2001 INSC 0747
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vlink=purple leftmargin=50> div class=Section1> p align=center style='text-
align:center'>b>SUPREME COURT OF INDIA/b>/p> p align=center style='text-
align:center'>BHARATHIDASAN UNIVERSITY amp; ANR.br> br> Vs.br> br> ALL INDIA
COUNCIL FOR TECHNICAL EDUCATION amp; ORS.br> br> 24/09/2001br> br> (S. Rajendra
Babu amp; Doraiswamy Raju.)/p> p align=center style='text-align:center'>Appeal (civil) 2056 of
1999/p> p>b>JUDGMENT/b>/p> p>Raju, J. /p> p>The only and important question of law that
arises for consideration in this appeal is as to whether the appellant-University created under the
Bharathidasan University Act, 1981 [hereinafter referred to as the University Act] having its area of
operation over the Districts of Tiruchirappalli, Thanjavur and Pudukkottai in the State of Tamil
Nadu, should seek prior approval of the All India Council for the Technical Education [hereinafter
referred to as AICTE] to start a department for imparting a course or programme in technical
education or a technical institution as an adjunct to the University itself to conduct technical courses
of its choice and selection. /p> p>The Bharathidasan University Act, 1981 created the University in
question to provide, among other things, for instruction and training in such branches of learning as
it may determine; to provide for research and for the advancement and dissemination of knowledge;
to institute degrees, titles, diplomas and other academic distinctions; to hold examinations and to
confer degrees, titles, diplomas and other academic distinctions on persons who have pursued an
approved course of study in a University college or laboratory or in an affiliated or approved college
and have passed the prescribed examinations of the University; to confer honorary degrees or other
academic distinction under conditions prescribed; and to institute, maintain and manage institutes of
research, University colleges and laboratories, libraries, museums and other institutions necessary to
carry out the objects of the University, etc. In other words, it is a full-fledged University recognized
by the University Grants Commission also. /p> p>When the appellant-University commenced
courses in technology such as Information Technology amp; Management, Bio- Engineering amp;
Technology, Petrochemical Engineering amp; Technology, Pharmaceutical Engineering and
Technology, etc., the AICTE filed a Writ Petition No.14558 of 1998 before the Madras High Court
seeking for a writ of mandamus to forebear the University authorities from running/conducting any
courses and programmes in those technical courses. The sum and substance of the grievance as well
as the objection put forward was that the University did not apply for and secure the prior approval
for those courses before their commencement by the University as envisaged under the All India
Council for Technical Education Act, 1987 [hereinafter referred to as the AICTE Act] and the
statutory regulations made thereunder by the AICTE, particularly Regulation No.4, which obligated
even an University to obtain such prior approval. The stand of the appellant- University was, as it is
now before us, that the appellant-University will not fall under the definition of Technical
Institution as defined under Section 2(h) of the AICTE Act and consequently, the regulations made
for seeking prior approval of the AICTE even by the Universities to commence a course or
programme in technical education or a new department for the purpose, were in excess of the
regulation-making powers of the AICTE and consequently, are null and void and cannot be enforced
against the appellant-University to the extent it obligates even Universities to seek and secure such
prior approval from the AICTE. /p> p>The learned Single Judge has chosen to accept the stand of
the AICTE by applying and following the ratio of the decision of a Full Bench of the Andhra
Pradesh High Court reported in M. Sambasiva Rao alias Sambaiah amp; Ors. Vs. Osmania
University, Hyderabad rep. By its Registrar amp; Ors. [1997(1) Andhra Law Times 629] and as a
consequence thereof, ordered the cancellation of the admissions made by the University. When the
matter was pursued before a Division Bench, the learned Judges in the Division Bench also felt
convinced of the ratio laid down by the Full Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court and rejected
the appeal, necessitating the appellant-University to come to this Court. Since the approach adopted
by the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench are on the same lines as the one adopted by the
Full Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court, which the Madras High Court has also purported to
follow, it would be just and necessary to refer to the said decision and also consider the correctness
or otherwise of the ratio in the said decision. /p> p>In M. Sambasiva Rao (supra), while adverting
to the relevant provisions of the University Grants Commission Act, 1956, the Andhra Pradesh State
Council for Higher Education Act, the A.P. Universities Act, 1991, the AICTE Act and the All India
Council for Technical Education (Grant of approval for starting new Technical Institutions,
introduction of courses or programmes and approval of intake capacity of seats for the courses or
programmes) Regulations, 1994 [hereinafter referred to as `the Regulations], the High Court arrived
at a conclusion that the AICTE Act being a special law on a particular category of education,
overrides even the University Grants Commission Act, which, in the opinion of the High Court, was
in the nature of a general law in regard to imparting of education by Universities in general in
respect of common matters covered thereunder. In spite of both the Acts being those made by the
Parliament within its legislative competence even as later law, the AICTE Act was held to be
binding. As for the relative operation of the AICTE Act and the State Act dealt with therein, it was
held that the AICTE Act occupied the field and that, therefore, the State Act has to yield and
consequently statutory regulations made are not only valid and had the force of law as a subordinate
legislation, but no question of repugnancy between the Regulations and AICTE Act or any alleged
excess exercise of power in framing such regulations, arose on the facts of the case having regard to
the creation of the AICTE for the proper planning and coordinated development of technical
education system throughout the country. The Andhra Pradesh High Court was of the view that
anybody or everyone of the authorities and institutions concerned with a technical education all over
the country would fall within the meaning of Technical Institution as defined in Section 2(h) of the
AICTE Act and, therefore, be bound by the authority of the AICTE under the AICTE Act and the
Regulations made thereunder. In coming to such conclusions, the Full Bench tried to draw
sustenance from the decisions of this Court reported in Unni Krishnan J.P. Vs. State of A.P.
[1993(1) SCC 645] and State of Tamil Nadu Vs. Adhiyaman Educational and Research Institute and
Ors. [1995(4) SCC 104]. /p> p>Shri Shanti Bhushan, learned senior counsel appearing for the
appellant-University, urged that a university like the appellant as defined under Section 2 (i) will not
fall within the definition of a technical institution contained in Section 2 (h) of the AICTE Act and,
therefore, equally stood outside the purview of Section 10 (1) (k) of the said Act and consequently
not obliged to seek for and obtain the prior approval of the AICTE for starting a department or
introducing new courses or programmers. The regulations framed by the AICTE for the same
reason insofar as it obligates even universities to obtain such prior approval, cannot be held to be
binding or enforceable against the appellant by the mere fact that the regulation specifically states
so, notwithstanding the provisions contained in the Act stipulating to the contrary and any
regulation so made will be void and unenforceable. It was also urged that the decision of the Full
Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court does not lay down the correct position of law and the
decisions of this Court relied upon in the said decision really do not lend any support to the
principles ultimately laid down therein and, therefore, the Madras High Court ought to have
considered the issues independently and not followed the ratio of the Full Bench in M. Sambasiva
Raos case (supra). The strong grievance ventilated on behalf of the appellant is that both the Andhra
Pradesh and Madras High Courts have failed to properly construe the relevant provisions of the Act,
applying the correct principles of interpretation and also giving due consideration and weight to the
various stipulations contained in Section 10 which made specific reference wherever the universities
also have to adhere to the provisions of the AICTE Act, Rules and Regulations. It was also urged
that no Rules or Regulations inconsistent with the provisions of the Act could have been either made
under the Act or sought to be enforced, legitimately. Strong reliance has also been placed on the
decisions reported in S.K. Singh amp; Others vs V.V. Giri amp; another (AIR 1970 SC 2097); D.K.
Trivedi amp; Sons and others vs State of Gujarat and others (AIR 1986 SC 1323) as also the very
decision in Unni Krishnan, J.P. and others vs State of Andhra Pradesh and others [(1993) 1 SCC
645] and State of T.N. and another vs Adhiyaman Educational amp; Research Institute and others
[(1995) 4 SCC 104] and Medical Council of India vs State of Karnataka and others [(1998) 6 SCC
131]. /p> p>Dr. J.P. Verghese, learned counsel for the AICTE, while drawing sustenance from the
reasoning of the judgment under challenge as well as the Andhra Pradesh case, urged that having
regard to the overall functions and powers of the Council under the Act to ensure proper planning
and coordinated development of the technical education system throughout the country, the
qualitative improvement of such education and regulation and proper maintenance of norms and
standards in the technical education system and matters connected therewith envisaged under
Section 10 of the Act particularly Section 10 (1) (k) read with Section 20 (1) (b) of the ATE Act, the
AICTE will have pervasive control over universities also and consequently, the prior approval of
AICTE has to be obtained by even the universities like any other technical institution for starting
any new department or institute or commencing a new course or programme in technical education.
The totality of the purpose and scheme, claimed to be underlying the enactment is said to confer
such sweeping powers over all functional activities relating to technical education and the
universities cannot claim immunity from such obligation cast under the Act and the regulations
made by the AICTE. The sheet anchor of support for the respondent seem to be the decision
reported in State of T.N. and another vs Adhiyaman Educational amp; Research Institute and others
(supra) and Jaya Gokul Educational Trust vs Commissioner amp; Secretary to Government Higher
Education Department, Thiruvanathapuram, Kerala State and another [(2000) 5 SCC 231], in
addition to the decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court. /p> p>We have bestowed our thoughtful
consideration to the submissions made on either side. When the legislative intent is found specific
mention and expression in the provisions of the Act itself, the same cannot be whittled down or
curtailed and rendered nugatory by giving undue importance to the so-called object underlying the
Act or the purpose of creation of a body to supervise the implementation of the provisions of the
Act, particularly when the AICTE Act does not contain any evidence of an intention to belittle and
destroy the authority or autonomy of other statutory bodies, having their own assigned roles to
perform. Merely activated by some assumed objects or desirabilities, the Courts cannot adorn the
mantle of legislature. It is hard to ignore the legislative intent to give definite meaning to words
employed in the Act and adopt an interpretation which would tend to do violence to the express
language as well as the plain meaning and patent aim and object underlying the various other
provisions of the Act. Even in endeavouring to maintain the object and spirit of the law to achieve
the goal fixed by the legislature, the Courts must go by the guidance of the words used and not on
certain pre-conceived notions of ideological structure and scheme underlying the law. In the
statement of objects and reasons for the AICTE Act, it is specifically stated that the AICTE, was
originally set up by a Government resolution as a National Expert Body to advice the Central and
State Governments for ensuring the coordinated development of technical education in accordance
with approved standards was playing an effective role, but, However, in recent years, a large
number of private engineering colleges and polytechnics have come up in complete disregard of the
guidelines, laid down by the AICTE and taking into account the serious deficiencies of even
rudimentary infrastructure necessary for imparting proper education and training and the need to
maintain educational standards and curtail the growing erosion of standards statutory authority was
meant to be conferred upon AICTE to play its role more effectively by enacting the AICTE Act. /p>
p>Section 2(h) defines `technical institution for the purposes of the Act, as follows:- /p> p>technical
institution means an institution, not being a University, which offers courses or programmes of
technical education, and shall include such other institutions as the Central Government may, in
consultation with the Council, by notification in the Official Gazette, declare as technical
institutions /p> p>Since it is intended to be other than a University, the Act defines in Section 2(i)
`University to mean a University defined under clause (f) of Section 2 of the University Grants
Commission Act, 1956 and also to be inclusive of an institution deemed to be a University under
Section 3 of the said Act. Section 10 of the Act enumerates the various powers and functions of the
AICTE as also its duties and obligations to take steps towards fulfillment of the same. One such as
envisaged in Section 10(1)(k) is to grant approval for starting new technical institutions and for
introduction of new courses or programmes in consultation with the agencies concerned. Section 23,
which empowers the Council to make regulations in the manner ordained therein emphatically and
specifically, mandates the making of such regulations only not inconsistent with the provisions of
this Act and the rules. The Act, for all purposes and throughout maintain the distinct identity and
existence of `technical institutions and `universities and it is in keeping tune with the said dichotomy
that wherever the University or the activities of the University is also to be supervised or regulated
and guided by the AICTE, specific mention has been made of the University alongside the technical
institutions and wherever the University is to be left out and not to be roped in merely refers to the
technical institution only in Sections 10, 11 and 22(2)(b). It is necessary and would be useful to
advert to Section 10(1)(c),(g),(o) which would go to show that Universities are mentioned alongside
the `technical institutions and clauses (k),(m),(p),(q),(s) and (u) wherein there is conspicuous
omission of reference to Universities and reference being made to technical institutions alone. It is
equally important to see that when the AICTE is empowered to inspect or cause to inspect any
technical institutions in clause (p) of sub-section (1) of Section 10 without any reservation
whatsoever, when it comes to the question of universities it is confined and limited to ascertaining
the financial needs or its standards of teaching, examination and research. The inspection may be
made or cause to be made of any department or departments only and that too, in such manner as
may be prescribed as envisaged in Section 11 of the Act. Clause (t) of sub-section (1) of Section 10
envisages the AICTE to only advice the UGC for declaring any institution imparting technical
education as a deemed University and not do any such thing by itself. Likewise, clause (u) of the
same provision which envisage the setting up of a National Board of Accreditation to periodically
conduct evaluation of technical institutions or programmes on the basis of guidelines, norms and
standards specified by it to make recommendation to it, or to the Council, or to the Commission or
to other bodies, regarding recognition or de-recognition of the institution or the programme. All
these vitally important aspects go to show that the AICTE created under the Act is not intended to
be an Authority either superior to or supervise and control the Universities and thereby super
impose itself upon such Universities merely for the reason that it is imparting teaching in technical
education or programmes in any of its Departments or Units. A careful scanning through of the
provisions of the AICTE Act and the provisions of the UGC Act in juxtaposition, will show that the
role of AICTE vis-?is the Universities is only advisory, recommendatory and a guiding factor and
thereby sub- serve the cause of maintaining appropriate standards and qualitative norms and not as
an authority empowered to issue and enforce any sanctions by itself, except submitting a Report to
the UGC for appropriate action. The conscious and deliberate omission to enact any such provision
in the AICTE Act in respect of Universities is not only a positive indicator but should be also one of
the determining factors in adjudging the status, role and activities of AICTE vis-?is Universities and
the activities and functioning of its departments and units. All these vitally important facets with so
much glaring significance of the scheme underlying the Act and the language of the various
provisions seem to have escaped the notice of the learned Judges, their otherwise well-merited
attention and consideration in their proper and correct perspective. The ultra activist view
articulated in M. Sambasiva Raos case (supra) on the basis of supposed intention and imagined
purpose of the AICTE or the Act constituting it, is uncalled for and ought to have been avoided, all
the more so when such an interpretation is not only bound to do violence to the language of the
various provisions but also inevitably render other statutory authorities like UGC and Universities
irrelevant or even as non-entities by making the AICTE a super power with a devastating role
undermining the status, authority and autonomous functioning of those institutions in areas and
spheres assigned to them under the respective legislations constituting and governing them. /p> p>In
Unni Krishnans case (supra), this Court was not concerned with issues of the nature now sought to
be raised and the observations made therein in the context of disputes pertaining to the powers,
rights and extent to which the State Legislature or Government could interfere, regulate or prohibit
the rights to establish and run professional colleges cannot be taken out of their context and purpose
to be pressed into service in this case. As a matter of fact, even this Court, which formulated a
scheme to prevent evils of capitation fees etc., specifically excluded from its purview colleges run
by the Government and the Universities. Equally, the consideration in Adhiyaman Engineering
College case (supra), the question was as to the relative scope and extent of control of a professional
engineering college by the State Government in the teeth of the AICTE Act and the powers
exercisable by the AICTE under the provisions of the said Act, Rules and Regulations made
thereunder. The decisions, the correctness of which are under our consideration in this case, have
not kept into consideration before the nature and character of the issues raised in the two decisions
of this Court noticed above before relying upon the observations contained therein in dealing with
the rights of an university constituted under a State enactment, which, apart from the enactment
constituting it, is governed by the provisions of the UGC Act, also made by the Parliament. The
decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in M. Sambasiva Raos case (supra) has unduly
oversimplified and underscored the status, position, as well as the importance of the UGC by stating
that the UGC was concerned only with the object of providing grants and financial assistance to
educational institutions and serving as a recommendatory and regulatory body completely loosing
sight of its superior, vital and exclusive role ordained to it by the Parliament itself as an expert body
in regard to Co-ordination and determination of standards in institutions for higher education or
research and scientific and technical institutions, and the standards of teaching and examination in
universities, even in the absence of the UGC and that too without a proper and comparative
consideration of the relative scope and effect of the respective role of the UGC as well as the
AICTE. /p> p>It is by now well-settled that Parliament has enacted the University Grants
Commission Act, 1956 as well as the AICTE Act, 1987 in the purported exercise of the powers
envisaged in Entry 66 of List-I of the VIIth Schedule to the Constitution of India, which reads as
Co-ordination and determination of standards in institutions for higher education or research and
scientific and technical institutions. It was permissible for the Parliament to enact a law with the
object and aim of co-ordination and determination of standards among a particular class or category
of institutions, which may deal with different kinds of education and research as also scientific and
technical institutions of different disciplines and specialised branches of even such disciplines. The
Parliament, while enacting the AICTE Act, was fully alive to the existence, in full force and effect
the provisions of the UGC Act, 1956, which specifically dealt with the co- ordination and
determination of standards at university level of institutions as well as institutions for higher studies
of the category or class other than but deemed to be universities and yet roped into the definition of
technical institution only institutions not being a University as defined in Section 2(i). Apart from so
defining technical Institutions so as to be exclusive of University even in empowering the AICTE to
do certain things, special care seems to have been conspicuously and deliberately taken to make
specific mention of universities, wherever and whenever alone the AICTE was expected to interact
with universities and University Departments as well as its constituent Institutions. In the statement
of objects to the AICTE Act, the evil sought to be curbed was stated to be the coming up
indiscriminately of number of private engineering colleges and polytechnics in complete disregard
of the guidelines resulting in diluted standards, unplanned growth, inadequate facilities and lack of
infra-structural facilities in them and not of any anomalies arising out of any university bodies or
UGC to even think of either sidelining or subjugating them by constituting AICTE. The guarded
language employed for the said purpose and deliberate omission to refer to the universities in
Section 10 (1) (k) of the AICTE Act while empowering AICTE to accord approval for starting new
technical institutions and introduction of new programmes or courses by or in such institutions
cannot be ignored to be of any insignificance. A careful analysis of the various provisions contained
in Sections 10,11 and 22 will further go to show that the role of interaction conferred upon AICTE
vis-a-vis Universities is limited to the purpose of ensuring the proper maintenance of norms and
standards in the technical education system so as to conform to the standards laid down by it, with
no further or direct control over such universities or scope for any direct action except bringing it to
the notice of the UGC or other authorities only, of any lapses in carrying out any directions of the
AICTE in this regard, for appropriate action. While stating that autonomy of universities should not
mean a permission for authoritarian functioning, the High Courts by the construction placed by
them have virtually allowed such authoritarianism to the AICTE to such an extent as to belittle the
importance and elegant role assigned to the universities in the Educational system of the country
and rendered virtually subordinate to the AICTE. In our view, that does not seem to be the object of
creating AICTE or passing of the AICTE Act. Such construction as has been placed by the Court in
M. Sambasiva Raos case (supra) which found favour of acceptance of the Court in the present case
ought to have been avoided and the same could neither be said to have been intended or was ever in
the contemplation of the Parliament nor should the UGC and the universities been relegated to a
role subordinate to the AICTE. The UGC and universities have always had and have an accepted
and well-merited role of Primacy to play in shaping as well as stepping up a co-ordinated
development and improvement in the standards of education and research in the sphere of
education. When it is only Institutions other than universities which are to seek affiliation, it was not
correct to state in the decisions under challenge that an University, which cannot grant affiliation to
a technical institution, cannot grant the same to itself. Consequently, the conclusions rendered based
on the principles for classifying enactments into `general law and `special law to keep them within
their respective limits or area of operation are not warranted and wholly uncalled for and do not
merit our approval or acceptance. /p> p>The AICTE cannot, in our view, make any regulation in
exercise of its powers under Section 23 of the Act, notwithstanding sub-section (1), which though
no doubt enables such regulations being made generally to carry out the purposes of the Act, when
such power is circumscribed by the specific limitation engrafted therein to ensure them to be not
inconsistent with the provisions of the Act and the rules. So far as the question of granting approval,
leave alone prior or post, Section 10(1)(k) specifically confines the limits of such power of AICTE
only to be exercised vis-?is technical institutions, as defined in the Act and not generally. When the
language is specific, unambiguous and positive, the same cannot be over-looked to give an
expansive meaning under the pretext of a purposive construction to perpetuate an ideological object
and aim, which also, having regard to the Statement of Objects and Reasons for the AICTE Act, are
not warranted or justified. Therefore, the regulation insofar as it compels the universities to seek for
and obtain prior approval and not to start any new department or course or programme in technical
education (Regulation 4) and empower itself to withdraw such approval, in a given case of
contravention of the regulations (Regulation 12) are directly opposed to and inconsistent with the
provisions of Section 10(1)(k) of the Act and consequently void and unenforceable. /p> p>The fact
that the regulations may have the force of law or when made have to be laid down before the
legislature concerned do not confer any more sanctity or immunity as though they are statutory
provisions themselves. Consequently, when the power to make regulations are confined to certain
limits and made to flow in a well defined canal within stipulated banks, those actually made or
shown and found to be not made within its confines but outside them, the courts are bound to ignore
them when the question of their enforcement arise and the mere fact that there was no specific relief
sought for to strike down or declare them ultra vires, particularly when the party in sufferance is a
respondent to the lis or proceedings cannot confer any further sanctity or authority and validity
which it is shown and found to obviously and patently lack. It would, therefore, be a myth to state
that regulations made under Section 23 of the Act have Constitutional and legal status, even
unmindful of the fact that anyone or more of them are found to be not consistent with specific
provisions of the Act itself. Thus, the regulations in question, which the AICTE could not have
made so as to bind universities/UGC within the confines of the powers conferred upon it, cannot be
enforced against or bind an University in the matter of any necessity to seek prior approval to
commence a new department or course and programme in technical education in any university or
any of its departments and constituent institutions. /p> p>To put it in a nutshell, a reading of Section
10 of AICTE Act will make it clear that whenever the Act omits to cover a `University, the same
has been specifically provided in the provisions of the Act. For example, while under clause (k) of
Section 10 only `technical institutions are referred to, clause (o) of Section 10 provides for the
guidelines for admission of students to `technical institutions and `Universities imparting technical
education. If we look at the definition of a `technical institution under Section 2(h) of the Act, it is
clear that a `technical institution cannot include a `University. The clear intention of the Legislature
is not that all institutions whether University or otherwise ought to be treated as `technical
institutions covered by the Act. If that was the intention, there was no difficulty for the Legislature
to have merely provided a definition of `technical institution by not excluding `University from the
definition thereof and thereby avoided the necessity to use alongside both the words `technical
institutions and University in several provisions in the Act. The definition of `technical institution
excludes from its purview a `University. When by definition a `University is excluded from a
`technical institution, to interpret that such a clause or such an expression wherever the expression
`technical institution occurs will include a `University will be reading into the Act what is not
provided therein. The power to grant approval for starting new technical institutions and for
introduction of new courses or programmes in consultation with the agencies concerned is covered
by Section 10(k) which would not cover a `University but only a `technical institution. If Section
10(k) does not cover a `University but only a `technical institution, a regulation cannot be framed in
such a manner so as to apply the regulation framed in respect of `technical institution to apply for
Universities when the Act maintains a complete dichotomy between a `University and a `technical
institution. Thus, we have to focus our attention mainly to the Act in question on the language
adopted in that enactment. In that view of the matter, it is, therefore, not even necessary to examine
the scope of other enactments or whether the Act prevails over the University Act or effect of
competing entries falling under Entries 63 to 65 of List-I vis-?is Entry 25 of List- III of the Seventh
Schedule to the Constitution. /p> p>The fact that initially the syndicate of the appellant-university
passed a resolution to seek for approval from AICTE and did not pursue the matter on those lines
thereafter or that the other similar entities were adopting such a course of obtaining the same and
that the Andhra Pradesh High Court in M. Sambasiva Raos case (supra) taken a particular view of
the matter are not reasons which can be countenanced in law to non-suit the appellant. Nor such
reasons could be relevant or justifying factors to draw any adverse finding against and deny relief
by rejecting the claims of the appellant- university. We also place on record the statement of the
learned senior counsel for the appellant, which, in our view, even otherwise is the correct position of
law, that the challenge of the appellant with reference to the Regulation in question and claim of the
AICTE that the appellant-university should seek and obtain prior approval of the AICTE to start a
department or commence a new course or programme in technical education does not mean that
they have no obligation or duty to conform to the standards and norms laid down by the AICTE for
the purpose of ensuring co-ordinated and integrated development of technical education and
maintenance of standards. /p> p>For all the reasons stated above, we allow the appeal and
consequently set aside the judgment under challenge by dismissing the writ petition filed in the
High Court. Having regard to the position of law declared by us, the decision of the Andhra Pradesh
High Court reported in M. Sambasiva Raos case (supra) cannot also be considered to lay down the
correct position of law. No costs. /p> p>nbsp; /p> p>nbsp;/p> /div> /body> /html>