2018 INSC 0072
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REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.1562 OF 2018
(arising out of SLP(C) No.35738 of 2017)
STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH THROUGH
PRINCIPAL SECRETARY & ANR.    ... APPELLANTS
VERSUS
MAHENDRA GUPTA & ORS.    ... RESPONDENTS
J U D G M E N T
ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.
The   State   of   Madhya   Pradesh   is   in   appeal   against   the
judgment   of   Division   Bench   of   the   High   Court   of   Madhya
Pradesh,   Bench   at   Gwalior   dated   22.03.2017   by   which   judgment
writ appeal filed by the State questioning the judgment of the
learned Single Judge dated 17.03.2015 has been dismissed. 
2. The parties shall be described as referred to in the writ
petition. The facts giving rise to this appeal are:
The   writ   petitioners   have   permanent   permit   for   two

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routes,   one   Gwalior   to   Bhander   and   second   Gwalior   to   Datia.
Respondent   No.3   has   also   the   permanent   permit   for   the   route
Gwalior   to   Jhansi.   Respondent   No.3   preferred   an   application
for modification of time schedule for movement of his vehicle.
The application of Respondent No.3 came for hearing before the
State   Transport   Authority   on   16.10.2014.   On   the   date   of
hearing both counsel for the applicant as well as counsel for
the   objectors   were   heard.   The   State   Transport   Authority
allowed   the   modification   and   decided   to   change   the   time
schedule   as   prayed   by   the   applicant   in   the   public   interest.
The   order   was   issued   by   the   State   Transport   Authority   on
15.12.2014.   Aggrieved   by   the   order   dated   15.12.2014,   Writ
Petition   No.883   of   2015   was   filed   by   the   two   petitioners   who
were   objectors   before   the   State   Transport   Authority.   In   the
writ   petition   various   grounds   were   taken   questioning   the
application   filed   by   the   applicant­Pawan   Arora.   One   of   the
grounds   taken   before   the   learned   Single   Judge   was   that
although   the   State   Transport   Authority   heard   the   matter   on
16.10.2014   consisted   of  Chairperson  and  two  members,  however,
the order was delivered with the signatures of Chairperson and
only   one   member,   since   one   member,   Shri   Sanjay   Choudhary   was
transferred   in   the   meanwhile,   hence,   the   order   dated
15.12.2014   is   illegal.   The   learned   Single   Judge   accepted   the

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contention   of   the   writ   petitioners   and   allowed   the   writ
petition by setting aside the order dated 15.12.2014. 
3. The State of Madhya Pradesh filed writ appeal challenging
the   judgment   of   the   learned   Singe   Judge.   The   State   contended
before the Division Bench of the High Court that there was no
illegality   in   the   order   issued   by   the   Chairperson   and   one
member,   although,   it   was   heard   by   three   members   when   the
meeting   took   place   on   16.10.2014.   The   Division   Bench
dismissed the appeal upholding the view of the learned Single
Judge.
4. Learned   counsel   for   the   appellant   in   support   of   the
appeal   contends   that   under   the   Madhya   Pradesh   Motor   Vehicles
Rules,   1994   quorum   of   the   meeting   of   the   State   Transport
Authority is three ­ Chairman plus two members and quorum was
complete when the meeting was held on 16.10.2014, the decision
delivered   by   the   majority   of   the   members   is   in   no   manner
illegal.   It   is   submitted   that   after   hearing,   one   member   was
transferred   and   was   not   available   to   be   part   of   the   order
issued on 15.12.2014. It is submitted that even it is assumed
that   one   member   was   not   agreeing   with   the   decision   of   two
other members, although, there is no such pleading or material
on   the   record,   the   decision   taken   by   the   majority   of   the

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members   was   fully   valid   and   there   was   no   infirmity   in   the
order   dated   15.12.2014.   It   is   submitted   that   the   learned
Single   Judge   as   well   as   Division   Bench   committed   error   in
taking the view that the order dated 15.12.2014 was an illegal
order.
5. Learned   counsel   for   the   respondents   supported   the   order
of the High Court and contends that when one member who heard
the matter on 16.10.2014 was not available, no decision could
have   been   taken   by   the   State   Transport   Authority.   He   submits
that   the   matter   was   heard   by   three   members,   hence   decision
could   have   been   issued   only   by   three   members   and   the   views
taken   by   the   learned   Single   Judge   and   Division   Bench   are   in
accordance with law.
6. We have considered the submissions of the learned counsel
for the parties and perused the records.
7. The Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 provides for constitution of
a   State   Transport   Authority   to   exercise   and   discharge   the
powers   and   functions   as   specified   in   sub­section   (3)   of
Section 68. Section 68(1) and 68(3) are quoted below:
" 68.Transport   Authorities.­ (1)   The   State
Government   shall,   by   notification   in   the
Official   Gazette,   constitute   for   the   State   a

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State   Transport   Authority   to   exercise   and
discharge   the   powers   and   functions   specified
in   sub­section   (3),   and   shall   in   like   manner
constitute   Regional   Transport   Authorities   to
exercise   and   discharge   throughout   such   areas
(in   this   Chapter   referred   to   as   regions)   as
may   be   specified   in   the   notification,   in
respect   of   each   Regional   Transport   Authority;
the powers and functions conferred by or under
this Chapter on such Authorities: 
Provided   that   in   the   Union   territories,
the   Administrator   may   abstain   from
constituting any Regional Transport Authority.
(2) ....................................
(3)   The   State   Transport   Authority   and   every
Regional Transport Authority shall give effect
to   any   directions   issued   under   section   67   and
the   State   Transport   Authority   shall,   subject
to   such   directions   and   save   as   otherwise
provided   by   or   under   this   Act,   exercise   and
discharge   throughout   the   State   the   following
powers and functions, namely :­
(a) to co­ordinate and regulate the activities
and   policies   of   the   Regional   Transport
Authorities, if any, of the State ; 
(b)   to   perform   the   duties   of   a   Regional
Transport   Authority   where   there   is   no   such
Authority   and,   if   it   thinks   fit   or   if   so
required by a Regional Transport Authority, to
perform   those   duties   in   respect   of   any   route
common to two or more regions; 
(c)   to   settle   all   disputes   and   decide   all
matters   on   which   differences   of   opinion   arise
between Regional Transport Authorities; 
[(ca)   Government   to   formulate   routes   for
playing stage carriages;] and  
(d)   to   discharge   such   other   functions   as   may
be prescribed.” 

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8. The   Rules   have   been   framed   by   the   State   of   Madhya
Pradesh,   namely,   the   Madhya   Pradesh   Motor   Vehicles   Rules,
1994.   Chapter   V   of   the   Rules   contains   heading   “ Control   of
Transport   Vehicles”.   Rule   63   provides   for   State   Transport
Authority. Rule 63(4) to (7) are quoted as below:
“63. State Transport Authority. ­ 
(4)   The   State   Transport   Authority   shall
meet   at   such   time   and   at   such   place   as   the
Chairman may appoint.
(5) Not less than three days' notice shall
be   given   to   a   member   of   the   meeting   of   the
State Transport Authority.
(6) The quorum to constitute  a  meeting of
the   State   Transport   Authority   shall   be   the
Chairman   or   the   nominated   Chairman   under   the
sub­rule   (7)   and   two   other   members   (whether
official   or   non­official).   If   within   hall   an
hour from the time appointed for the meeting a
quorum   is   not   completed,   the   meeting   shall   be
adjourned   to   such   day   and   at   such   time   and
place   as   the   Chairman   or   the   acting   Chairman
nominated   under   sub­rule   (7)   may   appoint   and
no   quorum   is   necessary   for   holding   the
adjourned meeting.
(7) The Chairman, if unable to  attend the
meeting,   shall   nominate   a   member   to   act   as
Chairman at the meeting.”
9. Rule   64   provides   for   Regional   Transport   Authority   and
Rule   65   is   for   Conduct   of   Business   of   Transport   Authorities.
Rule 65(2) to 65(4) are as follows:
65.   Conduct   of   Business   of   Transport
Authorities.   ­ 

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(2) The State or Regional Transport Authority,
as   the   case   may   be,   may   decide   any   matter   of
urgent nature without holding a meeting by the
majority   of   votes   of   members   by   recorded   in
writing and send to the Secretary (hereinafter
referred to as the procedure by circulation).
(3)   In   the   event   of   procedure   by   circulation
being   followed,   the   Secretary   shall   send   to
each   member   of   the   Transport   Authority   such
particulars of the matter as may be reasonably
necessary   in   order   to   enable   the   member   to
arrive   at   a   decision   and   shall   specify   the
date   by   which   the   votes   of   members   are   to   be
received   in   the   office   of   the   Transport
Authority.   Upon   receipt   of   the   votes   of
members   as   aforesaid,   the   Secretary   shall   lay
the   papers   before   the   Chairman,   who   shall
record the decision by endorsement on the form
of   application   or   other   document,   as   the   case
may   be,   according   to   the   votes   received   and
the   vote   or   votes   cast   by   the   Chairman.   The
record   of   the   votes   cast   shall   not   be
available for inspection by any person save by
a   member   of   the   Transport   Authority   at   a
regularly constituted meeting of the Transport
Authority.   No   decision   shall   be   made   upon
procedure   by   circulation,   if   before   the   date
by   which   the   voles   of   members   are   required   to
reach   the   office   of   the   Transport   Authority,
not   less   than   one­third   of   the   members   of   the
Transport   Authority   have   given   notice   in
writing   to   the   Secretary   demanding   that   the
matter   be   referred   to   a   meeting   of   the
Transport Authority.
(4)   The   number   of   votes,   excluding   the
Chairman's   second   or   casting   vote,   necessary
for   a   decision   to   be   taken   upon   procedure   by
circulation shall not be less than the members
necessary to constitute a quorum.
xxx xxx xxx xxx

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10. The  facts  of   the  case,  as  noted  above,   reveal  that   State
Transport   Authority   convened   the   meeting   of   the   Authority   by
issuing the Agenda for 16.10.2014. In addition to Chairperson,
two   members   ­   Shri   Sanjay   Chaudhary,   Transport   Commissioner
and   Shri   Rajiv   Sharma,     Chief   Engineer,   Public   Works
Department were present in the meeting. The applicant as well
as the counsel for the objectors were heard on 16.10.2014. The
decision   of   the   Committee   was   issued   on   15.12.2014   which   was
signed   by   the   Chairperson   and   only   one   member,   Shri   Rajiv
Sharma,   since,   after   the   date   of   the   hearing   and   before   the
issuance   of   the   order   one   member,   Shri   Sanjay   Chaudhary   was
transferred.   The   copy   of   the   order   dated   15.12.2014   has   been
brought   on   record   as   Annexure   P­1   which   clearly   mentions   the
date   of   hearing,   i.e.,   16.10.2014.   It   is   useful   to   extract
only the relevant parts of the order for the present case:
" THE STATE TRANSPORT AUTHORITY, 
MADHYA PRADESH MOTIMAHAL, GWALIOR
Agenda Serial No.71
Case No.2159/2014  Hearing on 16.10.2014
Before:
1. Pramod Agrawal   Chairperson
Principal Secretary,
Madhya Pradesh Government
Transport Department, Bhopal

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2. Sanjay Chaudhary   Member
Transport Commissioner
Madhya Pradesh, Gwalior
3. Rajiv Sharma   Member
Chief Engineer 
Public Works Department,
Gwalior
... ... ...
... ... ...
Listing   the   aforesaid   application
submitted   by   the   applicant   for   hearing   in   the
meeting of the State Transport Authority dated
16.10.2014 the same was included in the agenda
and   published   on   the   Departmental   Website   and
the   notice   board   of   the   Office   and   all
regional/   additional   regional   /   District
Transport   Office.   The   objections   of   the
aforesaid   Drivers   were   obtained   until   the
aforesaid fixed date.
The   case   was   presented   in   the   meeting
dated   16.10.2014   of   the   State   Transport
Authority. On the day of hearing, on behalf of
the parties their appointed counsels appeared,
who were heard.
... ... …
... ... …
Note:   Since   one   member   Shri   Sanjay   Chaudhary
of   the   Authority   was   transferred   after
hearing,   the   aforesaid   order   is   being   passed
by   the   Chairperson   and   one   member   Chief
Engineer of the Authority.
Sd/­ sd/­
   Member    Member
State Transport Authority          State Transport Authority
Madhya Pradesh”
11. The   only   issue   which   needs   to   be   considered   in   this

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appeal is as to whether, when in the meeting dated 16.10.2014
the Chairperson and two members had heard the application for
the   change   of   the   time   schedule,   the   order   could   have   been
passed   allowing   the   application   by   the   two   members
(Chairperson and one member) alone, since the order was signed
only by the Chairperson and one member, on 15.12.2014.
12. The   statutory   provisions   of   the   Motor   Vehicles   Act,   1988
as   well   as   the   Madhya   Pradesh   Motor   Vehicles   Rules,   1994
indicate that the State Transport Authority is a multi­member
body constituted by the State Government under Section 68(1).
The     State   Transport   Authority   is   a   multi­member   body   which
transacts   business   in   meeting   except   in   case   of   emergency.
Meeting   is   to   be   convened   at   such   time   and   at   such   place   as
the Chairman may appoint. Three days' notice is required to be
given to the members and quorum of the meeting is the Chairman
or the nominated Chairman and two other members, i.e., quorum
is   three.   In   the   present   case,   there   is   no   dispute   that   when
the   meeting   was   held   on   16.10.2014   quorum   was   complete   since
Chairperson and two members were present which fact is clearly
noticed in the order dated 15.12.2014 as extracted above. The
three   members   who   were   present   in   the   meeting   heard   the
applicant and objectors. But the order could be issued only on
15.12.2014,   by   which   one   of   the   members   had   been   transferred

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and   was   not   available   to   sign     the   order.   One   more   important
fact   which   is   to   be   noticed   is   that   learned   Single   Judge   had
categorically   noted   that   the   above   issue   was   raised   only
during   the   hearing   before   the   learned   Single   Judge   and   there
was   no   pleading   in   the   writ   petition.   In   paragraph   16   of   the
judgment,   learned   Single   Judge   himself   has   noticed   the
following:
"16. The last question raised by the parties is
about the competency of the STA in passing the
impugned   order.   Although   there   is   no   pleading
in   this   regard   in   this   petition.   However,
learned   senior   counsel,   Shri   K.N.   Gupta   has
not   disputed   the   fact   that   the   matter   was
heard   by   three   members   and   order   is   passed   by
two members .....”
13. The   multi­member   body   transacts   its   business   after
debate,  consultation   and  discussion.   The  view  of  multi­member
body is expressed unanimously or by votes. For various kind of
decisions   by   multi­member   body   special   majorities   are   also
provided   for   acceptance   of   the   decision.   Normally,   all
decisions   of   a   multi­member   body   are   expressed   by   opinion   of
majority   of   the   members   present   except   where   the   special
majorities are provided in the statute itself.
14. Shackleton   on   the   “ Law   and   Practice   of   Meetings” ,
Eleventh   Edition   while   discussing   the   majority   has   stated

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following in paragraph 7­30. Relevant parts of paragraphs 7­30
and 7­31 are quoted below:
" 4 MAJORITY
Definition
7­30 Majority   is   a   term   signifying   the   greater
number.   In   legislative   and   deliberative
assemblies, it is usual to decide questions by
a   majority   of   those   present   and   voting.   This
is sometimes expressed as a “simple” majority,
which   means   that   a   motion   is   carried   by   the
mere   fact   that   more   votes   are   cast   for   than
against   ,   as   distinct   from   a   “special”
majority   where   the   size   of   the   majority   is
critical. 
The   principle   has   long   been   established
that   the   will   of   a   corporation   or   body   can
only   be   expressed   by   the   whole   or   a   majority
of   its   members,   and   the   act   of   a   majority   is
regarded as the act of the whole.
A majority vote binds the minority
7­31   Unless   there   is   some   provision   to   the
contrary   in   the   instrument   by   which   a
corporation   is   formed,   the   resolution   of   the
majority, upon any question, is binding on the
majority   and   the   corporation,   but   the   rules
must be followed.”
15. Although   Rules,   1994   do   not   expressly   provide   that
decision   of   the   State   Transport   Authority   shall   be   taken   in
accordance   with   the   opinions   of   the   majority   but   there   being
no   special   majority   provided   for   decision   to   be   taken   in   the
meeting   of   the     State   Transport   Authority,   normal,   rule   that
decision   by   majority   of   the   members   present   has   to   be

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followed. In the present case when three members were present
and quorum was complete, the decision taken by majority, i.e.,
opinion   of   two   members   shall   form   the   valid   decision   of   the
State Transport Authority.
16. Rule   65   sub­section   (2)   of   the   Rules   dealing   with   the
conduct of business of Transport Authorities provides:
“65(2)   The   State   or   Regional   Transport
Authority,   as   the   case   may   be,   may   decide   any
matter   of   urgent   nature   without   holding   a
meeting by the majority of votes of members by
recorded   in   writing   and   send   to   the   Secretary
(hereinafter   referred   to   as   the   procedure   by
circulation).”
17. Thus, the concept of taking decision by majority of votes
of   the   members   is   very   much   present   in   the   scheme   of   the
Rules.   Although,   where   a   decision   is   to   be   taken   by   the
circulation   by   votes   a   special   majority   is   provided   in   Rule
65(4) but present being not a case of decision by circulation,
simple majority by members present was sufficient for making a
binding decision by the State Transport Authority.
18. In   paragraph   18.1   of   the   judgment,   the   Division   Bench
observed that:
" 18.1. In the instant case there is nothing on
record   to   indicate   that   the  

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STA   with   complete   quorum   heard   the   matter   and
before one of the members Shri Sanjay Chaudhry
was   transferred   out   any   draft   order   was   got
approved from the said transferred member.”
19. The   above   observation   was   made   by   the   Division   Bench   of
the High Court while distinguishing the judgment of this Court
in   Ramaswamy   Nadar   v.   The   State   of   Madras,   AIR   1958   SC   56.
Before   we   refer   to   the   decision   of   this   Court   in   Ramaswamy
Nadar ,   it   is   clear   that   observation   of   the   Division   Bench   of
the   High   Court   that   there   is   nothing   on   record   to   indicate
that the quorum of State Transport  Authority was complete, is
factually   wrong.   The   order   of   the   State   Transport   Authority
dated   15.12.2014   has   been   brought   on   record   as   Annexure   P­1
and the relevant portion of the order has been extracted above
by   us   which   clearly   mentions   that   the   hearing   took   place   on
16.10.2014 where the Chairperson and two members were present
the   quorum   being   three   as   per   Rule   68(1)   was   complete.   The
hearing   took   place   by   three   members   which   is   noted   in   the
order   itself,   as   extracted   above.   Thus,   observation   of   the
Division Bench of the High Court that quorum was not complete
and matter was not heard by three members is not correct.
20. Now,   we   come   to   the   judgment   of   this   Court   in   Ramaswamy
Nadar(supra) .   In   the   above   case   the   matter   was   heard   by   a

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Bench   of   three   Judges   of   this   Court   who   after   hearing   had
announced   the   decision   of   acquittal.   Draft   judgment   was   also
approved   by   one   of   the   Judges   who   had,   however,   died   before
judgment could be delivered. Note appended in the judgment was
to the following effect:
" NOTE
SINHA, J.
When   hearing   of   this   appeal   was   finished
last   week   by   a   Bench   consisting   of   three   of
us,   B.P.   Sinha,   P.   Govinda   Menon   and   J.L.
Kapur,   JJ.,   we   announced   that   we   had   come   to
the   conclusion   that   the   appellant   should   be
acquitted. We also indicated that the judgment
will   be   delivered   the   week   following.   The
draft   of   the   judgment   was   sent   to   late   Mr.
Justice Menon last week and he had approved of
it. What we are now delivering are the reasons
of   the   Judges   who   constituted   the   Bench;   but
it will be signed by two only of us on account
of the unexpected death of Mr. Justice. Menon.
K.S.B. Appeal allowed.”
21. In   the   above   case   judgment   was   pronounced   with   the
concurrence   of   the   three   judges.   When   the   hearing   took   place
opinion   of   all   the   three   Judges   was   expressed   but   judgment
could   be   signed     by   two   Judges   since   one   of   the   Judges   died.
Although,   the   facts   of   the   above   case   was   little   different
i.e.   there   was   material   to   indicate   that   the   third   Judge   who
could not sign had also concurred with the opinion, but in the

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present   case   there   is   no   pleading   of   third   member   whether
agreeing   or   not   agreeing   with   the   decision.     For   the   present
case, we proceed on the premise that the third member did not
agree   with   the   decision.   For   the   decisions   of   this   Court,
Article   145   sub­clause   (5)   of   the   Constitution   of   India
provides that judge of this Court can deliver a judgment with
the   concurrence   of   a   majority   of   the   Judges   present   at   the
hearing of the case.
22. The   present   is   a   case   where   decision   by   a   multi­member
body is to be taken in the meeting of the Committee as per the
statutory   Rules.   There   being   no   such   majority   provided   for
taking a decision, the decision by majority has to be accepted
as the opinion of the State Transport Authority.
23. Two   more   cases,   which   were   relied   by   the   appellant   and
noticed by the High Court need to be noted.  The Privy Council
judgment   in   Gokal   Chand­   Jagan   Nath   Vs.   Nand   Ram   Das­   Atma
Ram, AIR (1938) P.C. 292 , is relevant for the present case. In
the   appeal   before   the   Privy   Council,   judgment   of   the   High
Court   was   assailed   on   the   ground   that   the   two   Hon'ble   Judges
of   the   High   Court   heard   the   matter,   although,   both   judges
concurred   with   the   judgment,   but   one   Judge   went   on   leave

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before   signing   the   judgment,   which   was   signed   by   only   one
Judge.     The   Privy   Council   repelled   the   contention   and   held
that   signing   by   one   of   the   Judges   at   best   was   only
irregularity, not affecting the merits of the case.  Following
was laid down in Paragraphs 6, 7 and 8:­
“6.   A   further   point   was   raised   by   the
appellants.   They   urged   that   the   judgment   of
the   High   Court   appealed   from   was   not   a   valid
judgment   because   it   failed   to   comply   with
Order   XLI,   Rule   31,   of   the   Code   of   Civil
Procedure.   The   relevant   facts   on   this   issue
are   that   the   hearing   in   the   High   Court   was
before   two   Judges,   Harrison   and   Agha   Haider
JJ.,   and   was   actually   delivered   by   the   former
Judge,   the   latter   agreeing.   The   judgment   was
delivered   on   February   22,   1933.     But   Harrison
J.   went   on   leave   before   signing   the   judgment,
which was signed by Agha Haider J., the Deputy
Registrar   appending   a   note   that   Harrison   J.
had   gone   on   leave   before   signing   the   judgment
he delivered.
7.   Order   XLI,   Rule   31   requires   that   the
judgment   of   the   appellate   Court   shall   be   in
writing   and   shall   state   various   matters,   and
"shall   at   the   time   that   it   is   pronounced   be
signed and dated by the Judge or by the Judges
concurring therein." 
8.   The   Rule   does   not   say   that   if   its
requirements   are   not   complied   with   the
judgment   shall   be   a   nullity.   So   startling   a
result   would   need   clear   and   precise   words.
Indeed   the   Rule   does   not   even   state   any
definite   time   in   which   it   is   to   be   fulfilled.
The   time   is   left   to   be   defined   by   what   is
reasonable.   The   Rule   from   its   very   nature   is
not   intended   to   affect   the   rights   of   parties
to   a   judgment.   It   is   intended   to   secure
certainty   in   the   ascertainment   of   what   the

18
judgment   was.   It   is   a   rule   which   Judges   are
required   to   comply   with   for   that   object.   No
doubt   in   practice   Judges   do   so   comply,   as   it
is their duty to do. But accidents may happen.
A   Judge   may   die   after   giving   judgment   but
before   he   has   had   a   reasonable   opportunity   to
sign   it.   The   Court   must   have   inherent
jurisdiction to supply such a defect. The case
of   a   Judge   who   has   gone   on   leave   before
signing   the   judgment   may   call   for   more
comment,   but   even   so   the   convenience   of   the
Court   and   the   interest   of   litigants   must
prevail. The defect is merely an irregularity.
But   in   truth   the   difficulty   is   disposed   of   by
Sections   99   and   108   of   the   Civil   Procedure
Code. Section 99 provides that no decree shall
be   reversed   or   substantially   varied   nor   shall
any   case   be   remanded,   in   appeal   on   account   of
any   error,   defect   or   irregularity   in   any
proceedings   in   the   suit,   not   affecting   the
merits   of   the   case   or   the   jurisdiction   of   the
Court. That Section conies in the part dealing
with   appeals   from   original   decrees.   But
Section   108   applies   the   same   provision   to
appeals   from   appellate   decrees   and   it   is
always in the discretion of the Board to apply
the   principle   on   appeal   to   His   Majesty   in
Council.   In   their   Lordships'   judgment,   the
defect   here   was   an   irregularity   not   affecting
the   merits   of   the   case   or   the   jurisdiction   of
the   Court,   and   is   no   ground   for   setting   aside
the decree. ”
24. Another judgment, which was cited by the appellant was  A.
Shanta   Rao   Vs.   State   Transport   Appellate   Tribunal,   Hyderabad
& Ors., AIR 1985 A.P. 256.   In the above case, State Transport
Appellate   Tribunal   consisting   of   Chairman   and   two   members
heard the matter.  However, the order was issued only with the
signature   of   Chairman.     The   order   was   attacked   on   the   ground

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that   the   other   two   members   having   not   signed   the   order,   the
order   is   illegal.     Repelling   the   contention   following   was
stated in Paragraph 9:­
“9.   On   the   first   question,   I   am   of   the   view
that   once   the   minutes   of   the   State   Transport
Authority   are   found   to   be   signed   by   all   the
members   including   the   Chairman,   the   mere   fact
that the final order is communicated under the
signature   of   the   Chairman   alone   does   not
amount to any illegality. The Court has to see
the   substance   of   the   matter   and   not   the   mere
form,  and  if  it  is   clear   that  all  the  members
of the Tribunal have applied their mind to the
facts of the case and arrived at a conclusion,
it   does   not   matter   if   the   communication   is
made under the signature of the Chairman. ” 
25. Although,   in   above   two   cases,   there   was   concurrence   of
all   the   members   of   Court/Tribunal   but   all   had   not   signed   the
order.     The   present   is   a   case   where   Chairperson   and   two
members heard the application in meeting dated 16.10.2014 but
order was subsequently pronounced on 15.12.2014 and signed by
only Chairperson and one member.  The third member having been
transferred   in   the   meanwhile.     As   noticed   above,   there   is   no
pleading in the writ petition as to whether the third member,
who was transferred had agreed with the proposed order or did
not agree with the decision, which was to be delivered by the
State   Transport   Authority.     Had   third   member   agreed,   there
cannot be any debate in this matter, the issues being covered

20
by   judgment   of   this   Court   in   Ramaswamy   Nadar(supra)   and
judgment   of   the   Privy   Council   in   Gokal   Chand   ­Jagan   Nath
(supra).  But there being neither any pleading nor any material
to   come   to   the   conclusion   that   the   third   member   has   agreed
with   the   opinion,   we   have   proceeded   to   examine   the   present
case   as   if,     the   third   member   did   not   agree   with   the   order
proposed.     We   have   already   noticed   the   reason   for   coming   to
the   conclusion   that   the   order   issued   by   the   State   Transport
Authority, signed by the Chairperson and one member is a valid
order having been issued with the majority opinion of two out
of   three,   who   heard   the   application   on   16.10.2014.     Thus,   in
any view of the matter, no illegality can be attached with the
order   dated   15.12.2014,   which   was   signed   by   the   Chairperson
and one member.                           
26. In   view   of   the   foregoing   discussion,   we   are   of   the
opinion   that   decision   dated   15.12.2014   issued   with   the
signatures of Chairperson and one member was a valid decision
in   spite   of   the   fact   that   one   of   the   members   who   was   present
in   the   hearing   when   the   meeting   took   place   on   16.10.2014   and
had been transferred in the meanwhile did not sign the order.
The decision of the State Transport Authority dated 15.12.2014
was   fully   in   accordance   with   the   statutory   scheme   of   the
Rules,   1994   and   both   the   learned   Single   Judge   and   Division

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Bench erred in holding the decision as invalid. We, thus, are
of   the   view   that   judgments   of   learned   Single   Judge   and
Division Bench do not express the correct view of the law.
27. In the result, the appeal is allowed and judgments of the
High Court are set aside.
...............................J.
( A.K. SIKRI )
...............................J.
( ASHOK BHUSHAN )
NEW DELHI,
FEBRUARY 08, 2018.