ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Abdur Rahim
Vs
Joseph A Pinto
(Naik, C.J.)
13.11.1950
JUDGEMENT
Naik, C.J.
( 1. ) I have carefully read through the two judgments of my learned colleagues, Shripatrao and Ansari JJ. I do not feel the necessity of writing a separate elaborate judgment. They have dealt with all the points arisirg in the cases thoroughly and exhaustively. I entirely agree with the decisions given by them in their separate but concurrent judgments.
( 2. ) I also hold with them that the guarantee of equality before the law or
the equal protection of the laws, contained in Article 14 of our Constitution
means substantial equality of treatment under the laws. Equal treatment does
not necessarily mean identical treatment. In fact, identical treatment in
unequal circumstances amounts to inequality. In other words, in different
circumstances the variation in legal procedure is not only permissible bulb
necessary. Equal protection of laws does not mean protection by identical laws.
Sometimes, it is necessary to abridge the ordinary procedure in the interests
of justice itself. Of course, no abridgment of legal procedure which curtails
the essential safeguards can be permitted. A detailed procedure in normal times
and in ordinary cases may become harmful in abnormal times, or in extraordinary
and special case3, One of the reasons for appointing a Special Tribunal
consisting of three Sessions Judges instead of one is to obviate the chances of
error by the abridgment of the normal procedure. It is not always possible
to anticipate and enumerate all the circumstances under which a case may be
declared fit and proper to be tried by the Special Tribunal instead of by the
ordinary Court. It may not be convenient nor advisable for the State to specify
them. No fundamental right of an accused is violated in merely leaving the
choice of forum to the discretion of proper authorities. Perhaps the better
policy would be to state in detail the grounds of the classification but the
Courts are concerned with question of law and not with the policy of the
Legislature. They have only to see that the fundamental rights under the
Constitution are protected. A provision to be declared unconstitutional
must be offensive to the provisions of fundamental rights contained in Part III
of the Constitution. Procedure is not a vested right, though there are some
fundamental provisions even in procedural matters and they have to be insisted
upon. It is not for the Court to insist on an elaborate procedure if in the
opinion of the legislative authority, the circumstances demand an abridged one,
as long as the same substantial protections are given by both of them. The
revisional and appellate powers of the High Court are always there to see
whether the procedure adopted has affected any party prejudicially.
( 3. ) THE Regulation under discussion was enacted in abnormal times and to
meet an abnormal situation. THE advent of the Constitution and the fundamental
rights guaranteed therein have, however, entitled the petitioners to take
objection to certain of its provisions, My learned colleagues have carefully
considered all the objections urged on behalf of the petitioners and have shown
which provisions of the Regulation offend Article 14 of the Constitution and
have, therefore, to be deleted. I may mention that some portions of the
Regulation now being deleted, were, as a matter of fact, not acted upon by the
Special Tribunal and it was following a procedure in accordance with our
judgment; for example, in spite of the Regulation doing away with the necessity
of taking down the evidence at length and permitting only a memorandum of the
substance of what each witness said, this particular Tribunal has been recording
the evidence of witnesses in full. Similarly, in spite of the Regulation
enjoining the adoption of the procedure prescribed for summary trial and
permitting the procedure prescribed for the trial of warrant cases by
Magistrates, for reasons to be recorded by it, this Tribunal had adopted only
the latter procedure in the cases tried by it. ;