1988 INSC 0612
                                        SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                                       Guru Charan Singh & Pritam Singh

                                                           Vs.

                                                   State of Punjab

                                        Writ Petn. (Cri) No. 1566 of 1985

          (G. L. Oza, M. M. Dutt, K. N. Singh, K. Jagannatha Shetty and L. M. Sharma, JJ.)

                                                      11.10.1988

                                                   JUDGEMENT

OZA, J.:-

1. In view of the conflicting decisions in (i) T. V. Vatheeswaran v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1983) 2
SCR 348: (AIR 1983 SC 361 (2)); (ii) Sher Singh v. State of Punjab (1983) 2 SCR 582: (AIR 1982
SC 465) and (iii) Javed Ahmed Abdul Hamid Pawala v. State of Maharashtra, (1985) 2 SCR 9 :
(AIR 1985 SC 231) question as to whether prolonged delay in execution of death sentence entitles
the accused to the lesser sentence of life imprisonment has come up for consideration before the
Constitution Bench. We have examined the question carefully in the light of the submissions made
by counsel on both sides. We have also examined the individual cases listed for consideration. We
now give only our conclusion to avoid further delay in these matters. The reasons in support of the
conclusion will follow later.

2. We are of the opinion that :
1. Undue long delay in execution of the sentence of death will entitle the condemned person to
approach this Court under Article 32 but this Court will only examine the nature of delay caused
and circumstances ensued after sentence was finally confirmed by the judicial process and will have
no jurisdiction to re-open the conclusions reached by the Court while finally maintaining the
sentence of death. This Court, however, may consider the question of inordinate delay in the light of
all circumstances of the case to decide whether the execution of sentence should be carried out or
should be altered into imprisonment for life. No fixed period of delay could be held to make the
sentence of death inexecutable and to this extent the decision in Vatheeswaran's case cannot be said
to lay down the correct law and therefore to that extent stands overruled.

3. In the light of these principles and giving our anxious consideration to every one of these cases,
we allow in part only W. P. (Cri) No. 186 of 1986 and quash the sentence of death awarded to the
accused (Harbhajan Singh). In the place of the sentence of death, we substitute the sentence of
imprisonment for life to that accused.

4. We dismiss all other writ petitions.

         Order accordingly.

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