2018 INSC 0166
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REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO................OF 2018
(ARISING OUT OF SLP(C)NO.11067 OF 2017)
SITA RAM BHAMA                       … PETITIONER 
VERSUS
RAMVATAR BHAMA           … RESPONDENT
J U D G M E N T
ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.
The   appellant,   who   was   plaintiff   in   Civil   Suit   No.4   of
2011,   has   filed   this   appeal   questioning   the   judgment   of   the
High   Court   of   Judicature   for   Rajasthan   at   Jodhpur   dated
23.01.2017   by   which   writ   petition   filed   by   the   appellant
against the order dated 03.03.2015 of the Additional District
Judge has been dismissed.
2. Brief   facts   of   the   case   which   are   necessary   to   be   noted
for deciding this appeal are:
We   shall   refer   the   parties   as   described   in   the   plaint.
Plaintiff and respondent are real brothers being sons of late

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Devi   Dutt   Ji   Verma.   Plaintiff's   case   is   that   his   father   Devi
Dutt   Verma   on   25.10.1992   decided   to   divide   his   self­acquired
movable   and   immovable   properties   between   plaintiff   and
defendant.   The   late   father,   however,   did   not   execute   any
settlement   deed.   Devi   Dutt   Verma   died   on   10.09.1993   and
thereafter   on   09.09.1994   plaintiff   and   defendant   recorded   a
memorandum of settlement as decided by their father regarding
his self­acquired properties. The memorandum of settlement was
signed by mother of the parties as well two sisters had signed
as   witnesses.   According   to   memorandum   of   settlement   both
residential   house   as   well   as   shop   in   the   Aguna   Bazar   were
distributed as decided by their late father. 
3. A   Civil   Suit   No.5   of   2010   was   filed   by   the   plaintiff
praying for partition of the residential house as well as the
shop.   In   the   suit   an   application   under   Order   VII   Rule   11   of
the Civil Procedure Code was filed by the defendant, Ramvatar
Bhama taking the plea that on 25.10.1992 during the life time
of   Shri   Devi   Dutt   Verma,   the   father   of   the   plaintiff   and
defendant,   had   partitioned   the   house   and   the   shop.   Southern
portion   of   the   house   came   in   the   share   of   the   plaintiff   and
northern   part   came   in   the   share   of   the   defendant.   In
confirmation   of   the   earlier   partition   dated   25.10.1992   the

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family   settlement   dated   09.09.1994   was   executed   which   was
signed   by   the   plaintiff   and   defendant   along   with   both   the
sisters     as   well   as   mother.   It   was   pleaded   by   the   defendant,
in   view   of   the   aforesaid,   that   there   was   no   cause   of   action
for   the   plaintiff   to   file   a   partition   suit.   Defendant   prayed
that suit of the plaintiff is liable to be dismissed.
4. The   trial   court   vide   its   order   dated   19.01.2011   allowed
the application filed by the defendant under Order VII Rule 11
CPC   and   dismissed   the   suit   for   want   of   cause   of   action   in
favour of the plaintiff. The civil court accepted the case of
the defendant that the parties which were in joint family have
been   divided,   there   being   nothing   joint   between   the   parties,
there   is   no   cause   of   action   for   the   plaintiff   for   filing   the
suit   for   partition.   The   relief   for   permanent   injunction   was
also held to be related to the partition.
5. Another   Civil   Suit   No.4   of   2011   was   filed   by   the
plaintiff claiming that after dismissal of the earlier suit of
the plaintiff on 19.01.2011, defendant broke open the lock of
the   house   and   took   possession   of   the   house.   Plaintiff   prayed
for   decree   of   possession   against   the   defendant   as   well   as
decree   of   permanent   injunction.   Plaintiff   also   sought   for

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mesne profit and expenses.
6. In   the   suit,   plaintiff   has   filed   the   document   dated
09.09.1994   evidencing   family   settlement   which   was   claimed   by
the   plaintiff   as   memorandum   of   settlement.   An   application
under   Order   XIII   Rule   3   CPC   and   Article   45   and   Section   35   of
the   Indian   Stamp   Act   and   Sections   17   and   49   of   the   Indian
Registration   Act,   was   filed   by   the   defendant   claiming   that
document dated 09.09.1994 being not a registered document and
being not properly stamped is not admissible in evidence, same
may be rejected. The application was replied by the plaintiff.
The   trial   court   vide   its   order   dated   03.03.2015   allowed   the
application   of   the   defendant   holding   that   the   document   dated
09.09.1994   is   a   family   settlement   deed   and   a   relinquishment
document   which   is   not   admissible   as   evidence   being
inadequately   stamped   and   not   being   registered.   Against   the
said   order   dated   03.03.2015   writ   petition   was   filed   by   the
plaintiff which was dismissed by the High Court upholding the
order   of   the   trial   court.   The   High   Court   also   took   the   view
that   so   called   family   settlement   takes   away   the   share   of   the
sisters   and   mother,   therefore,   the   same   was   compulsorily
registrable.   Aggrieved   by   the   said   order,   the   plaintiff   has
come up in this appeal.

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7. Shri   Ajit   Kumar   Sinha,   learned   senior   counsel,   appearing
for   the   appellant   submits   that   document   dated   09.09.1994   is
only a memorandum of partition which took place on 25.10.1992
when   father   of   the   parties   had   partitioned   the   house   and   the
shop. The memorandum of family settlement is not compulsorily
registrable. The document itself being not a family settlement
rather   only   a   memorandum   ought   to   have   been   accepted   by   the
trial court. He further submits that in the earlier suit filed
by   the   plaintiff   being   Suit   No.5   of   2010,   the   suit   was
dismissed   under   Order   VII   Rule   11   CPC   on   the   plea   of   the
defendant   that   the   partition   has   already   taken   place   between
the   parties   as   claimed   by   the   plaintiff,   hence,     no   cause   of
action has arisen for filing a suit for partition. He submits
that   partition   effected   by   the   father   of   the   parties   on
25.10.1992   which   was   subsequently   recorded   on   09.09.1994
having   already   been   accepted,   it   is   not   open   for   trial   court
to   reject   the   document   dated   09.09.1994   for   being   taken   in
evidence. It is submitted that by order of the court below the
plaintiff has become remedy­less.
8. Learned   counsel   for   the   respondent   refuting   the
submission   of   the   learned   counsel   for   the   appellant   contends
that   the   trial   court   as   well   as   the   High   Court   has   rightly

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come   to   the   conclusion   that   document   dated   09.09.1994   was
compulsorily registrable. It being neither registered nor duly
stamped   has   rightly   been   rejected   by   the   trial   court   from
being   taken   in   evidence.   He   submits   that   the   High   Court   has
rightly dismissed the writ petition filed by the plaintiff.
9. We   have   considered   the   submissions   of   the   parties   and
perused the records.
10. The   only   question   which   needs   to   be   considered   in   the
present case is as to whether document dated 09.09.1994 could
have   been   accepted   by   the   trial   court   in   evidence   or   trial
court   has   rightly   held   the   said   document   inadmissible.   The
plaintiff  claimed  the  document  dated  09.09.1994  as   memorandum
of   family   settlement.   Plaintiff's   case   is   that   earlier
partition   took   place   in   the   life   time   of   the   father   of   the
parties   on   25.10.1992   which   was   recorded   as   memorandum   of
family   settlement   on   09.09.1994.   There   are   more   than   one
reasons   due   to   which   we   are   of   the   view   that   the   document
dated 09.09.1994 was not mere memorandum of family settlement
rather a family settlement itself. Firstly, on 25.10.1992, the
father of the parties was himself owner of both, the residence
and   shop   being   self­acquired   properties   of   Devi   Dutt   Verma.
The  High Court has rightly held that the said document cannot
be   said  to   be  a  Will,  so  that  father  could  have  made   Will  in

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favour   of   his   two   sons,   plaintiff   and   defendant.   Neither   the
plaintiff   nor   defendant   had   any   share   in   the   property   on   the
day   when   it   is   said   to   have   been   partitioned   by   Devi   Dutt
Verma.   Devi   Dutt   Verma   died   on   10.09.1993.   After   his   death
plaintiff,   defendant   and   their   mother   as   well   as   sisters
become   the   legal   heirs   under   Hindu   Succession   Act,   1955
inheriting   the   property   being   a   class   I   heir.   The   document
dated 09.09.1994 divided the entire property between plaintiff
and   defendant   which   document   is   also   claimed   to   be   signed   by
their   mother   as   well   as   the   sisters.   In   any   view   of   the
matter,   there   is   relinquishment   of   the   rights   of   other   heirs
of   the   properties,   hence,   courts   below   are   right   in   their
conclusion that there being relinquishment, the document dated
09.09.1994   was   compulsorily   registrable   under   Section   17   of
the Registration Act.
11. Pertaining   to   family   settlement,   a   memorandum   of   family
settlement and its necessity of registration, the law has been
settled   by   this   Court.   It   is   sufficient   to   refer   to   the
judgment of this Court in   Kale and others vs. Deputy Director
of   Consolidation   and   others,   (1976)   3   SCC   119.   T he
propositions   with   regard   to   family   settlement,   its
registration were laid down by this Court in paragraphs 10 and
11:

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“10.  In other words to put the binding effect
and   the   essentials   of   a   family   settlement   in   a
concretised   form,   the   matter   may   be   reduced
into the form of the following propositions:
( 1 ) The family settlement must be a bona fide
one   so   as   to   resolve   family   disputes   and   rival
claims   by   a   fair   and   equitable   division   or
allotment   of   properties   between   the   various
members of the family;
( 2 ) The said settlement must be voluntary and
should   not   be   induced   by   fraud,   coercion   or
undue influence;
( 3 )   The   family   arrangement   may   be   even   oral
in which case no registration is necessary;
( 4 )   It   is   well   settled   that   registration
would   be   necessary   only   if   the   terms   of   the
family   arrangement   are   reduced   into   writing.
Here also, a distinction should be made between
a document containing the terms and recitals of
a   family   arrangement   made   under   the   document
and a mere memorandum prepared after the family
arrangement   had   already   been   made   either   for
the purpose of the record or for information of
the   court   for   making   necessary   mutation.   In
such   a   case   the   memorandum   itself   does   not
create   or   extinguish   any   rights   in   immovable
properties   and   therefore   does   not   fall   within
the   mischief   of   Section   17(2)   of   the
Registration   Act   and   is,   therefore,   not
compulsorily registrable;
( 5 )   The   members   who   may   be   parties   to   the
family   arrangement   must   have   some   antecedent
title,   claim   or   interest   even   a   possible   claim
in   the   property   which   is   acknowledged   by   the
parties   to   the   settlement.   Even   if   one   of   the
parties   to   the   settlement   has   no   title   but
under   the   arrangement   the   other   party
relinquishes all its claims or titles in favour
of such a person and acknowledges him to be the
sole   owner,   then   the   antecedent   title   must   be
assumed   and   the   family   arrangement   will   be

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upheld   and   the   courts   will   find   no   difficulty
in giving assent to the same;
( 6 )   Even   if   bona   fide   disputes,   present   or
possible,   which   may   not   involve   legal   claims
are   settled   by   a   bona   fide   family   arrangement
which   is   fair   and   equitable   the   family
arrangement is final and binding on the parties
to the settlement.
11.   The   principles   indicated   above   have   been
clearly enunciated and adroitly adumbrated in a
long   course   of   decisions   of   this   Court   as   also
those   of   the   Privy   Council   and   other   High
Courts, which we shall discuss presently.”
12. We   are,   thus,   in   full   agreement   with   the   view   taken   by
the   trial   court   as   well   as   the   High   Court   that   the   document
dated   09.09.1994   was   compulsorily   registrable.   The   document
also   being   not   stamped   could   not   have   been   accepted   in
evidence   and   order   of   trial   court   allowing   the   application
under Order XII Rule 3 CPC and the reasons given by the trial
court   in   allowing   the   application     of   the   defendant   holding
the document as inadmissible cannot be faulted.
13. There   is   only   one   aspect   of   the   matter   which   needs
consideration,   i.e.,   whether   the   document   dated   09.09.1994
which   was   inadmissible   in   evidence   could   have   been   used   for
any   collateral   purpose.   In   a   suit   for   partition,   an
unregistered   document   can   be   relied   upon   for   collateral
purpose   i.e.   severancy   of   title,   nature   of   possession   of

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various   shares   but   not   for   the   primary   purpose   i.e.   division
of joint properties by metes and bounds. Further, an unstamped
instrument   is   not   admissible   in   evidence   even   for   collateral
purpose,   until   the   same   is   impounded.   A   two­Judge   Bench
judgment   of   this   Court   in   Yellapu   Uma   Maheswari   and   another
vs. Buddha Jagadheeswararao and others, (2015) 16 SCC 787,   is
appropriate. In the above case also admissibility of documents
Ext. B­21 dated 05.06.1975 a deed of memorandum and Ext. B­22
dated   04.06.1975   being   an   agreement   between   one   late
Mahalakshamma,   respondent   No.1­plaintiff   and   appellant
No.1­defendant   came   for   consideration.   Objection   was   taken
regarding   admissibility   which   was   upheld   both   by   the   High
Court   and   trial   court.   Matter   was   taken   up   by   this   Court.   In
the above case, this Court held that the nomenclature given to
the   document   is   not   decisive   factor   but   the   nature   and
substance   of   the   transaction   has   to   be   determined   with
reference   to   the   terms   of   the   documents.   This   Court   after
considering   both   the   documents,   B­21   and   B­22   held   that   they
require registration. In paragraph 15 following was held:
“15.  It is well settled that the nomenclature
given   to   the   document   is   not   decisive   factor
but the nature and substance of the transaction
has   to   be   determined   with   reference   to   the
terms   of   the   documents   and   that   the
admissibility   of   a   document   is   entirely
dependent   upon   the   recitals   contained   in   that
document   but   not   on   the   basis   of   the   pleadings

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set  up  by  the  party  who  seeks  to   introduce   the
document   in   question.   A   thorough   reading   of
both   Exts.   B­21   and   B­22   makes   it   very   clear
that   there   is   relinquishment   of   right   in
respect   of   immovable   property   through   a
document   which   is   compulsorily   registrable
document   and   if   the   same   is   not   registered,   it
becomes   an   inadmissible   document   as   envisaged
under   Section   49   of   the   Registration   Act.
Hence,   Exts.   B­21   and   B­22   are   the   documents
which squarely fall within the ambit of Section
17(1)( b )   of   the   Registration   Act   and   hence   are
compulsorily registrable documents and the same
are inadmissible in evidence for the purpose of
proving   the   factum   of   partition   between   the
parties.   We   are   of   the   considered   opinion   that
Exts.   B­21   and   B­22   are   not   admissible   in
evidence   for   the   purpose   of   proving   primary
purpose of partition.”
14. After   holding   the   said   documents   as   inadmissible,   this
Court further proceeded to consider the question as to whether
the   documents   B­21   and   B­22   can   be   used   for   any   collateral
purpose.   In   the   above   context   the   Court   accepted   the
submission   of   the   appellant   that   the   documents   can   be   looked
into   for   collateral   purpose   provided   appellant­defendant   to
pay the stamp duty together with penalty and get the document
impounded.   In   paragraphs   16   and   17   following   has   been   laid
down:
“16.   Then   the   next   question   that   falls   for
consideration   is   whether   these   can   be   used   for
any collateral purpose. The larger Bench of the
Andhra Pradesh High Court in   Chinnappareddigari
Peda   Mutyala   Reddy   v.   Chinnappareddigari
Venkata   Reddy (AIR   1969   AP   242)
  has   held   that

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the   whole   process   of   partition   contemplates
three phases i.e. severancy of status, division
of   joint   property   by   metes   and   bounds   and
nature   of   possession   of   various   shares.   In   a
suit   for   partition,   an   unregistered   document
can   be   relied   upon   for   collateral   purpose   i.e.
severancy   of   title,   nature   of   possession   of
various   shares   but   not   for   the   primary   purpose
i.e.   division   of   joint   properties   by   metes   and
bounds.   An   unstamped   instrument   is   not
admissible   in   evidence   even   for   collateral
purpose, until the same is impounded. Hence, if
the   appellant­defendant   want   to   mark   these
documents for collateral purpose it is open for
them   to   pay   the   stamp   duty   together   with
penalty   and   get   the   document   impounded   and   the
trial   court   is   at   liberty   to   mark   Exts.   B­21
and   B­22   for   collateral   purpose   subject   to
proof and relevance.
17.   Accordingly,   the   civil   appeal   is   partly
allowed   holding   that   Exts.   B­21   and   B­22   are
admissible   in   evidence   for   collateral   purpose
subject   to   payment   of   stamp   duty,   penalty,
proof and relevancy.”
15. Following   the   law   laid   down   by   this   Court   in   the   above
case, we are of the opinion that document dated 09.09.1994 may
be admissible in evidence for collateral purpose provided the
appellant get the document impounded and to pay the stamp duty
together with penalty as has been directed in the above case.
16. In   the   result,   this   appeal   is   partly   allowed   in   the
following manner:
The   order   of   the   trial   court   as   well   as   the   High   Court
holding   that   the   document   dated   09.09.1994     required

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compulsory   registration   is   upheld.   Following   the   aforesaid
view   of   this   Court   in   Yellapu   Uma   Maheswari   (supra),   this
appeal is partly allowed holding that deed dated 09.09.1994 is
admissible   in   evidence   for   collateral   purpose   subject   to
payment of stamp duty and penalty. 
...............................J.
( A.K. SIKRI )
...............................J.
( ASHOK BHUSHAN )
NEW DELHI,
MARCH 23, 2018.