2005 INSC 0245
                                    SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                                               Union of India

                                                      Vs.

                                          Jitendrasinh M. Parmar

                                           C.A.No.6570 of 1999

                                   (A. K. Mathur and Ashok Bhan JJ.)

                                                 02.03.2005

                                                JUDGMENT

A. K. Mathur, J.

1. The Union of India including other defendant-appellants, hereinafter referred to as "the
appellants", have filed this appeal against the judgment of a Single Judge of the High Court
of Bombay in Second Appeal No. 197 of 1997 dated 21-1-1998 wherein the High Court has
dismissed the appeal thereby affirming the judgments and decree passed by the courts below.

2. Shortly stated the facts are:

        "The respondent-plaintiffs, hereinafter referred to as "the respondents", filed a suit
        being Regular Civil Suit No. 30 of 1996 in the Court of Civil Judge, Dadra and Nagar
        Haveli at Silvassa seeking various reliefs including challenge to Notification No.
        ADM/LAW/DCF/7-1/8-FD dated 25-2-1988 issued under Section 29 of the Indian
        Forest Act, 1927 (for short "the Act"). The respondents prayed for permanent
        injunction as well as to restrain the appellants herein from implementing, enforcing in
        any manner the said notification as against the respondents. There was an alternative
        prayer seeking declaration that the said notification does not apply to the case of the
        respondents."

3. The trial court by its judgment dated 10-9-1996 partly decreed the suit. The trial court
rejected the prayer sought for by the respondents that notification was illegal and bad in law.
The trial court gave a declaration that the notification under challenge was not applicable to
the land owned by the respondents admeasuring 93, 127 sq. m. in Survey Nos. 197, 362 to
367 situated at Village Silvassa. It was held that the land not being waste, would not be
covered by Section 29. The condition imposed by the Mamlatdar directing the respondents to
keep 30 m margin from edge of the kotar (rainwater drain) on the respondents' land by the
appellants was declared to be illegal and bad in law. Accordingly, it was quashed and set
aside. Permanent injunction was granted in favour of the respondents restraining the

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appellants from implementing and enforcing in any manner whatsoever the notification dated
25-2-1988 to the suit land.

4. The appellants, being aggrieved, filed an appeal and the respondents filed their cross-
objections. Appeal as well as cross-objections were dismissed and the decree passed by the
trial court was affirmed by the first appellate court.

5. Being aggrieved, the appellants filed Second Appeal No. 197 of 1997 in the High Court
which has been dismissed by the impugned order.

6. The only point pressed before us is in respect of condition imposed by the Mamlatdar to
keep 30 m margin from edge of the kotar. According to the counsel for the appellants in the
absence of the plea that such a condition could not be imposed (which according to him the
respondents have not pleaded), the High Court and the courts below could not have given the
permanent injunction in favour of the respondents restraining the appellants from imposing
the condition directing the respondents herein to keep 30 m margin from the edge of the
kotar. The High Court has held that such a condition could be imposed by the Collector only
in exercise of his powers under Regulation 42 of the Dadra and Nagar Haveli Land Revenue
Administration Regulations and not by the Mamlatdar. It may be mentioned that the
Collector while granting conversion of land use from agricultural to non-agricultural purpose
did not impose the condition that no construction could be put up within 30 m from the edge
of the kotar. The Mamlatdar who is subordinate to the Collector could not have imposed such
a condition. Counsel for the appellants fairly conceded that the notification under challenge
was not applicable to the land of the respondents. He has failed to show with reference to any
provisions of statute that the Mamlatdar could also impose such a condition.

7. Under the circumstances, we have no other option but to agree with the findings recorded
by the High Court. Accordingly, this appeal is dismissed with no order as to costs.

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