

State of Tamil Nadu

Vs

Rejendran

Criminal Appeal No. 917 of 1996

(G. B. Pattanaik, M. Srinivasan, N. Santosh Hegde JJ)

22.09.1999

JUDGMENT

PATTANAIAK J.

1. This appeal by the State of Tamil Nadu is directed against the judgment of the Division Bench of Madras high Court, against the acquittal of the respondent in Death Reference Case No. 169 of 1994. The learned Sections Judge convicted the accused respondent of the charge under Section 302 for having murdered his wife and two children brutally and sentenced him to death. On a reference being made under Section 366 CrPC for confirmation of the death sentence, the High Court did not confirm the sentence of death and on the other hand acquitted the accused of the charges levelled against him and thus the present appeal.

2. The prosecution case in a nutshell is that the accused and deceased Jayalakshmi were married together about eight years prior to the date of occurrence in 1994. Out of their wedlock, two female children had been born named Jeeva, aged six years and Sita, aged two years. The accused was not having any job and was solely dependent on his wife, the deceased. He had the habit of taking liquor and for that purpose he used to assault her. On the very date of occurrence, there was a quarrel between the accused and the deceased to about 7 p.m. and it continued till about 9 p.m. PW 1, a close-by neighbour however interfered and pacified them, whereupon, she returned to her house which was hardly 150 feet away from the house of the accused. PW 4 was present there in the house of PW 1 and was sleeping. Suddenly, he heard the cries of the elder daughter of the deceased and when he came out, he found that the hut of the accused was on fire. PW 1 and was sleeping. Suddenly, he heard the cries of the elder daughter of the deceased and when he came out he found that the hut of the accused was on fire. PW 1 and PW 4 then came near the house of the accused and the younger daughter Sita had already become victims and had met their death. PW 4 then took the elder daughter to the Government Hospital at Thuraiyur. PW 1 went to her father PW 2 and narrated the incident. This was recorded by PW 2 and was sent to Padalur Police Station. The further prosecution case in that PW 5 met the accused on 11-4-1994 at the bus-stop and on questioning the accused about he setting fire of his house, he had stated that the deceased refused to serve meals to him and was also not giving money and as he has doubts about her chastity, so on the previous night he had stated that the deceased refused to serve meals to him and was also not giving money and as he had doubts about her. He also further said that he poured kerosene on the dead body of the deceased and set fire to the body. The elder daughter, Jeeva was examined by doctor PW 8 and extensive burn injuries on her person were found. He however died in the hospital on 11-4-1994 at 7 p.m. The sub-Inspector of Police on the basis of statement received for PW 2, registered a case under Section 436 and 302 IPC and started investigation and on completion of investigation submitted the charge-sheet and on being committed, the accused stood his trial. The learned

Additional Sessions Judge, Tiruchirapalli, relied upon the circumstances established by the prosecution witnesses and came to hold that it is the accused who is the perpetrator of the crime and, therefore, convicted him under Section 302 as well as Section 436 of the Indian Penal Code. Looking to the aggravating circumstances under which the murder was committed and in the absence of any extenuating circumstance, he sentenced the accused to death and made a reference to the High Court under Section 366 CrPC for his conviction under Section 302 and for his conviction under Section 366 CrPC for his conviction under Section 436, the accused was sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for seven years. It may be stated that the accused himself did not prefer any appeal against the conviction and sentence. The High Court however in the impugned judgment without examining the circumstances said to have been established by the prosecution evidence and without examining the conclusion of the learned trial Judge in a most slipshod manner, by coming to some conclusions abruptly on the peripheral issue, ultimately came to hold that the doubtful circumstances impel to give benefit of doubt to the accused and thus acquitted the accused.

3. Mr. Pragasam, the learned counsel appearing for the State seriously contended that bare reading of the impugned judgment of the High Court would indicate that the High Court has not discharged its duty as a court of appeal and instead of focussing its attention on the prosecution evidence establishing different circumstances and instead of finding whether the ultimate conclusion of the learned trial judge on those circumstances can at all be sustained or not, has given benefit of doubt to the accused on mere surmises, and, therefore the said order of acquittal cannot be sustained. Mr. Pragasam further contended that no doubt there is no eyewitness to the occurrence and the case, therefore depends upon the circumstantial evidence which would mean a combination of facts creating a net without there being any tear through which the accused can escape. In a case of circumstantial evidence, what is necessary to be examined by a court is whether the circumstances from which the conclusion is drawn have been proved and such circumstances whether are of such conclusive nature that it is consistent only with the hypothesis of guilt and inconsistent with the innocence of the accused. The High Court as a court of appeal, while entertaining a death reference no doubt has full powers to go into the evidence and come to its conclusion one way or the other on the evidence adduced by the prosecution. But the High Court cannot on mere surmises and conjectures without applying its mind to the specific conclusions of the learned Sessions Judge on the basis of the evidence on record can reverse the conviction by examining some peripheral issues and then abruptly come to a conclusion that the circumstances relied upon by the prosecution and found to have been established by the learned Sessions Judge have not even been enumerated in the impugned judgment and, therefore the judgment of acquittal is wholly unsustainable in law.

4. Mrs. K. Sharda Devi, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent on the other hand submitted that it is true that the High Court has not focussed its attention as an appellate court would do but all the same the accused having been given benefit of doubt and having been given benefit of doubt and having been acquitted by the High Court, the same should not be interfered with by this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution of India. The learned counsel also contended that the constitution of India. The learned counsel also contended that the conclusion of the High Court is possible on the evidence on record and even of another conclusion is possible on the same evidence, yet this Court finds that the conclusion of the High Court is not that of a reasonable man.

5. Having considered the rival submissions at the Bar, really two questions arise for our consideration-

- i. has the High Court discharged its duty as a court of appeal while entertaining the death

- reference in the impugned judgment, and
- ii. what are the circumstances which can be said to have been established and whether such circumstances thus proved are consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused and inconsistent with his innocence.

So far as the first question is concerned, a bare perusal of the impugned judgment perused us to come to the conclusion that the High Court has miserably failed in discharging its power under Section 386 of the Code of Criminal Procedure by not reappreciating and reassessing the facts and law any by not examining the conclusion arrived at by the learned Sessions Judge. When a reference is made to the High Court under Section 366 of the Code of Criminal Procedure by the learned Sessions Judge on passing a sentence of death, the High Court has to satisfy itself whether a case beyond reasonable doubt has been made out against the accused for infliction of the extreme penalty of death. The proceedings before the High Court in such a case require a reappraisal and reassessment of the entire facts and law so that it can come to its independent conclusion but while so doing, the High Court cannot also totally overlook the conclusion arrived at by the learned Sessions Judge. In performing its duty, the High Court is of necessity bound to consider the merits of the case itself and has to examine the entire evidence on record. The legislature having provided in the confirmation proceedings, a final safeguard of the life and liberty of the subject in cases of capital sentences, the duty of the High Court becomes more onerous to consider independently the matter carefully and examine all relevant material evidence and come to a conclusion one way or the other. It is, therefore, the duty of the High Court in a death reference to consider the evidence afresh. If the impugned judgment of the High Court is scrutinized bearing in mind the aforesaid parameters, the conclusion becomes irresistible that the High Court as a court of appeal has failed to exercise its power under Section 386 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and instead of discharging its bounden duty to examine the evidence and other materials on record and without appreciating the same, it has merely on surmises and conjectures come to the conclusion that the accused is entitled to the benefit of doubt. In our considered opinion, the aforesaid conclusion cannot be sustained. Not only has there been an infraction of the duty and obligation of the appellate court but also such infirmity has caused a gross miscarriage of justice.

6. Coming now to the second question, the law is fairly well settled that in a case of circumstantial evidence, the cumulative effect of all the circumstances proved must be such as to negative the innocence of the accused and to bring home the charge beyond reasonable doubt. It has been held by a series of decisions of this Court that the circumstances proved must lead to no other inference except that of guilt of the accused. [See *Ram Avtar v. State (Delhi Admn.)* (1985 Supp SCC 410 : 1985 SCC (Cri) 415) and *Prem Thakur v. State of Punjab*] ((1982) 3 SCC 462 : 1982 SCC (Cri) 88). The circumstances which can be said to have been established by unimpeachable evidence are that the husband and wife namely the accused and the deceased with frequently quarrelling and even on the date of the incident they quarreled with each other from 7 p.m. to 9 p.m., as has been deposed to by PWs 1, 3 and 4. The inside the house of the accused and the accused had been seen inside the house at 9 p.m. on the date of the incident, which has been established through the evidence of PWs 1, 3 and 4 and PW 1 and 3 and the accused has also admitted in his statement under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The very conduct of the accused in not raising any alarm even on seeing the fire, knowing fully well that his wife and two daughters were inside the house (sic) and no attempt has been made by the accused to save any one of the deceased persons. On the other hand the prosecution spectator. The opinion of the doctor indicating that the wife of the accused died of asphyxia but to strangulation and not on account of the accused died of asphyxia. If the

accused and his wife were seen together in the house at 9 p.m. and the accused came out in the morning through the rood, leaving the wife and two children and the death of the wife was found to be not on account of burn injuries but on account of strangulation and on being asked, the accused offers an explanation about the accidental fire which is found to be untrue, then in such a case, there cannot be any hesitation to come to the conclusion that it is the accused who is the perpetrator of the crime. In a case of circumstantial evidence when an incriminating circumstance is put to the accused and the said accused either offers no explanation or offers an explanation which is found to be untrue, then the same becomes an additional link in the chain of circumstances to make it complete. This proposition fully applies to the circumstances of the present case. On the circumstances enumerated above which have been established by the persecution, we have no hesitation to come to the conclusion that the charge of murder has been proved beyond reasonable doubt as against the accused respondent and the High Court erroneously acquitted him of the said charge. We, therefore, set aside the impugned order of acquittal and convict the respondent Rajendran of the offence under Section 302 IPC. So far as the sentence is concerned, we are not in a position to hold that the case represents one of the rarest of the rare cases, justifying a penalty of death. We, therefore sentence respondent Rajendran to imprisonment for life. Coming to the charge under Section 436 IPC. We, accordingly, set aside the order of acquittal of the High Court so far as this charge is concerned and confirm the conviction and sentence recorded by the learned Sessions Judge. Needless to mention, the sentences would run concurrently.

7. The appeal is allowed.