PRIVY COUNCIL

Sri Raja Rao Venkata Mahipati Gangadara Rama Rao Bahadur

                 Vs.

                 Raja of Pittapur

                                     P.C.A. No. 110 of 1916
(Viscount Haldane, CJ, Lords Dunedin , Sumner, Sir John Edge and Mr. Ameer Ali.

                                                 JJ)

                 2.5.1918

                 JUDGMENT

Lord Dunedin J.

1. The plaintiff is the son of an adopted son of the late Rajah of Pittapur, and he sues
the defendant the present Raja of Pittapur, for maintenance. At the time that the suit
was raised the father of the plaintiff, was alive, but pending the suit he died. The Raja
of Pittapur is an impartible zamindari, and was devised by will to the defendant, who
was described in the will as the aurasa son of the late Raja born of one of his wives,
three years after the adoption of the plaintiff's father. The plaintiff's father contested
the right of the defendant to the Raj and alleged that he was not the legitimate son of
the late Raja. In that suit the Subordinate Judge decided that the defendant was not
legitimate and that the Raj was inalienable. The judgment was reversed and the case
decided in favour of the defendant by the Court of Appeal and by this Board, who,
without deciding as to the legitimacy of the defendant, held that in accordance with
what had been laid down by this Board in the case of Sartaj Kuari v. Deoraj Kuari1
the zamindari of Pittapur, being impartible, there was no right in the plaintiff to
quarrel with the alienation made by the will of the late Raja.

2. The defendant in the present case resists the claim on the ground that no legal basis
for the claim is alleged. The plaintiff did not attempt to prove that there was any
custom affecting this particular zamindari which enjoined the making of grants of
maintenance to any persons, nor did he put his case on any claim resting on
relationship, a relationship which following his father's allegation, he did not allow
existed, but he rested his case on what he alleged was the general law, viz., that by
birth he had a right to maintenance out of the property constituting the Raj, which
right followed the property into the hands of a third party. The learned Judge of the
Subordinate Court gave judgment in favour of the plaintiff for maintenance and
arrears. This judgment was reversed by the Court of Appeal., who dismissed the case.
The ground on which the learned Subordinate Judge proceeded was shortly this: He
considered that the zamindari was joint family property, only with the peculiar quality
that it was impartible. Being joint family property, the right which accrues to every
junior member (and a grandson is such a junior member) in the case of the ordinary
joint family under the Mitakshara law exists also in this case. The learned Judges of
the Court of Appeal held that after the decisions in Sartaj Kuari v. Deoroj Kuari
(Supra) and Venkata Surya Mahipati Rama Krishna Rao v. Court of Wards2 it was
impossible to base the plaintiff's right to maintenance on any right of co-parcenary
accruing by birth, and that the case as put was based on no other ground.

3. It is beyond doubt that the decisions in the Madras Courts prior to the case of Sartaj
Kuari v. Deoraj Kuari embodied the theory that there was joint property in an
impartible zamindari, which only fell short of coparcenary because by custom,
partition was inadmissible. It is needless to cite or examine the authorities, as their
Lordships do not apprehend that there is any doubt as to this statement being correct.
It will be sufficient to quote a fragment of the decision of the Court of Appeal in that
case itself :-

       "It must be conceded that the complete rights of ordinary co-parcenaryship in
       the other members of the family to the extent of joint enjoyment and the
       capacity to demand partition are merged in - or perhaps, to use a more correct
       term, subordinated to - the title of the individual member to the incumbency of
       the estate, but the contingency of survivorship remains along with the right to
       maintenance in a sufficiently substantial form to preserve for them a kind of
       dormant co-ownership."
4. But the decision of the Board which binds their Lordships made that view no longer
tenable. It settled that in an impartible zamindari there is no coparcenary, and
consequently no person existed who as coparcener could object to alienation of the
whole subject by the de facto and de jure holder. That judgment was followed and
applied to this very Raj in the Venkata Surya Mahipati Rama Krishna Rao v. Court of
Wards (Supra) The import of these decisions was, in their Lordships' view, correctly
stated by Sir. L. Jenkins in the case of Bachoo v. Mankorebai3:-

       "It has now been definitely decided that in impartible properties there is no co-
       parcenary.'
5. It was admitted on both sides of the Bar that in an ordinary joint family ruled by the
Mitakshara law the junior members, down to three generations from the head of the
family, have a co-parcenary interest accruing by birth in the ancestral property; that
this co-parcenary interest carries with it the inchoate right to raise an action of
partition, and that until partition is de facto accomplished these same persons have a
right to maintenance. It seems clear that this right is an inherent quality of the right of
co-parcenary - that is, of common property. The individual enjoyment of the common
property being ousted by the management of the head of the family, they have a right
till they exercise their right to divide, to be maintained out of the property which is
common to them, who are excluded from the management, and to the head of the
family who is invested with the management. As it is expressed by the late Mr. Mayne
in his work:-

       "Those who would be entitled to share in the bulk of the property are entitled to
       have all their necessary expenses paid out of its income."
6. It follows that the right to maintenance, so far as founded on or inseparable from the
right of co-parcenary, begins where co-parcenary begins and ceases where co-
parcenary ceases.

7. There are, however, certain persons who, as is explained by express texts of the
Mitakshara, while not entitled to succeed as co-owners, are given rights of
maintenance. There is the category of persons who by reason of personal
disqualification are not allowed to inherit. Such as the idiot, the blind from birth, the
mad man, etc. Such persons are debarred from the rights of co-parcenary, but are
given maintenance in lieu. That this is owing not to a denial of their birth status, but to
a personal disqualification preventing enjoyment, is clear by the fact that the children
of such persons, being within the allowed degrees and not themselves stigmatized with
the personal defect, get by their birth the full status of co-parcenary.

8. There must also be added another class, equally the subject of special texts. The
right of this class to maintenance lies in personal relationship, but is limited to the
widow, the parent, and the infant child. It does not include the grandson. It is obvious
that so far as certain individuals are concerned this category overlaps the first. But it is
an obligation which is independent of the fact of there being ancestral or joint family
property. It is an obligation attaching to the individual. These categories exhaust the
classes of person who have such a right to maintenance under the Mitakshara law.
9. Their Lordships will now revert to the position of an impartible zamindari as it has
been fixed by the decisions before referred to. An impartible, zamindari is the creature
of custom and it is of its essence that no co-parcenary exists. This being so, the basis
of the claim is gone, inasmuch as it is founded on the consideration that the plaintiff is
a person who, if the zamindari were not impartible, would be entitled as of right to
maintenance. There is no claim based on personal relationship.

10. This proposition, it must be noted, does not negative the doctrine that there are
members of the family entitled to maintenance in the case of an impartible zamindari.
Just as the impartibility is the creature of custom, so custom may and does affirm a
right to maintenance in certain members of the family. No attempt has been, as
already stated, made by the plaintiff to prove any special custom in this zamindari.
That by itself in the case of some claims would not be fatal. When a custom or usage,
whether in regard to a tenure or a contract or a family right, is repeatedly brought to
the notice of the Courts of a country, the Courts may hold that custom or usage to be
introduced into the law without the necessity of proof in each individual case. It
becomes in the end truly a matter of process and pleading. Analogy may be found in
instances in the law merchant or in certain customs in copyhold tenure. In the matter
in hand their Lordships do not doubt that the right of sons to maintenance in an
impartible zamindari has been so often recognized that it would not be necessary to
prove the custom in each case. It is this which will explain the reference to rights of
maintenance in cases decided subsequent to the decision in the case of Sartaj Kuari v.
Deoraj Kuari (Supra) For example, in the case of Yarlagadda Mallikarjuna Prasada
v. Yarlagadda Durga Prasada4. The Judgment says :-

       "As to the zamindari estate the Board held that it was impartible, and the
       consequence is that the plaintiffs as the younger brothers of the zamindar retain
       such right and interest in respect of maintenance as belong to the junior
       members of a Raj or other impartible estate descendible to a single heir."
11. But their Lordships may agree here with what was said by the Court in the case of
Nilmony Singh v. Hingoo Lall Singh5

       "We can find no invariable or certain custom that any below the first generation
       from the last Raja can claim maintenance as of right."
12. Apart from custom, what is left? The matter is tersely put by Sankaran Nair J., in
the Court of Appeal :-

       "The plaintiff does not advance any claim based on relationship. He refuses to
       admit any relationship.............As there was no community of interest, the
       property is not burdened with his claim in the hands of a donee."
13. Their Lordships will humbly advise His Majesty to dismiss the appeal with costs.

Appeal dismissed.

Cases Referred.

   1. [1888] 10 All. 272 : 15 I. A.51 : 12 Jur 213
   2. [1899] 22 Mad. 383 : 26 I. A.83 : 1 Bom. L.R.277 : 3 C.W.N. 415 : 9 M. L. J.

       Sup. 1
   3. [1904] 29 Bom. 51 : 6 Bom. L.R.26 at p. 58
   4. [1900] 24 Mad. 147 : 27 I.A.151 : 2 Bom. L.R.945 : 5 C.W.N. 71 : 7 Sar 761 :

       10 M.L.J., 294
   5. [1879] 5 Cal. 256.