2004 INSC 0607
                                    SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                                       Hirabhai Chhibabhai Tandel

                                                      Vs.

                                               State of Gujarat

                                        Crl.A.Nos.557-58 of 2004

                     (R. C. Lahoti, Ashok Bhan and D. M. Dharmadhikari JJ.)

                                                 30.04.2004

                                                JUDGMENT

1. Leave granted.

2. In Special Case No. 2 of 2001, the learned Designated Judge has framed a charge against
the appellant under sub-sections (3) and (4) of Section 3 of the Terrorist and Disruptive
Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 (for short "the TADA Act") and under Section 212 of the
Indian Penal Code. The principal accused is one Haji Haji Ismail against whom the challan
has been filed. Though the accused is absconding and has not been apprehended and put up
for trial so far, the appellant was impleaded by way of a supplementary challan filed by the
police. The two provisions of the TADA Act under which the appellant has been charged
read as under:

        "3. Punishment for terrorist actt. - (1)-(2) * * *

        (3) Whoever conspires or attempts to commit, or advocates, abets, advises or incites
        or knowingly facilitates the commission of, a terrorist act or any act preparatory to a
        terrorist act, shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less
        than five years but which may extend to imprisonment for life and shall also be liable
        to fine.

        (4) Whoever harbours or conceals, or attempts to harbour or conceal, any terrorist
        shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than five
        years but which may extend to imprisonment for life and shall also be liable to fine."
        *

3. A perusal of the challan papers shows that there is no material available against the
appellant based on which he could be charged under sub-section (3) Section 3 of the TADA
Act. The only allegation made against the appellant is that the appellant harboured the
principal accused Haji Haji Ismail on or about 12-4-2001.

1  SpotLaw
4. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the appellant that the TADA Act stood repealed
on 24-5-1995 and an act done after the repeal of the Act cannot be held punishable by
reference to that Act. There is merit in the submission of the learned counsel for the
appellant. The learned counsel for the State has in her opposition to the appeal and in her
effort at supporting the impugned judgment of the Designated Court, carried us through the
averments made in the charge-sheet as also to the contents of the confessional statement of
the appellant. Nothing can be found out therein to hold the involvement of the appellant in
any criminal activity punishable under the TADA Act and relatable to a date prior to its
repeal i.e. during the period the Act was in force. The appellant cannot, therefore, be tried by
the Designated Judge under the TADA Act.

5. The appeals are allowed. The charge framed by the learned Designated Judge against the
appellant under Sections 3(3) and 3(4) of the TADA Act is directed to be quashed. However,
we clarify that the appellant is not absolved of the liability for being proceeded against under
any law under which his act may be punishable excepting under the TADA Act.

2  SpotLaw