2001 INSC 0763
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align:center'>b>SUPREME COURT OF INDIA/b>/p> p align=center style='text-
align:center'>SATVIR SINGH AND ORS.br> br> Vs.br> br> STATE OF PUNJAB AND ANR.br>
br> 27/09/2001br> br> (K.T. Thomas amp; S.N. Variava)br> br> Appeal (crl.) 1319 of 1998br>
Appeal (crl.) 123 of 1999/p> p>b>JUDGMENT/b> /p> p>THOMAS, J. /p> p>A young mother of
two kids, who is a double graduate, ran into the rail in front of a running train to end her life as well
as her miseries once and for all. She was driven to that action on account of the cruel treatments
suffered by her at her nuptial home. But the destiny also was cruel to her as the locomotive which
she desired to be her destroyer, instead of snuffing her life out in a trice, converted her into a
veritable vegetable. She lost her left hand from shoulder joint and got her spinal cord ruptured. She
turned into a paraplegic. She herself described her present plight as a living corpse. Thus the
miseries she longed to end transformed into a monstrous dimension clutching her as long as she is
alive. /p> p>Her husband, father-in-law and mother-in-law (the appellants before us) were convicted
by the Sessions Court under Section 116 read with Section 306 IPC, besides Section 498A. On the
first count they were sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for two and a half years and a fine of
Rs.10,000/- each, and on the second count they were sentenced to imprisonment for two years and a
fine of Rs.5,000/- each. When the appellants filed an appeal before the High Court in challenge of
the said conviction and sentence the victim also made a motion before the same High Court as she
felt that condign punishment has not been meted out to the guilty persons. Both were disposed of by
the impugned judgment delivered by a single Judge of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana. The
findings made by the Sessions Court were concurred with by the High Court. However, an alteration
was made by substituting Section 306 IPC with Section 304B IPC to be read with Section 116 IPC.
Commensurate alteration was made in the quantum of sentence by escalating it to RI for five years
each. /p> p>It was during the wee hours of 17.6.1996 that Tejinder Pal Kaur (PW-5) ran in front of
a train. The events which culminated in the said tragedy have been set out by the prosecution like
this: /p> p>Tejinder Pal Kaur (PW-5) daughter of Narender Singh (PW-6) obtained B.A. degree and
B.Ed. degree before her marriage. On 15.11.1992 she was given in marriage to Satvir Singh (A-1), a
businessman, and thenceforth she was living in her husbands house. Devinder Singh (A-2) and
Paramjit Kaur(A-3) who are the parents of Satvir Singh(A-1) were also living in the same house.
Though dowry was given at the time of marriage the appellants started harassing the bride after
about 4 or 5 months of the wedding for not giving a car and a house as part of the dowry. They used
to hurl taunts on her pertaining to the subject, including telling her that she had brought rags instead
of wedding costumes. After about a year a male child was born to her and about one and a half
years thereafter she gave birth to another male child. /p> p>In the month of November 1995 her
father Narender Singh (PW-6) paid Rs.20,000/- to her husband Satvir Singh presumably for
appeasing him so that he would desist from causing any harassment to Tejinder Pal Kaur. But that
appeared to be only a modicum of pelf for abating the shower of abuses heaped up on the
housewife. /p> p>The immediate cause for the tragic episode happened on the night of 16.6.1996.
When food was served to Satvir Singh (A-1) in the night, it was noticed that one of the items in the
meals (salad) contained excessive salt. (According to PW-5 the salt was added to the salad by her
mother-in-law). After tasting the salad Satvir Singh became furious and he unleashed abuses on his
wife and then he was profusely supported by his mother and later they were reinforced by his father.
They went to the extent of suggesting to her why not end your life in front of one of the trains as
many such trains are running nearby. /p> p>On 17.6.1996 Tejinder Pal Kaur (PW-5) left the house
all alone at about 4 A.M. and reached the railway line yonder, expecting the arrival of a train from
Jallandhar. Within 15 minutes the expected train arrived and Tejinder Pal Kaur, standing on the
track, was run over by that train. What happened thereafter need not be narrated in detail over again
except pointing out that she was devastatingly maimed, yet survived. There is practically no dispute
that she went to the railway track on that morning and in an attempt to end her life she allowed the
train to pass over her. As the doctors expressed the opinion that the testimonial capacity of Tejinder
Pal Kaur (PW-5) was not seriously impaired prosecution examined her as the prime witness in the
case. The trial court and the High Court believed her testimony. There is no reason to dissent from
the finding regarding reliability of her evidence. /p> p>At the outset we may point out that on the
aforesaid facts no offence linked with Section 306 IPC can be found against any of the appellants.
The said section penalises abetment of suicide. It is worded thus: If any person commits suicide,
whoever abets the commission of such suicide, shall be punished with imprisonment of either
description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine. It is a unique
legal phenomenon in the Indian Penal Code that the only act, the attempt of which alone will
become an offence. The person who attempts to commit suicide is guilty of the offence under
Section 309 IPC whereas the person who committed suicide cannot be reached at all. Section 306
renders the person who abets the commission of suicide punishable for which the condition
precedent is that suicide should necessarily have been committed. It is possible to abet the
commission of suicide. But nobody would abet a mere attempt to commit suicide. It would be
preposterous if law could afford to penalise an abetment to the offence of mere attempt to commit
suicide. /p> p>Learned Sessions Judge went wrong in convicting the appellants under section 116
linked with Section 306 IPC. The former is abetment of offence punishable with imprisonment - if
offence be not committed. But the crux of the offence under Section 306 itself is abetment. In other
words, if there is no abetment there is no question of the offence under Section 306 coming into
play. It is inconceivable to have abetment of an abetment. Hence there cannot be an offence under
Section 116 read with Section 306 IPC. Therefore, the High Court was correct in altering the
conviction from the penalising provisions fastened with the appellants by Sessions Court. /p>
p>Now, we have to see whether the appellants can be convicted under Section 511 read with Section
304B IPC. For that purpose it is necessary to extract Section 511 as under: /p> p>511.Punishment
for attempting to commit offences punishable with imprisonment for life or other imprisonment.-
Whoever attempts to commit an offence punishable by this Code with imprisonment for life or
imprisonment, or to cause such an offence to be committed, and in such attempt does any act
towards the commission of the offence, shall, where no express provision is made by this Code for
the punishment of such attempt, be punished with imprisonment of any description provided for the
offence, for a term which may extend to one-half of the imprisonment for life or, as the case may
be, one-half of the longest term of imprisonment provided for that offence or with such fine as is
provided for the offence, or with both. /p> p>The above section is the solitary provision included in
the last chapter of the IPC under the title Of Attempts to Commit Offences. It makes attempt to
commit an offence punishable. The offence attempted should be one punishable by the Code with
imprisonment. The conditions stipulated in the provision for completion of the said offence are: (1)
The offender should have done some act towards commission of the main offence. (2) Such an
attempt is not expressly covered as a penal provision elsewhere in the Code. Thus, attempt on the
part of the accused is sine qua non for the offence under Section 511. Before considering the
question as to what is meant by doing any act towards the commission of the offence as an
inevitable part of the process of attempt, we may point out that the last act attributed to the accused
in this case is that they asked Tejinder Pal Kaur (PW-5) to go to the rail track and commit suicide.
That act of the accused is alleged to have driven the young lady to proceed to the railway line on the
next morning to be run over by the train. Assuming that the said act was perpetrated by the
appellants and that the said act could fall within the ambit of attempt to commit the offence under
section 304B it has to be considered whether there is any other express provision in the Code which
makes such act punishable. For this purpose we have to look at Section 498A which has been added
to the IPC by Act 46 of 1983. That provision makes cruelty (which a husband of a woman or his
relative subjects her to) as a punishable offence. One of the categories included in the explanation to
the said section (by which the word cruelty is defined) is thus: /p> p>(a) Any willful conduct which
is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or
danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical) of the woman; /p> p>Thus, if the act of
the accused asking Tejinder Pal Kaur (PW-5) to go and commit suicide had driven her to proceed to
the railway track for ending her life then it is expressly made punishable under Section 498A IPC.
When it is so expressly made punishable the act involved therein stands lifted out of the purview of
Section 511 IPC. The very policy underlying in Section 511 seems to be for providing it as a
residuary provision. The corollary, therefore, is that the accused, in this case, cannot be convicted
under Section 511 on account of the acts alleged against him. /p> p>Now, we have to consider
whether the High Court was correct in convicting the appellants under Section 116 read with
Section 304B IPC. Shri R.S. Cheema, learned senior counsel for the appellants advanced two
contentions against it. First is that Section 304B cannot apply to a case of suicide at all, whether it is
sequel to cruelty or harassment with the demand for dowry or not. Second is that the concept of
abetment of an offence under Section 304-B is inconceivable in the absence of death of a woman
within the statutory period mentioned in that provision. In elaborating the first contention learned
senior counsel submitted that Section 306 IPC is now intended to cover all cases of suicide in view
of Section 113A of the Evidence Act (which was brought in by Act 46 of 1983). /p> p>Both the
contentions are fallacious. The essential components of Section 304B are: (i) Death of a woman
occurring otherwise than under normal circumstances, within 7 years of marriage. (ii) Soon before
her death she should have been subjected to cruelty and harassment in connection with any demand
for dowry. When the above ingredients are fulfilled, the husband or his relative, who subjected her
to such cruelty or harassment, can be presumed to be guilty of offence under Section 304B. To be
within the province of the first ingredient the provision stipulates that where the death of a woman
is caused by any burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances. It may
appear that the former limb which is described by the words death caused by burns or bodily injury
is a redundancy because such death would also fall within the wider province of death caused
otherwise than under normal circumstances. The former limb was inserted for highlighting that by
no means death caused by burns or bodily injury should be treated as falling outside the ambit of the
offence. In the present context it is advantageous to read Section 113A of the Evidence Act. It is
extracted below: /p> p>113A.Presumption as to abetment of suicide by a married woman.- When
the question is whether the commission of suicide by a woman had been abetted by her husband or
any relative of her husband and it is shown that she had committed suicide within a period of seven
years from the date of her marriage and that her husband or such relative of her husband had
subjected her to cruelty, the Court may presume, having regard to all the other circumstances of the
case, that such suicide had been abetted by her husband or by such relative of her husband. /p>
p>Learned senior counsel submitted that since the word cruelty employed therein is a virtual
importation of that word from Section 498A IPC, the offence envisaged in Section 306 IPC is
capable of enveloping all cases of suicide within its ambit, including dowry related suicide.
According to him, the second limb of the Explanation to Section 498A which defines the word
cruelty is sufficient to clarify the position. That limb reads thus: /p> p>For the purpose this section,
cruelty means- (b) harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view to coercing her
or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is
on account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand. /p> p>At the first
blush we thought that there was force in the said contention but on a deeper analysis we found that
the contention is unacceptable. Section 306 IPC when read with Section 113A of the Evidence Act
has only enabled the court to punish a husband or his relative who subjected a woman to cruelty (as
envisaged in Section 498A IPC) if such woman committed suicide within 7 years of her marriage. It
is immaterial for Section 306 IPC whether the cruelty or harassment was caused soon before her
death or earlier. If it was caused soon before her death the special provision in Section 304B IPC
would be invokable, otherwise resort can be made to Section 306 IPC. /p> p>No doubt Section 306
IPC read with Section 113A of the Evidence Act is wide enough to take care of an offence under
Section 304B also. But the latter is made a more serious offence by providing a much higher
sentence and also by imposing a minimum period of imprisonment as the sentence. In other words,
if death occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances within 7 years of the marriage as a
sequel to the cruelty or harassment inflicted on a woman with demand of dowry, soon before her
death, Parliament intended such a case to be treated as a very serious offence punishable even upto
imprisonment for life in appropriate cases. It is for the said purpose that such cases are separated
from the general category provided under Section 306 IPC (read with Section 113A of the Evidence
Act) and made a separate offence. /p> p>We are, therefore, unable to concur with the contention
that if the dowry related death is a case of suicide it would not fall within the purview of Section
304B IPC at all. In Smt. Shanti and anr. vs. State of Haryana {1991(1) SCC 371} and in Kans Raj
vs. State of Pubjab and ors. {2000(5) SCC 207} this Court has held that suicide is one of the modes
of death falling within the ambit of Section 304B IPC. /p> p>Now we have to consider whether the
appellants are liable to be punished under Section 116 linked with section 304B IPC. We have
already noted above that according to the learned senior counsel for the appellants there is no
question of considering Section 304B unless death of a woman had occurred. In the present case,
death did not occur. Before considering that contention we may delve into the question whether
Tejinder Pal Kaur (PW-5) was subjected to cruelty or harassment in connection with the demand for
dowry soon before her death, on a hypothetical assumption that her attempt to commit suicide had
succeeded. /p> p>Prosecution, in a case of offence under Section 304B IPC cannot escape from the
burden of proof that the harassment or cruelty was related to the demand for dowry and also that
such cruelty or harassment was caused soon before her death. The word dowry in Section 304B has
to be understood as it is defined in Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. That definition
reads thus: /p> p>In this Act, dowry means any property or valuable security given or agreed to be
given either directly or indirectly- (a) by one party to marriage to the other party to the marriage; or
(b) by the parents of either party to a marriage or by any other person, to either party to the marriage
or to any other person; at or before or any time after the marriage in connection with the marriage of
the said parties, but does not include dower or mahr in the case of persons to whom the Muslim
Personal Law (Shariat) applies. /p> p>Thus, there are three occasions related to dowry. One is
before the marriage, second is at the time of marriage and the third is at any time after the marriage.
The third occasion may appear to be an unending period. But the crucial words are in connection
with the marriage of the said parties. This means that giving or agreeing to give any property or
valuable security on any of the above three stages should have been in connection with the marriage
of the parties. There can be many other instances for payment of money or giving property as
between the spouses. For example, some customary payments in connection with birth of a child or
other ceremonies are prevalent in different societies. Such payments are not enveloped within the
ambit of dowry. Hence the dowry mentioned in Section 304B should be any property or valuable
security given or agreed to be given in connection with the marriage. /p> p>It is not enough that
harassment or cruelty was caused to the woman with a demand for dowry at some time, if Section
304B is to be invoked. But it should have happened soon before her death. The said phrase, no
doubt, is an elastic expression and can refer to a period either immediately before her death or
within a few days or even a few weeks before it. But the proximity to her death is the pivot
indicated by that expression. The legislative object in providing such a radius of time by employing
the words soon before her death is to emphasise the idea that her death should, in all probabilities,
have been the aftermath of such cruelty or harassment. In other words, there should be a perceptible
nexus between her death and the dowry related harassment or cruelty inflicted on her. If the interval
elapsed between the infliction of such harassment or cruelty and her death is wide the court would
be in a position to gauge that in all probabilities the death would not have been the immediate cause
of her death. It is hence for the court to decide, on the facts and circumstances of each case, whether
the said interval in that particular case was sufficient to snuff its cord from the concept soon before
her death. /p> p>Applying the said principle in this case we have to refer to the evidence of the
prosecution to know whether the findings made by the High Court on the facts warrant interference.
PW-5 Tejinder Pal Kaur in her evidence said that 4 or 5 months after her marriage, she was ill-
treated on the ground of insufficiency of dowry and then she reported the matter to her father. But
PW-5 did not say one word in her evidence regarding any other ill treatment relating to dowry
thereafter. It is true, she said in her evidence that in November 1995, a sum of Rs.20,000/- was paid
by her father. But neither PW-5 (Tejinder Pal Kaur) nor PW-6 (Narendra Singh) testified that the
said amount was paid as part of the dowry or in connection with the marriage. We cannot overlook
two important events which had happened in the family during the said long interregnum of three
years. One is the birth of the elder son on 12.11.1993 and the other is the birth of the second son on
10.6.1995. We have to bear in mind the payment of Rs.20,000/- was made five months after the
birth of the second son. Even PW-6 had no case that his daughter was subjected to any ill treatment
in connection with the demand for dowry on any day after she reported to him about the demand for
further dowry way back in the early 1993 months. All amounts paid by the in-laws of the husband
of a woman cannot become dowry. /p> p>Shri U.R. Lalit, learned senior counsel for Tejinder Pal
Kaur (PW-5) contended that payment of Rs.20,000/- in November 1995 should be presumed as part
of the three year old demand for further dowry. When the very participants in the deliberations have
no such case it is not proper for the court to make an incriminating presumption against the accused
on a very crucial ingredient of the offence, more so when it is quite possible to draw a presumption
the other way around as well. /p> p>Thus, there is dearth of evidence to show that Tejinder Pal
Kaur (PW-5) was subjected to cruelty or harassment connected with the demand for dowry, soon
before the attempt to commit suicide. When the position is such it is an unnecessary exercise on our
part to consider whether Section 116 IPC can ever be linked with the offence under Section 304B
IPC. /p> p>We, therefore, conclude that appellants cannot be convicted under Section 116 IPC
either by linking it with Section 306 or with Section 304B. Hence the conviction and sentence
passed on them under Section 116 IPC is set aside. /p> p>We have no reason to interfere with the
conviction passed on the appellants under Section 498A IPC. We do confirm the same. We are told
that first appellant Satvir Singh (A-1) has undergone the substantial portion of the sentence of
imprisonment imposed on him and the remaining appellants have also undergone a long period of
imprisonment by now in connection with this case. But we feel that the fine portion of the sentence
imposed on the appellants is too insufficient, particularly when such fine was intended to be
disbursed as compensation to PW-5. In our view PW-5 Tejinder pal Kaur should get at least three
lakhs of rupees as compensation from the appellants. We are told that A-2 Devinder Singh and A-3
Paramjit Kaur have now become aged as both have crossed the age of 70. We therefore, modify the
sentence under Section 498A IPC in the following terms: /p> p>The sentence of imprisonment
imposed on the appellants shall stand reduced to the period which they have already undergone. We
enhance the fine part of the sentence for the offence under Section 498A IPC, to Rs. one lakh each
for all the three appellants. They shall remit the fine amount in the trial court, within three months
from today, failing which each of the defaulter shall undergo imprisonment for a further period of
nine months. The appeals are disposed of in the above terms. /p> /div> /body> /html>