2018 INSC 0139 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO(s).2763 OF 2018 (arising out of SLP(C) No.1118 of 2018) UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS ….APPELLANT(S) VERSUS CHAMAN RANA ….RESPONDENT(S) WITH CIVIL APPEAL NO(s).2764 OF 2018 (arising out of SLP(C) No.1123 of 2018) UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS ….APPELLANT(S) VERSUS GULSHAN KUMAR SHARMA ….RESPONDENT(S) JUDGMENT NAVIN SINHA, J. Leave granted. 2. These   two   appeals   arise   from   a   common   order   dated 05.05.2017,   directing   retrospective   consideration   for 1 promotion   of   the   respondents   to   the   post   of   Second­in­ Command   and   Commandant   respectively,   in   the   Border Security Force (BSF), from the date that their juniors had been promoted, along with all consequential benefits.  3. The   respondents   in   the   two   writ   petitions   were superseded in the years 1996 and 2000, respectively.   Both of them   were   subsequently   promoted   on   28.11.1997   and 16.06.2003   as   Second­in­Command   and   Commandant respectively.     Subsequently,   both   of   them   submitted   several representations   for   promotion   from   the   date   of   supersession. Orders rejecting the representations, along with reasons, were duly   communicated   to   them   more   than   once.     After   the pronouncement   in   Sukhdev   Singh   vs.   Union   of   India   & ors. , (2013) 9 SCC 566 affirming  Dev Dutt vs. Union of India &   ors. ,   (2008)   8   SCC   725,     separate   writ   petitions   were   filed by them on 25.09.2016.  The common plea taken was that the entry  ‘good’  in their annual confidential reports (ACRs) for the relevant   years   was   an   adverse   remark   in   view   of   the 2 benchmark   of   ‘very   good’.     Since   the   adverse   entry   had   not been   communicated   to   them,   it   could   not   be   taken   into consideration,   requiring   reconsideration   for   promotion   from the date of supersession.  4. Learned   counsel   for   the   appellants   submitted   that   the claims of the respondents were highly belated and stale.   The writ   petitions   ought   to   have  been  dismissed  on  the  ground   of delay   and   laches.     Specific   objection   had   been   taken   in   the counter   affidavit,   including   the   cascading   effect   that   it   would have had upon those promoted earlier to the respondents, and which   would   lead   to   administrative   chaos.     Mere   filing   of representations   or   a   subsequent   judgement,   could   not   be sufficient justification to entertain such belated claims, dehors the   facts   of   a   case.     The   High   Court   ought   not   to   have   given directions   to   consider   their   candidature   with   retrospective effect.   3 5. Learned   counsel   for   the   respondents   submitted   that enunciation   of   law   by  this   Court  will  always   have   to   be   given retrospective   effect,   unless   it   is   made   prospective   specifically. The grading  ‘good’ in the facts of the case was adverse as the benchmark for promotion was ‘very good’.     In view of the law laid down in   Dev Dutt   (supra) as affirmed in   Sukhdev Singh (supra),   it   was   mandatory   for   the   appellants   to   have communicated   such   adverse   remarks   to   the   respondents.     In absence   of   such   communication,   these   remarks   could   not have   been   considered   to   deny   promotions.     The   respondents were  genuinely  and  bonafide  pursuing  their  grievances  before the authorities themselves, hoping that they would see reason, and   only   when   they   realised   that   relief   would   not   be forthcoming   otherwise,   they   approached   the   High   Court ultimately. 6. We   have   considered   the   submissions   on   behalf   of   the parties.     The   only   question   for   consideration   is   the applicability   of   the   law   as   declared   in   Dev   Dutt   (supra)   and 4 affirmed in   Sukhdev Singh   (supra) to the respondents in the facts and circumstances of the present case.  7. The   benchmark   for   promotion   to   the   posts   in   question under   the   BSF   (Seniority,   Promotion   and   Superannuation   of Officers)   Rules   of   1978,   as   prescribed   in   paramilitary Promotion   DO   letter   dated   25.11.1988   was   modified   on 08.05.1990   from   ‘Good’   to   ‘Very   Good’.     The   respondent Chaman   Rana,   a   Deputy   Commandant   was   considered   for promotion   to   the   rank   of   Second­in­Command   at   the departmental   promotion   committee   (DPC)   meeting   held   on 13.09.1996   but   could   not   make   the   grade   in   view   of   the criteria   prescribed   in   DO   letter   dated   08.05.1990.     The respondent   represented   on   20.02.1997   against   his supersession.     An   order   of   rejection   with   reasons   was communicated   to   him   on   25.03.1997.       The   cause   of   action had,   therefore,   accrued   to   seek   relief   before   a   court   of   law. Nonetheless a repeat representation was made on 31.07.1997, and   a   reasoned   rejection   was   again   communicated   on 5 07.05.1998.  In the meantime, the respondent was empanelled to   be   considered   for   promotion   to   the   rank   of   Second­in­ Command   by   the   DPC   held   in   the   year   1997,   and   he   was promoted   as   such   on   28.11.1997.     A   cause   of   action   again accrued to the respondent for approaching the Court for relief but   he   again   represented   on   30.06.1998,   followed   by   further representations   on   14.09.1998,   22.08.2000,   22.08.2006.     A fresh reasoned order of rejection was again communicated on 16.05.2007.     Repeat   representations   followed   on   28.08.2012, 07.11.2015 and 20.11.2015 after which the writ petition came to be instituted. 8. Likewise,   the   respondent   Gulshan   Kumar   Sharma   was considered   for   promotion   as   Commandant   in   the  years   2000­ 2001   and   2001­2002   by   the   DPC   but   was   superseded   as   he failed   to   secure   the   benchmark.     He   represented   on 25.10.2001   and   was   informed   on   09.01.2002   that   he   had failed   to   secure   the   benchmark.     The   cause   of   action   to approach   the   Court   for   grant   of   relief   had   accrued   to   the 6 respondent   but   he   again   represented   on   18.03.2002.       An order of rejection along with reasons was again communicated to   him   on   01.09.2004.     After   he   was   promoted   as Commandant   on   16.06.2003,   instead   of   approaching   the Court,   he   again   represented   on   04.05.2005,   followed   by another   representation   on   08.01.2007.     A   reasoned   order   of rejection   was   again   communicated   to   him   on   17.04.2008. This   was   followed   by   further   representation   on   11.08.2009 which   was   again   rejected   on   02.09.2009   allegedly communicated on 01.01.2016.  A further representation dated 03.08.2015   was   also   rejected   on   27.11.2015.       The   writ petition then came to be instituted. 9. Manifestly,   the   cause   of   action   first   arose   to   the respondents   on   the   date   of   initial   supersession   and   again   on the   date   when   rejection   of   their   representation   was communicated   to   them,   or   within   reasonable   time   thereafter. Even if the plea based on   Dev Dutt   (supra)   be considered, the cause of action based thereon accrued on 12.05.2008.   There 7 has   to   be   a   difference   between   a   cause   of   action   and   what   is perceived   as   materials   in   support   of   the   cause   of   action.     In service   matters,   especially   with   regard   to   promotion,   there   is always  an urgency.     The  aggrieved must approach  the  Court at   the   earliest   opportunity,   or   within   a   reasonable   time thereafter   as   third   party   rights   accrue   in   the   meantime   to those   who   are   subsequently   promoted.     Such   persons continue  to  work on the  promotional  post, ensconced in  their belief of the protection available to them in service with regard to seniority.   Any belated interference with the same is bound to   have   adverse   effect   on   those   already   promoted   affecting their   morale   in  service  also.     Additionally,  any   directions   at  a belated   stage   to   consider   others   for   promotion   with retrospective   effect,   after   considerable   time   is   bound   to   have serious   administrative   implications   apart   from   the   financial burden on the government that would follow by such orders of promotion. 8 10.     As far back as in    P.S. Sadasivaswamy vs. The State of   Tamil   Nadu ,   (1975)   1   SCC   152,   considering     a   claim   for promotion belated by 14 years,  this Court had observed that a period   of   six   months   or   at   the   utmost   a   year   would   be reasonable   time   to   approach   a   court   against   denial   of promotion   and   that   it   would   be   a   sound   and   wise   exercise   of discretion not to entertain such claims by persons who tried to unsettle   the   settled   matters,   which   only   clog   the   work   of   the court   impeding   it   in   considering   genuine   grievances   within time in the following words :­ “2…..   A   person   aggrieved   by   an   order   of promoting   a   junior   over   his   head   should approach the Court at least within six months or   at   the   most   a   year   of   such   promotion.   It   is not that there is any period of limitation for the Courts   to   exercise   their   powers   under   Article 226   nor   is   it   that   there   can   never   be   a   case where   the   Courts   cannot   interfere   in   a   matter after   the   passage   of   a   certain   length   of   time. But   it   would   be   a   sound   and   wise   exercise   of discretion   for   the   Courts   to   refuse   to   exercise their   extraordinary   powers   under   Article   226 in the case of persons who do not approach it expeditiously   for   relief   and   who   stand   by   and allow things to happen and then approach the Court   to   put   forward   stale   claims   and   try   to unsettle   settled   matters.   The   petitioner’s petition should, therefore, have been dismissed 9 in   limine.   Entertaining   such   petitions   is   a waste of time of the Court. It clogs the work of the   Court   and   impedes   the   work   of   the   Court in considering legitimate grievances as also its normal work. We consider that the High Court was right in dismissing the appellant’s petition as well as the appeal.” 11. Mere   repeated   filing   of   representations   could   not   be sufficient   explanation   for   delay   in   approaching   the   Court   for grant   of   relief,   was   considered   in   Gandhinagar   Motor Transport Society vs. State of Bombay,  A.I.R. 1954 Bombay 202, by Chief Justice Chagla,  observing as follows :­ “(2)……   Now,   we   have   had   occasion   to   point out   that   the   only   delay   which   this   Court   will excuse   in   presenting   a   petition   is   the   delay which   is   caused   by   the   petitioner   pursuing   a legal   remedy   which   is   given   to   him.   In   this particular case the petitioner did not pursue a legal   remedy.   The   remedy   he   pursued   was extra­legal   or   extra­judicial.   Once   the   final decision   of   government   is   given,   a representation is merely an appeal for mercy or indulgence,   but   it   is   not   pursuing   a   remedy which the law gave to the petitioner…” 12.  The   appellant,   in   its   counter   affidavit   before   the   High Court, had specifically taken the objection that the claim was highly   belated,   and   that   any   direction   for   a   retrospective 10 consideration   would   have   a   destabilising   effect   in   unsettling the settled position which would lead to complete chaos apart from   other   administrative   consequences.     The   High   Court failed   to   consider   the   objection.     In   Union   of   India   vs.   M.K. Sarkar , (2010) 2 SCC 59, this Court observed as follows:­ “16 .   A   court   or   tribunal,   before   directing ‘consideration’   of   a   claim   or   representation should   examine   whether   the   claim   or representation is with reference to a ‘live’ issue or   whether   it   is   with   reference   to   a   ‘dead’   or ‘stale’ issue. If it is with reference to a ‘dead’ or ‘stale’   issue   or   dispute,   the   court/tribunal should   put   an   end   to   the   matter   and   should not direct consideration or reconsideration….” 13.  In   Dev   Dutt   (supra),   the   DPC   was   held   on   16.12.1994. The   appellant   therein,   aggrieved   by   his   supersession   moved the   High   Court   with   utmost   expedition   leading   to   the pronouncement by the Single Judge on 21.08.2001 and by the Division   Bench   on   26.11.2001.     The   appeal   was   instituted before this Court in the year 2002.   If that were not sufficient to distinguish the case of the respondents, reference may also be made to the observations in paragraph 36 as follows: 11 “36.  In the present case, we are developing the principles   of   natural   justice   by   holding   that fairness   and   transparency   in   public administration   requires   that   all   entries (whether poor, fair, average, good or very good) in   the   annual   confidential   report   of   a   public servant, whether in civil, judicial, police or any other   State   service   (except   the   military),   must be   communicated   to   him   within   a   reasonable period   so   that   he   can   make   a   representation for its upgradation.”  14.  The High Court erred in placing absolute reliance on  Dev Dutt   (supra)   and   Sukhdev   (supra)   without   noticing   the   fact situation   of   the   respondents.       In   Union   of   India   and another   vs.   Major   Bahadur   Singh,   (2006)   (1)   SCC   368,   it was observed:­ “9.   The   courts   should   not   place   reliance   on decisions   without   discussing   as   to   how   the factual   situation   fits   in   with   the   fact   situation of   the   decision   on   which   reliance   is   placed. Observations   of   the   courts   are   neither   to   be read as Euclid’s theorems nor as provisions of the   statute   and   that   too   taken   out   of   their context.   These   observations   must   be   read   in the context in which they appear to have been stated.   Judgments   of   the   courts   are   not   to   be construed   as   statutes.   To   interpret   words, phrases   and   provisions   of   a   statute,   it   may become   necessary   for   judges   to   embark   into lengthy   discussions   but   the   discussion   is 12 meant   to   explain   and   not   to   define.   Judges interpret   statutes,   they   do   not   interpret judgments….” 15. A   subsequent   pronouncement   by   this   Court   could   not enthuse a fresh lease of life, or furnish a fresh cause of action to   what   was   otherwise   clearly   a   dead   and   stale   claim.       In State   of   Uttaranchal   vs.   Shiv   Charan   Singh   Bhandari , (2013) 12 SCC 179, it was observed that :­ “29….   Not   for   nothing,   has   it   been   said   that everything   may   stop   but   not   the   time,   for   we are   all   slaves   of   time.   There   may   not   be   any provision   providing   for   limitation   but   a grievance   relating   to   promotion   cannot   be given a new lease of life at any point of time.”   16.  The   observations   with   regard   to   the   modus   operandi   of the   representation   syndrome   to   revive   what   are   clearly   dead and   stale   claims   as   discussed   in   C.   Jacob   vs.   Director   of Geology and Mining , ( 2008 )   10   SCC   115, and the caution to be exercised by the Court are also considered apposite in the facts of the present case.  13 17. In   the   facts   and   circumstances   of   the   present   case,   any direction   to   consider   retrospective   promotion   of   the respondents at such a belated passage of time of over 17 to 20 years, would virtually bring a tsunami in the service resulting in   administrative   chaos   quite   apart   from   the   financial implications for the government.   The order of the High Court is therefore held to be unsustainable and is set aside.  18. Both the appeals are allowed for the aforesaid reasons.  ………………………………….J.    (Arun Mishra)  .……….………………………..J.    (Navin Sinha)   New Delhi, March 12, 2018. 14 ITEM NO.1502 COURT NO.10 SECTION IV-B S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS C.A.No.2763/2018 @ SLP(C)No..1118/2018 (Arising out of impugned final judgment and order dated 05-05- 2017 in CWP No.20322/2016 passed by the High Court Of Punjab & Haryana At Chandigarh) UNION OF INDIA & ORS. Petitioner(s) VERSUS CHAMAN RANA Respondent(s) WITH C.A.No.2764/2018 @ SLP(C)No.1123/2018 (IV-B) Date : 12-03-2018 These petitions were called on for pronouncement of judgment today. For Petitioner(s) Mr. B.V. Balaram Das,AOR For Respondent(s) Mr. Deepak Goel,AOR Hon'ble Mr. Justice Navin Sinha pronounced the Reportable judgment of the Bench comprising Hon'ble Mr. Justice Arun Mishra and His Lordship. Leave granted. The appeals are allowed in terms of the signed Reportable judgment. Pending application, if any, stands disposed of. (Sarita Purohit) (Suman Jain) Court Master Branch Officer (Signed Reportable judgment is placed on the file) 15