SUPREME COURT OF UNITED STATES
United States of America and Federal Communications Commission, Petitioners,
Vs.
Storer Broadcasting Company
No. 94.

Argued Feb. 28, 29, 1956.
Decided May 21, 1956.

Mr.Warren E. Baker, for petitioner.

Mr. Albert R. Connelly, New York City, for respondent.

Mr. Justice REED delivered the opinion of the Court.

The Federal Communications Commission issued, on August 19, 1948, a notice of proposed
rulemaking under the authority of 47 U.S.C. §§ 303(r), 311, 313 and 314, 47 U.S.C.A. §§ 303(r),
311, 313, 314 (Communications Act of 1934, as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 301 et seq., 47 U.S.C.A. §
301 et seq.). It was proposed, so far as is pertinent to this case, to amend Rules 3.35, 3.240 and
3.636 relating to Multiple Ownership of standard, FM and television broadcast stations. Those rules
provide that licenses for broadcasting stations will not be granted if the applicant, directly or
indirectly, has an interest in other stations beyond a limited number. The purpose of the limitations
is to avoid overconcentration of broadcasting facilities.
As required by 5 U.S.C. § 1003(b), 5 U.S.C.A. § 1003(b), the notice permitted 'interested' parties to
file statements or briefs. Such parties might also intervene in appeals. 47 U.S.C. § 402(d) and (e),
47 U.S.C.A. § 402(d, e). Respondent, licensee of a number of radio and television stations, filed a
statement objecting to the proposed changes, as did other interested broadcasters. Respondent based
its objections largely on the fact that the proposed rules did not allow one person to hold as many
FM and television stations as standard stations. Storer argued that such limitations might cause
irreparable financial damage to owners of standard stations if an obsolescent standard station could
not be augmented by FM and television facilities.
In November 1953 the Commission entered an order amending the Rules in question without
significant changes from the proposed forms.1 A review was sought in due course by respondent in
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit under 5 U.S.C. § 1034, 5 U.S.C.A. §
1034,2 47 U.S.C. § 402(a), 47 U.S.C.A. § 402(a),3 and 5 U.S.C. § 1009(a), (c), 5 U.S.C.A. §
1009(a, c).4 Respondent alleged it owned or controlled, within the meaning of the Multiple
Ownership Rules, seven standard radio, five FM radio and five television broadcast stations. It
asserted that the Rules complained of were in conflict with the statutory mandates that applicants
should be granted licenses if the public interest would be served and that applicants must have a
hearing before denial of an application. 47 U.S.C. § 309(a) and (b), 47 U.S.C.A. § 309(a, b).5
Respondent also claimed:

'The Rules, in considering the ownership of one (1%) per cent or more of the voting stock of a
broadcast licensee corporation as equivalent to ownership, operation or control of the station, are
unreasonable and bear no rational relationship to the national Anti-Trust policy.'

This latter claim was important to respondent because allegedly 20% of its voting stock was in
scattered ownership and was traded in by licensed dealers. This stock was thus beyond its control.

Respondent asserted it was a 'party aggrieved' and a 'person suffering legal wrong' or adversely
affected under the several statutes that authorize review of FCC action. See notes 2, 3 and 4, supra.
It stated its injuries from the Rules thus:

'Storer is adversely affected and aggrieved by the Order of the Commission adopted on November
25, 1953, amending the Multiple Ownership Rules, in that:

'(a) Storer is denied the right of a full and fair hearing to determine whether its ownership of an
interest in more than seven (7) standard radio and five (5) television broadcast stations, in light of
and upon a showing of all material circumstances, will thereby serve the public interest,
convenience and necessity.

'(b) The acquisition of Storer's voting stock by the public under circumstances beyond the control of
Storer, may and could be violative of the Multiple Ownership rules, as amended, and result in a
forfeiture of licenses now held by Storer, with resultant loss and injury to Storer and to all other
Storer stockholders.'

On the day the amendments to the Rules were adopted, a pending application of Storer for an
additional television station at Miami was dismissed on the basis of the Rules.

While the question of respondent's right to appeal has not been raised by either party or by the Court
of Appeals, our jurisdiction is now mooted. It may be considered. Federal Communications
Commission v. National Broadcasting Co., [1943] USSC 102; 319 U.S. 239, 246[1943] USSC 102;
, 63 S.Ct. 1035, 1038[1943] USSC 102; , 87 L.Ed. 1374. Jurisdiction depends upon standing to seek
review and upon ripeness. If respondent could not rightfully seek review from the order adopting
the challenged regulations, it must await action to its disadvantage under them, and neither the
Court of Appeals nor this Court has jurisdiction of the controversy. Under the above-cited Code
sections, review of Commission action is granted any party aggrieved or suffering legal wrong by
that action.

We think respondent had standing to sue at the time it exercised its privilege. The process of
rulemaking was complete. It was final agency action, 5 U.S.C. § 1001(c) and (g), 5 U.S.C.A. §
1001(c, g), by which Storer claimed to be 'aggrieved.' When the authority to appeal was
substantially the same, we held that an appellant who complained of the grant of a license to a
competitor because it would reduce its own income had standing to appeal against a contention,
admittedly sound, that such economic injury to appellant was not a proper issue before the
Commission. We said:

'Congress had some purpose in enacting section 402(b)(2). It may have been of opinion that one
likely to be financially injured by the issue of a license would by the only person having a sufficient
interest to bring to the attention of the appellate court errors of law in the action of the Commission
in granting the license. It is within the power of Congress to confer such standing to prosecute an
appeal.' Federal Communications Comm'n v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 477, 60
S.Ct. 693, 698, 84 L.Ed. 869.

We added that such an appellant could raise any relevant question of law in respect to the order.

Again in Columbia Broadcasting System v. United States, [1942] USSC 123; 316 U.S. 407, 62 S.Ct.
1194, 86 L.Ed. 1563, this Court considered the problem of standing to review Commission action
under the then existing § 402(a), 48 Stat. 1093, and the Urgent Deficiencies Act, 38 Stat. 219. CBS
there sought review of the adoption of Chain Broadcasting Regulations by the Commission. Against
the contention that the adoption of regulations did not command CBS to do or refrain from doing
anything, dissent 316 U.S. at 429, 62 S.Ct. 1206, this Court held that the order promulgating
regulations was reviewable because it presently affected existing contractual relationships. It said:

'The regulations are not any the less reviewable because their promulgation did not operate of their
own force to deny or cancel a license. It is enough that failure to comply with them penalizes
licensees, and appellant, with whom they contract. If an administrative order has that effect it is
reviewable and it does not cease to be so merely because it is not certain whether the Commission
will institute proceedings to enforce the penalty incurred under its regulations for non-compliance.'
Id., 316 U.S. at pages 417 418, 62 S.Ct. at page 1200.

The Court said that the regulations 'presently determine rights.' Id., 316 U.S. at page 421, 62 S.Ct. at
page 1202.

'Appellant's standing to maintain the present suit in equity is unaffected by the fact that the
regulations are not directed to appellant and do not in terms compel action by it or impose penalties
upon it because of its action or failure to act. It is enough that, by setting the controlling standards
for the Commission's action, the regulations purport to operate to alter and affect adversely
appellant's contractual rights and business relations with station owners whose applications for
licenses the regulations will cause to be rejected and whose licenses the regulations may cause to be
revoked.' Id., 316 U.S. at page 422, 62 S.Ct. at page 1202.

See Federal Communications Commission v. American Broadcasting Co., [1954] USSC 27; 347
U.S. 284, 289, 74 S.Ct. 593, 597[1954] USSC 27; , 98 L.Ed. 699, and EL Dorado Oil Works v.
United States, [1946] USSC 74; 328 U.S. 12, 18--19[1946] USSC 74; , 66 S.Ct. 843, 846[1946]
USSC 74; , 90 L.Ed. 1053.

The regulations here under consideration presently aggrieve the respondent. The Commission
exercised a power of rulemaking which controls broadcasters. The Rules now operate to control the
business affairs of Storer. Unless it obtains a modification of this declared administrative policy,
Storer cannot enlarge the number of its standard of FM stations. It seems, too, that the note to Rule
3.636 (n. 1, supra) endangers Storer's stations as alleged in its petition for review. See this opinion,
supra, 76 S.Ct. at page 767 at (b). Commission hearings are affected now by the Rules. Storer
cannot cogently plan its present or future operations.7 It cannot plan to enlarge the number of its
standard or FM stations, and at any moment the purchase of Storer's voting stock by some member
of the public could endanger its existing structure. These are grievances presently restricting Storer's
operations. In the light of the legislation allowing review of the Commission's actions, we hold that
Storer has standing to bring this action.

In its petition for review Storer prayed the court to vacate the provisions of the Multiple Ownership
Rules insofar as they denied to an applicant already controlling the allowable number of stations a
'full and fair hearing' to determine whether additional licenses to the applicant would be in the
public interest.8 The Court of Appeals struck out, as contrary to § 309(a) and (b) of the
Communications Act (n. 5, supra), the words italicized in Rule 3.636 (n. 1, supra) and the similar
words in Rules 3.35 and 3.240. The case was remanded to the Commission with directions to
eliminate these words. 95 U.S.App.D.C. 97, 220 F.2d 204. We granted certiorari 350 U.S. 816, 76
S.Ct. 52.

The Commission asserts that its power to make regulations gives it the authority to limit
concentration of stations under a single control.9 It argues that rules may go beyond the technical
aspects of radio, that rules may validly give concreteness to a standard of public interest, and that
the right to a hearing does not exist where an applicant admittedly does not meet those standards as
there would be no facts to ascertain. The Commission shows that its regulations permit applicants to
seek amendments and waivers of or exceptions to its Rules.10 It adds:

'This does not mean, of course, that the mere filing of an application for a waiver * * * would
necessarily require the holding of a hearing, for if that were the case a rule would no longer be a
rule. It means only that it might be an abuse of discretion to fail to hear a request for a waiver which
showed, on its face, the existence of circumstances making application of the rule inappropriate.'

Respondent defends the position of the Court of Appeals. It urges that an application cannot be
rejected under 47 U.S.C. § 309, 47 U.S.C.A. § 309, without a 'full hearing' to applicant. We agree
that a 'full hearing' under § 309 means that every party shall have the right to present his case or
defense by oral or documentary evidence, to submit rebuttal evidence, and to conduct such cross-
examination as may be required for a full and true disclosure of the facts. Cf. 5 U.S.C. § 1006(c), 5
U.S.C.A. § 1006(c). Such a hearing is essential for wise and just application of the authority of
administrative boards and agencies.

We do not read the hearing requirement, however, as withdrawing from the power of the
Commission the rulemaking authority necessary for the orderly conduct of its business. As
conceded by Storer, 'Section 309(b) does not require the Commission to hold a hearing before
denying a license to operate a station in ways contrary to those that the Congress has determined are
in the public interest.'11 The challenged Rules contain limitations against licensing not specifically
authorized by statute. But that is not the limit of the Commission's rulemaking authority. 47 U.S.C.
§ 154(i) and § 303(r), 47 U.S.C.A. §§ 154(i), 303(r), grant general rulemaking power not
inconsistent with the Act or law.

This Commission, like other agencies, deals with the public interest. Scripps-Howard Radio v.
Federal Communications Commission, [1942] USSC 71; 316 U.S. 4, 14[1942] USSC 71; , 62 S.Ct.
875, 882[1942] USSC 71; , 86 L.Ed. 1229. Its authority covers new and rapidly developing fields.
Congress sought to create regulation for public protection with careful provision to assure fair
opportunity for open competition in the use of broadcasting facilities. Accordingly, we cannot
interpret § 309(b) as barring rules that declare a present intent to limit the number of stations
consistent with a permissible 'concentration of control.' It is but a rule that announces the
Commission's attitude on public protection against such concentration.12 The Communications Act
must be read as a whole and with appreciation of the responsibilities of the body charged with its
fair and efficient operation. The growing complexity of our economy induced the Congress to place
regulation of businesses like communication in specialized agencies with broad powers. Courts are
slow to interfere with their conclusions when reconcilable with statutory directions.13 We think the
Multiple Ownership Rules, as adopted, are reconcilable with the Communications Act as a whole.
An applicant files his application with knowledge of the Commission's attitude toward concentration
of control.

In National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, [1943] USSC 100; 319 U.S. 190, 63 S.Ct. 997, 87
L.Ed. 1344, similar rules prohibiting certain methods of chain broadcasting were upheld despite a
claim that the Rules caused licenses to be denied without 'examination of written applications
presented * * * as required by §§ 308 and 309.' Id., 319 U.S. at page 230, 63 S.Ct. at page 1016.14
The National Broadcasting case validated numerous regulations couched in the prohibitory language
of the present regulations. The one in the margin will serve as an example.

In the National Broadcasting case we called attention to the necessity for flexiblity in the Rules
there involved. 'Commission provided that 'networks will be given full opportunity, on proper
application for new facilities or renewal of existing licenses, to call to our attention any reasons why
the principle should be modified or held inapplicable." Id., 319 U.S. at apge 207, 63 S.Ct. at page
1005. We said:

'The Commission therefore did not bind itself inflexibly to the licensing policies expressed in the
Regulations. In each case that comes before it the Commission must still exercise an ultimate
judgment whether the grant of a license would serve the 'public interest, convenience, or necessity.'
If time and changing circumstances reveal that the 'public interest' is not served by application of the
Regulations, it must be assumed that the Commission will act in accordance with its statutory
obligations.' Id., 319 U.S. at page 225, 63 S.Ct. at page 1013.

That flexibility is here under the present § 309(a) and (b) and the FCC's regulations. See n. 10,
supra. We read the Act and Regulations as providing a 'full hearing' for applicants who have reached
the existing limit of stations, upon their presentation of applications conforming to Rules 1.361(c)
and 1.702, that set out adequate reasons why the Rules should be waived or amended. The Act,
considered as a whole, requires no more. We agree with the contention of the Commission that a full
hearing, such as is required by § 309(b), note 5, supra, would not be necessary on all such
applications. As the Commission has promulgated its Rules after extensive administrative hearings,
it is necessary for the accompanying papers to set forth reasons, sufficient if true, to justify a change
or waiver of the Rules. We do not think Congress intended the Commission to waste time on
applications that do not state a valid basis for a hearing. If any applicant is aggrieved by a refusal,
the way for review is open.

We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case to that court so that it may
consider respondent's other objections to the Multiple Ownership Rules.

Reversed and remanded.

Mr. Justice DOUGLAS concurs in the result.

Mr. Justice HARLAN, concurring in part and dissenting in part.

The Court has properly deemed it necessary to question sua sponte the jurisdiction of the Court of
Appeals to entertain this case,1 but I am unable to agree with its decision that such jurisdiction
existed. In my view, Storer was not a 'party aggrieved by a final order' of the Commission, within
the meaning of 5 U.S.C. § 1034, 5 U.S.C.A. § 1034, and hence was not entitled to invoke the
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals. Accordingly, I would vacate the judgment below and remand
the case to the Court of Appeals with directions to dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction.

1. These regulations do not, in my view, constitute an 'order' within the meaning of § 1034. They
simply establish certain standards to be followed by the Commission in the future exercise of its
licensing powers; they do not require any licensee to do or to refrain from doing anything, attach no
consequences to his action or inaction, and determine no questions as to his legal status. As such
they are quite unlike the Chain Broadcasting regulations which were held to be a reviewable 'order'
in Columbia Broadcasting System v. United States, [1942] USSC 123; 316 U.S. 407, 62 S.Ct. 1194,
86 L.Ed. 1563, in a proceeding comparable to this one. Those regulations were held reviewable, not
because every Commission action in the form of a regulation was considered to be an 'order,' but for
the specific reason that they proscribed certain kinds of contracts between licensees and the national
networks and, by prescribing the sanction of license cancellation for noncompliance, operated to
coerce action by the licensees and to determine the legal status of the networks' contracts. Of their
own force and with no further administrative action being taken, the regulations induced licensees to
cancel existing network contracts and deterred them from entering into new ones. That coercive
effect of the regulations on present conduct, the very characteristic which led the Court to regard the
Chain Broadcasting regulations as an 'order' despite their form, is totally lacking here.

2. A second obstacle to review of the regulations here is that, even if they be deemed an 'order,'
Storer has not shown that it is 'aggrieved' by them.

In assessing the character of Storer's grievance, we must put aside the Commission's order, made
simultaneously with its promulgation of the challenged regulations, which denied a pending
application by Storer for a sixth television license. That order was reviewable only by a direct
appeal within 30 days under 47 U.S.C. § 402(b), (c), 47 U.S.C.A. § 402(b), (c), Federal
Communications Commission v. Columbia Broadcasting System, [1940] USSC 123; 311 U.S. 132,
61 S.Ct. 152, 85 L.Ed. 87, and became final and conclusive upon Storer's failure to appeal from it.
Since that order cannot be reviewed, and no relief from it may be granted in this proceeding, it is
only of the prospective effect of the regulations, not their past application, that Storer may
complain. And it is by that effect that Storer must show it is 'aggrieved.'

In its petition for review, Storer alleged that it was aggrieved by the regulations in that:

'(a) Storer is denied the right of a full and fair hearing to determine whether its ownership of an
interest in more than seven (7) standard radio and five (5) television broadcast stations, in light of
and upon a showing of all material circumstances, will thereby serve the public interest,
convenience and necessity.

'(b) The acquisition of Storer's voting stock by the public under circumstances beyond the control of
Storer, may and could be violative of the Multiple Ownership rules, as amended, and result in a
forfeiture of licenses now held by Storer, with resultant loss and injury to Storer and to all other
Storer stockholders.'

However these allegations are read, they assert no more than that the Commission may in the future
take action pursuant to the regulations to deny or revoke a license. Of course, if such action should
ever be taken, Storer would then be 'aggrieved.' But by the same token it would then have a
complete remedy through a direct appeal from such action under § 402(b). Until such time as the
regulations are applied to it, however, Storer will not have been 'aggrieved' and hence will not be
entitled to review. Indeed, in this case we do not even reach often difficult problem whether an
alleged injury is sufficient or of such a nature as to entitle the complaining party to review; here we
have that rare case in which no present injury of any kind is even alleged.

It is said, however, that the regulations 'now operate to control the business affairs of Storer,' despite
the absence of any such allegation by Storer. Since the Regulations do not have any coercive effect,
I take that to mean only that Storer, if it exercises prudent business judgment, will take into account
the announced policy of the Commission in deciding whether or not to apply for an additional
license. No doubtt hat is true, but I fail to see show Storer has been 'aggrieved' by being told in
advance one of the factors that will govern the disposition of any future license application on its
part. If anything, Storer is now able to make a more enlightened judgment as to the probabilities of
success in obtaining a further license.

3. So clear is it, in fact, that Storer has not been 'aggrieved' by the mere issuance of the regulations,
that the Court's grant of review in this case must be premised not upon the effect of the regulations
themselves, but simply upon Storer's interest in knowing whether or not a future application of them
would be valid. The result is that the statutory procedure for obtaining relief from a present injury
caused by an order has been converted into something quite different--namely, a procedure for
obtaining a declaratory judgment as to the validity of a future application of new regulations. Not
only is such a proceeding not authorized by the statute, however, but Storer would not have standing
to invoke it even if it were.

That declaratory relief from future orders is not contemplated by § 1034 seems clear. That section
authorizes review only of an 'order,' only if the order is 'final,' and only at the instance of one
aggrieved 'by' the challenged order itself. The regulations here are not an 'order'; if they were it
would not be 'final' since further administrative action must be taken before Storer will be affected;
and Storer's grievance, if any, will be caused not 'by' the regulations but only by their future
application. Moreover, quite apart from these obstacles, the procedure provided for by § 1034 is
inappropriate for anticipatory equitable relief. That section requires, for example, that petitions for
review be filed within 60 days after the order is issued. While such a time limitation is clearly
appropriate to a procedure for relief from an injury already suffered, there seems no justification for
so limiting the availability of declaratory relief from future action. Why should declaratory relief be
denied as the threat of the future injury becomes more imminent, or be granted to those who have a
sufficient interest to seek review immediately while being denied to those who later acquire a
similar or even greater interest? Finally, no reason is apparent why existing procedures for
declaratory judgments are not adequate; to construe § 1034 as an alternative declaratory judgment
procedure simply produces the incongruous result of authorizing declaratory relief in the Courts of
Appeals within 60 days after the order is issued and in the District Courts thereafter.

In the second place, even if § 1034 is to be construed as authorizing declaratory relief, I see no
reason why the usual requirements for invoking equity jurisdiction should not be as applicable to
such a proceeding as they are to an ordinary declaratory judgment action or to a proceeding to set
aside a Commission order under the Urgent Deficiencies Act, the predecessor to § 1034 under
which the CBS case arose. In that case, CBS's right to equitable relief in advance of the application
of the regulations was expressly based on the irreparable injury it would suffer--the wholesale
concellation of its contracts with licensees--before any further administrative action was taken and
for which there was no other adequate remedy. Unless these requirements for equitable relief are to
be abandoned, there can be no right to relief here, for Storer alleges no threatened injury of any
kind, other than the possibility of future administrative action for which there would be a complete
remedy by appeal.

It is said, however--again without support of any allegations by Storer--that Storer 'cannot
cogently plan its present or future operations' unless it is advised whether or not the regulations are
valid. But plans for expansion of communications facilities have always had to be made subject to
the contingency that the Commission might refuse to grant the necessary license for any one of a
number of reasons. Storer's position in this respect is now no different than it was before the
regulations were issued: any plan to acquire a new station must simply take into account, among the
several contingencies, the likelihood that a denial of a license under the regulations would be upheld
on appeal. What this argument comes down to, therefore, is that Storer needs to know whether or
not it can validly be denied a license under the regulations so that, if it can, it need not make an
application. That is, the injury that Storer will have suffered if the decision on the validity of the
regulations is postponed until Storer in fact applies for a license is the expense of making that very
application, the same injury that is suffered by all unsuccessful license applicants. Until today, I
should not have thought argument was necessary to reject such a basis for declaratory relief.
Declaratory relief has been denied persons whose only alternative was to risk both dismissal from
public employment and the imposition of criminal penalties, United Public Workers of America
(C.I.O.) v. Mitchell, [1947] USSC 23; 330 U.S. 75, 67 S.Ct. 556, 91 L.Ed. 754, yet it is granted
here to relieve Storer of the mere burden of making an application for a license.

The holding of the Court today amounts to this: that regulations which impose no duty and
determine no rights may be reviewed at the instance of a person who alleges no injury, to settle
whether a future application of the regulations that may never occur would be valid. The lack of
support for this decision is disclosed by the Court's primary reliance on CBS,4 a case which in my
view not only fails to support the Court's conclusion but is persuasive, if not controlling, authority
for precisely the opposite result.5 In my opinion, the implications of the decision undermine much
of the settled law on reviewability of administrative action, and it is the more unfortunate because
made without the benefit of briefs or argument by the parties. I cannot concur in that part the Court's
opinion.

The Court having decided, however, that the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction, I concur with the
Court on the merits.

Mr. Justice FRANKFURTER, dissenting.

While I agree that the amendatory Rules promulgated by the Federal Communications Commission
relating to Multiple Ownership of standard, FM and television stations constitute a reviewable
'order' within the meaning of 5 U.S.C. § 1034, 5 U.S.C.A. § 1034, my Brother HARLAN'S
reasoning convinces me that the respondent was not on the record before us a 'party aggrieved'
under that section. Therefore the court below should not have entertained the petition to review the
Commission's order.

Procedural and jurisdictional limitations on judicial action by the federal courts are not playthings of
lawyers nor obstructions on the road of justice. Whether formulated by the Constitution,
congressional enactments or settled judicial precedents, they are means designed to keep the courts
within appropriate limits and to enforce rights according to general standards and not have them
depend on the impact of the individual case. To be sure, dealing as we are with general standards,
differences of views regarding their scope and applicability are bound to arise from time to time.
Who is a 'party aggrieved' or a 'party in interest' turns on the context, often confused and dubious, of
a particular set of circumstances and therefore raises issues on which judges not unnaturally divide,
as they do on other unmathematical problems of the law. See Singer & Sons v. Union Pacific R.
Co., [1940] USSC 142; 311 U.S. 295, 61 S.Ct. 254, 85 L.Ed. 198.

To the laity such matters may seem technicalities in a derogatory sense of the term. But this is only
one phase of an attitude of mind that thinks ill of law which does not accord with private wishes.
When informed by a legal adviser that to carry out his desires would encounter 'technical legal
difficulties,' a strenuous President of the United States impatiently observed that 'all law is
technicality.' But even professionally competent officials are at times impatient with decisions that
fail to adjudicate substantive issues on which light is sought. It seems to me important, therefore,
not to minimize the function of jurisdictional limitations upon adjudication by expressing views on
the merits. There are, of course, exceptional situations where it is proper for a dissenter to go to the
merits when a majority of theCourt removes from the case threshold objections of procedure and
jurisdiction. See e.g., Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 341, 56 S.Ct. 466,
480[1936] USSC 36; , 80 L.Ed. 688. This is not such a case.