2018 INSC 0171
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REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.406 OF 2018
(ARISING OUT OF SLP(CRL.)NO.1994 OF 2018)
SATYENDRA KUMAR MEHRA
@ SATENDERA KUMAR MEHRA                      … PETITIONER 
VERSUS
THE STATE OF JHARKHAND           … RESPONDENT
J U D G M E N T
ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.
This   appeal   has   been   filed   against   an   order   of   the   High
Court of Jharkhand at Ranchi in Criminal Appeal NO.176 of 2018
by   which   High   Court   by   allowing   I.A.No.   892   of   2018   filed   by
the   appellant,   has     directed   to   grant   suspension   of   sentence
of   the   appellant.   The   High   Court   further   directed   that   the
appellant   should   also   deposit   the   fine   amount   awarded   before
the court below. The appellant is aggrieved only against that
part of the order by which the High Court directed the deposit
of fine amount. 
2. The   appellant   was   an   accused   in   R.C.   Case   No.68(A)   of
1996­State   (through   CBI)   vs.   Lalu   Prasad   @   Lalu   Prasad   Yadav
and   others.   Accused   were   tried   for   the   offence   punishable
under   Sections   120­B/   read   with   409,   420,   467,   468,   471   and

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477­A of the IPC read with Section 13(1)(c) & (d) and 13(2) of
Prevention   of   Corruption   Act,   1988.   The   trial   court   by   order
dated   24.01.2018   convicted   the   accused   and   awarded   sentence.
The   appellant,   who   was   one   of   the   accused,   was   awarded   the
following sentence by the trial court:
    "44.   Satyendra   Kumar   Mehra   convicted   for
offence   punishable   U/s   120­B/420,   120­B/467,
120­B/468 and 120­B/471 IPC:
U/s 120­B/420 IPC R.I. of Five(05) Years with
fine of Rs.25,000/­ and in default of payment
of fine S.I. for Three (03) Months. 
U/s   120­B/467   IPC   R.I.   of   Five   (05)   Years
with   fine   of   Rs.25,000/­   and   in   default   of
payment of fine S.I. for Three (03) Months. 
U/s 120­B/468 IPC R.I. of Five(05) Years with
fine of Rs.25,000/­ and in default of payment
of fine S.I. for Three (03) Months. 
U/s 120­B/471 IPC R.I. of Five(05) Years with
fine of Rs.25,000/­ and in default of payment
of fine S.I. for Three (03) Months. 
All   the   sentences   shall   run   concurrently   and
the period undergone shall be set off.”
3. Aggrieved against the above conviction and sentence order
the appellant filed Criminal Appeal No.176 of 2018 before the
High   Court.   The   appellant   also   filed   application   praying
suspension of sentence. After hearing, the High Court allowed
the   application   granting   the   privilege   of   suspension   of
sentence   to   the   appellant   and   directing   the   appellant   be
released on bail on furnishing   bail bond of Rs.50,000/­ with
two sureties. However, while allowing the application the High

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Court  passed the following direction:
"Appellant should also deposit the fine amount
awarded before court below.”
4. The appellant aggrieved by the aforesaid direction of the
High Court to deposit the fine amount awarded by the court 
below has come up in this appeal.
5. We   have   heard   Shri   Sunil   Kumar,   learned   senior   counsel
appearing   for   the   appellant   and   Shri   Aman   Lekhi,   learned
Additional   Solicitor   General   for   India   appearing   for   the
respondent­State.
6. Learned   counsel   for   the   appellant   relying   on   Section   357
sub­Section (2) of Criminal Procedure Code submits that since
the   appellant   has   already   filed   an   appeal   before   the   High
Court,   the   amount   of   fine   imposed   by   the   trial   court
automatically   stands   stayed   till   the   decision   of   the   appeal.
He submits that in the present case sentence of fine was also
imposed by the trial court which is the subject of the appeal,
hence Section 357(2) Cr.P.C. is attracted in the present case
and   the   High   Court   should   not   have   directed   the   appellant   to
deposit   the   fine   amount   awarded   by   the   trial   court   which
direction   is   in   the   teeth   of   provisions   of   Section   357(2)
Cr.P.C.   Learned   counsel   for   the   appellant   in   support   of   his
submission   placed   reliance   on   the   judgment   of   this   Court

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reported   in     Dilip   S.   Dahanukar   vs.   Kotak   Mahindra   Co.Ltd.
And another, (2007) 6 SCC 528.
7. Shri Aman Lekhi, learned Additional Solicitor General for
India   refuting   the   submission   of   learned   counsel   for   the
appellant contends that the High Court did not commit error in
directing the appellant to deposit the fine amount awarded by
the court below. He submits that provisions of Section 357(2)
Cr.P.C. is not attracted in the present case. He submits that
what is contemplated by sub­Section (2) of Section 357 Cr.P.C.
is “payment of the compensation as envisaged in Section 357(1)
Cr.P.C.”.   He   submits   that   stay   of   payment   of   compensation   is
entirely   different   from   the   stay   of   fine   which   is   a   part   of
sentence imposed on accused.
8. He   submits   that   this   Court   in   Stanny   Felix   Pinto   vs.
Jangid   Builders   Pvt.   Ltd.   and   another,   (2001)   2   SCC   416,   has
also upheld a similar order passed by the High Court where the
High   Court   directed   payment   of   rupees   four   lakhs   as   a
condition   to   suspend   the   sentence   which   was   part   of   the   fine
imposed as part of sentence. 
9. Learned   counsel   for   the   appellant   submits   that   judgment
of   this   Court   in   Stanny   Felix   Pinto(supra)   cannot   be   pressed
into   service   with   regard   to   interpretation   of   Section   357(2)
Cr.P.C.   which   section   is   neither   referred   to   nor   adverted   to

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by this Court in above case. 
10.   We   have   considered   the   submissions   of   the   learned
counsel   for   the   parties   and   perused   the   records.     From   the
facts brought on record, it is clear that the sentence awarded
to   the   appellant   was   a   sentence   of   R.I.   of   five   years   with
payment   of   fine   of   Rs.25,000/­   and   in   default   S.I.   of   three
months.   The   said   sentence   was   recorded   in   four   cases   and   all
sentences were to run concurrently. Thus, the fine was part of
the   sentence.   The   question   which   is   to   be   answered   in   the
present   case   is   as   to   whether   by   virtue   of   Section   357(2)
Cr.P.C.,   the   said   fine   which   was   part   of   sentence
automatically   was   stayed   till   the   decision   of   the   appeal   and
would not have been directed by the High Court to be deposited
by the appellant. 
11. For   answering   the   question   we   need   to   reflect   upon   the
statutory   scheme   as   delineated   by   Section   357(2)   Cr.P.C.
Section 357(2) Cr.P.C. is part of Chapter XXVII­” THE JUDGMENT”
of   the       Criminal   Procedure   Code,   1973.   Section   353   deals
about   the   judgment,   its   pronouncement,   signatures,   delivery
and   other   aspects.   Section   354   deals   with   language   and
contents   of   judgment.   Section   355   refers   to   Metropolitan
Magistrate's   judgment.   Section   356   deals   with   order   for
notifying   address   of   previously   convicted   offender   and   then

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Section   357   bears   heading   “ Order   to   pay   compensation ”.   Order
to   pay   compensation,   thus,   is   a   part   of   judgment   where   Court
directs payment for compensation. 
12. Section 357(1) Cr.P.C. contemplates that when a Court 
imposes a sentence of fine or a sentence of which fine forms a
part,   the   Court   may,   while   passing   judgment,   order   the   whole
or   any   part   of   the   fine   recovered   to   be   applied.   Section   357
is to the following effect:­
“357. Order to pay compensation.
(1)   When   a   Court   imposes   a   sentence   of   fine
or a sentence (including a sentence of death)
of   which   fine   forms   a   part,   the   Court   may,
when   passing   judgment   order   the   whole   or   any
part of the fine recovered to be applied­
(a)   in   defraying   the   expenses   properly
incurred in the prosecution;
(b)   in   the   payment   to   any   person   of
compensation for any loss or injury caused by
the   offence,   when   compensation   is,   in   the
opinion   of   the   Court,   recoverable   by   such
person in a Civil Court;
(c)   when   any   person   is   convicted   of   any
offence   for   having   caused   the   death   of
another   person   or   of   having   abetted   the
commission   of   such   an   offence,   in   paying
compensation   to   the   persons   who   are,   under
the   Fatal   Accidents   Act,   1855   (13   of   1855),
entitled   to   recover   damages   from   the   person
sentenced for the loss resulting to them from
such death;

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(d)   when   any   person   is   convicted   of   any
offence   which   includes   theft,   criminal
misappropriation,   criminal   breach   of   trust,
or   cheating,   or   of   having   dishonestly
received   or   retained,   or   of   having
voluntarily   assisted   in   disposing   of,   stolen
property   knowing   or   having   reason   to   believe
the   same   to   be   stolen,   in   compensating   any
bona   fide   purchaser   of   such   property   for   the
loss of the same if such property is restored
to   the   possession   of   the   person   entitled
thereto.”
(2)   If   the   fine   is   imposed   in   a   case   which   is
subject   to   appeal,   no   such   payment   shall   be
made before the period allowed for presenting
the   appeal   has   elapsed,   or,   if   an   appeal   be
presented, before the decision of the appeal.
(3)   When a Court imposes a sentence, of which
fine   does   not   form   a   part,   the   Court   may,
when   passing   judgment   order   the   accused
person   to   pay,   by   way   of   compensation,   such
amount   as   may   be   specified   in   the   order   to
the   person   who   has   suffered   any   loss   or
injury   by   reason   of   the   act   for   which   the
accused person has been so sentenced.
(4)   An   order   under   this   section   may   also   be
made   by   an   Appellate   Court   or   by   the   High
Court or Court of Session when exercising its
powers of revision.
(5)   At   the   time   of   awarding   compensation   in
any   subsequent   civil   suit   relating   to   the
same   matter,   the   Court   shall   take   into
account   any   sum   paid   or   recovered   as
compensation under this section.”
13. All   the   circumstances   in   sub­section   (1)   of   Section   357

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refer   to   direction   to   pay   compensation   out   of   the   fine
imposed.   Thus,   all   the   circumstances   are   circumstances   where
fine   imposed   and   recovered   is   to   be   applied   in   the   above
circumstances. 
14. The   fine   is   thus   contemplated   to   be   utilised   for
compensating   different   circumstances   as   enumerated   in   Section
357(1) Cr.P.C. Sub­Section (2) of Section 357 Cr.P.C. has been
engrafted   in reference to what was stated in sub­Section (1)
of Section 357 Cr.P.C.   Crucial words used in sub­Section (2)
of   Section   357   Cr.P.C.   are   “ no   such   payment   shall   be   made
before   the   period   allowed   for   presenting   the   appeal   has
elapsed, or if an appeal be presented, before the decision of
the   appeal”.   Thus,   what   is   prohibited   under   Section   357(2)
Cr.P.C. is that payment of compensation utilising the fine be
not paid till the period allowed for presenting the appeal has
elapsed, or if an appeal is filed then before the decision of
the   appeal.     It   does   not   involve   any   concept   of   stay   of
sentence.
15. Chapter   XXIX   deals   with   the   appeals.   In   the   said   Chapter
Section   389   deals   with   the   subject   “suspension   of   sentence
pending the appeal; release of appellant on bail”. Section
389(1) Cr.P.C. empowers the Appellate Court to order that the
execution   of   the   sentence   or   order   appealed   against   be

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suspended   and,   also,   if   he   is   in   confinement,   that   he   be
released   on   bail.   Thus,   the   power   of   suspension   of   sentence
emanates   from   Section   389   Cr.P.C.   where   Appellate   Court   is
empowered to pass such an order. Sections 357 and 389 Cr.P.C.
operate in two different fields. Section 357 Cr.P.C. contains
an embargo that on passing a judgment of sentence of fine, the
fine   be   not   utilised   for   payment   of   compensation   till
contingency as mentioned therein does not occur. The sentence
awarded   by   the   Court   including   sentence   of   fine   is   in   no   way
affected   by   embargo   contained   in   Section   357(2)   Cr.P.C.   The
operation   of   Section   357(2)   Cr.P.C.   is   restricted   to   payment
of   compensation   as   contemplated   by   Section   357(1)   and   (3)
Cr.P.C. The heading of the Section 357 Cr.P.C. i.e. “Order to
pay   compensation”   as   well   as   contents   of   the   Section   lead   to
only   one   conclusion   that   the   entire   provision   has   been
engrafted   regarding   payment   of   compensation   out   of   the   fine
imposed or when Court imposes sentence the fine is not part of
which, the Court may by way of compensation direct payment of
such amount to a person who has suffered the injury. We, thus,
are   of   the   view   that   Section   357   Cr.P.C.   has   nothing   to   do
with suspension of sentence awarded by the trial court and the
sentence of fine imposed on the accused is in no way affected
by   Section   357(2)   Cr.P.C.   The   present   is   not   a   case   where

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trial court has directed payment of any compensation to anyone
out   of   fine   imposed.   There   is   no   direction   for   payment   of
compensation in the order of the trial court nor present case
is   covered   by   the   circumstances   mentioned   in   sub­clauses   (a)
to (d) of Section 357(1) Cr.P.C. Present is also not a case of
Section   357(3)   Cr.P.C.   Hence,   there   is   no   question   of
applicability of Section 357(2) Cr.P.C. The heading of Section
357   Cr.   P.C.   throws   considerable   light   in   finding   the   object
and   purpose   of   the   Section.   Section   357   Cr.P.C.   is   only
attracted   when   Court   orders   for   payment   of   compensation.
Section   357   is   not   attracted   in   any   other   case.   It   is   well
settled that heading of the Section plays a role when there is
any   doubt   in   interpretation   of   the   Section.   This   Court   in
Bhinka   and   others   vs.   Charan   Singh,   AIR   1959   SC   960,   while
examining the role of a heading of section while interpreting
a section noticed the following principle;
“15. .....Section   180   provides   for   the
eviction of a person who but for the eviction
would become a hereditary tenant by efflux of
the   prescribed   time.   If   there   is   any
ambiguity — we find none — it is dispelled by
the heading given to the section and also the
description   of   the   nature   of   the   suit   given
in the Schedule. The heading reads thus:
“Ejectment   of   person   occupying   land
without title.”
“Maxwell On Interpretation of Statutes, 10th

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Edn., gives the scope of the user of such a
heading   in   the   interpretation   of   a   section
thus, at p. 50:
“The   headings   prefixed   to   sections   or   sets
of   sections   in   some   modern   statutes   are
regarded   as   preambles   to   those   sections.
They   cannot   control   the   plain   words   of   the
statute   but   they   may   explain   ambiguous
words.”
If   there   is   any   doubt   in   the   interpretation
of   the   words   in   the   section,   the   heading
certainly   helps   us   to   resolve   that
doubt.......”
16. The   similar   proposition   was   again   reiterated   by
three­Judge   Bench   of   this   Court   in   N.C.   Dhoundial   vs.   Union
of   India   and   others,   (2004)   2   SCC   579,   where   in   paragraph   15
following has been held:
“15......The   language   employed   in   the
marginal   heading   is   another   indicator   that
it   is   a   jurisdictional   limitation.   It   is   a
settled   rule   of   interpretation   that   the
section   heading   or   marginal   note   can   be
relied upon to clear any doubt or ambiguity
in   the   interpretation   of   the   provision   and
to   discern   the   legislative   intent   (vide
Uttam   Das   Chela   Sunder   Das   v.   Shiromani
Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee, (1996) 5 SCC
71   and   Bhinka   v.   Charan   Singh,   AIR   1959   SC
960).”
17. Now   we   come   to   the   judgment   which   has   been   relied   on   by
the   learned   counsel   for   the   appellant,   i.e.,   Dilip   S.
Dahanukar   (supra).   In   the   above   case   this   Court   had   occasion
to   interpret   Section   357   Cr.P.C.   The   appellant   therein   was
accused   No.2,   who   was   directed   to   pay   compensation   to   the

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complainant of Rs.15 lakh apart from the simple imprisonment.
The facts have been noted in paragraph 3 of the judgment which
is to the following effect:
“ 3.   Accused   1,   M/s   Goodvalue   Marketing
Co.   Ltd.,   a   company   registered   and
incorporated   under   the   Companies   Act,   1956
and   Accused   2,   the   appellant   herein   were
convicted   for   commission   of   an   offence
involving   Section   138   of   the   Act   by   a
judgment   of   conviction   and   sentence   dated
23­2­2006 holding:
“Accused   1   company,   M/s   Goodvalue
Marketing   Co.   Ltd.   stands   convicted   for
the   offence   punishable   under   Section   138
read   with   Section   141   of   the   Negotiable
Instruments Act.
Accused 1 company is sentenced to pay a
fine   of   Rs   25,000   (Rupees   twenty­five
thousand   only).   In   default   of   payment   of
fine,   Accused   2   Mr   Dilip   Dahanukar,   the
Chairman   of   Accused   1   and   representative
at   the   trial,   shall   suffer   SI   for   1
month.
Accused   2   Mr   Dilip   S.   Dahanukar,   stands
convicted   for   the   offence   punishable
under   Section   138   read   with   Section   141
of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.
Accused   2   is   sentenced   to   suffer   SI   for   1
month.
Accused 2 is also directed to pay compensation
to   the   complainant,   quantified   (sic)   at   Rs
15,00,000   (Rupees   fifteen   lakhs   only),   under
Section 357(3) CrPC. Accused  2  is entitled  to
pay   the   amount   of   compensation   in   two   equal
monthly   instalments   of   Rs   7,50,000   each.   The
first instalment  of Rs 7,50,000 shall be paid
on   or   before   23­3­2006   and   the   second

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instalment of Rs 7,50,000 shall be paid on or
before 24­4­2006; in default of payment of the
amount   of   compensation   Accused   2   shall   suffer
further SI for 2 months.”
18. An appeal was preferred against the conviction order. The
Appellate   Court   while   admitting   the   appeal   directed   the
accused   to   deposit   a   sum   of   Rs.5   lakh   each   within   four   weeks
from   the   said   date.   Writ   petition   was   filed   questioning   the
legality   of   the   said   order   of   the   Appellate   Court   which   was
dismissed and thereafter the matter was taken to this Court. A
submission was raised before this Court that having regard to
the   provisions   of   Section   357(2)   of   the   Code,   the   impugned
judgment is wholly unsustainable inasmuch as in terms thereof
the amount of fine imposed would automatically be suspended.
19. In the above case this Court considered sub­Sections (1),
(2)   and   (3)   of   Section     357   of   the   Code   and   observed   that
sub­Section   (2)   shall   be   applicable   both   in   regard   to
compensation   as   well   as   direction   under   sub­Section   (3).   In
paragraphs 43, 44 and 45 following has been laid down:
“ 43.   It   does   not   appeal   to   us   that
although   a   compensation   payable   out   of   the
quantum   of   fine   would   remain   stayed   under
sub­section (2) of Section 357 of the Code, if
a   compensation   is   directed   to   be   paid   under
sub­section   (3)   thereof,   the   same   would   not
attract   the   said   provision.   (See   P.   Suresh
Kumar  v.  R. Shankar, [(2007) 4 SCC 752].)

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44.   Magistrates  cannot  award  compensation
in   addition   to   fine.   When   a   fine   is   imposed,
however,   the   private   party   has   no   right   to
insist   that   compensation   may   be   awarded   to
him   out   of   the   amount   of   fine.   The   power   to
award   compensation   under   Section   357(3)   is
not   an   ancillary   power.   It   is   an   additional
power.   (See   Balraj   v.   State   of   U.P.,   [(1994)
4 SCC 29]. )
45.   Clause   ( b )   of   sub­section   (1)   of
Section   357   and   sub­section   (1)   of   Section
357   and   sub­section   (3)   of   Section   357   seek
to   achieve   the   same   purpose.   What   is
necessary   is   to   find   out   the   intention   of
the   lawmaker   and   the   object   sought   to   be
achieved.   Sub­section   (2)   of   Section   357
uses   the   word   “fine”.   It   does   not   say   that
what   would   be   stayed   i.e.   application   of
fine. Sub­section (2) of Section 357, in our
opinion,   does   not   contemplate   any   other
interpretation.   Even   assuming   that   Mr   Lalit
was   correct   in   his   submission,   still   then
sub­section   (3)   would   be   squarely
attracted.”
20. Referring   to   Section   389   Cr.   P.C.,   this   Court   noticed
that   suspension   of   a   sentence   and   enlarging   an   appellant   on
bail, who is convicted and realisation of fine has been dealt
with by Parliament under different provisions of the Code. In
paragraph 51 following has been laid down:
“51.   Section   389   does   not   deal   with
exactly   a   similar   situation.   Section   389   of
the   Code   is   to   be   read   with   Section   387
thereof.   Suspension   of   a   sentence   and
enlarging   an   appellant   on   bail,   who   is
convicted   and   realisation   of   fine   has   been
dealt   with   by   Parliament   under   different
provisions   of   the   Code.   The   power   of   the
court,   thus,   to   suspend   a   sentence   in   regard

15
to   realisation   of   compensation   may   be
different   from   that   of   a   direction   in
realisation of fine.”
21. This   Court   in   the   aforesaid   case   has   noted   the
distinction   between   fine   of   Rs.25,000/­   which   was   imposed   on
the Company and compensation of Rs.15 lakh which was directed
to be paid by the Chairman of the Company. In paragraph 71 the
aforesaid was mentioned to the following effect:
“ 71.   We   are   prima   facie   of   the   opinion
(without   going   into   the   merit   of   the   appeal)
that the direction of the learned trial Judge
appears   to   be   somewhat   unreasonable.   The
appellant   herein   has   been   sentenced   to
imprisonment.   Only   fine   has   been   imposed   on
the   Company.   Thus,   for   all   intent   and
purpose,   the   learned   trial   Judge   has   invoked
both   sub­sections   (1)   and   (3)   of   Section   357
of   the   Code.   The   liability   of   the   appellant
herein   was   a   vicarious   one   in   terms   of
Section   141   of   the   Negotiable   Instruments
Act.   The   question   may   also   have   to   be
considered   from   the   angle   that   the   learned
trial   Judge   thought   it   fit   to   impose   a   fine
of   Rs   25,000   only   upon   the   Company.   If   that
be   so,   a   question   would   arise   as   to   whether
an   amount   of   compensation   for   a   sum   of   Rs   15
lakhs should have been directed to be paid by
the   Chairman   of   the   Company.   We   feel   that   it
is not.”
22. This   Court   ultimately   directed   the   appellant   to   deposit
rupees   one   lakh   towards   the   compensation   and   recorded   its
conclusion in paragraph 72 which is to the following effect:
“ 72.  We, therefore, are of the opinion:

16
( i ) in a case of this nature, sub­section (2)
of   Section   357   of   the   Code   of   Criminal
Procedure   would   be   attracted   even   when   the
appellant was directed to pay compensation;
( ii )   the   appellate   court,   however,   while
suspending   the   sentence,   was   entitled   to   put
the appellant on terms. However, no such term
could   be   put   as   a   condition   precedent   for
entertaining   the   appeal   which   is   a
constitutional and statutory right;
( iii )   the   amount   of   compensation   must   be   a
reasonable sum;
( iv )   the   court,   while   fixing   such   amount,
must   have   regard   to   all   relevant   factors
including   the   one   referred   to   in   sub­section
(5)   of   Section   357   of   the   Code   of   Criminal
Procedure;
( v ) no unreasonable amount of compensation can
be directed to be paid.”
23. This   Court,   in   the   above   case,   was   dealing   with   the
question   of   payment   of   compensation   which   was   awarded   by   the
Court   under   sub­Section   (3)   of   Section   357   Cr.P.C.   The   Court
was not dealing with fine which was part of the sentence. The
Court,   thus,   had   no   occasion   to   consider   the   issue   which   has
arisen   in   the   present   case.   We,   in   the   present   case,   are   not
concerned with payment of any compensation or applicability of
Section   357(2)   Cr.P.C.   with   regard   to   payment   of   any   such
compensation. 
24. We   also   need   to   notice   the   judgment   of   this   Court   in

17
Stanny   Felix   Pinto   (supra).   In   the   above   case   along   with
sentence of imprisonment, fine was also imposed under Section
138   of   the   Negotiable   Instruments   Act.   The   High   Court   while
entertaining   the   revision   granted   suspension   of   the   sentence
by   imposing   a   condition   that   part   of   the   fine   shall   be
remitted in court within a specified time which direction was
challenged   in   this   Court.   This   Court   upheld   the   said
direction. Following was held in paragraph 2:
“2.   When   a   person   was   convicted   under
Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act
and   sentenced   to   imprisonment   and   fine   he
moved   the   superior   court   for   suspension   of
the   sentence.   The   High   Court   while
entertaining   his   revision   granted   suspension
of   the   sentence   by   imposing   a   condition   that
part   of   the   fine   shall   be   remitted   in   court
within   a   specified   time.   It   is   against   the
said   direction   that   this   petition   has   been
filed. In our view the High Court has done it
correctly   and   in   the   interest   of   justice.   We
feel   that   while   suspending   the   sentence   for
the   offence   under   Section   138   of   the
Negotiable   Instruments   Act   it   is   advisable
that   the   court   imposes   a   condition   that   the
fine   part   is   remitted   within   a   certain
period.   If   the   fine   amount   is   heavy,   the
court   can   direct   at   least   a   portion   thereof
to   be   remitted   as   the   convicted   person   wants
the   sentence   to   be   suspended   during   the
pendency   of   the   appeal.   In   this   case   the
grievance   of   the   appellant   is   that   he   is
required   by   the   High   Court   to   remit   a   huge
amount of rupees four lakhs as a condition to
suspend   the   sentence.   When   considering   the
total   amount   of   fine   imposed   by   the   trial
court   (twenty   lakhs   of   rupees)   there   is
nothing   unjust   or   unconscionable   in   imposing
such   a   condition.   Hence,   there   is   no   need   to

18
interfere with the impugned order. As such no
notice   need   be   issued   to   the   respondent.
Appeal is accordingly dismissed.”
25. It   is   true   that   this   Court   while   deciding   the   said   case
did   not   consider   Section   357(2)   Cr.P.C.   Learned   counsel   for
the   appellant   is   right   in   his   submission   that   the   above
judgment   cannot   be   held   to   be   laying   down   any   ratio   on
applicability of Section 357(2) Cr.P.C. 
26. We   may   also   refer   to   a   judgment   of   Karnataka   High   Court
in   Irrigation Engineering Company (India) Private Limited and
Anr. vs. The Small­Scale Industrial Development Bank of India
(SIDBI), 2003 (6) KarLJ 387,   where while interpreting Section
357(2)   Cr.P.C.,   Karnataka   High   Court   had   observed   that   word
“payment”   found   in   Section   357(2)   Cr.P.C.   does   not   refer   to
the   'deposit'   of   compensation   or   fine   amount   by   the   accused.
In the case before the High Court appellant was convicted with
sentence of fine. In appeal the High Court directed suspension
of sentence on the condition that the appellant shall deposit
20%   of   the   total   fine   which   was   challenged   before   the   High
Court   on   the   ground   that   in   view   of   Section   357(2)   Cr.P.C.,
Appellate Court was not right in asking them to deposit 20% of
the total fine. In paragraphs 8,9 and 10 following was stated:
“ 8.   What   Section   357(2)   of   the   Cr.   P.C.   says
is as under:

19
"If   the   fine   is   imposed   in   a   case
which   is   subject   to   appeal,   no   such
payment   shall   be   made   before   the
period   allowed   for   presenting   the
appeal   has   elapsed,   or,   if   an   appeal
be   presented,   before   the   decision   of
the appeal".
Nowhere   it   says   that   the   Court   of   Appeal,
while   suspending   sentence   imposed   on   an
accused,   cannot   impose   a   condition   of
depositing   a  part  of   fine  amount.  It  is  true
that   as   per   the   decision   relied   on   for   the
petitioners,   stay   engrafted   under   the   said
provision   of   law   equally   applies   to   the
compensation granted under Sub­section (3) of
Section   357   of   the   Code,   but   it   cannot   be
taken   to   hold   or   read   that   the   Appellate
Court   cannot   pass   a   conditional   order   for
suspending a sentence.
9.   According   to   me,   the   word   "payment"   found
in   Section   357(2)   of   the   Cr.   P.C.,   does   not
refer   to   the   'deposit'   of   compensation   or
fine   amount   by   an   accused   in   pursuance   of   an
order   passed   by   Appellate   Court   while
suspending   sentence   imposed   on   an   accused
since,   to   my   mind,   the   word   "payment"   refers
to   payment   to   be   made   to   the   person,   who   is
ordered   to   be   paid   compensation   and   not   the
fine   amount,   inclusive   of   compensation   amount
to   be   'deposited'   by   accused.   The   stay
engrafted   into   the   said   provision   of   law   is
with   reference   to   the   'payment'   of   such
amount   earlier   to   the   expiry   of   the   appeal
period   or,   where   appeal   has   been   preferred,
during   the   pendency   of   such   appeal.   So,
Section   357   need   not   and   cannot   be   read   with
Section   389   of   the   Cr.   P.C.   In   fact,   neither
the   petitioners/appellants   applied   for,   nor
the Appellate Court ordered suspension of the
sentence   relating   to   compensation   of   Rs.   16
lakhs   only.   On   the   other   hand,   when   the
suspension   of   impugned   sentence   passed
against   them   is   seen   with   the   power   given   to
the   Appellate   Court   under   Section   389   of   the

20
Cr.   P.C.,   besides   the   ambit   or   scope   of
Section   357   of   the   Cr.   P.C.,   there   will   not
be any difficulty in holding that there is no
error   of   record   or   infirmity   or   irregularity
or illegality in the impugned order passed by
the Court of Sessions suspending the sentence
on   condition   of   depositing   20%   of   the   total
fine amount imposed on them (petitioners).
10.   In   this   view   of   the   matter,   neither
Section   357(2)   of   the   Cr.   P.C.   nor   the
decision   relied   on   for   the   petitioners   is   of
any help to the petitioners.“
27. Learned   Counsel   for   the   appellant   has   relied   on   three
judgments of High Courts, one of Punjab and Haryana High Court
and   two   judgments   of   Patna   High   Court   in   support   of   his
submissions. We need to refer to above judgments relied by the
learned   counsel   for   the   appellant.   The   first   judgment   is
judgment   of   Punjab   and   Haryana   High   Court   reported   in   2006
(3) PLR 194, Kedar Nath versus State of Haryana.   In the above
case,   the   petitioner   was   convicted   for   offence   under   Section
138   of   the   Negotiable   Instruments   Act,   1881   for   dishonour   of
several cheques amounting to Rs.1,50,000/­. The petitioner was
sentenced   to   undergo   rigorous   imprisonment   for   period   of   one
year   and   to   pay   a   fine   of   Rs.3,00,000/­.   It   was   also   ordered
that   out   of   fine   of   Rs.3,00,000/­,   a   sum   of   Rs.2,50,000/­be
given to the complainant as compensation. An appeal was filed
where Appellate Court suspended the sentence on the condition

21
that petitioner will deposit an amount of Rs.1,50,000/­ before
the trial court. The aforesaid condition was challenged by the
petitioner   in   the   High   Court.   It   was   submitted   that   in
accordance with Section 357 sub­section (2) Cr.P.C. petitioner
was   not   liable   to   pay   any   amount   of   fine.   The   High   Court
accepted the submission relying on Section 357 sub­section (2)
Cr.P.C.. In paragraph 8 of the judgment, following was held:
“8. Against the judgment  of conviction and  order  to
sentence, an appeal was preferred by the petitioner,
which was admitted for hearing. While suspending the
sentence,   the   Appellate   Court   imposed   a   condition
for depositing an amount of Rs.1,50,000/­ out of the
amount   of   fine   of   Rs.3   lacs   imposed   by   the   trial
Court.   In   my   opinion,   by   imposing   the   said
condition,   the   petitioner   was   compelled   to   pay   the
amount   of   fine,   which   according   to   sub­section   (2)
of Section 357 Cr.P.C., the accused is not liable to
pay   till   the   final   adjudication   of   the   appeal.
Merely   because   out   of   the   amount   of   fine   of   Rs.3
lacs,   Rs.2,50,000/­   was   ordered   to   be   paid   to   the
complainant as compensation, in my opinion, does not
change the nature of fine. The judgment of the trial
court   is   very   clear   that   a   fine   of   Rs.3   lacs   was
imposed   along   with   the   sentence   of   one   year.   The
facts   of   this   case   are   squarely   covered   by   the
decision   of   the   this   Court   in   Sabita   Behl’s
case(supra).   Thus,   in   my   opinion,   the   Appellate
Court   was   not   justified  while   imposing   the   impugned
condition   directing   the   petitioner   to   deposit   an
amount   of   Rs.1,50,000/­   before   the   trial   Court   at
the time of furnishing the bail bonds in view of the
order   of   suspension   of   sentence   passed   by   the
Appellate Court.”
28. The   above   case   is   clearly   distinguishable   from   the
present   case.   In   the   above   case,   there   was   direction   within

22
the   meaning   of   Section   357   sub­section   (1)   (b)   Cr.P.C.   for
payment   of   compensation.   Hence   Section   357   sub­section   (2)
Cr.P.C.   was   relied   by   the   Court.   Present   is   not   a   case   of
payment of any compensation out of fine imposed on appellant.
Thus, the above case in no manner helps the appellant.
29. Now   we   come   to   the   second   case   relied   by   the   appellant
i.e.   Division   Bench   Judgment   of   Patna   High   court   in   Bharat
Mandal   son   of   Sitaram   Mandal   &   Ors.   Vs.   The   State   of   Bihar,
2012   (2)   PLJR   855.   In   the   above   case   accused   were   convicted
under   Section   307/149   IPC   and   Section   27   of   the   Arms   Act.
They   were   sentenced   for   life   imprisonment   and   further
directed   to   pay   a   fine   of   Rs.20,000/­   each.   The   appeal   was
filed   in   which   the   Appellate   Court   declined   to   stay   the
payment of fine. The appellant pressed for stay of payment of
fine   which   was   considered   by   the   High   Court.   High   Court
relied   on   Section   357   sub­section   (2)   Cr.P.C.   and   accepted
the   submission   of   the   appellant   that   the   fine   was   not   to   be
paid. Following was held in paragraph 7:
“7.   The   argument   of   Mr.   Yogesh   Chandra   Verma,
learned counsel for the appellant is based squarely
upon   the   literal   interpretation   from   the   Section.
In   our   view,   the   submission   as   made   by   Sri   Verma
has   to   be   accepted.   On   the   plain   reading   of
sub­section   (2)   of   Section   357   of   the   Code   of
Criminal Procedure we find that there is absolutely
no   ambiguity   in   the   provision   as   engrafted   by   the

23
legislature, it clearly stipulates firstly, that no
such   payment   shall   be   made   before   the   period
allowed   for   presenting   the   appeal   has   elapsed.
Thus, this stops any  court  from enforcing payment,
for   the   period   in   which   appeal   could   be   filed.   It
then   secondly   provides   that   the   stay   of   action   of
realization or payment  would  continue if  an appeal
is   presented   till   the   decision   of   the   appeal.
“Decision of the Appeal” would only mean the final
judgment   in   the   appeal   and   not   any   order   at   any
interlocutory   stage   because   that   would   not   be   the
decision of the appeal. Thus, on the plain reading
of Section 357(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure
a   fine   imposed,   would   automatically   get   stayed
firstly   for   the   period   which   is   available   to   file
appeal   and   once   the   appeal   is   filed   then   till   the
decision of the appeal. That is the mandate of the
legislature   itself,   clear   and   unambiguous.   The
situation   would   be   different,   if   instead   of
awarding   fine,   in   terms   of   Section   357(3)   of   the
Code   of   Criminal   Procedure   compensation   only   is
awarded.   In   such   a   case,   the   appellate   court   has
judicial   discretion   to   stay   or,   not   to   stay   the
compensation so awarded depending upon the facts of
the case under consideration.”
30. From the facts noticed by the High Court it is not clear
as  to  whether  the  amount  of fine  Rs.20,000/­  was  directed  to
be paid to the victim. No such facts have been noticed in the
judgment.   If   there   was   no   direction   to   pay   any   compensation
out   of   the   fine   imposed   the   facts   of   the   said   case   are
similar   to   the   case   in   hand.   We   have   taken   the   view   that   if
there   is   no   direction   to   pay   any   compensation   out   of   fine
imposed,   Section   357(2)   Cr.P.C.   is   not   attracted.   We   are   of
the   view   that   the   High   Court's   observation   that   in   view   of
Section   357   sub­section   (2)   of   Cr.P.C.   the   realisation   of

24
fine   would   automatically   get   stayed   does   not   take   into
consideration the distinction in a case where fine is part of
sentence  and  there  is  direction to  pay  compensation and in  a
case where there is no direction to pay any compensation. 
31. The   third   case   relied   by   the   learned   Counsel   for   the
appellant   is   again   a   Division   Bench   Judgment   of   Patna   High
Court   in   Criminal   Appeal   (DB)   No.529   of   2012,   Naresh   Yadav@
Naresh   Mahto   &   Ors.   Vs.   The   State   of   Bihar,   decided   on
26.06.2012.   The   Judgment   of   Patna   High   Court   has   been   placed
on record along with the short submissions of learned counsel
for   the   appellant.   A   perusal   of   the   judgment     indicate   that
Patna   High   Court   has   not   noticed   the   facts   of   the   case   and
the   nature   of   Order   passed   by   the   trial   Court   regarding
imposition   of   fine.   The   applicant   prayed   for   modification   of
Order of the High Court by which the direction was issued for
depositing   the   fine.   Section   357   sub­section   (2)   Cr.P.C.   was
relied   and   the   Division   Bench   relying   on   earlier   judgment   of
Patna High Court in   Bharat Mandal & Ors. (Supra)  modified the
last   paragraph   of   the   Order   dated   04.06.2012   providing   that
the fine imposed shall remain stayed till the decision of the
case. The above judgment relies only on   Bharat Mandal & Ors.
which  has  already  been  noted  above  by  us  hence  this judgment
also does not help the appellant.

25
32. The   object   and   purpose   of   Section   357   Cr.P.C.   was
considered by this Court in   Hari Singh vs. Sukhbir Singh and
others,   (1988)   4   SCC   551.   This   Court   held   that   the   power
given   to   the   Court   to   direct   for   payment   of   compensation   is
intended   to   do   something   for   the   victim.   The   provision   was
held   to   be   a   step     forward   in   our   criminal   justice   system.
Following were the observations made in paragraph 10:
"10...It   empowers   the   court   to   award
compensation   to   victims   while   passing
judgment   of   conviction.   In   addition   to
conviction,   the   court   may   order   the   accused
to   pay   some   amount   by   way   of   compensation   to
victim   who   has   suffered   by   the   action   of
accused.   It   may   be   noted   that   this   power   of
courts to award compensation is not ancillary
to   other   sentences   but   it   is   in   addition
thereto.   This   power   was   intended   to   do
something   to   reassure   the   victim   that   he   or
she   is   not   forgotten   in   the   criminal   justice
system.   It   is   a   measure   of   responding
appropriately to crime as well of reconciling
the   victim   with   the   offender.   It   is,   to   some
extent, a constructive approach to crimes. It
is   indeed   a   step   forward   in   our   criminal
justice   system.   We,   therefore,   recommend   to
all   courts   to   exercise   this   power   liberally
so as to meet the ends of justice in a better
way.”
33. What   is   the   purpose   and   object   of   sub­Section   (2)   of
section   357   Cr.P.C.?   Section   357(1)   Cr.P.C.   contemplated
utilisation   of   fine   imposed   in   certain   circumstances   as
compensation   to   be   paid   to   victim.   Sub­section   (2)   engrafted

26
an embargo that such payment shall not be made till the period
allowed for appeal has elapsed or if the appeal is filed, till
the   same   is   decided.   Legislature   was   conscious   that
compensation   paid   if   utilised,   there   may   not   be   appropriate
measures   to   recover   the   said   amount   utilised   from   victim   to
whom   the   compensation   is   paid   hence   embargo   in   payment   has
been   engrafted   in   sub­section   (2).     Thus   at   best   sub­section
(2)   of   Section   357   Cr.P.C.   is   a   provision   which   differs   or
withholds   the   utilisation   of   the   amount   of   compensation
awarded till the limitation of appeal elapses or if filed till
it is decided.   The provision in no manner stays the sentence
of   fine   during   the   pendency   of   the   appeal.   The   purpose   for
which sub­section (2) of Section 357 Cr.P.C. has been enacted
is different as noted above and it never contemplates as stay
of sentence of fine imposed on accused.
34. We,   however,   make   it   clear   that   Appellate   Court   while
exercising   power   under   Section   389   Cr.P.C.   can   suspend   the
sentence   of   imprisonment   as   well   as   of   fine   without   any
condition   or   with   conditions.   There   are   no   fetters   on   the
power   of   the   Appellate   Court   while   exercising   jurisdiction
under   Section   389   Cr.P.C..   The   Appellate   Court   could   have
suspended   the   sentence   and   fine   both   or   could   have   directed
for deposit of fine or part of fine.

27
35. Learned   counsel   for   the   appellant   has   also   relied   on   the
judgment   of   this   Court   in   K.C.   Sareen   vs.   C.B.I.   Chandigarh,
(2001)   6   SCC   584,   where   this   Court   has   made   the   following
observation:
"No doubt when the appellate court admits
the   appeal   filed   in   challenge   of   the
conviction and sentence for the offence under
the   PC   Act,   the   superior   court   should
normally   suspend   the   sentence   of   imprisonment
until disposal of the appeal, because refusal
thereof   would   render   the   very   appeal   otiose
unless   such   appeal   could   be   heard   soon   after
the filing of the appeal.”
36. The   above   observation   was   made   by   this   Court   in   the
context of suspension of sentence of imprisonment. The present
is   not   a   case   where   question   of   suspension   of   sentence   of
imprisonment   is   involved   rather   Appellate   Court   has   already
suspended   the   sentence   of   imprisonment.   The   above   case   also
thus   does   not   help   the   appellant   in   the   facts   of   the   present
case. 
37. In   view   of   the   foregoing   discussion,   we   are   of   the   view
that   Section   357(2)   Cr.P.C.   was   not   attracted   in   the   present
case   since   there   was   no   direction   of   payment   of   any
compensation   out   of   the   fine   imposed   by   the   trial   court   as
part of sentence. Section 357 Cr.P.C.(2) comes into play only
where any order of payment of compensation utilising the fine
imposed   as   sentence   under   Section   357(1)   Cr.P.C.   or

28
compensation as directed under Section 357(3) Cr.P.C. is made.
Present   being   neither   a   case   of   Section   357(1)   Cr.P.C.   nor
Section   357(3),   sub­section(2)   of   Section   357   Cr.P.C.   is
clearly   not   applicable   and   the   submissions   raised   by   the
learned   counsel   for   the   appellant   are   without   any   substance.
We,   thus,   do   not   find   any   infirmity   in   the   impugned   order   of
the High Court where the High Court has directed the appellant
to deposit the fine awarded by the trial court. In the result,
the appeal is dismissed.
...............................J.
( A.K. SIKRI )
...............................J.
( ASHOK BHUSHAN )
NEW DELHI,
MARCH 23, 2018.