1970 INSC 0327
R. K. Bhatt
v.
Union of India and Others
(Supreme Court Of India)
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE A.N. GROVER HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE J.C.
SHAH
Civil Appeal No. 1734 Of 1966 | 25-09-1970

Grover, J.

1. This is an appeal by special leave from a judgment of a Division Bench of the
Punjab High Court (Circuit Bench, Delhi) dismissing the writ petition of the
appellant who had succeeded before a learned single Judge.

2. The appellant was appointed as an Upper Division Clerk in the office of the
Central Claims Organisation, Ministry of Rehabilitation, Mussourie on
December 24, 1956. According to him he received a telegram on November 8,
1958 from Aligarh to which place he belonged that his mother was ill. He took
leave and while he was on leave he was arrested on November 15, 1958 in
connection with a criminal case. On November 17, 1958, his father wrote to the
authoriteis concerned to grant him more leave as the appellant was in police
custody, On November 24, 1958 respondent No. 3 directed his suspension with
effect from November 15, 1958. On January 3, 1959, his services were
terminated. The appellant preferred an appeal but no orders were passed
thereon. On July 2, 1959, he applied to the employment officer, Employment
Exchange, 14, Darya Gunj, Delhi for allowing him priority in respect of
employment assistance which under the directions of the Ministry of Home
Affairs was admissible to Government servants whose services had been
terminated under Rule 5 of the Central Civil Services (Temporary Service)
Rules. 1949. The appellant alleged that owing to the communication received
from respondent No. 3 the employment Officer refused to accord the priority to
him. The position taken up on behalf of the respondents was that the appellant
was employed in a purely temporary capacity and that according to the terms of
employment his services could be terminated at any time after one month's
notice or on payment of a month's salary in lieu of notice. As the services of the

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appellant were no longer required they were terminated on December 31, 1958,
under Rule 5 of the aforesaid Rules. The appellant's allegation that his
membership of the staff council of a certain organisation had offended
respondent 3 was denied. It was maintained that the termination of the service
of the appellant had not been effected by way of punishment.

3. S. B. Capur J., who heard the writ petition, held that the impugned order,
while purporting to be one of the termination of services in exercise of the
power conferred by Rule 5 of the Rules referred to before, was in reality one
which amounted to removal from service on the ground that the appellant was
involved in a criminal case. The matter was taken in appeal before the Division
Bench by the respondents. The Division Bench on a consideration of certain
decisions of this court observed that if a right existed under the Rule to
terminate the services it was not relevant to consider the motive operating on
the mind of the government in taking action under the Rules. That is what was
said by S. K. Kapur J., who delivered the judgment of the Division Bench :

"It is fairly clearly that being involved in a murder case does not constitute a
misconduct. It is, therefore, difficult to assume that the Government adopted a
device to punish the respondent for something which is not punishable under the
rules. That being the situation, I think, the Government could legitimately say to
itself : 'Here is a man, who has been involved in a murder case, disposal of
which may take a very long time, and, therefore, it is desirable to terminate the
contract of his service in terms of the rules'. Even a perusal of the discharge
order clearly shows that no stigma was attached on the respondent."

The appellant contends that he had been acquitted in the criminal case on June
11, 1959. Before that date the order of suspension had been made on June 4,
1959 (annexure B-11 to the writ petition) and this order had been made even
after the termination of the services of the appellant. It is urged that the
appellant has been deprived of substantial part of his salary during the period
for which he was suspended and in that manner he has been visited with civil
consequences without having any opportunity under Art. 311(2) of the
Constitution to show cause against the termination of the services which were
founded purely on the implication or involvement of the appellant in the
criminal case in which he was ultimately acquitted. Our attention had also been
invited to the correspondence which passed between respondent No. 3 and the

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Employment Exchange and it has been suggested by the appellant that this
correspondence fully demonstrated the real reason behind the termination of his
services.

4. The High Court does not, with respect appear to have gone fully into all the
circumstances and matters which required determination and investigation for
finding whether the termination of services of the appellant had been ordered in
the ordinary course because his services were no longer required or whether it
was by way of punishment that that action was taken. In two recent decisions of
this Court, i.e., Union of India and Another v. R. S. Dhaba, Income-tax Officer,
Hoshiarpur (Civil Appeal 882/66 dt. 7th April 1969) and State of Bihar & others
v. Shiva Bhikshuk Mishra (Civil Appeal 1363/66 dt. 14th Sep. 1970), since
reported in [1970 - II L.L.J. 440], the tests laid down by this Court for decision
of cases of the present kind have been restated and reiterated. It is for the High
Court to reconsider the entire matter in the light of these tests and other relevant
cases and give a fresh decision. The case is accordingly remanded to the High
Court for the aforesaid purpose. In the circumstances there will be no order as to
costs.

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