PRIVY COUNCIL

                Mian Ghulam Basul Khan

                Vs.

                Secretary of State for India

                        Privy Council Appeal No.2 of 1924
(Lords Shaw, Carson J. Blanesburgh, Sir John Edge and Mr. Ameer Ali JJ.)

                12.3.1925

                JUDGMENT

LORD CARSON J.

1.The (plaintiff) appellant is a resident in the District of Ludhiana of the Punjab and is
the owner of "culturable lands" in that district. In or about the year 1912 he bought
certain other lands and applied for mutation of names. The Deputy Commissioner and,
on appeal, the Financial Commissioner of the Punjab, on the 3rd May, 1913, refused
the application on the ground that the alienation in question was against the policy of
the Punjab Alienation of Lands Act No. 13 of 1900 - that Act by Section 3 enacts as
follows :-

       "3. - (1) A person who desires to- make a permanent alienation of his land shall
       be at liberty to make such alienation where -
       (a) The alienor is not a member of an agricultural tribe; or
       (c)The alienor is a member of an agricultural tribe and the alienee is a member
       of the same tribe or of a tribe in the same group.
       "(2) Except in the oases provided for in Sub-Section (1), a permanent alienation
       of land shall not take effect as such unless and until sanction is given thereto by
       a Deputy Commissioner.
       "(3) The Deputy Commissioner shall enquire into the circumstances of the
       alienation and shall have discretion to grant or refuse the sanction required by
       sub-section (2)."
2. The grounds of the decision both of the Deputy Commissioner and the Financial
Commissioner were that the plaintiff was described in the Revenue Records as
"Khayyat Mohal," that that tribe was not one of the notified agricultural tribes of the
Ludhiana District, nor was the Mohal tribe to which it corresponded. The plaintiff
alleged that although described in the Revenue Record of the land belonging to him as
"Mohal Khayyat" he was nevertheless a Rajput and a member of an agricultural tribe.
It was admitted that if he was a Rajput he was entitled to become the alienee of the
property, as Rajputs were an agricultural tribe and were so declared in the "Punjab
Gazette" of the 21st April, 1904.

3. The plaintiff then instituted this suit in the Court of the District Judge of Ludhiana
against the respondent and prayed for a declaratory decree to the effect that he was a
Mohal Rajput and that all the entries in the Revenue papers showing his caste as
"Mohal Khayyat" were incorrect. The parties went to trial on one issue only, namely,
"Is the plain tiff a Rajput ?"

4. On the 24th June, 1915, the Subordinate Judge, after hearing a number of witnesses
and examining a number of documents on both sides, delivered judgment and passed a
decree in favour of the plaintiff. The respondent appealed to the High Court of
Judicature at Lahore and on the 25th October, 1920, that Court set aside the decree of
the Subordinate Judge and dismissed the plaintiff's suit. Hence the present appeal in
which, admittedly, the only question for determination is whether the plaintiff is a
Rajput.

5. The case made by the plaintiff, as the appellate Court states, was that although in
the Revenue Records the plaintiff's family has been shown since 1852 as holding land
and their caste been described as Khayyat Mohal the term Khayyat does not denote a
tribe, but merely a profession, viz., tailoring, that his got (i. e., sub tribe) is Mohal and
that his real tribe is Rajput and that there is no other tribe except that of Rajputs which
contains a got of the name of Mohal. The Revenue Records of Mauza Shahna give his
pedigree back as far as his great grandfather Nathu who by a pedigree propounded by
the plaintiff was alleged to be one of the four sons of Khana who was himself
descended in the 13th generation from Mohal. The appellate Court admitted that if
Nathu was proved to be descended as alleged from Khana the plaintiff would have
proved his right to be a member of the Rajput tribe. That Court, however, refused to
rely upon the evidence produced as proving that the plaintiff traced his pedigree
through his great grandfather Nathu to Khana and thence to Mohal. In the view that
their Lordships take of the other evidence in the case proving that the plaintiff's got is
Mohal and that thereby his tribe is Rajput their Lordships do not think it necessary to
pronounce any opinion as to whether Nathu was descended from Khana. As the Court
of Appeal finds.
       "there seems to be little doubt that; Mohal is the name of a sub-division of the
       tribe of Rajputs, and so far as the evidence in this case shows there is no other
       tribe in the Punjab which has a got of the name of Mohal." and the same Court
       also states -
       "The conclusion at which we arrive is that, so far as is known, there are no per
       sons in the Punjab who have any real right to be described as Mohals except
       Rajputs and some Jats, who rightly or wrongly claim that they are really of
       Rajput origin."
6. It is clear, therefore, that if the appel late Court had been of opinion that the plaintiff
had a title to the use of the term Mohal that Court would have decided in favour of the
appellant. Now the first thing to be observed is that in the course of the present
litigation S. Bachan Singh, the respondent's pleader, stated on oath that it was
conceded "that plaintiff is Mohal got of Khayyat tribe" (see statement of 27th July,
1914.

7. The appellate Court has found that the mere fact that various members of the family
have worked at tailoring cannot be regarded as any proof that the plaintiff is not a
Rajput, for, as stated in Ibbetson's Census Report, p. 333, which has been quoted by
the learned Subordinate Judge, men of all castes follow the trade: or as the
Subordinate Judge has stated, Khay yats do not make a tribal clan by them selves. It is
proved beyond all doubt and so found by the Appellate Court that in the Revenue
Records the plaintiff's family has been shown since 1852 as holding land, their caste
being described as Khay yat Mohal - and there are in evidence ex tracts from the
settlement records of this district for 1853 in which Ilahia and Gahia grand-uncle and
grand-father of the plaintiff are put down as owners of 25 ghumaons of land in the
village of Shahna, their quaum being mentioned in Kayyat (Mahommadan) and got as
Mohal. Similar entries are to be found in relation to the settlement of 1882. It is
admitted by the appellate Court that if these records truly described the plaintiff's
family as Mohals it would prove the plaintiff's right in this action, but they attempt to
dispose of this evidence by saying "there is no proof that whoever first caused this
entry to be made had any real title to the use of the term Mohal." That is the only link
apparently which the appellate Court has found to be absent from the evidence
necessary to prove the plaintiff's case.

8. Their Lordships cannot share the view of the Appellate Court that evidence of this
character, taken from public records for a series of years since 1852 and recorded in
accordance with the requirements of the law, can in a pedigree case be disregarded for
the reason stated by the appel late Court. No evidence is given and no suggestion is
made that such entries were false or that there was any existing reason why
deliberately false entries should have been made. In such a case as the present,
statements in public documents are receivable to prove the facts stated on the general
grounds that they were made by the authorised agents of the public in the course of,
official duty and respecting facts which were of public interest or required to be
recorded for the benefit of the community (Taylor, Law of Evidence, 10th Ed., section
1591). In many cases, indeed, in nearly all cases, after a lapse of years it would be
impossible to give evidence that the statements contained in such documents were in
fact true, and it is for this reason that such an exception is made to the rule of hearsay
evidence. Their Lord ships being of opinion that the plaintiff has proved that he is
entitled to the description of Mohal, it follows from the facts found by the appellate
Court, and already referred to, that the plaintiff is a Rajput and is entitled to the relief
claimed in this action. Their Lordships will therefore humbly advise His Majesty that
this appeal should be allowed with costs here and in the Court below and that the
decree of the Subordinate Judge should be restored.

Appeal dismissed.