,  Land  improvement,

Animal Husbandry, Social Forestry, Rural housing,  Drinking  water,  Poverty

alleviation, Education, Libraries, Market and fairs, Health and  Sanitation,

Family welfare, Women and Child Development etc. Entry no.13  therein  deals

with Roads,  Culverts,  Bridges,  Ferries,  Waterways  and  other  means  of

communication. Article 243W casts similar  power  and  obligation  upon  the

Municipalities. Schedule relevant therein is Twelfth Schedule and Roads  and

Bridges is entry no.4 in it. Article 243N specifies that  any  law  relating

to  Panchayat  in  force,  immediately  before  the  commencement   of   the

Constitution [73rd Amendment] Act,  1992  which  is  inconsistent  with  the

provision of this part IX of the  Constitution,  shall  continue  to  be  in

force until amended or repealed by a  competent  legislature  or  until  the

expiration of one year from its commencement, whichever  is  earlier.  Thus,

these new provision added to Constitution for  strengthening  the  Panchayat

Raj must operate after 1 year, if State  Legislature  had  any  inconsistent

law with provision in said part and if that Legislature does  not  bring  it

in consonance with said part within said period of one year.

23.  These  Constitutional  provision  no  where  show  the   intention   of

Parliament to deprive the Panchayats or Municipalities of  their  powers  or

to  dilute  their  function  as  institutions  of  self-government.  On  the

contrary, subject to provision of Constitution,  the  Legislature  of  State

has been permitted to confer  necessary  powers  and  authority  upon  these

bodies to enable them to function effectively. Article 243ZD which  makes  a

provision for DPC, is one such provision. It  requires  the  Legislature  to

make a law and stipulates that purpose of DPC is  to  consolidate  the  plan

prepared by the Panchayats and Municipalities in Districts and to prepare  a

draft development plan for District as a whole. The provision  noted  by  us

above show relevance of matters of common interest, as specified in  Article

243 ZD [3][a] for said purpose. A Panchayat  or  Municipality  can  function

only in area over  which  it  has  jurisdiction.  Schemes  prepared  by  it,

therefore may not have any extra territorial application though  possibility

of its such impact or extending its benefit to  outsiders  cannot  be  ruled

out.  The  water  reservoir  or   other   physical/natural   resources,   in

jurisdiction  of  such  institution  of  local  self   government   can   be

conveniently exploited for larger area of two or  more  Panchayats  or  then

Panchayats and municipalities at same cost or by saving public  revenue.  To

facilitate such exploitation, the Parliament has thought it fit to create  a

District Planning  Committee  [DPC]  which  can  consolidate  the  otherwise

separate plans prepared by the Panchayats and Municipalities and  prepare  a

draft development plan for entire District as a  whole.  It  is,  therefore,

obvious  that  when  such  consolidation  of  development  plans  which  are

otherwise separate, becomes  necessary  or  is  found  essential  in  larger

public interest, DPC has been constituted to  undertake  that  exercise.  It

has been given power to prepare a draft development plan for district  as  a

whole also. Thus idea seems  to  be  maximum  utilization  of  resources  at

minimum costs by larger number of people spread over under  different  local

bodies in a district. Article 243ZD does not confer  any  executable  status

on such plans and the same need to be  sent  to  Government  of  the  State.

Thus, if development is restricted to area of only one authority and has  no

extraterritorial potential,  the  right  of  concerned  local  authority  to

proceed with it, is normally not prejudiced in any way.”

                                           (emphasis supplied by this Court)

As has been mentioned supra, the Respondent No.2-RDA was  constituted  under

Section 38 of the Act  of  1973.  The  Town  Development  Scheme  framed  by

Respondent No. 2-RDA,  however, has to be  read  in  the  light  of  Section

50(4) which provides for the approval of  the  Town  Development  Scheme  by

appropriate authority which reads as under:

“(4) The Town and Country  Development  Authority  shall  consider  all  the

objections and suggestions as may be received within  the  period  specified

in the notice under sub section (3) and shall,  after  giving  a  reasonable

opportunity to such persons  affected  thereby  as  are  desirous  of  being

heard, or after considering the report of the  committee  constituted  under

Sub section (5) approve the draft scheme shall be deemed to have lapsed.]”

Further, an amendment was made for the  State  of  Chhattisgarh  only,  with

respect to constitution of committee for evaluating reconstitution of  plots

for the purpose of the Town Development  Scheme.  The  amendment  came  into

force w.e.f. 6.9.2010 which reads as under:

“[(5) Where the town development scheme relates to reconstitution of  plots,

the Town and Country Development Authority shall,  notwithstanding  anything

contained in Sub- section (4), constitute  a  committee  consisting  of  the

Chief Executive Officer of the said Authority and to other members  of  whom

one shall be representative of the District Collector, not  below  the  rank

of Deputy Collector and the other shall  be  an  officer  of  the  Town  and

Country Planning Department not below the rank of Deputy Director  nominated

by the Director of Town &  Country  Planning  for  the  purpose  of  hearing

objection and suggestions received under sub- section (3).]”

                                            (emphasis supplied by the Court)

Therefore, in the light  of  the  provisions  mentioned  above  if  read  in

harmonious construction, the Chief Executive Officer of  Respondent  No.  2-

RDA is not permitted to unilaterally prepare a development scheme  resulting

reconstitution of land without taking into  consideration  the  opinion  and

suggestions of the  democratically  elected  bodies  such  as  the  District

Planning Committee and Officer of the Town and Country Planning  Department,

as mentioned in the Act of 1973. However, in the present case,  as  per  the

evidence on record put before us, the Chief Executive Officer of  Respondent

No. 2- RDA, formulated  the  Town  Development  Scheme  without  taking  the

opinion of the local committees which  are  constitutionally  authorized  to

make suggestions in the matter of Town Development Scheme under the  amended

provisions of Section 50(5) of the Act of 1973.

     In addition to this, it  has  been  contended  by  the  learned  senior

counsel on behalf of the appellants that the present master plan,  of  which

the development authority wants to  implement,  has  been  prepared  by  the

Chief Executive Officer without regard to the District Planning  Committee’s

power under the constitutional provisions which provisions are  incorporated

in the State Act. Therefore, it  has  been  argued  by  the  learned  senior

counsel  that  the  revised  master  plan   itself   is   opposed   to   the

constitutional and statutory provisions and therefore, it is  a  nullity  in

the eyes of law. Following the same,  the  KVTDS  framed  and  purported  in

compliance with the Raipur Master Plan (Revised) 2021, is  also  nullity  in

the eyes of law.

The above said argument is raised by the learned senior  counsel  on  behalf

of the appellants drawing our attention to  the  case  of  Chairman,  Indore

Vikas Pradhikaran v. Pure Industrial Coke & Chemicals Ltd.[4] which will  be

discussed in the appropriate place of this judgment. It  was  held  in  that

case that both development plan and master plan are one and the  same  thing

described by different names in different states. It has  been  admitted  by

the Respondent No. 2- RDA that they have prepared the Master Plan  (Revised)

2021. We are of the opinion that the Master Plan so  prepared  is  in  clear

contravention of Section 14 of the Act of 1973 read along  with  Section  17

of the same Act. Section 17 of the Act mandates the  requirement  of  taking

into consideration the Annual Development  Plan  of  the  District  prepared

under the Madhya Pradesh Zila Yojana Samiti Adhiniyam 1995. However, in  the

case in hand, there is no evidence to show that the Respondent  No.  2-  RDA

had taken into consideration any report prepared under the Act of  1995.  On

the other hand,  there  is  correspondence  on  record  to  prove  that  the

Respondent No. 2- RDA, on its own, without  taking  into  consideration  any

report, revised the Master Plan 2021 to suit it to the  requirement  of  the

KVTDS. Therefore, we are of the opinion that the Master Plan (Revised)  2021

requires reconsideration and should  be  prepared  in  accordance  with  the

legal procedure.

Next, it is relevant for us to examine Entry 5 of List  II  of  the  Seventh

Schedule to the Constitution which empowers the local  government  to  elect

members to municipal  corporations,  improvement  trusts,  District  boards,

Mining settlement authorities and other local authorities  for  the  purpose

of local self-government or village administration. Also,  under  Entries  1

and 3 of  Twelfth  Schedule,  Urban  planning  includes  town  planning  and

planning for economic and social development respectively. In the  light  of

the above entries, it is contended by the learned senior counsel  on  behalf

of the appellants, Mr. Gopal Subramaniam and Mr. Huzefa Ahmadi that the  Act

of 1973 in the present case has been read by the respondents without  taking

into account the subsequent amendments made to the Act in adherence  to  the

constitutional amendment provision. As a consequence, the  power  vested  on

the Director of the Planning Authority has been read by the respondent No.2-

RDA in isolation to the  subsequent  amendments  made  in  the  Act  thereby

violating the present constitutional scheme of self governance.

 It was further argued by the  learned  senior  counsel  on  behalf  of  the

appellants that under Article 243 N and Article 243 ZF, the Act of 1973  was

required to be amended to make it adherent to the  provisions  of  73rd  and

74th Constitutional amendments. The learned senior  counsel  further  argued

that disobedience to the constitutional mandate amounts to breaking down  of

the  federal  polity  leading  to  constitutional   impasse.   The   amended

provisions of the  Act  of  1973  clearly  provides  for  a  role  of  local

authorities in the planning process. The same cannot  be  abrogated.  It  is

also contended  that  the  role  and  functions  of  the  District  Planning

Committee were  notified  once  Chhattisgarh  was  notified  out  of  Madhya

Pradesh. This was further supplemented by the District  Planning  Committee.

Therefore, in the presence of a notified  District  Planning  Committee,  it

was argued by the learned senior counsel, that planning for districts  as  a

conglomeration of panchayats cannot be done by Respondent No. 2-RDA.

We are in agreement with the legal contentions raised by the learned  senior

counsel on behalf of the appellants.  Once  the  Constitution  provides  for

democratically elected bodies for local self-government,  a  nominated  body

like Respondent No. 2- RDA cannot assume the role of  an  elected  body  and

consequently usurp the power of the local authority in  framing  development

schemes and subsequently altering the size and use of land in the KVTDS.

 On the other hand, it was argued by  Mrs.  Pinky  Anand  and  Mr.  Prashant

Desai, the learned senior counsel on behalf of the respondents that most  of

the submissions made by the learned senior counsel of the  appellants,  were

not raised before the courts below and have been raised for the  first  time

before this Court on the ground of violation of the 73rd and 74th  amendment

of the Constitution. Further,  it  was  argued  that  there  has  been  full

compliance of 73rd and 74th Constitutional Amendment and  the  committee  as

contemplated  by  the  said  amendment,  is   also   responsible   for   the

modification or revision of the development plan under Section 23 read  with

Sections 14 to 18 of the Act of 1973.

 We are not able to agree with the  contention  of  the  respondent  that  a

ground raised before this Court for  the  first  time  is  not  maintainable

because it has been raised before us for the first time  and  has  not  been

raised before the courts below. Though the said legal  plea  is  raised  for

the first time in these proceedings, the learned senior  counsel  on  behalf

of the appellants placed reliance upon the judgment of the Privy Council  In

Connecticut Fire Insurance Co. v.  Kavanagh[5]   wherein,  Lord  Watson  has

observed as under:

“when a question of law is raised for the first time  in  a  court  of  last

resort, upon the construction of a document, or upon facts  either  admitted

or proved beyond controversy, it is not only  competent  but  expedient,  in

the interests of justice, to entertain the plea.”

The aforesaid views of the Court of Appeal have been  relied  upon  by  this

Court in Gurcharan Singh v. Kamla Singh[6]. The above  mentioned  aspect  of

Article 243ZD, although is being raised before  this  Court  for  the  first

time, we are of the view that the same is  based  on  admitted  facts.   The

legal submission made on behalf of the appellants  under  Article  243ZD  of

the Constitution has to be accepted by this Court in  view  of  the  similar

view that a new ground raising a pure question of law can be raised  at  any

stage before this Court as  laid  down  by  this  Court  in  V.L.S.  Finance

Limited v. Union of India & Ors.[7], which reads thus :-

“7. Mr Shankaranarayanan has taken an extreme stand before  this  Court  and

contends that the Company Law Board  has  no  jurisdiction  to  compound  an

offence punishable under  Section  211(7)  of  the  Act  as  the  punishment

provided  is  imprisonment  also.  Mr   Bhushan,   however,   submits   that

imprisonment is not a mandatory punishment under Section 211(7) of  the  Act

and, hence, the Company Law Board has the authority to  compound  the  same.

He also points out that this submission was not at all advanced  before  the

Company Law Board and, therefore,  the  appellant  cannot  be  permitted  to

raise this question for the first time before this  Court.  We  are  not  in

agreement with Mr Bhushan in regard to his plea that  this  question  cannot

be gone into by this Court at the first instance. In our opinion, in a  case

in which the facts pleaded give rise to a pure question of law going to  the

root of the matter, this Court possesses discretion to  go  into  that.  The

position would have been different had the  appellant  for  the  first  time

prayed before this Court for adjudication on an issue of fact  and  then  to

apply the law and hold that the Company Law Board  had  no  jurisdiction  to

compound the offence.”

Further, this Court in Greater Mohali Area Development Authority &  Ors.  v.

Manju Jain & Ors.[8] held as under :-

“26. Respondent 1 raised the plea of non-receipt of the letter of  allotment

first time before the High Court. Even if it is assumed that it is  correct,

the question does arise as to whether such a new  plea  on  facts  could  be

agitated before the writ court. It is settled legal  proposition  that  pure

question of law can be raised at any time of the proceedings but a  question

of fact which requires investigation and inquiry, and for which  no  factual

foundation has been laid by a party before  the  court  or  tribunal  below,

cannot be allowed to be agitated in the writ petition.  If  the  writ  court

for some compelling circumstances desires to entertain a  new  factual  plea

the court must give due opportunity to the opposite party to controvert  the

same and adduce the evidence to substantiate its pleadings. Thus, it is  not

permissible for the High Court to consider a new  case  on  facts  or  mixed

question of fact and law which was not the case of the  parties  before  the

court or tribunal below. [Vide State of U.P. v. Dr. Anupam Gupta, Ram  Kumar

Agarwal v. Thawar Das, Vasantha Viswanathan v. V.K.  Elayalwar,  Anup  Kumar

Kundu v. Sudip Charan Chakraborty, Tirupati  Jute  Industries  (P)  Ltd.  v.

State of W.B. and Sanghvi Reconditioners (P) Ltd. v. Union of India.]

27. In the instant case, as the new plea on fact has been raised first  time

before the High Court it could not have been  entertained,  particularly  in

the manner the High Court has dealt with as no opportunity of  controverting

the same had been given to the appellants. More so, the High Court,  instead

of examining the case in the correct perspective, proceeded in haste,  which

itself amounts to arbitrariness. (Vide Fuljit Kaur v. State of Punjab.)”

In National Textile Corporation Ltd. v. Naresh Kumar Badrikumar Jagad[9],

it was held as under:-

“19. There is no quarrel to the settled legal proposition that  a  new  plea

cannot be taken in respect of any factual controversy  whatsoever,  however,

a new ground raising a pure  legal  issue  for  which  no  inquiry/proof  is

required can be permitted to be raised by the court  at  any  stage  of  the

proceedings. [See Sanghvi Reconditioners (P) Ltd.  v.  Union  of  India  and

Greater Mohali Area Development Authority v. Manju Jain.]”

 Further, this Court has frowned upon the  practice  of  the  Government  to

raise technical pleas to defeat the rights of the citizens  in  Madras  Port

Trust v. Hymanshu International[10] wherein it was opined that it  is  about

time that governments and public  authorities  adopt  the  practice  of  not

relying upon technical pleas for the purpose of defeating legitimate  claims

of citizens and do what is fair and just to the citizens. Para  2  from  the

said case reads thus :-

“2. We do not think that this is a fit  case  where  we  should  proceed  to

determine whether the claim of the respondent was barred by Section  110  of

the Madras Port Trust Act (II of 1905). The  plea  of  limitation  based  on

this section is one which the court always looks upon with disfavour and  it

is unfortunate that a public authority like the Port Trust  should,  in  all

morality and justice, take up such a plea to defeat  a  just  claim  of  the

citizen. It is high time that governments and public authorities  adopt  the

practice of not relying upon technical pleas for the  purpose  of  defeating

legitimate claims of citizens and do what is fair and just to the  citizens.

Of course, if a government or a public authority takes up a technical  plea,

the Court has to decide it and if the plea is well-founded,  it  has  to  be

upheld by the court, but what we  feel  is  that  such  a  plea  should  not

ordinarily be taken up by a government or  a  public  authority,  unless  of

course the claim is not well-founded and by reason of delay  in  filing  it,

the evidence  for  the.  purpose  of  resisting  such  a  claim  has  become

unavailable. Here, it js obvious that the claim  of  the  respondent  was  a

just claim supported as it  was  by  the  recommendation  of  the  Assistant

Collector of Customs and hence in  the  exercise  of  our  discretion  under

Article 136 of the Constitution, we do not see  any  reason  why  we  should

proceed to hear this appeal and adjudicate upon the plea  of  the  appellant

based on Section 110 of the Madras Port Trust Act (II of 1905).”

We are also not inclined to accept  the  contention  urged  by  the  learned

senior  counsel  on  behalf  of  the  respondents  that  the  committee   is

authorised to modify or alter the Development Plan under Sections 14 and  17

read with Section 23 of the Act of 1973.

As has been mentioned earlier, section 14 of the Act confers the power  upon

the Director of Town and  Country  Planning  appointed  under  the  Act,  to

prepare development plans. However, this power conferred upon  the  Director

has to be read along  with  Section  17  of  the  Act,  which  mandates  the

Director to take into consideration, any draft Five  Year  Plan  and  Annual

Development Plan of a  district  prepared  under  the  Madhya  Pradesh  Zila

Yojana Samiti Adhiniyam, 1995. In the case in hand, there is no evidence  to

prove that the Director had taken into account any  report  made  under  the

1995 Adhiniyam. On the other hand, the evidence on  record  produced  before

us clearly shows that the Development Plan has  been  altered  to  suit  the

requisites of KVTDS. This  action  by  the  Director  is  impermissible  and

unlawful.

Therefore, we are inclined to accept the contention raised  by  the  learned

senior counsel on behalf of the  appellants  and  hold  that  KVTDS,  having

formulated  solely  by  the  Respondent  No.  2-  RDA  without  taking  into

consideration the reports of the local authority, violates the Act  of  1973

as well as Part IX and IX-A of the Constitution.

 We are inclined to agree with the fact that the Development  Plan  and  its

modification has  not  been  made  in  accordance  with  the  constitutional

mandate and the Act of 1973. It is further contended by the  learned  senior

counsel on behalf of the appellants that in the backdrop  of  the  aforesaid

Constitutional morality and the fact situation of the  cases  in  hand,  the

decision of the Respondent No.2- RDA to add 1900 acres of land at  different

stages, and also change of land use, is sullied by bias of Sri  S.S.  Bajaj,

who acted in different  capacities  in  relation  to  the  same  transaction

wherein each authority was expected to apply its mind independently of  each

other. The said contention by the learned senior counsel on  behalf  of  the

appellants is well founded and the same must  be  accepted  by  this  Court.

There is strong substance and evidence in the  submissions  of  the  learned

senior counsel of the appellants. As per the evidence  produced  before  us,

on 20.07.2009, one Sri S.S. Bajaj, served as the CEO of the  Respondent  No.

2- RDA proposed addition of 1900 acres of land  in  KVTDS.   About  20  days

later, on 10.08.2009, the  same  Mr.  S.S.  Bajaj  was  serving  as  Special

Secretary, Department of Housing  &  Environment,  Chhattisgarh  Government,

which is Respondent No.1 before us has approved the said  addition  of  1900

acres of land to the scheme which is a clear case of bias.  This  Court  has

on many occasions, mentioned the  bare  minimum  requirement  of  trust  and

fairness by the state that should  ensure  its  people  in  running  of  the

government.  In  the  case  of  Mohinder  Singh  Gill  v.   Chief   Election

Commissioner[11], this Court held as under:

“3. The moral may be stated with telling terseness in the words  of  William

Pitt: 'Where laws end, tyranny begins'. Embracing both  these  mandates  and

emphasizing their combined effect is  the  elemental  law  and  politics  or

Power best expressed by Benjamin Dizreeli:

I repeat...that all power  is  a  trust-that  we  are  accountable  for  its

exercise-that, from the people and for the  people,  all  springs,  and  all

must exist."

(Vivien Grey, BK. VI. Ch. 7)

Aside from these is yet another, bearings on the play  of  natural  justice,

its  nuances,  non-applications,  contours,  colour  and  content.   Natural

Justice is no mystic testament of judge made  juristic  but  the  pragmatic,

yet principled,  requirement  of  fairplay  in  action  as  the  norm  of  a

civilised  justice-system  and  minimum  of   good   government-crystallised

clearly in our jurisprudence by a catena of cases here and elsewhere….”

It has also been held by this Court that principles of natural  justice  are

applicable to administrative enquiries as well, and that no person can be  a

judge in his own cause. It was held in the case of A.K  Kraipak  &  Ors.  v.

Union of India & Ors.[12]:

“20.The aim of the rules of natural justice is to secure justice or  to  put

it negatively to prevent miscarriage of justice.  These  rules  can  operate

only in areas not covered by any law validly made. In other  words  they  do

not supplant the law of the land but supplement it. The concept  of  natural

justice     has undergone a great deal of change in  recent  years.  In  the

past it was thought that it included just two rules namely (1) no one  shall

be a judge in his own  case (Nemo debet esse judex propria  causa)  and  (2)

no decision  shall  be  given  against  a  party  without  affording  him  a

reasonable hearing (audi alteram partem). Very soon  there-  after  a  third

rule was envisaged and that is that quasi- judicial enquiries must  be  held

in good faith, without bias and not arbitrarily or unreasonably. But      in

the course of years many more subsidiary rules  came  to  be  added  to  the

rules of natural justice. Till    very recently it was the  opinion  of  the

courts that unless the authority concerned was required  by  the  law  under

which it functioned to  act  judicially  there  was  no       room  for  the

application of the  rules     of  natural  justice.  The  validity  of  that

limitation is now questioned.  If  the  purpose  of  the  rules  of  natural

justice is to prevent miscarriage of justice one fails  to  see  why   those

rules should be made inapplicable to administrative enquiries.  Often  times

it is not easy to draw the line  that  demarcates  administrative  enquiries

from    quasi-judicial   enquiries.   Enquiries   which   were    considered

administrative at one time are now being  considered  as  quasi-judicial  in

character. Arriving at a just decision is the aim of  both  quasi-  judicial

enquiries as well as administrative enquiries.”

For the above reason alone  as  rightly  contended  by  the  learned  senior

counsel on behalf of the appellants, the enhancement of land  in  the  KVTDS

is vitiated due to lack of objectivity and non-application of mind.

The initial intention to prepare the KVTDS of 416.93 acres was published  in

the Gazette  on  05.06.2009.  Thereafter,  on  14.07.2009,  Sri  S.S.  Bajaj

serving as CEO of Respondent No. 2- RDA presided over  the  meeting  of  the

Board of Directors of the RDA wherein the decision  to  add  1900  acres  of

land of villages including Dumartarai Village to KVTDS was  taken.  Pursuant

to the said Board Resolution, the CEO-RDA sent a proposal  dated  20.07.2009

to the State Government seeking addition of an area of  1900  acres  to  the

KVTDS.  It is clear from the minutes of the Board meeting  on  14.7.2009  as

well  as  the  said  proposal  dated  20.7.2009  that  no  prior  survey  or

assessment of the need for addition of land to the area of  the  scheme  was

undertaken by the RDA.

As rightly pointed out by the  learned  senior  counsel  on  behalf  of  the

appellants, a proposal for  the  Town  Development  Scheme  required  to  be

submitted to the State Government in accordance with  the  Government  Order

dated 18.11.1999 and it is the obligation of the  Respondent  No.  1-  State

Government to independently consider such a proposal and exercise  its  mind

as to whether the same is  proper  and  if  it  raises  concerns  of  public

interest when such inclusion  of  the  land  use  is  made  under  the  Town

Development Scheme.  Independently, it is evident  from  the  fact  that  on

20th July, 2009, a proposal was sent by the Respondent No.  2-  RDA  to  the

Respondent No. 1- State Government and the same was  approved  by  Sri  S.S.

Bajaj,  who  at  that  point  of  time  was  acting  as  Special  Secretary,

Department of Housing and Environment, Government of  Chhattisgarh  who  had

also proposed the addition of 1900 acres to be included in the  scheme  when

he was acting as the CEO of the RDA. It is evident from the evidence put  on

record  before  us  that  the  same  person  was  acting  in  two  different

capacities who proposed as well as accepted the plan of addition of land  at

subsequent stage. The said proposal was accepted within a span  of  20  days

only i.e. on 10.08.2009.

In view of the aforesaid undisputed facts as  pointed  out  by  the  learned

senior counsel on behalf of the appellants, the aforesaid decision taken  by

Sri S.S. Bajaj as Special Secretary, Department of Housing and  Environment,

Government of Chhattisgarh (Respondent No. 1) in approving the  proposal  of

RDA to include large extent of land to the KVTDS is  vitiated action in  law

as the same is tainted with bias and non-application of mind on the part  of

the State Government-Respondent No.1 with regard  to  the  proposal  of  the

Respondent No. 2- RDA to include large extent of land in  the  scheme.   The

Respondent No. 2- RDA released an affidavit dated 23.11.2010 on  the  ground

of challenge by stating that:

“all decisions and actions have been taken by the Authority and not  by  any

individual.  Even otherwise the communications done by the officer  for  the

answering respondent was not his individual communication but was on  behalf

of the Committee as well as Board of Directors and therefore  could  not  be

said to have in his individual capacity. Likewise,  whole  corresponding  on

behalf of the State Government and on behalf of His Excellency the  Governor

and in his individual capacity.”

 However on the basis of the evidence on record produced before us,  we  are

unable to concede with the affidavits so released by Respondent No.  2-  RDA

since the evidence of bias and self-interest is evident. This Court  in  one

occasion, in the case of The State of Punjab and Anr. v. Gurdial  Singh  and

Ors.[13] opined with respect to mala fide  in  jurisprudence  of  power,  as

under :-

“9. The question, then, is what  is  mala  fides  in  the  jurisprudence  of

power? Legal malice is gibberish unless juristic clarity keeps  it  separate

from the popular concept of personal vice.  Pithily  put,  bad  faith  which

invalidates the exercise of power sometimes called  colourable  exercise  or

fraud on power and oftentimes overlaps motives, passions  and  satisfactions

is the attainment of ends  beyond  the  sanctioned  purposes"  of  power  by

simulation or pretension of gaining a legitimate goal. If  the  use  of  the

power is for  the  fulfilment  of  a  legitimate  object  the  actuation  or

catalysation by malice is not legicidal. The action is bad  where  the  true

object is to reach an end different from the one  for  which  the  power  is

entrusted, goaded by extraneous considerations, good or bad, but  irrelevant

to the entrustment. When  the  custodian  of  power  is  influenced  in  its

exercise by considerations outside those for promotion of  which  the  power

is vested the court calls it a colourable  exercise  and  is  undeceived  by

illusion. In a broad, blurred sense, Benjamin Disraeli was not off the  mark

even in Law when he stated: "I repeat that all power is a trust that we  are

accountable for its exercise that, from the people, and for the people,  all

springs, and all must exist".Fraud on power voids the order  if  it  is  not

exercised bona fide for the end designed.  Fraud  in  this  context  is  not

equal to moral  turpitude  and  embraces  all  cases  in  which  the  action

impugned is to effect some object which is beyond the purpose and intent  of

the power, whether this be malices-laden or even benign. If the  purpose  is

corrupt the resultant act is bad. If considerations, foreign  to  the  scope

of the power or extraneous to the statute, enter the verdict  or  impel  the

action mala fides or fraud on  power,  vitiates  the  acquisition  or  other

official act.”

In the case in hand, we are convinced that the action  taken  by  Respondent

No. 2- RDA as mentioned in the affidavit issued by it, meets different  ends

than the reason for which power had been assigned to it. It is contended  by

the learned senior counsel on behalf of the appellants  that  there  was  no

“Committee” in place. We are in agreement with  this  contention  raised  by

the learned senior counsel. As per the Order issued by  the  Revenue  Branch

of Respondent No. 2- RDA, the said Committee which was to review the  scheme

under Section 50(5) of the Act of 1973, was constituted  only  on  or  about

30.11.2009 but the decision to further extend the land size  into  the  Town

Development Scheme can be traced as early as 14.7.2009 with  the  report  of

Board Meeting No. 03/09.

 Apart from the said contravention made by the Respondent No.  2-  RDA,  its

proposal to have township of 2300 acres of land was examined by a  Committee

constituted under Section 50(5) of the  Act  of  1973,  which  prepared  its

report dated 8.6.2010.  The same was accepted by Shri S.S.  Bajaj,  Chairman

of Respondent  No.  2-RDA  in  the  Board  meeting  held  on  21.6.2010  and

22.6.2010. Therefore, the entire exercise made by RDA under Section  50  (5)

of the Act has been rendered otiose and an empty formality in the  light  of

the decisions of this Court mentioned supra and in  view  of  the  aforesaid

undisputed facts in relation to the action taken by the  Respondent  No.  1-

State  Government,  to  give  permission  only  after  applying   its   mind

independently on the materials submitted by the Respondent No.  2-RDA  which

is not done by the State Government and therefore, the  power  exercised  by

the State Government in sanctioning the proposed scheme of Respondent No. 2-

 RDA has rendered otiose. It is a well established principle in  the  Indian

jurisprudence that no one can be a judge in his own case. The fact has  been

established by various decisions of this Court. It was held in the  case  of

M/s. J. Mohapatra and Co. and Anr. v. State of Orissa & Anr.[14] as under:

“12. There is, however, an exception to the above rule that no men shall  be

a  judge  in  his  own  cause,  namely,  the  doctrine  of   necessity.   An

adjudicator, who is subject to disqualification on the  ground  of  bias  or

interest in  the  matter  which  ha  has  to  decide,  may  be  required  to

adjudicate if there is no other person who is  competent  or  authorized  to

adjudicate or if a quorum cannot be  formed  without  him  or  if  no  other

competent tribunal can be  constituted.  In  such  cases  the  principle  of

natural justice would have to give way  to  necessity  for  otherwise  there

would be no means of deciding the matter and the  machinery  of  justice  or

administration would break down. Thus, in  The  Judges  v.  Attorney-General

for Saskatchewan 53 TLR 464, the Judges of the Court  of  Appeal  were  held

competent to decide the question whether Judges of the Court of  Appeal,  of

the Court of King's Bench and of the District  Courts  of  the  Province  of

Saskatchewan were subject to taxation under the  Income-tax  Act,  1932,  of

Saskatchewan on the ground that they were bound to act ex  necessitate.  The

doctrine of necessity applies not only  to  judicial  matters  but  also  to

quasi-judicial and administrative matters. The High Court, however,  wrongly

applied  this  doctrine  to  the  author-members  of  the  Assessment   Sub-

Committee. It is true, the members of this Sub-Committee were  appointed  by

a Government Resolution and some of them were appointed  by  virtue  of  the

official position they were  holding,  such  as,  the  Secretary,  Education

Department of the Government of Orissa, and the Director, Higher  Education,

etc.  There  was,  however,  nothing  to  prevent  those  whose  books  were

submitted for selection from pointing out this fact to the State  Government

so that it  could  amend  its  Resolution  by  appointing  a  substitute  or

substitutes, as the case may be. There was equally nothing to  prevent  such

nonofficial author-members from resigning from the committee on  the  ground

of their interest in the matter.”

Therefore, in the light of the reasons mentioned by us above, we are of  the

considered view that there is total lack  of  application  of  mind  by  the

Respondent No. 1- State Government in not taking into consideration all  the

relevant aspects while declaring the KVTDS as well  as  the  finance  Scheme

proposed by the  Respondent  No.  2-  RDA.   The  Respondent  No.  1-  State

Government could not have sanctioned the aforesaid Scheme as the same is  in

contravention to the procedure laid down comprehensively in  Section  50  of

the Act of 1973.  The initial approval of the Scheme was  on  25.1.2008  and

approval to add 1900 acres of land to KVTDS dated 10.08.2009 was granted  by

the  State  Government  without  any  application  of  mind  and   objective

consideration by  the  Respondent  No.  1-State  Government  which  fact  is

expressly clear as the said proposed scheme was neither in  accordance  with

the Development Plan nor did any Zonal Plan which existed  at  the  material

point of time.  Therefore, for the reasons mentioned by us, we  answer  this

point in favour of the appellants.

Answer to Point No. 2

It is contended by the learned senior counsel on behalf  of  the  appellants

that the Town Development Scheme KVTDS prepared in the case in hand,  is  in

contravention to the provisions laid down in Section 50 of the Act.

Section 50(1) of the Act of 1973 reads thus:

“Preparation of Town Development Schemes-

The Town and Country Development Authority may, at  any  time,  declare  its

intention to prepare a Town Development Scheme:

[Provided that no such declaration of  intent  shall  be  made  without  the

prior approval of the State Government].

………”

Reliance has been placed upon the phrase “at any time” in Section  50(1)  of

the Act of 1973 by the learned senior counsel on behalf  of  the  appellants

contending  that  it  is  not  a   source   of   arbitrary   and   unbridled

power/discretion to exercise  its  power  arbitrarily  but  requires  study,

survey and assessment of need/requirement of plots for the residents of  the

area  before the intention of the RDA  can  be  declared  by  the  Town  and

Country Development Authority.

 In this regard, the learned senior counsel  on  behalf  of  the  appellants

have rightly placed reliance upon the judgment of this Court in the case  of

Chairman, Indore Vikas Pradhikaran (supra), wherein it was held as under:

“80. Section 50(1) of the Act provide for declaration of this  intention  to

prepare town development scheme “at any time”. The words “at  any  time”  do

not confer upon any statutory authority an unfettered  discretion  to  frame

the town development scheme whenever it so pleases. The words “at any  time”

are not charter for the exercise of an arbitrary  decision  as  and  when  a

scheme has to be framed. The words “at any time” have no exemption from  all

forms of limitation for unexplained and undue delay. Such an  interpretation

would not only result in the destruction of citizens’ rights but would  also

go contrary to the entire context in which the power has been given  to  the

authority.

81. The words “at any time” have to be interpreted in the context  in  which

they are used. Since a town development scheme in the context of the Act  is

intended to implement the development plan, the declaration of intention  to

prepare a scheme can only be in the  context  of  a  development  plan.  The

starting point of the declaration of  the  intention  has  to  be  upon  the

notification of development plan and the outer limit for  the  authority  to

frame such a scheme  upon  lapsing  of  the  plan.  That  is  the  plausible

interpretation of the words “at any time” used in Section 50(1) of the  Act.

(See State of H.P. v. Rajkumar Brijender Singh.”

The phrase “at any time” under Section 50(1) of the Act  is  not  a  charter

for the exercise of an arbitrary decision as and when a  scheme  has  to  be

framed.  The words ‘At any  time”  have  no  exemption  from  all  forms  of

limitation for unexplained and undue delay.  Such  an  interpretation  would

not only result  in  destruction  of  citizens  rights  but  would  also  go

contrary to the entire context in which the power has  been  conferred  upon

the authority.

Also, a proviso added to Section 50(1) of the Act in the  year  2012  states

that a Development Authority can declare its  intention  of  preparing  Town

Development Scheme only with the prior approval of the State Government.

Section 49 of the Act of 1973 provides for the  matters  for  which  a  Town

Development Scheme can be prepared. Section 49 of the Act reads thus:

“49. Town Development Scheme- A Town Development Scheme may  make  provision

for any of the following matters:-

(i) acquisition, development and sale or leasing of land for the purpose  of

town expansion;

(ii) acquisition, relaying out of, rebuilding,  or  relocating  areas  which

have been badly laid out or which has developed or degenerated into a slum;

(iii) acquisition and development  of  land  for  public  purposes  such  as

housing development, development  of  shopping  centres,  cultural  centres,

administrative centres;

(iv) acquisition and development of  areas  for  commercial  and  industrial

purposes;

(v) undertaking of such building or construction work as  may  be  necessary

to provide housing, shopping, commercial and other facilities;

(vi) acquisition of land and its development for the purpose of  laying  out

or remodelling of road and street patterns;

(vii)  acquisition  and  development  of  land   for   playgrounds,   parks,

recreation centres and stadia;

(viii) re-construction  of  plots  for  the  purpose  of  buildings,  roads,

drains, sewage lines and other similar amenities;

(ix) any other work of a nature such  as  would  bring  about  environmental

improvements which may be taken up by the authority with prior  approval  of

the State Government.”

Section 50(1) of the Act of 1973 vests the  jurisdiction  on  the  Town  and

Country Development Authority to declare its intention for preparing a  Town

Development Scheme, which in this case is the Respondent No. 2-RDA.  Section

49 provides that a Town Development Scheme can be proposed for  the  purpose

of  town  expansion,  for  rebuilding  and  regenerating  areas  which  have

degenerated into slums, acquire and development land for public,  commercial

and industrial purpose and also for  other  work  which  would  bring  about

environmental improvement which shall  also  be  taken  up  with  the  prior

approval of the State Government.  It may be noted that  Respondent  No.  2-

RDA has not put any document on record, either  before  the  High  Court  or

this Court which shows any assessment of “need” or  “requirement”  for  town

expansion conducted by it prior to proposing the KVTDS.  Even  though  KVTDS

has allegedly been introduced for a population of 16,000 per  40  Hect.   of

land there is no document /survey report on record  to  show  how  the  said

figure was arrived at by the RDA.  The requirement of  such  assessment  was

all the more necessary because already a new capital  called  ‘Naya  Raipur’

has been built near Raipur.

 Further, frequent changes in the extent of land acquired for the  KVTDS  by

the RDA is a very strong indicator of the fact that there  is  no  rationale

behind the proposal of  the  said  Scheme.  The  Respondent  No.2-  RDA  had

proposed the area of KVTDS to be 900  acres  on  31.7.2006,  1100  acres  on

14.11.2006, 394 acres on 3.6.2008 and eventually 2300  acres  on  20.7.2009,

without assigning reasons for coming to such conclusions  in  expanding  the

area to the scheme. In view of the above, there is clear non-application  of

mind on the part  of  the  State  Government  behind  the  increase  in  the

sanctioned area of KVTDS from 416.93 acres of land to 2300  acres  of  land.

In fact, in the letter dated 27.8.2008  to  the  Joint  Director,  Town  and

Country Planning Authority, it has been  specifically  noted  that  physical

survey of the area must be carried out.  It  is  contended  by  the  learned

senior counsel on behalf of  the  appellants  that  even  the  letter  dated

20.7.2009 addressed by Respondent No. 2- RDA to the Respondent No. 1-  State

Government admits that survey  of the area is being carried out  in  respect

of previous 416.93 acres of land.  In the  instant  case,  the  proposal  to

have KVTDS as well as sanction for the same by the Respondent No.  1-  State

Government, is not preceded by a survey  of  the  area,  which  renders  the

exercise of its power of ex post facto survey into an empty formality  which

action of it is wholly unsustainable in law.

Further, the purpose of the KVTDS as has been cited by the Respondent No. 2-

 RDA, is only with the purpose of curbing  illegal  plotting  which  can  be

served by regulating development work by exercise of statutory power  vested

in the Respondent No. 2- RDA under the  Act  of  1973.  On  the  pretext  of

regulating development  or  stopping  illegal  construction/  plotting,  the

Respondent No.2- RDA  cannot  take  away  the  land  of  the  appellants  in

exercise of the power of eminent domain by the State  Government.  The  Town

Development Scheme envisaged under Section 49 of the Act is for the  purpose

of acquisition, development and sale or leasing of land for the  purpose  of

town expansion. Under Section 49 (i) and (ii) of  the  Act,  the  Respondent

No. 2- RDA has power only to provide  for  housing  and  not  for  plotting.

Reconstruction of plot under  Section  49  clause  (viii)  of  the  Act,  is

confined only for the limited purpose of buildings, roads,  drains,  sewage,

sewage lines and other similar amenities. Reliance was also  placed  by  the

learned senior counsel on behalf of the appellants, on the decision of  this

Court in the case of Bondu Ramaswamy v. Bangalore Development  Authority[15]

to show that  this  Court  had  already  expressed  its  concern  about  the

lackadaisical manner in which the land is acquired by the  State  Government

in favour of the Bangalore Development Authority for housing scheme  in  the

metropolitan area without conducting proper enquiry about the  need  of  the

residents of the area and plights of the land owners. It  was  held  in  the

case as under :

“150. Frequent complaints and grievances in regard  to  the  following  five

areas, with reference to the prevailing system of acquisitions  governed  by

Land Acquisition Act, 1894, requires  the  urgent  attention  of  the  state

governments and development authorities:

(i) absence of proper or adequate survey and planning before embarking  upon

acquisition;

(ii) indiscriminate use of emergency provisions in  Section  17  of  the  LA

Act;

(iii) notification of areas far larger than what is actually  required,  for

acquisition, and then making arbitrary deletions and  withdrawals  from  the

acquisitions;

(iv)  offer  of  very  low  amount  as  compensation  by  Land   Acquisition

Collectors, necessitating references to court in almost all cases;

(v) inordinate delay in payment of compensation; and

(vi) absence of any rehabilitatory measures.

While the plight of project oustees and landlosers affected  by  acquisition

for industries has been frequently highlighted in the media, there has  been

very little effort to draw attention to the plight of  farmers  affected  by

frequent acquisitions for urban development.”

XXX           XXX            XXX

156. When BDA prepares a development scheme it is  required  to  conduct  an

initial survey about the availability and suitability of  the  lands  to  be

acquired. While acquiring 16 villages at a stretch, if in respect of any  of

the [pic]villages, about 30% area of the village  is  not  included  in  the

notification under Section 4(1) though available for  acquisition,  and  out

of the remaining 70% area which is notified, more than half (that is,  about

40% of the village area) is deleted when final notification is  issued,  and

the acquisition is only of 30% area which is non-contiguous, it  means  that

there was no proper survey or  application  of  mind  when  formulating  the

development scheme or that the deletions were for  extraneous  or  arbitrary

reasons.

157. Inclusion of the land of a person in an acquisition notification, is  a

traumatic experience for the landowner, particularly if  he  was  eking  out

his livelihood from that land. If large areas are notified  and  then  large

extents  are  to  be  deleted,  it  breeds  corruption  and  nepotism  among

officials. It also creates hostility, mutual distrust and  disharmony  among

the villagers, dividing them on the lines of “those who  can  influence  and

get their lands  deleted”  and  “those  who  cannot”.  Touts  and  middlemen

flaunting political  connections  flourish,  extracting  money  for  getting

lands deleted. Why subject a large number  of  citizens  to  such  traumatic

experience?  Why  not  plan  properly  before  embarking  upon   acquisition

process? In this case, out of  the  four  villages  included  at  the  final

stages of finalising the development scheme, irregularities have been  found

at least in regard to three  villages,  thereby  emphasising  the  need  for

proper planning and survey before embarking upon acquisition.

158.  Where  arbitrary  and  unexplained  deletions  and   exclusions   from

acquisition, of large extents of notified  lands,  render  the  acquisitions

meaningless, or totally unworkable, the court will have no  alternative  but

to quash the entire acquisition. But where many land  losers  have  accepted

the acquisition and received  the  compensation,  and  where  possession  of

considerable  portions  of  acquired  lands  has  already  been  taken,  and

development activities have been  carried  out  by  laying  plots  and  even

making provisional or actual allotments, those  factors  have  to  be  taken

note of, while granting relief. The Division Bench has  made  an  effort  to

protect the interests of all parties, on the  facts  and  circumstances,  by

issuing detailed directions. But  implementation  of  these  directions  may

lead to further litigations and complications.”

Section 2 (u) of the Act of 1973 defines a  Town  Development  Scheme  as  a

scheme formulated to implement the developmental plan. In the instant  case,

the development plan is the Master Plan of Raipur planning area.  Therefore,

the very definition clearly states that unless master plan allows use  of  a

particular area as ‘residential’, it is not open for  the  Respondent  No.2-

RDA to propose a township or a town development scheme whose land use is  at

variance with the one provided in the development plan.  Till such  time  as

the lands in question is notified for residential use, the Respondent No. 2-

 RDA cannot propose a Town Development scheme for the said land.

Respondent No.2- RDA is entrusted with a duty to implement the  master  plan

under Section 38(2) of the Act of  1973.   The  resolution  dated  5.11.2009

passed by the Respondent No. 2-RDA proposing to the State government to  get

the land use changed under Section 23A of the Act in order to implement  its

township project either by itself or the CEO, on their own or  in  a  manner

that is inconsistent with the text as well the  provisions  of  the  Act  of

1973.  In this regard, this Court has already laid down the legal  principle

in the case of Bangalore Medical Trust v. B.S. Muddappa[16], which reads  as

under:

“49. ….. There is no Section either in the Act nor any rule  was  placed  to

demonstrate that the Chairman alone, as such, could exercise  the  power  of

the Authority. There is no whisper nor there  is  any  record  to  establish

that any meeting of the Authority  was  held  regarding  alteration  of  the

scheme. In any case the power does not vest in the State Government  or  the

Chief Minister of the State. The exercise of power is further hedged by  use

of the expression, if 'it appears to the Authority'.  In  legal  terminology

it visualises prior consideration and objective decision. And all this  must

have  resulted  in  conclusion  that  the   alteration   would   have   been

improvement. Not even one was followed. The Chairman could  not  have  acted

on his own. Yet  without  calling  any  meeting  of  the  authority  or  any

committee he sent the letter for converting the site. How did it  appear  to

him that it was necessary, is mentioned in  the  letter  dated  21st  April,

because the Chief Minister desired so. The purpose of the  Authority  taking

such a decision is their knowledge of local conditions and what  was  better

for them. That  is  why  participatory  exercise  is  contemplated.  If  any

alteration in Scheme could be done by the Chairman and  the  Chief  Minister

then Sub-section  (4)  of  Section  19  is  rendered  otiose.  There  is  no

provision in the Act for alteration in a scheme by converting  one  site  to

another, except, of course if it appeared to be improvement. But  even  that

power vested in the Authority not the Government. What should have  happened

was that the Authority should have applied its mind and must  have  come  to

the conclusion that conversion of the site reserved for public park  into  a

private nursing home amounted to an improvement  then  only  it  could  have

exercised the power. But what happened in fact was that the application  for

allotment of the site was accepted first  and  the  procedural  requirements

were attempted to be gone through later and that  too  by  the  State  Govt.

which was not authorised to do so. Not  only  that  the  Authority  did  not

apply its mind and take any decision if there was  any  necessity  to  alter

the Scheme but even if it is assumed that the State  Govt.  could  have  any

role to play, the entire exercise instead of  proceeding  from  below,  that

is, from the BDA to State Government proceeded in reverse  direction,  that,

from the State Government to the BDA……”

As per the factual averments of  this  case,  the  Respondent  No.  2-  RDA,

without any resolution of the Board, on its own motion, addressed  a  letter

dated 31.7.2006 and approached the State Government for change of  land  use

because it had to propose the township in Tikrapara, Devpuri and  Boriakhurd

villages. Thereafter, KVTDS was  also  proposed,  published,  finalised  and

approved before the land use was changed by the State Government. Under  the

provisions of the Act of 1973, the development plan/ Raipur Master  Prevised

2021 that is prevailing, the Respondent No. 2-  RDA as  well  as  the  State

Government gave primacy to KVTDS and sought changes in the  master  plan  to

suit KVTDS. This is impermissible in law.  The finding recorded by the  High

Court of Chhattisgarh, Bilaspur, in its judgment  in  this  regard  that  no

finality can be attached  to  the  master  plan  is  an  erroneous  finding.

Accordingly, we are of the opinion that the Town  Development  Scheme  which

is KVTDS in the present case, was not prepared in  accordance  with  Section

50 of the Act of 1973 and we hold that KVTDS is ultra vires to  the  Act  of

1973.

Answer to Point No. 3

Though we have answered point no. 2 in favour of the  appellant,  we  intend

to mention other grounds too, which render KVTDS  as  illegal.  The  learned

senior counsel on behalf of the appellants contended that in the absence  of

a zonal plan, a Town Development Scheme cannot be framed by  Respondent  No.

2- RDA, and therefore, the  acquisition  proceedings  of  the  land  of  the

appellants cannot be allowed to sustain.

    The town development scheme is always subservient to the master plan  as

well as the zonal plan, as provided under Section 17 of  the  Act  of  1973,

which reads as under :-

“Section 17: Contents of development plan. A  development  plan  shall  take

into account any  draft  five  year  and  Annual  Development  plan  of  the

district prepared under the Madhya Pradesh  Zila  Yojana  Samiti  Adhiniyam,

1995 (No. 19 of 1995) in which the planning area is situated......”

Master plan falls within the category of  broad  development  plans  and  is

prepared by only after taking into account the  Annual  Development  Reports

prepared  by  constitutionally  elected  bodies  of  local  panchayats   and

municipalities etc. A zonal plan is mandated to be prepared only  after  the

publication of the Development Plan. Section 20 of the Act reads thus:

“20. Preparation of Zonal Plans- The Local Authority may on its  own  motion

at any time after the publication of the development plan, or thereafter  if

so required by the State Government shall, within the  next  six  months  of

such requisition, prepare a Zoning Plan”

Further, Section 21 of the Act reads thus:

Section 21: Contents of zoning plan. The zoning  plan  shall  “enlarge”  the

details of the land use as indicated in the development plan....

                                                (emphasis laid by the Court)

Thus, it is evident from the language of Sections 20  and  21  of  the  Act,

that a Zonal Plan can be prepared only in adherence to the Development  Plan

which in the present case is the Raipur Master Plan of 2021.

    Next, Section 49 of the Act which provides for the provisions for  which

a Town Development Scheme can  be  prepared,  has  to  be  read  along  with

Section 21 of the Act, which clearly mentions that  the  land  required  for

acquisition by the Town and Country Development Authority  for  the  purpose

of any development scheme has to be laid down in the Zonal Plan.

    Therefore, a combined reading of Sections 17, 21 and 49 lays  down  that

the Development Plan is the umbrella under which a zonal plan  is  made  for

the city. The zonal  plan  in  turn,  allocates  the  land  which  could  be

acquired for town development schemes. The Respondent  No.  2-  RDA  on  the

other hand, has taken the following stand in their common counter  affidavit

dated 23.11.2011 filed in the writ petition proceedings:

“That, thus, earlier the Master Plan, 2021 is modified as per  scheme  under

Section 23A or the scheme is modified  as  per  Master  Plan  under  Section

52(1) (b) of the Act, the net results remains that there is no violation  of

Master Plan, 2021 and therefore, the allegations of the petitioner that  the

scheme has been formulated and finalised in violation of  the  Master  Plan,

2021 is incorrect.”

Therefore, in the absence of a zonal plan in place, the  Respondent  No.  2-

RDA has skipped the legal  mandate  in  place  for  preparation  of  a  Town

Development Scheme.

The importance of zonal planning lies in  its  distinguished  characteristic

which lays down with sufficient particularity the use to which a  particular

piece of land could be put. The object and purpose of the  1973  Act  itself

foresees  that  zonal  plan  is  necessary  for  implementation  of  a  Town

Development Scheme. The preamble of the Act clearly discloses  that  a  Town

Development Scheme is at best a vehicle to implement  the  Development  Plan

and Zonal Plan. The object and purpose of the Act reads thus:

“An Act to make provision for planning and development and use of  land;  to

make better provision for the preparation of development  plans  and  zoning

plans with a view to ensuring town planning schemes are  made  in  a  proper

manner and their execution is made effective to,…..”

                                               (emphasis laid by this Court)

Therefore, the Object and Purpose of the  Act  also  provides  that  a  Town

Development Scheme can be prepared in the presence of a Zonal Plan which  in

turn has to be prepared for the implementation of the Development Plan.

In fact, Section 2(g) of the Act  of  1973  defines  “development  plan”  as

including “a zonal  plan”.  Therefore,  unless  a  Zonal  Plan  and  also  a

development plan is prepared, a Town Development Scheme cannot be  proposed.

 The provisions of Sections 49 and 50  of  the  Act  of  1973  categorically

provide for “Development Plan” to mean  “master  plan”  as  well  as  “Zonal

Plan”.

In the case in hand, the KVTDS has been prepared in the absence of  a  Zonal

Plan. It is not possible to define the utilization of land  under  the  Town

Development Scheme unless the Zonal Plan formulated by the  local  authority

describes with sufficient particularity the details for  which  the  broadly

indicated use of land in the Development Plan may be put. Respondent No.  2-

RDA is not permitted to either usurp or bypass the  power  vested  with  the

local authorities for preparing town development scheme in  the  absence  of

zoning plan merely on the ground that the local authority did  not  exercise

its  constitutional  power  in  preparing  the  zonal  plan  following   the

direction of Respondent No. 1- State Government under Section 20 of the  Act

of 1973. A mere glance at the Master Plan would clearly go to show  that  it

does not  set  out  the  detailed  land  use  with  sufficient  particulars.

Therefore, the framing of a Zonal Plan by local authority in  laying  out  a

detailed plan of land use with sufficient particulars  is  a  sine  qua  non

under the provisions of the Act.

The legal contention  urged  on  behalf  of  the  respondents  that  a  Town

Development Scheme can be framed pursuant to the  Development  Plan  without

there being a zonal plan, is not sustainable.  The  learned  senior  counsel

Mrs. Pinky Anand and Mr. Prashant Desai on behalf of the respondents  relied

upon the Act pari materia for the State of Gujarat where the  Town  Planning

Act does not contemplate a Zonal Plan, and which contemplates “DP-TP”.

The letter of Respondent No. 2-RDA dated 20.07.2009 addressed to  Respondent

No. 1- State Government seeking permission for the Town  Development  Scheme

in the enhanced area itself highlights the importance of planning  at  Zonal

level to stop illegal  development.  Having  regard  to  the  provisions  of

Sections 17, 19, 20, 21 and 49 of the Act of 1973, the relationship  between

the scope of Development Plan, Zoning Plan and Town Development  Scheme  can

be well understood and in view of the aforesaid provisions and  the  factual

position in relation to the KVTDS, unless a Zoning Plan exists,  it  is  not

possible for the Planning Authority to ascertain as to which area is  to  be

used for which purpose. A development authority under Section 38(2)  of  the

1973  Act  cannot,  in  the  name  of  planning  and  implementing  a   Town

Development Scheme, usurp the power of the local authorities and define  the

land use under the Town Development Scheme and  subsequently,  seek  changes

in the Master Plan to bring it in conformity with the KVTDS. In  support  of

this contention, reliance  has  been  placed  upon  by  the  learned  senior

counsel on behalf of the  appellants  on  the  judgment  of  this  Court  in

Chairman, Indore  Vikas  Pradhikaran  case  mentioned  supra,  the  relevant

portion of which is quoted hereunder :

“37. When a planning area is defined,  the  same  envisages  preparation  of

development plan and the manner in which the existing  land  use  is  to  be

implemented. A development plan in some statutes is also known as  a  master

plan. It lays  down  the  broad  objectives  and  parameters  wherewith  the

development plan is to  deal  with.  It  also  lays  down  the  geographical

splitting giving rise to preparation and finalization of  zonal  plans.  The

zonal plans contain more detailed and specific maters than the  master  plan

or the development plan. Town  planning  scheme  or  lay-out  plan  contains

further details on plot-wise basis. It may provide for the manner  in  which

each plot shall be dealt with as also the matter relating to regulations  of

development.

      XXX        XXX         XXX

72. Land use, development plan and zonal  plan  provided  for  the  plan  at

macro level whereas the town planning scheme is at a micro level and,  thus,

would be subject  to  development  plan.  It  is,  therefore,  difficult  to

comprehend that broad based macro level planning may not at all be in  place

when a town planning scheme is prepared.

       XXX        XXX         XXX

75. The purpose of declaring the intent under Section 50(1) of  the  Act  is

to implement a development plan. Section 53 of the Act  freezing  any  other

development is  an  incidence  arising  consequent  to  the  purpose,  which

purpose is to implement a development plan.  If  the  purpose  of  declaring

such an intention is merely to bring  into  play  Section  53,  and  thereby

freeze all development, it would amount to exercise of the power of  Section

50(1) for a collateral purpose, i.e., freezing of  development  rather  than

implementation of a development plan. The collateral purpose  also  will  be

to indirectly get over the fact that an owner of land  pending  finalization

of a development plan has all attendant rights of ownership subject  to  the

restraints under Section 16. If the declaration of  intent  to  formulate  a

town development scheme is to get over Section  16  and  freeze  development

activities under Section 53, it would amount to  exercise  of  power  for  a

collateral purpose.

76. A bare perusal of  Sections  17  and  49  would  show  that  it  is  the

development plan which determines the manner of usage of the  land  and  the

town development scheme enumerates the manner in which such  proposed  usage

can be implemented. It would follow  that  until  the  usage  is  determined

through a development plan, the stage of manner of  implementation  of  such

proposed usage cannot be brought about. It would also therefore follow  that

what is  contemplated  is  the  final  development  plan  and  not  a  draft

development plan, since until the development plan  is  finalized  it  would

have no statutory or legal force and the land use as existing prior  thereto

with the rights of usage of the land arising therefrom would continue.

77. To accept that it is open to the town development authority  to  declare

an  intention  to  formulate  a  town  development  scheme  even  without  a

development plan and ipso facto bring into play a freeze  on  usage  of  the

land under Section 53 would lead to complete misuse of powers and  arbitrary

exercise thereof depriving the citizen of his right to use the land  subject

to the permitted land use and laws relating to the manner of usage  thereof.

This would be an unlawful deprivation of the  citizen's  right  to  property

which right includes within it the right to use the property  in  accordance

with the law as it stands at such  time.  To  illustrate  the  absurdity  to

which such an interpretation could lead it would then  become  open  to  the

town  development  authority  to  notify  an  intent  to  formulate  a  town

development scheme even in the absence of a  development  plan,  freeze  all

usage of the property by a owner thereof by virtue  of  Section  53  of  the

Act, and should no development  plan  be  finalized  within  3  years,  such

scheme would lapse and the authority thereupon would merely notify  a  fresh

intent to formulate a town development scheme  and  once  again  freeze  the

usage of the  land  for  another  three  years  and  continue  the  same  ad

infinitum thereby in effect completely depriving the citizen  of  the  right

to use his property which was in a manner otherwise permitted under  law  as

it stands.

78. The essence of planning in the Act is the  existence  of  a  development

plan. It is a development plan, which under Section  17  will  indicate  the

areas and zones, the users, the open spaces, the institutions  and  offices,

the special purposes, etc. Town planning would be based on the  contents  of

the development plan. It is only when the development plan is in  existence,

can a town planning scheme be framed. In fact, unless  it  is  known  as  to

what  the  contents  of  a  possible  town  planning  scheme  would  be,  or

alternatively, whether in terms of the development plan  such  a  scheme  at

all is required, the intention to frame the scheme cannot be notified.

        XXX        XXX         XXX

87. An area conceived of under the Act, as  noticed  hereinbefore,  consists

of both plan area and non-plan area. Development of  plan  area  may  be  in

phases. A master plan may be followed by a zonal plan and a zonal  plan  may

be followed by a town development scheme.”

Further, the learned  senior  counsel  on  behalf  of  the  appellants  have

rightly placed reliance upon the principle  of  Constitutional  morality  as

explained by Dr. B. R. Ambedkar to the Constituent Assembly on 4th  November

1948.  The relevant portion of which is extracted hereunder:

“While  everybody   recognizes   the   necessity   of   the   diffusion   of

Constitutional  morality  for  the  peaceful   working   of   a   democratic

Constitution, there are two things interconnected with  it  which  are  not,

unfortunately, generally recognized. One is that the form of  administration

has a close connection with the form of the Constitution. The  form  of  the

administration must be appropriate to and in the same sense as the  form  of

the Constitution. The other is that it is perfectly possible to pervert  the

Constitution, without changing its form by merely changing the form  of  the

administration and to make it inconsistent and opposed to the spirit of  the

Constitution.” 

 In the light of  the  facts  and  circumstances  of  the  case,  the  legal

contentions urged before us, the provisions of  the  Act  and  also  in  the

light of the legal principles already laid down by this  Court,  we  are  of

the opinion that Respondent No. 2- RDA could not have  formulated  KVTDS-for

Raipur without a Zoning Plan there in place.  Accordingly,  we  answer  this

point in favour of the appellants.

Answer to Point No. 4

Section 50 (5) of the Act of 1973, read with Section 50 (6) of  the  Act  of

1973, provides for constitution of a committee  which  shall  determine  the

various aspects of a Town Development Scheme such  as  its  viability,  cost

effect etc. Section 50(6) of the Act provides that a  committee  constituted

under  section  50(5)  of  the  Act  shall  consider  the   objections   and

suggestions and  give  hearing  to  any  person  desirous  of  being  heard.

Thereafter, the committee shall submit its report to the  Town  and  Country

Development Authority and, is required  to  submit  its  proposal  on  these

aspects:

  Define and demarcate areas allotted or reserved for public purpose;

Demarcate the reconstituted plots;

Evaluate value of original plots and reconstituted plots;

Determine whether  the  areas  marked  for  public  purpose  are  wholly  or

partially beneficial to the residents;

  Estimate the  compensation  or  contribution  from  beneficiaries  of  the

scheme;

Evaluate increment in  value  of  the  reconstituted  plot  for  calculating

incremental value;

Evaluate the reduction in value and assess compensation payable therefor;

The committee, in the case, in hand, has recorded in its report only on  the

first four aspects and has held the last three aspects as not applicable  to

the scheme without assigning any valid  reasons.   Therefore,  in  providing

this  report,  the  committee  has  violated  the  mandatory  provision   of

providing a complete report before  acquiring  land  from  landowners  which

often results in loss of livelihood for poor agriculturists. This aspect  of

loss of livelihood has been noted  by  this  Court  in  the  case  of  Bondu

Ramaswamy mentioned supra.

The learned single judge of the High Court  of  Chhattisgarh,  Bilaspur,  in

his judgment, has held that the aforesaid three aspects are  not  applicable

in the present case  for  the  reason  that  the  Respondent  No.  1-  State

government has decided not to seek payment of incremental  cost/contribution

cost  from  the  land-holder  on  account  of  development  of  area   while

prescribing the  size  of  the  reconstituted  plots  for  which  respective

landholders would be entitled.

The said view of the learned single Judge has  been  erroneously  upheld  by

the Division Bench of the High Court of Chhattisgarh,  Bilaspur.   The  said

view taken by both the learned single judge and Division Bench of  the  High

Court of Chhattisgarh, Bilaspur, is contrary to the provision of the Act  of

1973,  since  the  High  Court  has  not  noticed   in   arriving   at   the

aforementioned conclusion  that  the  committee  was  not  adhering  to  the

mandatory provisions with  regard  to  development  scheme.  Therefore,  the

scheme is vitiated in law for lack of compliance with the provisions of  the

Act of 1973.  The manner in which the computation of increment in the  value

of the reconstituted plot has been arrived at, is vague.

 The affidavit of RDA dated 23.11.2011 by way  of  its  reply  to  the  writ

petitions, has taken the following stand:

“However, finally the Committee came to the conclusion that  as  the  scheme

is to be made in participation with, the general public, therefore,  neither

any  charge  would  be  levied  on  the  public  under  any  head  nor   any

compensation would be payable to any of the members of public on account  of

reduction of his plot size or  value…  However,  while  finally  making  its

recommendation the committee on  internal  page  No.  114  and  115  of  the

Annexure categorically recommended that the provisions  of  sub-section  (v)

(vi) and (vii) of the  Section  50  (6)  would  not  be  applicable  on  the

scheme.”

From the above averments of the Respondent No. 2- RDA in  its  affidavit  by

way of reply, it is evident that it has unilaterally  decided  to  make  the

mandatory provisions of Section 50(6) (v) (vi)  and  (vii)  of  the  Act  of

1973, inapplicable to the scheme without providing any reason for the  same.

 It could not have stated so, as this aspect is no more  res  integra.  This

court has already taken the view that  the  provisions  of  Section  50  are

mandatory in nature in the case of Ahmedabad Municipal Corpn.  v.  Ahmedabad

Green Belt Khedut Mandal[17], which will be discussed at  appropriate  place

in this judgment.

Further, there is no board resolution for the  village  Dumartarai,  and  in

any event, Board resolution of Respondent No. 2-  RDA  does  not  amount  to

intention to declare under Section 50 (1)  to  develop  a  town  development

scheme in terms of the Government Order dated  18.11.1999.   The  Respondent

No. 2- RDA,  on  the  other  hand,  is  required  to  seek  permission  from

Respondent No. 1- State Government to publish the intention in the  official

gazette.  The RDA under the aforesaid provision was required to declare  its

intention to the public at large.

In the  instant  case,  the  Respondent  No.  1-  State  Government  granted

permission to Respondent No. 2- RDA to publish its intention  under  Section

50(2)of the  Act  of  1973,   on  25.1.2008  for  village  Dunda  alone.  It

published its intention under the aforesaid provision for  the  villages  of

Dunda as well as Tikrapara pursuant to the Board Resolution by  circulations

dated 12.5.2009 and  5.6.2009.   Afterwards  the  Respondent  No.  1-  State

Government granted permission dated 10.8.2009 for  increasing  the  area  of

the Scheme to 2300 acres.  The Board of the RDA  issued  another  resolution

by circulation dated  20.8.2009  for  inclusion  of  three  villages  namely

Boriakhurd, Dumartarai and  Devpuri.   The  Board  Resolution  is  only  for

publication of the scheme in the gazette and the same was for  KVTDS  Scheme

No. 5 and not KVTDS Scheme No.4. Pursuant  to  the  Board  Resolution  dated

20.08.2009, a declaration of intention was published for amended  scheme  on

4.9.2009. The board resolution is merely for publication of  the  scheme  in

the official gazette.  There is no provision under the  1973  Act  to  issue

declaration only in so far  as  amended  portion  is  concerned.  Thus,  the

inclusion of village Tikrapara is  not  in  accordance  with  the  procedure

prescribed under the Act and the entire  process  had  to  be  commenced  de

novo.

The learned senior counsel for the appellants have rightly pointed  out  the

procedure of passing a resolution, by placing reliance upon  the  provisions

of Section  289  of  the  Company’s  Act,  1956  which  specifically  allows

resolution by circulation in the following terms:

“289. Passing of resolutions by circulation. No resolution shall  be  deemed

to have been duly  passed  by  the  Board  or  by  a  committee  thereof  by

circulation, unless the resolution has been circulated  in  draft,  together

with the necessary papers, if any, to all  the  directors,  or  to  all  the

members of the committee, then in India (not being less in number  than  the

quorum fixed for a meeting of the Board or committee, as the case  may  be),

and to all other directors or members at their usual address in  India,  and

has been approved by such of the directors as are then in  India,  or  by  a

majority of such of them, as are entitled to vote on the Resolution.”

Thus, since there is no declaration of intent preceding publication  in  the

gazette, Board Resolutions which are not  declared  to  the  public  in  the

matter prescribed under  the  Act  of  1973,  and  same  do  not  amount  to

declaration.

The Act does not empower the Respondent No. 2- RDA  to  reconstitute  plots.

Even if any authority can be read into it, it has to be  limited  to  public

utilities.

The provision under Section 49 of  the  Act  of  1973  only  allows  a  Town

Development Scheme to make provision for reconstruction  of  plots  for  the

purpose  of  buildings,  roads,  drains,  sewage  lines  and  other  similar

amenities. It may be noted that the Maharashtra Regional and  Town  Planning

Act, 1966 and the Gujarat Town Planning  and  Urban  Development  Act,  1976

specifically provide for reconstituted plots and the Acts also provided  the

procedure to be  followed  for  the  same  under  the  respective  statutes.

Section 65 (1) of the Maharashtra Act and Section 45 (1) of the Gujarat  Act

are in pari material, which are reproduced hereunder:

“Section 65 (1) of the Maharashtra Act:  In the draft scheme, the  size  and

shape of every reconstituted plot shall be determined, so far as may be,  to

render it suitable for building purposes, and where a plot is already  built

upon, to ensure that the buildings  as  far  as  possible  comply  with  the

provisions of the scheme as regards open spaces.”

Section 45 (1) of Gujarat Act: In the draft scheme referred  to  in  Section

44, the size and shape of every plot shall be determined, so far as may  be,

to render it suitable for building purposes and where the  plot  is  already

built upon, to ensure that the building, as far as possible,  complies  with

the provisions of the scheme as regards open spaces”

Further Section 49 (viii) of the Act of 1973 empowers RDA to make  provision

for reconstitution, which reads as under:

 “49.  Town  Development  Scheme  –  A  town  development  scheme  may  make

provision for any of the following matters:

    ……….

(viii) Re-constitution of plots for the purpose of buildings, road,  drains,

sewage lines and other similar amenities....”

From a careful reading of the aforesaid conclusions, it is evident that  the

board conferred power upon the Respondent No. 2-RDA to  make  provision  for

reconstitution and not for reconstruction per se.  In any event, such  power

to make provision for reconstitution is limited to certain specified  public

purposes, which does not include general housing scheme.

There is conspicuous absence of any empowering mechanism under  the  Act  of

1973 for the above purpose and  no  authority  has  been  vested  under  the

provision of the  Act  applicable  to  Chhattisgarh,  to  adjust  rights  of

parties in the land. In view of the aforesaid provision,  mere  prescription

or the scope of the activity in the Town Development  Scheme  under  Section

49 of the Act will not ipso facto confer the power upon  Respondent  No.  2-

RDA to alter rights of landowners in their properties.  This unique  anomaly

under the Act may be contrasted with the Gujarat  Act  and  the  Maharashtra

Act wherein the office of the Town Planning Officer  has  been  specifically

created for the said purpose.

    Further, under Section 52 of the Gujarat Act the town  planning  officer

carries out the task of reconstitution of  lands.  The  provision  reads  as

under:

“52(1) In a preliminary scheme, the Town Planning Officer shall:-

After giving notice in the prescribed manner and in the prescribed  form  to

the persons affected by the scheme, define and demarcate the areas  allotted

to, or reserved  for,  any  public  purpose,  or  for  the  purpose  of  the

appropriate authority and the final plots;

After giving notice as aforesaid, determine in a case in which a final  plot

is to be allotted to persons in ownership  in  common,  the  share  of  such

persons;

Provide for the total or the partial transfer of any right  in  an  original

plot to a final plot or  provide  for  the  transfer  of  any  right  in  an

original plot in accordance with the provisions of Section 81;

Determine a period within which  works  provided  in  the  scheme  shall  be

completed by the appropriate authority.”

Also, Section 81 of the Gujarat Town  Planning  and  Urban  Development  Act

reads as under:

“Any right in an original plot which in the opinion  of  the  Town  Planning

Officer  is  capable  of  being  transferred  wholly  or  in  part,  without

prejudice to the making of a town planning scheme, to a final plot shall  be

transferred and any right in an original plot which in the  opinion  of  the

Town Planning Officer is not  capable  of  being  so  transferred  shall  be

extinguished:

Provided that an  agricultural  lease  shall  not  be  transferred  from  an

original plot to final plot without the consent of all the parties  to  such

lease.”

The Maharashtra Act of 1966 confer this right on an Arbitrator appointed  by

the State Government. Section 72 (3) (xiii) of the Act reads as under:

“72 (3)in accordance with prescribed procedure, every Arbitrator shall,-

………….

(xiii) provide for the total  or  partial  transfer  of  any  right  in  the

original plot to a final plot or provide for the execution of any  right  in

an original plot in accordance with  the  provisions  contained  in  section

101;”

In the light of the provisions above mentioned, it is clear that under  both

the town  planning  legislations  for  Gujarat  and  Maharashtra  States,  a

specific authority has  been  statutorily  authorized  to  alter  rights  in

property and to reconstitute plots, whereas no such authority  has  been  so

empowered under  the  Chhattisgarh  Town  Planning  Act,  1973.   Therefore,

without an official amendment to the Chhattisgarh Act and without  following

the  mandatory  procedure,  no  reconstitution  of  land  under   the   Town

Development Scheme can take place.

To further establish this point, reliance has been  placed  by  the  learned

senior counsel on behalf of the appellants  on  the  following  judgment  of

this Court in Ahmedabad Municipal Corpn.  v.  Ahmedabad  Green  Belt  Khedut

Mandal (supra), wherein it was held as under :

“27. The aforesaid provisions read conjointly give a clear picture that  the

scheme is just like the consolidation proceedings as the land, belonging  to

various persons, covered by the scheme first be put into  a  pool  and  then

the land be allocated for different purposes  and,  in  such  a  way,  after

having all deductions for the purpose of either by  way  of  acquisition  of

land under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to  as  “the

1894 Act”) or the land taken under the provisions  of  Section  40(3)(jj)(a)

of the 1976 Act, the loss and profit of individual tenure-holder  is  to  be

calculated. After assessing the market value on the date of  declaration  of

the intention to frame a scheme and the value of the property  after  making

all these deductions, adjustments, improvements, etc. and, therefore,  if  a

person has suffered any loss, his loss is to be made good from the funds  of

the scheme and if a person has gained an amount equivalent to net  gain,  is

to be recovered from him.

The case mentioned supra, further reads:

“40. As  we  have  explained  hereinabove  that  the  town  planning  scheme

provides for pooling the entire land covered by the  scheme  and  thereafter

reshuffling and reconstituting of plots, the market value  of  the  original

plots and final plots is to be assessed and the authority has  to  determine

as to whether a landowner has suffered some injury or has gained  from  such

process. Reconstitution of  plots  is  permissible  as  provided  under  the

scheme of the Act as is evident from cogent reading  of  Sections  45(2)(a),

(b), (c) and Section 52(1)(iii) in accordance with Section 81  of  the  1976

Act. By  reconstitution  of  the  plots,  if  anybody  suffers  injury,  the

statutory provisions provide for compensation under Section 67(b) read  with

Section 80 of the 1976 Act.  By  this  reconstitution  and  readjustment  of

plots, there is no vesting of land in the  local  authority  and  therefore,

the Act provides for payment of non-monetary compensation and  such  a  mode

has been approved by the Constitution  Bench  of  this  Court  in  Shantilal

Mangaldas, wherein this Court has held  that  when  the  scheme  comes  into

force all rights in the original plots are extinguished, and  simultaneously

therewith  ownership  springs  in  the  reconstituted  plots.  It  does  not

predicate  ownership  of  the  plots  in  the  local   authority,   and   no

process—actual   or   notional—of   transfer   is   contemplated   in   that

appropriation. Under clause (a) of Section 53,  vesting  of  land  in  local

authority takes place  only  on  commencement  of  scheme  into  force.  The

concept that lands vest in a local authority when the intention  to  make  a

scheme is notified, is against the plain intendment of the Act.  Even  steps

taken by the State do not involve application of  the  doctrine  of  eminent

domain.”

It is further contended by the learned  senior  counsel  on  behalf  of  the

appellants that apart from this, the allotment  of  reconstituted  plots  to

the original land owners is being done in an  arbitrary  and  discriminatory

manner and therefore the  same  is  wholly  unsustainable  in  law.  It  was

further contended that  the  Respondent  No.1-State  government  arbitrarily

excluded and included lands in the scheme  without  any  rational  basis  or

explanation for initial proposal of the  Town  Development  Scheme  on  land

measuring 416.93 acres and there is neither rational  explanation  or  basis

for subsequent addition of another 1900 acres of land included  pursuant  to

RDA’s  Resolution  dated  20.7.2009.   Barring  one  acre  land  of  Jalaram

Cooperative Housing Society, which was originally included  in  the  earlier

sanctioned area of 416.93 acres, the entire  land  of  the  appellants  have

been affected by the enhancement of acquisition of area to about 2300  acres

of land.   The villages of Tikrapara  and  Dumartarai  were  not  originally

included in the first  phase  of  development  in  the  Raipur  Master  Plan

(Revised) 2021.

 The location of the land of the appellants  which  is  also  shown  in  the

map/plan  annexed  to  the  Convenience  Compilation  is  produced  by   the

appellants, stating that-

The total 22 acres of land of which about 11 acres of land  is  of  Rajendra

Shankar Shukla and family of Village Dumartarai is an island,  separated  by

distance of 1.5 kms from the main site.   Thus, this piece of  11  acres  of

land is separate from the rest of land parcel being developed, and there  is

no reason for its inclusion except malice in law.

Land of  petitioner’s  Chinmay  Builders  and  Jalaram  Cooperative  Housing

Society of village Tikrapara is on the fringe of  their  existing  colonies,

and is therefore, sufficiently developed.

Land of petitioner’s Chhatri Family and petitioner Vijay Rajani  and  family

is on the main orad and is sufficiently developed on  account  of  proximity

to the main road.

Only a piece of land jointly  owned  by  Vijay  Rajani,  Rakesh  Amrani  and

Pradeep Prithwani admeasuring  about  1  acres  is  in  the  centre  of  the

township.

 It was further argued that draft Scheme was published on  20.11.2009  which

included vast tracts of agricultural land as well as abadi areas.   However,

the final scheme  published  on  16.07.2010  was  for  1600  acres.   It  is

submitted by the learned senior counsel on behalf  of  the  appellants  that

firstly the inclusion of 1900 acres  of  land  was  approved  on  10.08.2009

without following the  procedure  and  conducting  the  survey.   But  after

harassing the land owners, the Respondent No. 2- RDA excluded 700  acres  of

land, which were as under:

Land notified for agricultural use under the Master Plan (Revised) 2021

Land carrying construction over them, and

Land of private colonizers whose layout had been  approved  irrespective  of

whether construction has been carried out or not  in  the  permission  dated

25.01.2008, the State Government had itself directed that lands  with  trees

and construction will not  be  included,  and  therefore,  the  question  of

having such a huge area including constructed land did  not  arise  for  its

consideration.

As a consequence of the above said exclusion, portions of land belonging  to

the appellants in Civil Appeal arising out of SLP  (C)  No.  30942  of  2014

measuring about 11 acres was separated from the main proposed township by  a

distance of about 1.5 kms.  Between these two chunks of land, there  lies  a

densely populated area.  Apparently, there are no means to provide  services

to the separated land other  than  by  spending  disproportionate  costs  on

separate infrastructural facilities such as sub-station, sewerage  treatment

plant, water pumping station, separate  water  pipeline,  separate  sewerage

plant etc.  Therefore, it  is  contended  that  there  will  be  no  adverse

implication for the proposed township if lands belonging to  the  appellants

in the above mentioned appeal are excluded from the KVTDS.

 Further, the lands of other appellants namely,  Vijay  Rajani  and  family,

Jalaram Cooperative Housing Society, Bulamal Chhatri and Chinmay  Developers

are also on the fringe of the township and  as  such  there  is  no  adverse

implication for the proposed township if the said land of the appellants  is

excluded. In support of the aforesaid reasons, the  learned  senior  counsel

on behalf of the appellants has rightly placed reliance upon  the  following

decisions  of  this  Court  in  Bondu  Ramaswamy  v.  Bangalore  Development

Authority, (supra) wherein it was held as under:

“134. Therefore, if a development authority having acquired  a  large  tract

of  land  withdraws  or  deletes  huge  chunks,  the  development   by   the

development authority will resemble haphazard developments  by  unscrupulous

private developers rather than  being  a  planned  and  orderly  development

expected from a Development Authority. therefore  when  a  large  layout  is

being planned, the development authorities should exercise care and  caution

in deleting large number of pockets/chunks of land  in  the  middle  of  the

proposed layout. There is no point in proposing a planned  layout  but  then

deleting various portions of land in the middle merely on  the  ground  that

there is a small  structure  of  100  sq.ft  or  200  sq.ft.  which  may  be

authorized or unauthorized. Such deletions make a  mockery  of  development.

Further such deletions/exclusions encourage corruption and  favouritism  and

bring discontent among those who are not favourably treated.

135. The complaint by appellants is that in the proposed  Arkavathi  layout,

rich and powerful with "connections" and "money  power"  were  able  to  get

their lands,  (even  vacant  lands)  released,  by  showing  some  imaginary

structure or by putting up some unauthorised structure overnight. Though  we

do not propose to go into motives, the concurrent  finding  by  the  learned

Single Judge and Division Bench is  that  there  are  arbitrary  unexplained

deletions. While we may not comment on policy, it is obvious  that  deletion

from proposed acquisition should be  only  in  regard  to  areas  which  are

already well developed in a planned manner.

136. Sporadic small unauthorised  constructions  in  unauthorised  colonies/

layouts, are not to be deleted  as  the  very  purpose  of  acquisition  for

planned development is to avoid such unauthorised development.  If  hardship

is the  reason  for  such  deletion,  the  appropriate  course  is  to  give

preference to the land/plot owners in making allotments  and  help  them  to

resettle and not to continue the illegal and  haphazard  pockets  merely  on

the ground that some temporary structure or a dilapidated structure  existed

therein. A development authority should either provide  orderly  development

or should stay away  from  development.  It  cannot  act  like  unscrupulous

private developers//colonisers attempting development of small bits of  land

with only profit motive. When we refer to private  developers/colonisers  by

way  of  comparison,  our  intention  is  not  to  deprecate   all   private

developers/colonisers.    We    are    aware    that     several     private

developers/colonisers provide large, well planned  authorized  developments,

some of which are even better than developments by development  authorities.

What is discouraged and deprecated is  small  unauthorized  layouts  without

any basic amenities. Be that as it may.

137. What do we say about a  `development',  where  with  reference  to  the

total extent of a village, one-third is not notified at all, and  more  than

half is deleted from proposed acquisition of  the  remaining  two-third  and

only the remaining  about  20%  to  30%  area  is  acquired,  that  too  not

contiguously, but in different parcels and pockets. What can  be  done  with

such acquisition? Can it be used  for  orderly  development?  Can  it  avoid

haphazard and irregular growth? The power of deletion and withdrawal  unless

exercised with responsibility and fairly and  reasonably,  will  play  havoc

with orderly development, will add to haphazard  and  irregular  growth  and

create discontent among sections of society who were not fortunate  to  have

their lands deleted.”

The above decision holds true in the present case in the light of  the  fact

that vast amount of  tracts  have  been  deleted  subsequently  without  the

respondents assigning any reason for the same. As a consequence,  KVTDS  has

turned  into  disconnected  pockets  of  acquired  land  and  land   deleted

subsequently after acquisition.

 The functioning of the Committee under Section 50(5) of the Act of 1973  is

dissatisfactory and  required  the  process  to  be  followed  afresh.   The

committee constituted under the aforesaid Act  to  hear  objections  of  the

desirous  parties,  was  a  mere  eye  wash.  The  committee  rejected   the

objections submitted by the appellants without  providing  any  reasons  for

the same and not even providing  any  hearing  opportunities  to  put  forth

their objections before the said Committee. Therefore,  the  recommendations

of the Committee did  not  carry  any  weight.  This  action  of  the  State

Government is vitiated in law and therefore liable to be set aside.

It can be asserted from the evidence on record produced before us  that  the

Committee constituted under Section 50(5) of the Act,  heard  objections  of

the land owners  from  25.01.2010  to  2.6.2010.   At  the  same  time,  the

Respondent No.  2-  RDA  proposed  change  of  land  use  on  15.4.2010  and

20.5.2010 and even the lay-out  plan  was  also  prepared  and  approved  on

26.5.2010. This shows  that  the  hearing  and  consideration  of  the  land

owner’s objections was only a sham. The committee had pre-decided about  the

plan and was hearing objections of the  land  owners  only  as  a  formality

procedure. Clearly,  when  the  land  plan  was  prepared  and  approved  on

26.5.2010, the hearing of objections till 2.6.2010 was immaterial.

The committee took decision to exclude agricultural land which was  formally

taken on 22.6.2010 after acceptance of the report  of  the  Committee  dated

8.6.2010. But even before this, vide letter  dated  15.4.2010,  CEO  of  the

Respondent No. 2- RDA had made it clear  to  the  Respondent  No.  1-  State

Government  that agricultural land will be  excluded.

The  committee  constituted  under  Section  50(5)  was  headed  by  CEO  of

Respondent No. 2- RDA who himself proposed inclusion of 1900 acres  of  land

vide letter dated 20.7.2009. This affects the rights of the appellants.  For

this reason also, they did not receive fair hearing from the Committee.  The

recommendations of the committee were considered by the Board  of  Directors

of Respondent No. 2- RDA on 21.6.2010. While the committee was  hearing  the

objections, there was no freezing of land use  and  Respondent  No.  2-  RDA

kept on proposing change in land use. This affected the statutory rights  of

the land owners who were entitled to fair hearing  against  the  acquisition

of land.

In the case of Raghbir Singh Sehrawat  v.  State  of  Haryana[18],  held  as

under:

“40. Though it is neither possible nor desirable  to  make  a  list  of  the

grounds  on  which  the  landowner  can  persuade  the  Collector  to   make

recommendations against the  proposed  acquisition  of  land,  but  what  is

important is that the Collector should give a fair  opportunity  of  hearing

to the objector and objectively consider his plea  against  the  acquisition

of land. Only thereafter, he should make recommendations supported by  brief

reasons as to why the particular piece of  land  should  or  should  not  be

acquired and whether or not the plea put  forward  by  the  objector  merits

acceptance. In other words, the recommendations made by the  Collector  must

reflect objective application  of  mind  to  the  objections  filed  by  the

landowners and other interested persons.

Further, in the case of Indore Development Authority v. Madan Lal[19], it

was held as under:

“10. We do not  think  that  the  Development  Authority  was  justified  in

following a short cut in this case. The procedure followed under  the  Trust

Act could not be  sufficient  to  dispense  with  all  the  requirements  of

Section 50 of the Adhiniyam. As earlier  noticed  that  Section  50  of  the

Adhiniyam provides procedure for preparation  and  approval  of  scheme  for

development. After preparing a draft scheme, the Development Authority  must

invite objections and  suggestions  from  the  public.  There  must  be  due

consideration of the objections and suggestions received in  [pic]the  light

of the Master  Plan  of  Indore.  Indeed,  the  public  must  also  have  an

opportunity to examine the scheme and file objections in the  light  of  the

Master Plan if the Development Authority wants to adopt  the  scheme.  Since

the scheme in question was not an approved scheme under the Trust  Act,  the

Development  Authority  could  not  have  dispensed   with   the   procedure

prescribed under Section 50 of the Adhiniyam.”

Therefore, in the light of the facts and circumstances of the case  and  the

legal principles laid down by  this  Court,  we  are  of  the  opinion  that

reconstitution of plot  for  the  purpose  of  town  development  scheme  is

permissible for public purpose only and that  too  by  following  the  legal

procedure of publication by the authority in gazette  about  its  intent  to

acquire land. In the absence of the same, and  also  when  the  purpose  for

reconstitution of land is not for public  purpose,  such  reconstitution  of

land is impermissible under the Act. Therefore,  we  answer  this  point  in

favour of the  appellants  that  the  respondent  No.2-RDA  could  not  have

reconstituted plot for any other purpose other than public purpose.

Answer to Point No. 5

It has  been  argued  by  the  learned  senior  counsel  on  behalf  of  the

appellants that taking away land located in prime location and  giving  away

land anywhere as per the discretion of Respondent No. 2- RDA, that  too,  to

the extent of mere 35%  of  the  area,  is  constitutionally  impermissible.

Against this contention  raised  by  the  learned  senior  counsel  for  the

appellants, the learned senior counsel for the the Respondent No.  1-  State

Government as well as the  High  Court  of  Chhattisgarh,  relied  upon  the

decision of this Court  in  the  case  of  State  of  Gujarat  v.  Shantilal

Mangaldas and Ors.[20], to hold that taking away land and  giving  back  35%

developed land in return, is in accordance with the  Constitution.  On  this

aspect, we are inclined to rely upon the  decision  of  this  court  in  His

Holiness Kesavananda Bharathi v. State of Kerala[21]  which  laid  down  the

subsequent development on the jurisprudence of  compensation  and  overruled

the decision of Shantilal in the  process.  It  was  held  in  the  case  of

Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala as under:

“584.  The  later  decisions  had  continued  to  uphold  the   concept   of

“compensation” i.e. just equivalent of the value of  the  property  acquired

in spite of the amendments made in 1955. In State of  Gujarat  v.  Shantilal

Mangaldas and Others  the  decision  in  Metal  Corporation  of  India,  was

overruled which itself was virtually overruled by R.C. Cooper  v.  Union  of

India. According  to  the  Advocate-General  of  Maharashtra,  if  Shantilal

Mangaldas case, had not been overruled by R.C. Cooper  v.  Union  of  India,

there would have been no necessity of amending Article 31(2).

……………….

1744. In the Bank Nationalisation  case,  the  majority  decision  virtually

overruled the decision in Gujarat v. Shantilal.  The  majority  was  of  the

view  that  even  after  the  Fourth  Amendment  ‘compensation’  meant  “the

equivalent  in  terms  of  money  of  the  property  compulsorily  acquired”

according to “relevant principles” which principles must be  appropriate  to

the determination or compensation  for  the  particular  class  of  property

sought to be acquired.”

Since compensation for  acquisition  of  land  need  to  be  reasonable  and

adequate  in  the  interest  of  justice,  we  rely  upon  the  decision  of

Kesavananda Bharathi case (supra) to hold that  returning  35%  of  land  in

lieu of acquisition is constitutionally impermissible. This is also  because

the ‘development’ which  occurs  due  to  the  implementation  of  the  Town

Development Scheme accrues the benefit to everyone. In  the  same  way,  the

appellants whose land has been acquired and proposed to be developed,  would

have gained from the development, if at all, as a member  of  the  community

gaining  from  the  town  development  scheme  and  not  in  his  individual

capacity. When the compensation for  land  acquisition  is  determined,  the

price  of  the  land  on  the  date  of  the  declaration  of  intention  of

acquisition is taken  into  consideration  and  not  subsequent  development

after acquisition since the development is not connected to acquisition.  In

the same manner, if the land is reconstituted in plots for  distribution  to

the Economically Weaker Sections of the community or other public  purposes,

the same cannot be done by arbitrarily depriving the land  owners  of  their

Constitutional rights guaranteed under Article 300 A of the Constitution  of

India. They are entitled for the compensation  from  the  State  Government.

The State Government on the other hand, cannot  involuntarily  acquire  land

and impose developmental charges in the same breath.

We come to this conclusion  further  on  the  ground  that  35%  figure  was

arrived at by Respondent No. 2- RDA while allocating reconstituted  land  to

the appellants, without any valid form of  calculation  arrived  at  by  the

respondents. This action of the respondents is arbitrary  also  because  the

percentage of reconstituted land to be returned  to  the  land  owners  vary

from 35% to 58% for large plot holders and small plot  holders.  Also,  from

the letter dated 20.7.2009, it is evident that Respondent  No.  2-  RDA  had

already taken a decision that not more than 40% of land will be returned  to

the  land  owners.  This  decision  is  arrived  at  without   taking   into

consideration the value of each portion  of  land  on  the  basis  of  their

geographical locations.

It is further submitted by the learned  senior  counsel  on  behalf  of  the

appellants that taking land under “Development Contribution” to  the  extent

of 65%  is  not  contemplated  under  Section  50(6)  of  the  Act.  Section

50(6)(vi) of the Act of 1973 reads as under:

“……(vi)evaluate the increment in the value of each  reconstituted  plot  and

assess the development contribution leviable on each plot holder:

Provided that the contribution shall not exceed half the  accrued  increment

in value.”

Even under Section 40(3)(jj)(a) of the Gujarat Act, the maximum  permissible

contribution of land by land owner cannot  exceed  50%.  Therefore,  in  the

absence of any reasonable procedure arrived at by  the  Respondents,  taking

65% of the area of the plot as development  contribution  is  wholly  unfair

and arbitrary, and is also impermissible as per Section 50  (6)(vi)  of  the

1973 Act. We hold that the respondents were not justified in returning  only

35%  of  reconstituted  plots  and  retaining  65%  for  different  purposes

mentioned by them.

Answer to Point No. 6

The learned senior counsel on  behalf  of  the  appellants  urged  that  the

Respondent No. 2- RDA’s  application  for  Environmental  Impact  Assessment

clearance dated 17.6.2010, was prior to the date of  approval  of  KVTDS  by

the Board of RDA, the same being accorded  on  22.6.2010  and  published  on

16.7.2010. Therefore, the  application  of  the  Respondent  No.2-  RDA  was

initially for EIA clearance for 2300 acres, whereas  the  final  scheme  was

only for 1600 acres of land.  As  per  the  condition  (v)  of  the  General

Condition of the Environmental Clearance (EC) dated 25.1.2011,  if  the  RDA

has changed the scope of the project, it has to take a fresh EC. The EC  was

sought for considerably more than the area for which the  final  scheme  was

notified i.e. 1600 acres.

As per the MoEF, EIA  notification  dated  14.9.2006  was  issued  by  which

Townships and Area Development Projects are put in  Category–B1.  The  KVTDS

Scheme  No.-04  falls  in  this  category.  As  per  general  conditions  of

14.9.2006 notification, projects of “B1”  category  will  be  considered  as

projects of category “A” if the same falls  in  critically  polluted  areas.

Then the Central Government is the competent authority  to  grant  clearance

to such projects.

Further, MoEF, issued a circular dated 25.8.2009, which has noted  that  the

Central Pollution Control Board (CPCB) had  identified  critically  polluted

areas. The Expert Appraisal Committee (EAC) is appraising proposal of EC  to

the areas. Thereafter the concerned State Pollution Control Board will  send

its  representative  with  its  comments.  The  circular  pertained  to  the

procedure of grant of EC to  development  projects  in  Critically  Polluted

Areas.

The MoEF issued O.M. dated 13.1.2010 listing out ‘critically  polluted’  and

‘severely polluted’ areas. Raipur falls in severely polluted  area  (S.  No.

63 with CEPI-65.45). Para 4.1.1 and 4.1.2 of the said O.M. puts  a  complete

prohibition on grant of  environmental  clearance  to  projects  falling  in

‘critically polluted areas’  for  8  months  and  the  said  moratorium  was

further extended by letter dated  31.10.2010.  Para  4.2  of  the  said  O.M

provides  that  the  procedure  for  grant  of  environmental  clearance  to

development projects in ‘severely polluted’ areas will be  as  per  circular

dated 25.8.2009, i.e. for critically polluted areas. Therefore,  the  effect

of O.M. referred to supra is that that the EC  to  the  said  projects  will

have to be given by the Central Government.

The Respondent No. 2-RDA submitted its  application  on  17.6.2010  for  EIA

approval  for  2300  acres  of  township.  On  25.1.2011,  EC  clearance/EIA

approval was granted  by  the  State  Level  Environment  Impact  Assessment

Authority (SEIAA) to Respondent No.2–RDA which is not the authority to  give

such clearance as per O.M dated 13.1.2010 since the same has to  be  granted

by the MoEF.

The MoEF in its affidavit filed before the High Court in Writ  Petition  (c)

No.6040 of 2011, has stated that  general  conditions  of  EIA  Notification

dated 14.9.2006 were made inapplicable on the projects  in  item  8(b)  vide

MoEF O.M. dated 24.5.2011. The  High  Court  has  relied  on  the  aforesaid

affidavit and dismissed the contention of the appellants with regard to  the

EC issue, thereby it has erred in not  appreciating  the  said  O.M.  issued

after SEIAA  had  given  EC  to  KVTDS-04.  As  on  25.1.2011,  the  general

conditions of EIA notification dated 14.9.2006 were applicable  to  category

‘B’ projects and Central Government was the competent authority to grant  EC

to KVTDS-Scheme No. 04.

Even assuming that the EIA clearance granted by the SEIAA to RDA  is  valid,

the RDA has deviated mandatory conditions as prescribed under the  EC  dated

25.1.2011. In the EC certificate, there is a specific  condition  that  ‘the

project proponent shall not deviate from  the  land  use  proposals  in  the

scheme area as provided under the  said  master  plan’.  On  31.1.2011,  the

respondent no.1- The State Government issued circular with regard to  change

in land use from agricultural to residential purposes. The land use  in  the

concerned khasras was already notified as  ‘residential’  under  the  Master

Plan. The notification dated 4.3.2011 was published in the official  gazette

of the State  government with regard to change of the land  use  of  khasras

from Agricultural to Residential purposes in the villages Dunda, Devpur  and

Dumartarai  and  also  from  Educational  to  Residential  area  in  village

Tikrapara.

As per condition (ii) in the aforesaid notification, 185  hectares  of  land

has to be maintained. The land use approved by the Board on  22.6.2010  only

provides for 129.42 hectares of land for green zone.

On 25.1.2011, condition (v) of the General Conditions,  stipulated  that  if

the scope of a project is changed, fresh permission should  be  sought  from

the SEIAA. Scope of KVTDS-04 was changed as hereunder:

On 17.6.2010, i.e. the date of application for  EIA,  RDA  sought  clearance

for 2300 acres/847.84 hectares but  finally  the  scheme  was  published  on

16.7.2010 for 1600 acres.

4.3.2011: change in land use notified on  31.1.2011  published  in  official

gazette

17.8.2011: In RDA Board Meeting, layout plan was amended  in  view  of  G.O.

dated 25.2.2011.

This resulted in change in scope  of  the  project.  Thus  in  view  of  the

specific condition (ii) of  the  Environmental  Clearance  dated  25.1.2011,

fresh EC should have been sought and obtained by the RDA but  the  same  has

not been obtained by it.

Section 50(8) of the Act cannot be made retrospectively applicable.  In  the

absence of vesting of land with the RDA,  layout  is  not  complete  and  no

allotment can be done. The aforesaid provision of the Act  was  inserted  by

Ordinance dated 16.6.2010. Therefore, the same  cannot  be  made  applicable

retrospectively to the Scheme as it was sanctioned by the  State  Government

on 25.1.2008 and 10.8.2009.

 The Scheme was finalised on 26.5.2010, by which  date,  no  land  had  been

acquired by Respondent No. 2- RDA nor any piece of land vested in it.  Plots

are being earmarked only on paper and such ‘on  paper’  allotment  of  plots

have been done by Respondent No. 2- RDA. Therefore, we are  of  the  opinion

that due to the change in the scope of the project, Respondent  No.  2-  RDA

was required to seek sanction for the project from the  Central  Government.

The same has not been done. Therefore, the KVTDS scheme has also  failed  to

obtain the  environmental  clearance  requirement  which  is  the  mandatory

requirement in law for initiating any project by  the  RDA.  A  faulty  town

development scheme prepared through  incompetent  authorities  with  blatant

violation of legal and environmental procedure  cannot  be  the  reason  for

deprivation of constitutional rights of the appellants.

Since we answered all the points framed in these  cases  in  favour  of  the

appellants, we allow these appeals by setting aside the  impugned  judgments

and orders passed by the High Court of  Chhattisgarh  at  Bilaspur  in  writ

appeals and writ petitions of the appellants and further  allow  the  prayer

of the appellants by quashing the acquisition of their land of the  villages

which were included subsequently in  the  KVTDS  in  their  respective  writ

petitions.   The appeals are allowed. No costs.

                                                        ………………………………………………J.

                                   [V.GOPALA GOWDA]

                                                        ………………………………………………J.

                                   [C. NAGAPPAN]

New Delhi,                                           July 29, 2015

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[1]    Report of the Select Committee of House of Commons. 1832 Vol. III  p.

331  as  quoted  in  T.N.  Srivastava,  Local  ‘Self’  Governance  and   the

Constitution, EPW July 27, 2002 at p. 3190- 3191

[2]    Constituent Assembly Debates, Vol. VII at p.  352  on  November  9th,

1949

[3]    2012 (4) Bom CR 40 at para 22- 23

[4]    (2007) 8 SCC 705

[5]    [(1892) A.C. 473, 480 (Privy Council)

[6]    (1976) 2 SCC 152

[7]    (2013) 6 SCC 278

[8]    (2010) 9 SCC 157

[9]    (2011) 12 SCC 695

[10]   (1979) 4 SCC 176

[11]   (1978)  1 SCC 405

[12]   (1969) 2 SCC 262

[13]   AIR 1980 SC 319

[14]   AIR 1984 SC 1572

[15]   (2010) 7 SCC 129

[16]   (1991) 4 SCC 54

[17]   (2014) 7 SCC 357

[18]   (2012) 1 SCC 792

[19]   (1990) 2 SCC 334

[20]   AIR 1969 SC 634

[21]   (1973) 4 SCC 225

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|REPORTABLE     |