2018 INSC 0541
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION [C] NO. 766 OF 2018
RAJDEEP GHOSH …  PETITIONER
VERSUS
STATE OF ASSAM  & ORS. …  RESPONDENTS
WITH
WRIT PETITION [C] NO. 795/2018
WRIT PETITION [C] NO. 831/2018
WRIT PETITION [C] NO. 768/2018
WRIT PETITION [C] NO. 763/2018 
S.L.P. [C] No. 16200/2018, 
WRIT PETITION [C] NO. 758/2018, 
WRIT PETITION [C] NO. 771/2018, 
WRIT PETITION [C] NO. 767/2018,
WRIT PETITION [C] NO. 759/2018,
WRIT PETITION [C] NO. 765/2018,
WRIT PETITION [C] NO. 760/2018,
WRIT PETITION [C] NO. 776/2018,
WRIT PETITION [C] NO. 781/2018,
WRIT PETITION [C] NO. 780/2018,
WRIT PETITION [C] NO. 813/2018,
WRIT PETITION [C] NO. 835/2018,
WRIT PETITION [C] NO. 800/2018,
WRIT PETITION [C] NO. 812/2018
AND
WRIT PETITION [C] NO. 821/2018.
J U D G M E N T
ARUN MISHRA, J.
1. The   writ   petitions   have   been   preferred   under   Article   32   of   the
Constitution   of   India   questioning   the   constitutional   validity   of   Rule
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3(1)(c)   of   the   Medical   Colleges   and   Dental   Colleges   of   Assam
(Regulations   of   Admission   into   1 st
  year   MBBS/BDS   Courses)   Rules,
2017 (in short referred to as ‘the Rules of 2017’). The petitioners have
come with the case that though State can provide for preference in the
matter of admission, however, such classification must be based upon
objective criteria and must have a rational nexus with the objective it
seeks to achieve. 
2. Rule   3   of   the   Rules   of   2017   provides   for   eligibility   for   the   State
quota seats. Same is extracted hereunder :
“Rule 3 – Eligibility for State Quota Seats:
The following conditions must be fulfilled:­
1.(a) The candidate must be a citizen of India.
(b)   The   candidate   must   be   a   permanent   citizen   of
Assam.     The   father/   mother   or   the   candidate   must
be   residing   in   the   State   of   Assam   continuously   for
not less than a period of 20 years.  (The certificate at
Annexure   –   I   in   Application   Form   at   Schedule   –   I   of
these   rules   must   be   submitted   if   a   candidate   is
called for counseling): 
Provided   that   this   shall   not   be   applicable   to   the
sons/   daughters   of   officers   of   All   India   Services
allotted to Assam (certificate regarding the service of
father/   mother   of   the   candidate   from   the   concerned
authority/department of Government of Assam must
be submitted if a candidate is called for counseling.
(c) The candidate  must study in all  the classes from
class VII to XII in the State of Assam and must pass
the   Qualifying   Examination   or   its   equivalent
examination  from  any Institute situated in the State
of   Assam.     (Certificate   at   Annexure­II   in   Application
Form   at   Schedule   –   I   of   these   rules   must   be
submitted if a candidate is called for counseling.)
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Provided   that   if   a   candidate   studies   outside   Assam
from   Class   –   VII   onwards   because   his/her   father/
mother   is   posted   outside   Assam   as   a   Assam   State
Government   Employee   or   as   a   Central   Government
employee   or   as   an   employee   of   a   Corporation/
Agency/   instrumentality   under   Government   of
Assam   or   Central   Government   whether   on
deputation   or   transfer   or   regular   posting   then   the
period   for   which   the   said   father/mother   is   working
outside   the   State   shall   be   relaxable   for   such
candidate.     (Certificate   of   employment   of
father/mother outside the State indicating the period
of   service   from   the   concerned   authority   must   be
submitted if a candidate is called for counseling.) 
(d) Candidate’s age should not be below 17 years and
above   25   years   of   age   on   the   31 st
  December   of   the
year in which the admission is sought for:
Provided that the maximum age limit is relaxable by
3   years   in   case   of   candidates   belonging   to
SC/ST(P)/ST(H)/ OBC/MOBC category.”
3. The   petitioners   have   questioned   aforesaid   Rule   3(1)(c)   which
requires that a candidate must study in all the classes from Class VII
to XII in the State of Assam and must pass the qualifying examination
or  its equivalent examination  from  any  Institute  situated  in the  State
of Assam. The exception has been carved out in case father or mother
is  posted  outside  Assam  as  an   Assam   State  Government  employee  or
Central   Government   employee   or   as   an   employee   of   a
Corporation/Agency/instrumentality under the Government of Assam
or Central Government.
4. The   petitioners   submit   that   they   have   not   passed   Class   XII.
Some of the petitioners have not passed both  Class XI and Class XII.
They   are   residents   of   the   State   of   Assam.   They   claim   that   they   have
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studied   in   Assam   for   sufficient   period.   However,   they   are   not   eligible
as per the aforesaid criteria prescribed under Rule 3(1)(c) of the Rules
of 2017.
5. The petitioners have urged that classification made is violative of
Article   14.   No   expert   study   has   been   done   so   as   to   find   out   the
candidates who have studied from Class VII to XII outside the State of
Assam are likely not to serve the State after they acquire their MBBS
degree.   In   the   absence   of   such   study   and   collection   of   material,   the
action   is   unsustainable   and   is   not   in   accordance   with   the   law   laid
down in  Dr. Jagadish Saran & Ors. v. Union of India  (1980) 2 SCC 768.
As   the   parents   of   the   petitioner   are   permanent   residents   of   State   of
Assam   and   fulfill   other   conditions   of   eligibility,   denial   of   State­quota
seats only on the ground that they have completed their class XI and
XII from outside the State of Assam, is clearly irrational, unreasonable
and   arbitrary.   The   State   Government   obtains   a   bond   agreement   to
serve   the   State   for   a   period   of   5   years   or   render   one   year   of   rural
service   on   completion   of   the   MBBS   course   and   in   case   of   breach,   to
pay a sum of Rs.30 lakhs to the Government as compensation. While
a   student   is   admitted   in   the   MBBS   course   that   would   ensure   the
incumbent would serve the State as provided in bond after passing out
MBBS. Considering the provisions contained in Rule 15 of the Rules of
2017,   the   requirement   of   study   in   educational   institution/s   in   the
State, as provided in Rule 3(1)(c) has to be construed as directory and
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not   mandatory.     The   classification   made   is   a   hostile   one   and   is   not
based   on   any   intelligible   differentia.   In   case   any   parent   is   in   the
employment   of   other   State   Government   and   is   serving   in   the   other
State   or   in   the   case   of   a   person,   his   parent   is   doing   a   private   job
outside,   could   not   have   been   discriminated   and   ought   to   have   been
kept   at   par   in   the   excepted   category   as   provided   in   Rule   3(1)(c)   as
Central Government or State Government servant. 
6. The petitioners have submitted that the admission rules framed
by  the  State Government have  undergone changes  from time  to  time.
In   the   Rules   of   2007,   Rule   3(2)(c)   provided   for   4   years   schooling   in
Assam either in (i) HSLC or (ii) HSLC and HSSLC stages combined as
an   eligibility   condition   for   appearing   in   the   qualifying   examination.
The   proviso   to   the   said   rule,   however,   relaxed   the   above   condition   in
case   the   father   or   the   mother   of   the   candidate   have   completed   their
schooling in the State for a minimum of 4 years in HSLC level.
7. Rule   3(1)   of   the   2015   Rules   provided   the   following   eligibility
conditions:
(a) The candidate must be a citizen of India.
(b)
(c) The   candidate   must   be   a   permanent   resident   of
Assam.     The   candidate   or   his/   her   father/   mother
must be residing in the State of Assam continuously
for not less than  a  period  of  20  years.    (The  original
PRC certificate at Annexure – I in Application form B
at Schedule – I of these rules must be submitted if a
candidate is called for counseling):
Provided   that   this   shall   not   be   applicable   to   the
sons/   daughters   of   officers   of   All   India   Services
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allotted to Assam (certificate regarding the service of
father/   mother   of   the   candidate   from   the   concerned
authority/   department   of   Government   of   Assam
must   be   submitted   if   a   candidate   is   called   for
counseling.)
(d) The   candidate   including   sons/   daughters   of   officers
of   All   India   Services   must   study   in   all   classes   from
class VII to XII in the State of Assam and must pass
the   Qualifying   Examination   from   the   Institutes
situated   in   the   State   of   Assam.   (Certificate   at
Annexure­II   in   Application   Form   B   at   Schedule­I   of
these   rules   must   be   submitted   if   a   candidate   is
called for counseling.)
Provided   that   if   a   candidate   studies   outside   Assam
from   Class   –   VII   onwards   because   his/   her   father/
mother   is   posted   outside   Assam   as   a   State
Government   employee   on   deputation   or   transfer   or
regular   posting   then   the   period   for   which   father/
mother   is   working   outside   the   State   shall   be
relaxable   for   such   candidate.     (Certificate   of
employment   of   father/   mother   outside   the   State
indicating the period of service must be submitted if
a candidate is called for counseling.)”
In 2016 “Rule 3(1)(c) was amended as follows:
(c)   The   candidate,   including   sons/   daughters   of
Officers   of   All   India   Services,   must   study   in   all
classes from class VI to X in the State of Assam and
must   pass   the   HSLC   or   its   equivalent   examination
conducted   by   the   Government   recognized   Board/
Council   from   any   institute   situated   in   the   State   of
Assam   (Certificate   at   Annexure­II   in   Application
Form   B   at   Schedule   –   I   of   these   rules   must   be
submitted if a candidate is called for counselling).”
8. The   petitioners   have   further   submitted   that   Rule   3(1)(c)   as
amended   in   2016,   was   questioned   before   the   Guwahati   High   Court
and it was struck down. It was  declared to be irrational  and violative
of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. The review petition was also
filed and the same was dismissed. Thereafter, Rules of 2017 have been
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enacted   prescribing   the   aforesaid   criteria   of   study   in   Rule   3(1)(c).   In
February   2018,   NEET   examination   was   conducted   on   all   India   basis
for   admission   in   any   medical   college   including   dental   colleges   and
Ayurvedic   colleges   and   the   result   of   NEET   has   been   declared.   Notice
for counseling was issued on 22.6.2018. Pursuant thereto counseling
was   held   on   29.6.2018.   As   per   the   NEET   position,   the   petitioners
claimed   that   they   were   entitled   to   admission.   However,   it   was   not
given  to  them owing  to  not fulfilling  the irrational  criteria under Rule
3(1)(c). 
9. In   the   counter   affidavit   filed   by   the   State   of   Assam   in   W.P.   [C]
No.758/2018, it was contended that in the Rules of 2007 requirement
of   4   years   of   school   education   between   6 th
  to   12 th
  standard   was
necessary   in   the   State   of   Assam.   Having   regard   to   the   level   of
backwardness,   inadequate   development,   lack   of   adequate   number   of
doctors to provide services all over the State of Assam including in the
remote   areas,   it   was   considered   to   be   quintessential   to   ensure   that
admissions   in   medical   MBBS   courses   in   the   Government   medical
colleges   do   become   available   to   bona   fide   candidates   of   Assam
belonging to the State. The rules were amended in the year 2015 and
the requirement of 6 years of schooling was introduced between 7 th
  to
12 th
  standard in the State of Assam. The other two requirements were
that   the   candidate   must   be   a   permanent   resident   of   State   of   Assam
and   the   candidate   or   his/her   father/mother   must   be   residing   in   the
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State   of   Assam   continuously   for   a   minimum   period   of   20   years.   This
amendment was notified. It was known to all concerned that there is a
requirement of undertaking the study in the schools of State of Assam.
Thus, after having taken a conscious decision to exercise their choice
to study class XI and XII, in schools outside the State of Assam, they
cannot   stake   the   claim   that   they   should   be   considered   eligible   for
admission in the MBBS course in Government colleges in the State of
Assam   as   against   State   quota   seats.   The   petitioners   do   not   fulfill   the
criteria.
10. The   amendment   of   2016   made   in   Rule   3(1)(c)   was   challenged
before   the   High   Court   of   Guwahati.   The   provisions   of   2016   were
different   and   in   the   review   application,   the   High   Court   had   observed
that   the   State   can   lay   down   any   reasonable   eligibility   criteria   of
domicile   for   admission   under   the   State   quota   seats   for   medical
courses   in   the   State   of   Assam.   It   is   contended   that  the   State   can   lay
down   the   criteria   of   institutional   preference   or   number   of   years   of
study   in   the   State.   Thereafter,   the   amendment   in   rules   has   been
made.  
11. Rules   of   2017   prescribe   6   years   of   schooling   from   Class   VII   to
Class   XII   in   the   State   of   Assam.   Other   requirements   being   that   the
candidate   must  be   a  permanent   resident   and   father/mother   must  be
residing in the State continuously for 20 years. Rule 15 provides for a
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bond   to   be   filed   containing   the   aforesaid   stipulation.   The   High   Court
has   upheld   the   validity   of   the   rule   by   judgment   dated   2.8.2017.
Special   leave   petition   was   preferred   against   the   same   judgment.
Special  leave  petition  was  disposed  of  and was not decided  on merits
as admissions already made were not to be disturbed after the lapse of
time   frame.   The   petitioners   were   fully   aware   while   they   were   taking
instructions  outside  the  State that they could not be eligible to  stake
their claim in the State quota seats in the State of Assam.   They have
not   questioned   the   rule   before   appearing   for   NEET   examination.   The
stipulation   of   pursuing   the   study   from   Class   VII   to   Class   XII   in   the
State of Assam has been provided with the object that the candidates
stay   back   in   the   State   of   Assam   after   completion   of   their   studies   to
serve   the   State   and   its   requirement.   The   stipulation   made   is
constitutionally   valid   and   is   in   the   best   interest   of   the   State.   Having
regard   to   the   limited   resources   available   at   the   State’s   disposal,   the
provision   is   constitutional   and   legal.   It   is   necessary   for   the   State   of
Assam   to   have   the   doctors   to   take   care   of   its   inhabitants   in   the   far­
flung northeast area.
12. Education   is   a  State   subject  and   one   of   the   Directive   Principles
enshrined in Part IV of the Constitution is that the State should make
effective   provisions   for   education   within   the   limits   of   its   economy.
Concession   given   to   the   residents   of   the   State   in   the   matter   of
admission is obviously calculated to serve their interest as presumably
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some   of   them   may   after   passing   out   of   the   college,   settle   down   as
doctors   and   serve   the   needs   of   the   locality.   The   classification   is
reasonable and has a correlation with the object to be achieved by the
legislation   and   is   not   amenable   to   challenge.   A   similar   stipulation   in
the case of other States has been upheld by this Court. Law has been
settled by this Court as to the MBBS/BDS courses.
13. It was submitted by learned senior and other counsel appearing
on   behalf   of   the   petitioners   that   classification   made   in   Rule   3(1)(c)   of
the Rules of 2017 is violative of Article 14, arbitrary and unreasonable.
The condition of obtaining education from Class VII to XII in the State
of   Assam   is   wholly   uncalled   for,   for   obtaining   a  better   education   and
the   students   usually   go   out   of   the   State.   The   state   could   not   have
deprived them of staking their claims against the State­quota seats in
the   medical   colleges   in   Assam.   It   was   also   urged   that   the   coaching
facilities are not available in the State of Assam, as such some of the
students   have   obtained   admission   outside,   due   to   coaching   facilities
available in other States. Thus, it could not be said to be reasonable to
impose a rider of obtaining an education of Class XI and XII in State of
Assam   only.   It   was   further   urged   that   the   parents   of   certain
candidates/petitioners   are   in   the   Government   service   of   other
adjoining   States   such   as   Arunachal   Pradesh.   Their   wards   have   also
been deprived of admission as they have obtained the education from
the   place   where   their   parents   are   staying   in   other   States.   Thus,   the
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classification   made   is   unreasonable   and   arbitrary.   It   was   also
submitted   that   distinction   could   not   have   been   made   between   the
Government employment and private employment and in case parents
are also in private employment outside the State and the students are
obtaining   education   in   other   States   where   their   parents   are   residing,
they   ought   not   to   have   been   ousted   from   the   eligibility   criteria
prescribed   in   Rules   3(1)(c).   Thus,   the   same   deserves   to   be   struck
down.  
14. Mr.   Maninder   Singh,   learned   ASG   and   Mr.   Nalin   Kohli,   learned
AAG   and   other   learned   counsel   appearing   on   behalf   of   the
respondents supported the rule. It was submitted that it was open to
the   State   Government  to   make   such   a   provision.   The   same   has   been
enacted in order to enable the students to obtain an education in the
State of Assam who are otherwise also residents of Assam and in order
to ensure that after obtaining the education, they cater to the needs of
the   State   of   Assam.   There   is   a  dearth   of   doctors.   Thus,   the   provision
could   have   been   made   providing   reservation   on   the   ground   of
residence   and   education   in   the   State,   otherwise,   the   classification
made is reasonable. Provision has been made for the employees of the
State of Assam or the Central Government employees or the employees
of   the   Corporation/agency/instrumentalities   or   who   are   posted
outside on deputation etc. The relaxation has been given to them. The
classification   of   obtaining   the   education   that   has   been   made   is
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reasonable.   Besides   that,   its   aim   has   a   rational   nexus   with   the
objective sought to be achieved by serving the populace of the State of
Assam.   The   students   who   have   obtained   education   outside   the   State
are   not   likely   to   stay   in   Assam.   The   provision   of   Rule   15   regarding
furnishing of bond requiring the MBBS students to serve the State for
5  years  or  to  pay   Rs.30  lakhs  in  case  of  default  cannot  be  said  to  be
an   adequate   safeguard,   as   such   provision   for   such   reservation   is
permissible to be made with respect to the seats of State quota. They
are   required   to   be   fulfilled   as   per   the   eligibility   criteria   prescribed   by
the Government.
15. The main question for consideration is whether the classification
that   has   been   made   in   Rule   3(1)(c)   to   the   Rules   of   2017   is
unreasonable and violative of the provisions contained in Article 14 of
the   Constitution   of   India   and   students   passing   out   or   obtaining
education   in   other   States   in   the   aforesaid   exigencies   have   been
illegally ousted from the eligibility criteria prescribed for seats of State
quota. 
16. A bare reading of Rule 3(1)(c) makes it clear that the requirement
is   multi­fold.   Firstly,   the   candidate   must   be   a   citizen   of   India,
secondly,  he/she  must be  a  permanent citizen of Assam  and for that
father/mother or the candidate must be residing in the State of Assam
continuously for not less than a period of 20 years. The exception has
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been   carved   out   with   respect   towards   of   the   employees   of   all­India
services allotted to Assam. The third requirement is that the candidate
must   study   in   all   the   classes   from   class   VII   to   XII   in   the   State   of
Assam   and   must   pass   a   qualifying   examination   equivalent   from   an
institution situated in Assam. Exception has been carved out in favour
of such candidates whose parents are posted, his/her father or mother
is   posted   outside   the   State   of   Assam   as   Assam   State   Government
employee   or   as   Central   Government   employee   or   as   the   employee   of
Corporation/Agency/instrumentality under the Government of Assam
or   Central   Government,   on   deputation,   transfer   or   regular   posting.
The   exception   has   been   given   for   the   period   father   or   mother   is
working   outside   the   State,   besides   the   eligibility   criteria   prescribing
the age of the candidate to be between 17 and 25 years. Three years’
relaxation   has   been   given   to   SC/ST(P)/ST(H)/OBC   category   in   the
maximum age limit. 
17. Before   dwelling   upon   the   rival   submissions,   it   is   appropriate   to
take note of the various decisions referred to at Bar.   In   D.P. Joshi v.
State   of   Madhya   Bharat   &   Anr .,   AIR   1955   SC   334,   the   student   who
was   a   resident   of   Madhya   Bharat   was   obtaining   an   education   in
Indore in Malwa region in a medical college. There was discrimination
with   respect   to   the   fees.   This   Court   had   observed   that   the
classification to help the students who are residents of Madhya Bharat
13

was   made   with   the   legitimate   and   laudable   objective   to   encourage
education within its borders. The Court has observed:
“15.     The   object   of   the   classification   underlying   the
impugned   rule   was   clearly   to   help   to   some   extent
students   who   are   residents   of   Madhya   Bharat   in   the
prosecution of their studies, and it cannot be disputed
that it is quite a legitimate and laudable objective for a
State   to   encourage   education   within   its   borders.
Education   is   a   State   subject,   and   one   of   the   directive
principles declared in Part IV of the Constitution is that
the   State   should   make   effective   provisions   for
education within the limits of its economy. (Vide article
41).     The   State   has   to   contribute   for   the   upkeep   and
the running of its educational institutions.
We   are   in   this   petition   concerned   with   a   Medical
College,   and   it   is   well­known   that   it   requires
considerable finance to maintain such an institution. If
the State has to spend money on it, is it unreasonable
that it should so order the educational system that the
advantage of it would to some extent at least enure for
the   benefit   of   the   State?   A   concession   given   to   the
residents of the State in the matter of fees is obviously
calculated   to   serve   that   end,   as   presumably   some   of
them   might,   after   passing   out   of   the   College,   settle
down as doctors and serve the needs of the locality.
The classification is thus based on a ground which has
a   reasonable   relation   to   the   subject­matter   of   the
legislation and is in consequence not open to attack. It
has   been   held   in   The   State   of   Punjab   v.   Ajaib   Singh
and another, AIR 1953 SC 10 (G), that a classification
might validly be made on a geographical basis. Such a
classification   would   be   eminently   just   and   reasonable,
where   it   relates   to   education   which   is   the   concern
primarily   of   the   State.   The   contention,   therefore,   that
the   rule   imposing   capitation   fee   is   in   contravention   of
article 14 must be rejected.”
18. In   Kumari N. Vasundara v. State of Mysore & Anr . 1971 (2) SCC
22,   this   Court   considered   the   Government  rules   for   admission   to   the
pre­professional course in medical college. Rule 3 of the selection rules
14

prescribed the condition of residence for 10 years. It was held that the
object of  the Rules  was  to  ensure  imparting  medical  education  to  the
best   talent   available   out   of   the   class   of   persons   who   were   likely   to
serve as doctors, the inhabitants of the State of Mysore and the same
does   not   suffer   from   the   vice   of   unreasonableness.   The   Court   had
observed:
“7.     In   D.P.   Joshi   v.   The   State   of   Madhya   Bharat   and
Anr., AIR 1955 SC 334, this Court had while upholding
by   majority   the   rules,   made   by   the   State   of   Madhya
Bharat,   for   admission   to   the   Mahatma   Gandhi
Memorial   Medical   College,   Indore,   charging   capitation
fee   from   non­Madhya   Bharat   students   laid   down   that
in   those   rules   the   word   "domicile"   was   used   in   its
popular   sense   conveying   the   idea   of   residence.
Venkatarama Ayyar. J., speaking for the majority said:
“It was also urged on behalf of the respondent
that   the   word   "domicile"   in   the   rule   might   be
construed not in its technical legal sense, but
in   a   popular   sense   as   meaning   "residence",
and   the   following   passage   in   Wharton's   Law
Lexicon, 14th Edition, page 344 was quoted as
supporting such a construction:
"By   the   term   'domicile',   in   its   ordinary
acceptation,   is   meant   the   place   where   a
person   lives   or   has   his   home.   In   this
sense, the  place where a person  has  his
actual   residence,   inhabitancy,   or
commorancy,   is   sometimes   called   his
domicile".
        In   Mcmullen   v.   Wadsworth   (1880)   14  A.C.
631,   it   was   observed   by   the   Judicial
Committee   that   "the   word   'domicil'   in   Article
63   (of   the   Civil   Code   of   Lower   Canada)   was
used   in   the   sense   of   residence,   and   did   not
refer   to   international   domicile".   What   has   to
be   considered   is   whether   in   the   present
context   "domicile"   was   used   in   the   sense   of
residence. The rule requiring the payment of a
15

capitation   fee   and   providing   for   exemption
therefrom   refers   only   to   bona   fide   residents
within   the   State.   There   is   no   reference   to
domicile   in   the   rule   itself,   but   in   the
Explanation which follows, Clauses (a) and (b)
refers   to   domicile,   and   they   occur   as   part   of
the   definition   of   "bona   fide   resident".   In
Corpus   Juris   Secundum,   Volume   28,   page   5,
it is stated:
"The   term   'bona   fide   residence'   means
the residence with domiciliary intent."
There   is,   therefore,   considerable   force   in   the
contention   of   the   respondent   that   when   the
rulemaking   authorities   referred   to   domicile   in
Clauses (a) and (b) they were thinking really of
residence.   In   this   view   also,   the   contention
that   the   rule   is   repugnant   to   Article   15(1)
must fail."
Under   the   impugned   rule,   in   that   case,   no   capitation
fee was to be charged from the students who were bona
fide   residents   of   Madhya   Bharat,   and   the   expression
"bona   fide   resident"   for   the   purpose   of   the   rule   was
defined as (to quote the relevant portion):
“one who is­
(a) a citizen of India whose original domicile is
in   Madhya   Bharat   provided   he   has   not
acquired a domicile elsewhere, or
(b) a citizen of India, whose original domicile is
not in Madhya Bharat but who has acquired a
domicile   in   Madhya   Bharat   and   has   resided
there for not less than 5 years at the date, on
which he applies for admission, or
(c)   a   person   who   migrated   from   Pakistan
before   September   30,   1948,   and   intends   to
reside in Madhya Bharat permanently, or
(d) x x x x.”
In   our   view,   the   word   "domicile"   as   used   in   Rule   3   in
the   present   case   is   also   used   to   convey   the   idea   of   an
intention to reside or remain in the State of Mysore. If
classification   based   on   residence   does   not   impinge
upon   the   principle   of   equality   enshrined   in   Article   14
as   held   by   this   Court   in   the   decision   already   cited
16

which is binding upon us, then the further condition of
the   residence   in   the   State   being   there   for   at   least   ten
years   would   also   seem   to   be   equally   valid   unless   it   is
shown   by   the   petitioner   that   selection   of   the   period   of
ten   years   makes   the   classification   so   unreasonable   as
to render it arbitrary and without any substantial basis
or   intelligible   differentia.   The   object   of   framing   the
impugned   rule   seems   to   be   to   attempt   to   impart
medical education to the best talent available out of the
class   of   persons   who   are   likely,   so   far   as   it   can
reasonably   be   foreseen,   to   serve   as   doctors,   the
inhabitants   of   the   State   of   Mysore.   It   is   true   that   it   is
not   possible   to   say   with   absolute   certainty   that   all
those   admitted   to   the   medical   colleges   would
necessarily   stay   in   Mysore   State   after   qualifying   as
doctors:   they   have   indeed   a   fundamental   right   as
citizens   to   settle   anywhere   in   India   and   they   are   also
free,   if   they   so   desire   and   can   manage,   to   go   out   of
India   for   further   studies   or   even   otherwise.   But   these
possibilities   are   permissible   and   inherent   in   our
Constitutional   set­up   and   these   considerations   cannot
adversely   affect   the   Constitutionality   of   the   otherwise
valid   rule.   The   problem   as   noticed   in   Minor   P.
Rajendran's case, (1968) 2 SCR 786 and as revealed by
a   large   number   of   cases   which   have   recently   come   to
this Court Is that the number of candidates desirous of
having   a   medical   education   is   very   much   larger   than
the   number   of   seats   available   in   medical   colleges.   The
need and demand for doctors in our country is so great
that   young   boys   and   girls   feel   that   in   medical
profession   they   can   both   get   gainful   employment   and
serve the people. The State has, therefore, to formulate
with   reasonable   foresight   a   just   scheme   of
classification   for   imparting   medical   education   to   the
available  candidates  which  would   serve  the  object and
purpose   of   providing   broad­based   medical   aid   to   the
people   of   the   State   and   provide   medical   education   to
those   who   are   best   suited   for   such   education.   Proper
classification   inspired   by   this   consideration   and
selection   on   merit   from   such   classified   groups,
therefore,   cannot   be   challenged   on   the   ground   of
inequality   violating   Article   14.   The   impugned   rule   has
not been shown by the petitioner to suffer from the vice
of  unreasonableness.  The  counter­affidavit  filed  by   the
State,   on   the   other   hand,   discloses   the   purpose   to   be
17

that of serving the interests of the residents of the State
by providing medical aid for them.
8.   The   petitioner's   argument   that   candidates   whose
parents have of necessity to remain out of Mysore State
and who have also by compelling reasons to shift their
residence frequently from one State to another without
completing   ten   years   in   any   one   State,   would   suffer
because their parents cannot afford to arrange for their
children's   residence   in   Mysore   State   for   ten   years
during   the   first   17   years   of   their   age,   merely   suggests
that   there   is   a   likelihood   of   some   cases   of   hardship
under   the   impugned   rule.   But   cases   of   hardship   are
likely  to arise in the working of almost any rule  which
may   be   framed   for   selecting   a   limited   number   of
candidates   for   admission   out   of   a   long   list.   This,
however,   would   not   render   the   rule   unconstitutional.
For   relief   against   hardship   in   the   working   of   a   valid
rule, the petitioner has to approach elsewhere because
it relates to the policy underlying the rule. Redress for
the grievance against the wide gap between the number
of   seats   in   the   medical   colleges   and   the   number   of
candidates aspiring to become doctors for earning their
own livelihood and for serving the needs of the country,
is   also   to   be   sought   elsewhere   and   not   in   this   Court,
which   is   only   concerned   with   the   constitutionality   of
the rule.”
19. In  Dr. Pradeep Jain & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors ., (1984) 3 SCC
654,   the   Court   has   observed   that   for   the   MBBS   course   residence
requirement in a particular State in the matter of admission cannot be
said to be irrational or irrelevant and neither in violation of Article 14.
The Court observed:
“19. It   will   be   noticed   from   the   above   discussion
that though intra­state discrimination between persons
resident   in   different   districts   or   regions   of   a   State   has
by   and   large   been   frowned   upon   by   the   court   and
struck down as invalid as in Minor P. Rajendran's case
(supra)   and   Perukaruppan's   case   (supra),   the   Court
has   in   D.N.   Chanchalas   case   and   other   similar   cases
up­held   institutional   reservation   effected   through
18

university   wise   distribution   of   seats   for   admission   to
medical colleges. The Court has also by its decisions in
D.P.   Joshi's   case   and   N.   Vasundhara's   case   (supra)
sustained   the   constitutional   validity   of   reservation
based   on   residence   within   a   State   for   the   purpose   of
admission to medical college. These decisions which all
relate   to   admission   to   MBBS   course   are   binding   upon
us and it is therefore not possible for us to hold, in the
face   of   these   decisions,   that   residence   requirement   in
at State for admission to MBBS course is irrational and
irrelevant and  cannot  be introduced  as a condition  for
admission without violating the mandate of equality of
opportunity   contained   in   Article   14   We   must   proceed
on the basis that at least so far as admission to MBBS
course   is   concerned,   residence   requirement   in   a   State
can   be   introduced   as   a   condition   for   admission   to   the
MBBS   course.   It   is   of   course   true   that   the   Medical
Education   Review   Committee   established   by   the
Government   of   India   has   in   its   report   recommended
after   taking   into   account   all   relevant   considerations,
that   the   "final   objective   should   be   to   ensure   that   all
admissions   to   the   MBBS   course   should   be   open   to
candidates on an All India basis without the imposition
of existing domiciliary condition", but having  regard to
the practical difficulties of transition to the stage where
admissions   to   MBBS   course   in   all   medical   colleges
would   be   on   All   India   Basis,   the   Medical   Education
Review   Committee   has   suggested   "that   to   begin   with
not less than 25 per cent seats in each institution may
be open to candidates on all India basis." We are not all
sure   whether   at   the   present   stage   it   would   be
consistent   with   the   mandate   of   equality   in   its   broader
dynamic sense to provide that admissions to the MBBS
course in all medical colleges in the country should be
on   all   India   basis.   Theoretically,   of   course,   if
admissions are given on the basis of all India national
entrance   examination,   each   individual   would   have
equal   opportunity   of   securing   admission,   but   that
would   not   take   into   account   diverse   consideration,
such   as,   differing   level   of   social,   economic   and
educational   development   of   different   regions,   disparity
in   the   number   of   seats   available   for.   admission   to   the
MBBS course in different States, difficulties which may
be experienced by students from one region who might
in   the   competition   on   all   India   basis   get   admission   to
the   MBBS   course   in   another   region   far   remote   from
19

their   own   and   other   allied   factors.   There   can   be   no
doubt   that   the   policy   of   ensuring   admissions   to   the
MBBS   course   on   all   India   basis   is   a   highly   desirable
policy, based as it is on the postulate that India is one
national   and   every   citizen   of   India   is   entitled   to   have
equal opportunity for education and advancement, but
it   is   an   ideal   to   be   aimed   at   and   it   may   not   be
realistically   possible,   in   the   present   circumstances,   to
adopt   it,   for   it   cannot   produce   real   equality   of
opportunity   unless   there   is   complete   absent   of
disparities   and   inequalities   a   situation   which   simply
does not exist in the country today. There are massive
social   and   economic   disparities   and   inequalities   not
only   between   State   and   State   but   also   between   region
and   region   within   a   state   and   even   between   citizens
and citizens within the same region. There is a yawning
gap   between   the   rich   and   the   poor   and   there   are   so
many   disabilities   and   injustices   from   which   the   poor
suffer   as   a   class   that   they   cannot   avail   themselves   of
any   opportunities   which   may   in   law   be   open   to   them.
They   do   not   have   the   social   and   material   resources   to
take   advantage   of   these   opportunities   which   remain
merely on paper recognised by law but non­existent in
fact.     Students   from   backward   States   or   regions   will
hardly   be   able   to   compete   with   those   from   advanced
States   or   regions   because,   though   possessing   an
intelligent   mind,   they   would   have   had   no   adequate
opportunities for development so as to be in a position
to   compete   with   others.   So   also   students   belonging   to
the   weaker   sections   who   have   not,   by   reason   of   their
socially   or   economically   disadvantaged   position,   been
able to secure education in good schools would be at a
disadvantage   compared   to   students   belonging   to   the
affluent or well­to­do families who have had the best of
school   education   and   in   open   All   India   Competition,
they would be likely to be worsted. There would also be
a number of students who, if they do not get admission
in   a   medical   college   near   their   residence   and   are
assigned admission in a far of college in another State
as   a   result   of   open   All   India   competition,   may   not   be
able   to   go   to   such   other   college   on   account   of   lack   of
resources and facilities and in the result, they would be
effectively   deprived   of   a   real   opportunity   for   pursuing
the   medical   course   even   though   on   paper   they   would
have   got   admission   in   medical   college.   It   would   be
tantamount   to   telling   these   students   that   they   are
20

given   an   opportunity   of   taking   up   the   medical   course,
but   if   they   cannot   afford   it   by   reason   of   the   medical
college   to   which   they   are   admitted   being   far   away   in
another   State,   it   is   their,   bad   luck:   the   State   cannot
help   it,   because   the   State   has   done   all   that   it   could,
namely,   provide   equal   opportunity   to   all   for   medical
education. But the question is whether the opportunity
provided is real or illusory? We are therefore of the view
that a certain percentage of reservation on the basis of
residence   requirement   may   legitimately   be   made   in
Order   to   equalise   opportunities   for   medical   admission
on   a   broader   basis   and   to   bring   about   real   and   not
formal,   actual   and   not   merely   legal,   equality.   The
percentage of reservation made on this count may also
include   institutional   reservation   for   students   passing
the   PUC   or   pre­medical   examination   of   the   same
university   or   clearing   the   qualifying   examination   from
the   school   system   of   the   educational   hinterland   of   the
medical   colleges   in   the   State   and   for   this   purpose,
there   should   be   no   distinction   between   schools
affiliated   to   State   Board   and   schools   affiliated   to   the
Central   Board   of   Secondary   Education,   It   would   be
constitutionally   permissible   to   provide,   as   an   interim
measure   until   we   reach   the   stage   when   we   can
consistently   with   the   broad   mandate   of   the   rule   of
equality in the larger sense ; ensure admissions to the
M.B.B.S,   course   on   the   basis   of   national   entrance
examination an ideal which we must increasingly strive
to reach for reservation of a certain percentage of seats
in   the   medical   colleges   for   students   satisfying   a
prescribed   residence   requirement   as   also   for   students
who have passed P.U.C. or pre­medical examination or
any other qualifying examination held by the university
or   the   State   and   for   this   purpose   it   should   make   no
difference   whether   the   qualifying   examination   is
conducted by the State Board or by the Central  Board
of Secondary Education, because no discrimination can
be   made   between   schools   alleviated   can   be   made
between   schools   affiliated   to   the   Central   Board   of
Secondary   Education.   We   may   point   out   that   at   the
close   of   the   arguments   we   asked   the   learned   Attorney
General to inform the court as to what was the stand of
the   Government   of   India   in   the   matter   of   such
reservation   and   the   learned   Attorney   General   in
response to the inquiry made by the Court filed a policy
21

statement which contained the following formulation of
the policy of the Government of India:
Central Government is generally opposed to
the   principle   of   reservation   based   on
domicile   or   residence   for   admission   to   an
institution   of   higher   education,   whether
professional   or   otherwise.   In   view   of   the
territorially articulated nature of the system
of   institutions   of   higher   learning   including
institutions   of   professional   education,   there
is   no   objection,   however,   to   stipulating
reservation   or   preference   for   a   reasonable
quantum   in   undergraduate   courses   for
students   hailing   from   the   school   system   of
educational   hinterland   of   the   institutions.
For   this   purpose,   there   should   be   no
distinction between school affiliated to State
Board and schools affiliated to CBSE.
We are glad to find that the policy of the Government of
India   in   the   matter   of   reservation   based   on   residence
requirement   and   institutional   preference   accords   with
the view taken by us in that behalf. We may point out
that   even   if   at   some   stage   it   is   decided   to   regulate
admissions   to   the   M.B.B.S,   course   on   the   basis   of   All
India   Entrance   Examination,   some   provision   would
have   to   be   made   for   allocation   of   seats   amongst   the
selected   candidates   on   the   basis   of   residence   or
institutional   affiliation   so   as   to   take   into   account   the
aforementioned factors." 
20. In   Anant   Madaan   v.   State   of   Haryana   and   Ors .,   (1995)   2   SCC
135,   the   Court   considered   the   validity   of   the   provision   providing
reservation   of   85%   seats   on   the   basis   of   candidate’s   education   for
preceding 3 years in the State along with the requirement of domicile.
The condition was held not to be violative of Article 14. The Court has
observed:
“4. The petitioners before the Punjab and Haryana
High   Court   had   challenged   the   eligibility   conditions   of
22

1994   insofar   as   they   require   that   candidates   should
have studied for the 10th, 11th and 12th standards as
regular   candidates   in   recognised   institutions   in
Haryana.   They   had   also   challenged   the   Corrigendum.
The   two   learned   Judges   of   the   Punjab   and   Haryana
High   Court   who   heard   these   writ   petitions   differed.
Hence the petitions were referred to a third Judge who
concurred   with   one   of   the   Judges   and   held   that   the
condition   requiring   a   candidate   to   have   studied   in   the
10th, 10+1 and 10+2 classes in recognised institutions
in   Haryana   was   valid.   The   condition   in   the
Corrigendum   which   required   an   affidavit   from   the
parent or guardian of the candidate that the candidate
was not appearing or had not appeared in the entrance
test   of   any   State   or   Union   Territory   was,   however,
struck   down   as   arbitrary   and   unreasonable.   In   the
present   appeals,   however,   we   are   not   concerned   with
the Corrigendum.
*** *** ***
8.   In   view   of   the   above   facts,   we   have   to   consider
whether   the   condition   requiring   a   candidate   to   have
studied in 10th, 10+1 and 10+2 classes in a recognised
institution   in   the   State   of   Haryana,   can   be   considered
as   arbitrary   or   unreasonable.   It   is   by   now   well   settled
that preference in admissions on the basis of residence,
as   well   as   institutional   preference,     is   permissible   so
long   as   there   is   no   total   reservation   on   the   basis   of
residential or institutional preference. As far back as in
1955, in the case of D.P. Joshi v. The State of Madhya
Bharat and Anr., AIR 1955 SC 334, this Court, making
a distinction between the place of birth  and residence,
upheld   a   preference   on   the   basis   of   residence,   in
educational institutions.
9. In the case of   Jagadish Saran (Dr) v. Union of India ,
(1980)   2   SCR   831,   this   Court   reiterated   that   regional
preference or  preference  on  the ground  of  residence  in
granting   admission   to   medical   colleges   was   not
arbitrary   or   unreasonable   so   long   as   it   was   not   a
wholesale reservation on this basis. This Court referred
to   various   reasons   why   such   preference   may   be
required.   For   example,   the   residents   of   a   particular
region   may   have   very   limited   opportunities   for
technical  education while  the region may  require  such
technically   qualified   persons.   Candidates   who   were
residents   of   that   region   were   more   likely   to   remain   in
23

the region and serve their region if they were preferred
for   admission   to   technical   institutions   in   the   State,
particularly   medical   colleges.   A   State   which   was   short
of   medical   personnel   would   be   justified   in   giving
preference   to   its   own   residents   in   medical   colleges   as
these   residents,   after   qualifying   as   doctors,   were   more
likely   to   remain   in   the   State   and   give   their   services   to
their State. The Court also observed that in the case of
women students, regional or residential preference may
be justified as their parents may not be willing to send
them   outside   the   State   for   medical   education.   We,
however,   need   not   examine   the   various   reasons   which
have   impelled   this   Court   to   uphold   residential   or
institutional   preference   for   admission   to   medical
colleges. The question is settled by the decision of this
Court   in   Pradeep   Jain   (Dr)   v.   Union   of   India,   (1984)   3
SCR   942.   This   Court   has   observed,   in   that   judgment:
(SCR p.981: SCC p.687, para 19)
“We   are,   therefore,   of   the   view   that   a   certain
percentage   of   reservation   on   the   basis   of
residence   requirement   may   legitimately   be
made   to   equalize   opportunities   for   medical
admission   on   a   broader   basis   and   to   bring
about   real   and   not   formal,   actual   and   not
merely   legal,   equality.   The   percentage   of
reservation   made   on   this   count   may   also
include   institutional   reservation   for   students
passing   the   PUC   or   pre­medical   examination
of   the   same   university   or   clearing   the
qualifying examination from the school system
of   the   educational   hinterland   of   the   medical
colleges in the State....”
This   Court   held   in   that   case   that   reservation   to   the
extent of 70% on this basis would be permissible. This
percentage   of   reservation   was   subsequently   increased
to 85% by this Court in the case of Dinesh Kumar (Dr)
v.   Motilal   Nehru   Medical   College,     (1986)   3   SCR   345.
This   Court,   in   that   case,   directed   an   entrance
examination   on   an   All   India   basis   for   the   remaining
15% of seats.
10. In the present case, the reservation which has been
made on the basis of candidates having studied for the
preceding three years in recognised schools/colleges in
Haryana is in respect of these 85% of seats. It excludes
15%   seats   which   have   to   be   filled   in   on   an.   All   India
24

basis.   This   eligibility   criterion,   therefore,   is   in
conformity   with   the   decisions   of   this   Court   referred   to
above.   It   cannot,   therefore,   be   considered   as   arbitrary
or   unreasonable   or   violative   of   Article   14   of   the
Constitution.”
21. In   Dr.   Jagadish   Saran   and   Ors.   v.   Union   of   India ,   (1980)   2   SCC
768, the question arose of the constitutionality of reservation of seats
or   quota   for   local   candidates   in   professional   courses.   Whether   it   was
in denial of equal opportunity in higher education. The Court observed
that   the   region   where   the   institution   is   situated   is   a   relevant
consideration   for   degree   courses,   but   considerations   are   different,   if
the course is on a higher level of specialty, and in case the concession
is apparently discriminatory, the burden of proof is on the respondent­
State.   Where   the   data,   facts,   and   figures   are   insufficient   the   court
would be reluctant to rule unconstitutionality and pass consequential
orders   if   its   effect   is   to   be   wide­ranging   involving   policy   matters.   The
Court has observed that ‘equal protection of the laws’ for full growth is
guaranteed,   apart   from   ‘equality   before   the   law’.     Even   so   in   our
imperfect   society,   some   objective   standards   like   common   admission
tests   are   prescribed   to   measure   merit,   without   subjective
manipulation   or   university­wise   invidiousness.   The   Court   has
observed   that   preference   can   be   given   to   the   students   of   the
University.   That   strategy   ensures   the   probability   of   their   serving   the
backward   people   for   whom   medical   courses   were   opened.   The   Court
held:
25

“20.   Again,   if   the   State   finds   that   only   students   from
the backward regions, when given medical  graduation,
will   care   to   serve   in   that   area,   drawn   towards   it   by   a
sense   of   belonging,   and   those   from   outside   will,   on
graduation,   leave   for   the   cities   or   their   own   regions,   it
may   evolve   a   policy   of   preference   or   reservation   for
students   of   that   University.   That   strategy   ensures   the
probability   of   their   serving   the   backward   people   for
whose   benefit   the   medical   courses   were   opened.   Such
measures   which   make   for   equality   of   opportunity   for
medical   education   and   medical   service   for   backward
human   sectors   may   be   constitutionalised   even   by
Articles   14   and   15.   But   it   must   be   remembered   that
exceptions   cannot   over­rule   the   rule   itself   by   running
riot or by making reservations as a matter of course, in
every   university   and   every   course.   For   instance,   you
cannot   wholly   exclude   meritorious   candidates   as   that
will promote sub­standard candidates and bring about
a fall in medical competence, injurious, in the long run,
to the very region. It is no blessing to inflict quacks and
medical   midgets   on   people   by   wholesale   sacrifice   of
talent   at   the   threshold.   Nor   can   the   very   best   be
rejected from admission because that will be a national
loss   and  the   interests  of  no   region   can  be  higher  than
those   of   the   nation.   So,   within   these   limitations,
without   going   into   excesses,   there   is   room   for   play   of
the State's policy choices.
*** *** ***
27.     The   conclusion   that   we   reach   from   this   ruling
which adverts to earlier precedents on the point is that
university­wise   preferential   treatment   may   still   be
consistent   with   the   rule   of   equality   of   opportunity
where   it   is   calculated   to   correct   an   imbalance   or
handicap and permit equality in the larger sense.
*** *** ***
32.     If   university­wise   classification   for   post­graduate
medical   education   is   shown   to   be   relevant   and
reasonable   and   the   differential   has   a   nexus   to   the
larger goal of equalisation of educational  opportunities
the vice of discrimination may not invalidate the rule.
*** *** ***
40.  Coming to brass tacks, deviation from equal marks
will meet with approval only if the essential conditions
26

set   out   above   are   fulfilled.   The   class   which   enjoys
reservation   must   be   educationally   handicapped.   The
reservation   must   be   geared   to   getting   over   the
handicap.   The   rationale   of   reservation   must   be   in   the
case   of   medical   students,   removal   of   regional   or   class
inadequacy   or   hike   disadvantage.   The   quantum   of
reservation   should   not   be   excessive   or   societally
injurious,   measured   by   the   overall   competency   of   the
end­product,   viz.   degree­holders.   A   host   of   variables
influence the quantification of the reservation. But one
factor deserves great  emphasis. The higher  the level of
the   specialty   the   lesser   the   role   of   reservation.   Such
being   the   pragmatics   and   dynamics   of   social   justice
and   equal   rights,   let  us   apply   the   tests   to   the   case   on
hand.
*** *** ***
44.     Secondly,   and   more   importantly,   it   is   difficult   to
denounce   or   renounce   the   merit   criterion   when   the
selection   is   for   post­graduate   or   post­doctoral   courses
in specialised subjects. There is no substitute for sheer
flair,   for   creative   talent,   for   fine­tuned   performance   at
the difficult heights of some disciplines where the best
alone   is   likely   to   blossom   as   the   best.   To   sympathise
mawkishly   with   the   weaker   sections   by   selecting   sub­
standard candidates is to punish society as a whole by
denying   the   prospect   of   excellence   say   in   hospital
service.   Even   the   poorest,   when   stricken   by   critical
illness, needs the attention of super­skilled specialists,
not humdrum  second­rates. So it is that relaxation on
merit, by over­ruling equality and quality altogether, is
a   social   risk   where   the   stage   is   post­graduate   or   post­
doctoral.”
22. The   Court   also   observed   that   law   is   no   absolute   logic   but   the
handmaid   of   current   social   facts   of   life.     This   Court   has   held   that
considerations   are   different   for   the   MBBS   Course   which   is   the   basic
course   and  the   selection   for   postgraduate  or   post­doctoral   courses   in
specialised subject.  It also observed that it was permissible to provide
reservation   in   basic   courses   like   MBBS   course,   but   it   would   be
27

different   if   such   reservation   is   made   for   super­skill   specialities.   The
Court   has   laid   down   such   reservation   is   permissible   in   the   basic
MBBS degree course, not postgraduate or post­doctoral courses.
23. A Constitution Bench of this Court in  Saurabh Chaudri & Ors. v.
Union   of   India   &   Ors.   (2003)   11   SCC   146   considered   the   question   of
reservation   for   postgraduate   courses   in   medical   colleges   by   providing
an   institutional   preference.   With   a   majority,   the   Court   observed   that
the expression ‘place of birth’ is  not synonymous with the expression
‘domicile’   and   they   reflect   two   different   concepts.   The   term   ‘place   of
birth’   appears   in   Article   15(1)   but   not   domicile.   The   question   of
whether   a   reservation   on   the   basis   of   domicile   is   impermissible   in
terms   of   Article   15(1),   was   answered   in   the   negative.   The   strict
scrutiny test or the intermediate scrutiny test applicable in the United
States   of   America   cannot   be   applied.   Such   a   test   is   not   applied   in
Indian courts. Such a test may be applied in a case where by reason of
a   statute   the   life   and   liberty   of   a   citizen   is   in   jeopardy.   The
constitutionality   of   a   statute   is   to   be   presumed   and   the   burden   to
prove contra is on him who asserts the thing. The courts always lean
against   a   construction   which   reduces   the   statute   to   a   futility.   A
statute   or  any  enacting  provision  therein  must  be  so  construed  as  to
make   it   effective   and   operative   on   the   principle   expressed   in   the
maxim   ut   res   magis   valeat   quam   pereat   i.e. ,   i t  is   better   for   a   thing   to
have   an   effect   than   to   be   made   void .   Even   applying   the   said   test,   it
28

was   observed   that   it   could   not   be   held   that   the   institutional
reservation   should   be   done   away   with,   having   regard   to   the   present­
day scenario. The lawmakers cannot shut their eyes to the local needs
also.   The   local   needs   must   receive   due   consideration   keeping   in   view
the duties of the State contained in Articles 41 and 47. The reservation
by institutional preference is not ultra vires Article 14. The hardship of
a   few   cannot   be   the   valid   basis   for   determining   the   validity   of   any
statute. The Court observed:
“65.   Hence,   we   may   also   notice   the   argument,
whether   institutional   reservation   fulfills   the
aforementioned criteria or not must be judged on the
following: ­
1. There is a presumption of constitutionality;
2. The burden of proof is upon the writ petitioners as
they   have   questioned   the   constitutionality   of   the
provisions;
3.   There   is   a   presumption   as   regard   the   State's
power on extent of its legislative competence;
4.   Hardship   of   few   cannot   be   the   basis   for
determining the validity of any statute.
*** *** ***
67. This   Court   may,   therefore,   notice   the
following:
(i) The State runs the Universities.
(ii)   It   has   to   spend   a   lot   of   money   in   imparting
medical education to the students of the State.
(iii)   Those   who   get   admission   in   Post   Graduate
Courses   are   also   required   to   be   paid   stipends.
Reservation   of   some   seats   to   a   reasonable   extent,
thus, would not violate the equality clause.
29

(iv)   The   criteria   for   institutional   preference   has   now
come to stay. It has worked out satisfactorily in most
of the States for last about two decades.
(v)   Even   those   States   which   defied   the   decision   of
this   Court   in   Dr.   Pradeep   Jain's   case   (supra)   had
realized the need for institutional preference.
(vi) No sufficient material has been brought on record
for   departing   from   this   well­established   admission
criteria.
(vii)   It   goes   beyond   any   cavil   of   doubt   that
institutional preference is based on a reasonable and
identifiable   classification.   It   may   be   that   while
working   out   the   percentage   of   reservation   invariably
some   local   students   will   have   preference   having
regard to the fact that domicile/residence was one of
the   criteria   for   admission   in   MBBS   Course.   But
together   with   the   local   students   15%,   students   who
had   competed   in   all   India   Entrance   Examination
would   also   be   getting   the   same   benefit.   The
percentage of students who were to get the benefit of
reservation   by   way   of   institutional   preference   would
further   go   down   if   the   decision   of   this   Court   in   Dr.
Pradeep Jain's case (supra) is scrupulously followed.
(viii) Giving of such a preference is a matter of State
policy   which   can   be   invalidated   only   in   the   event   of
being   violative   of   Article   14   of   the   Constitution   of
India.
(ix)   The   students   who   would   get   the   benefit   of
institutional preference being on identifiable ground,
there is hardly any scope for manipulation.
*** *** ***
70. We,   therefore,   do   not   find   any   reason   to
depart   from   the   ratio   laid   down   by   this   Court   in
Dr. Pradeep Jain (supra). The logical corollary of our
finding   is   that   reservation   by   way   of   institutional
preference   must   be   held   to   be   not   offending   Article
14 of the Constitution of India.”
30

24. Reliance   has   also   been   placed   on   certain   observations   made   in
Dr.
Pradeep Jain  (supra) thus :
“13.    We  may   now  proceed   to   consider  what  are   the
circumstances in which departure may justifiably be
made from the principle of selection based on merit.
Obviously,   such   departure   can   be   justified   only   on
equality­oriented   grounds,   for   whatever   be   the
principle of selection followed for making admissions
to   medical   colleges,   it   must   satisfy   the   test   of
equality.
Now the concept of equality under the Constitution is
a   dynamic   concept.   It   takes   within   its   sweep   every
process of equalisation and protective discrimination.
Equality   must   not   remain   mere   idle   incantation   but
it must become a living reality for the large masses of
people.   In   a   hierarchical   society   with   an   indelible
feudal   stamp   and   incurable   actual   inequality,   it   is
absurd   to   suggest   that   progressive   measures   to
eliminate   group   disabilities   and   promote   collective
equality   are   antagonistic   to   equality   on   the   ground
the   every   individual   is   entitled   to   equality   of
opportunity   based   purely   on   merit   judged   by   the
marks   obtained   by   him.   We   cannot   countenance
such   a   suggestion,   for   to   do   so   would   make   that
equality   clause   sterile   and   perpetuate   existing
inequalities.   Equality   of   opportunity   is   not   simply   a
matter   of   legal   equality.   Its   existence   depends   not
merely   on   the   absence   of   disabilities   but   on   the
presence   of   abilities.   Where,   therefore,   there   is
inequality,   in   fact,   legal   equality   always   tends   to
accentuate   it.   What   the   famous   poet   Willian   Blanks
said   graphically   is   very   true,   namely,   "One   law   for
the   Lion   and   the   Ox   is   oppression,"   Those   who   are
unequal,   in   fact,   cannot   treated   by   identical
standards;   that   may   be   equality   in   law   but   it   would
certainly   not   be   real   equality.   It   is,   therefore,
necessary   to   take   into   account   de   facto   inequalities
which   exist   in   the   society   and   to   take   affirmative
action by way of giving preference to the socially and
economically   disadvantaged   persons   or   inflicting
handicaps   on   those   more   advantageously   placed,   in
Order   to   bring   about   real   equality.   Such   affirmative
action   though   apparently   discriminatory   is
31

calculated to produce equality an a broader basis by
eliminating   de   facto   inequalities   and   placing   the
weaker   sections   of   the   community   on   a   footing   of
equality   with   the   stronger   and   more   powerful
section,   so   that   each   member   of   the   community,
whatever   is   his   births   occupation   or   social   position
may   enjoy   equal   opportunity   of   using   to   the   full   his
natural endowments of physique, of character and of
intelligence.
We   may   in   this   connection   usefully   quote   what
Mathew,   J.   said   in   Ahmedabad   St.   Xavier's   College
Society   and   Anr.   v.   State   of   Gujarat     [1975]1   SCR
173.
“...   It is obvious that "equality  in law precludes
discrimination  of  any  kind;  whereas  equality,  in
fact,   may   involve   the   necessity   of   differential
treatment   in   Order   to   attain   a   result   which
establishes   an   equilibrium   between   different
situations”
We   cannot,   therefore,   have   arid   equality   which   does
not   take   into   account   the   social   and   economic
disabilities and inequalities from which large masses
of people suffer in the country. Equality in law must
produce   real   equality;   de   jure   equality   must
ultimately   find   its   raison   d'etre   in   de   facto   equality.
The   State   must,   therefore,   resort   to   compensatory
State   action   for   the   purpose   of   making   people   who
are   factually   unequal   in   their   wealth,   education   or
social   environment,   equal   in   specified   areas.   The
State   must,   to   use   again   the   words   of   Krishna   Iyer.
J.   in   Jagdish   Saran's   case   (supra)   weave   those
special facilities into the web of equality which, in an
equitable   setting   provide   for   the   weak   and   promote
their   levelling   up   so   that,   in   the   long   run,   the
community   at   large   may   enjoy   a  general   measure   of
real   equal   opportunity   equality   is   not   negated   or
neglected   where   special   provisions   are   geared   to   the
large   goal   of   the   disabled   getting   over   their
disablement   consistently   with   the   general   good   and
individual   merit."   The   scheme   of   admission   to
medical   colleges   may,   therefore,   depart   from   the
principle   of   selection   based   on   merit,   where   it   is
necessary to do so for the purpose of bringing about
32

real   equality   of   opportunity   between   those   who   are
unequal’s.
*** *** ***
21.     But, then to what extent can reservation based
on   residence   requirement   within   the   State   or   on
institutional   preference   for   students   passing   the
qualifying   examination   held   by   the   university   or   the
state   be   regarded   as   constitutionally   permissible?   it
is not possible to provide a categorical answer to this
question   for,   as   pointed   out   by   the   policy   statement
of   Government   of   India,   the   extent   of   such
reservation   would   depend   on   several   factors
including opportunities for professional education in
that   particular   area,   the   extent   of   competition,   level
of   educational   development   of   the   area   and   other
relevant   factors.   It   may   be   that   in   a   State   were   the
level   of   educational   development   is   woefully   low,
there are comparatively inadequate opportunities for
training   in   the   medical   speciality   and   there   is   large­
scale   social   and   economic   backwardness,   there   may
be justification for reservation of a higher percentage
of seats in the medical colleges in the State and such
higher   percentage   may   not   militate   against   "the
equality   mandate   viewed   in   the   perspective   of   social
justice".  So   many   variables   depending  on  social  and
economic   facts   in   the   context   of   educational
opportunities   would   enter   into   the   determination   of
the question as to what in the case of any particular
State,   should   be   the   limit   of   reservation   based   on
residence   requirement   within   the   State   or   on
institutional   preference.   But,   in   our   opinion,   each
reservation should in no event exceed the outer limit
of 70 per cent of the total number of open seats after
taking   into   account   other   kinds   of   reservations
validly   made.   The   Medical   Education   Review
Committee has suggested that the outer limit should
not   exceed   75   percent   but   we   are   the   view   that   it
would   be   fair   and   just   to   fix   the   outer   limit   at   70
percent.   We   are   laying   down   this   outer   limit   of
reservation in an attempt to reconcile the apparently
conflicting claims of equality and excellence. We may
make it clear that this outer limit fixed by us will be
subject   to   any   reduction   or   attenuation   which   may
be made by the Indian Medical Council which is the
statutory   body   of   medical   practitioner   whose
33

functional   obligations   include   setting   standards   for
medical   education   and   providing   for   its   regulation
and   coordination.   We   are   of   the   opinion   that   this
outer limit fixed by us must gradually over the years
be   progressively   reduced   but   that   is   a   task   which
would   have   to   be   performed   by   the   Indian   Medical
Council. We would direct the Indian. Medical Council
to   consider   within   a   period   of   nine   months   from
today   whether   the   outer   limit   of   70  percent  fixed   by
us   needs   to   be   reduced   and   if   the   Indian   Medical
Council   determines   a   shorter   outer   limit,   it   will   be
binding   on  the   States  and   the  Union   Territories.   We
would   also   direct   the   Indian   Medical   Council   to
subject  the  outer  limit  so  fixed  to  reconsideration   at
the   end   of   every   three   years   but   in   no   event   should
the   outer   limit   exceed   70   percent   fixed   by   us.   The
result is that in any event at least 30 per cent of the
open   seats   shall   be   available   for   admission   of
students on all India basis irrespective of the State or
university   from   which   they   come   and   such
admissions   shall   be   granted   purely   on   merit   on   the
basis  of either  all  India Entrance  Exam.  or  entrance
examination   to   be   held   by   the   State.   Of   course,   we
need   not   add   that   even   where   reservation   on   the
basis   of   residence   requirement   or   institutional
preference is made in accordance with the directions
given   in   this   judgment,   admissions   from   the   source
or   sources   indicated   by   such   reservation   shall   be
based   only   on   merit,   because   the   object   must   be   to
select   the   best   and   most   meritorious   student   from
within such source or sources.”
(emphasis supplied)
25. In  Nikhil Himthani v. State of Uttarakhand & Ors .  (2013) 10 SCC
237,   the   question   arose   with   respect   to   admission   into   professional
colleges pertaining to medical and dental colleges in postgraduate and
super   specialty   courses.   It   was   observed   that   merit   cannot   be
compromised   by   making   a   reservation   on   the   basis   of   other
considerations   like   residential   requirement   etc.     The   decisions   in
34

Jagadish Saran  (supra) and Pradeep Jain (supra) had been referred to
and it was observed:
“19. Thus, it will be clear from what has been held by
the   three­Judge   Bench   of   this   Court   in   Magan
Mehrotra and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors. (supra)
that no preference can be given to candidates on the
basis   of   domicile   to   compete   for   the   institutional
quota of the State if such candidates have done their
MBBS course in colleges outside the State in view of
the   decisions   of   this   Court   in   Dr.   Pradeep   Jain   and
Ors.   v.   Union   of   India   and   Ors.   (supra).   Hence,
clauses   2   and   3   of   the   Eligibility   Criteria   in   the
Information Bulletin are also violative of Article 14 of
the Constitution.”
26. The   aforesaid   observations   have   been   made   with   respect   to   the
postgraduate   course   in   respect   of   which   the   different   yardstick   of
merit has to be applied. Thus, the decision in   Nikhil Himthani   (supra)
no way espouses the cause of the petitioners.
27. In   Vishal   Goyal   &   Ors.   v.   State   of   Karnataka   &   Ors .   (2014)   11
SCC 456, the question again came up for consideration with respect to
reservation   of   seats   with   State   quota   in   postgraduate   courses.   It   was
held   at   the   postgraduate   level   even   partial   reservation   based   on
residence   requirement   is   impermissible.   The   observation   has   been
made   the   criteria   for   the   postgraduate   course   does   not   hold   good   for
basic   MBBS   course.   Decisions   in   Magan   Mehrotra   v.   Union   of   India
(2003)   11   SCC   186,   Dr.   Pradeep   Jain   (supra),   Saurabh   Chaudri
(supra),   Nikhil   Himthani   (supra)   and   other   decisions   have   been
35

considered  and  this   Court  has   observed  with   respect to   postgraduate
courses thus:
“11. Mr.   Mariarputham   is   right   that   in   Saurabh
Chaudri   v.   Union   of   India   (supra),   this   Court   has
held   that   institutional   preference   can   be   given   by   a
State,   but   in   the   aforesaid   decision   of   Saurabh
Chaudri,   it   has   also   been   held   that   decision   of   the
State   to   give   institutional   preference   can   be
invalidated by the Court in the event it is shown that
the   decision   of   the   State   is   ultra   vires   the   right   to
equality   Under   Article   14   of   the   Constitution.   When
we   examine   Sub­clause   (a)   of   Clause   2.1   of   the   two
Information Bulletins, we find that the expression "A
candidate of Karnataka Origin" who only is eligible to
appear   for   Entrance   Test   has   been   so   defined   as   to
exclude  a  candidate  who  has   studied  MBBS   or  BDS
in   an   institution   in   the   State   of   Karnataka   but   who
does   not   satisfy   the   other   requirements   of   Sub­
clause   (a)   of   Clause   2.1   of   the   Information   Bulletin
for   PGET­2014.   Thus,   the   institutional   preference
sought to be given by Sub­clause (a) of Clause 2.1 of
the   Information   Bulletin   for   PGET­2014   is   clearly
contrary to the judgment of this Court in Dr. Pradeep
Jain's case (supra). 
13. Sub­clause   (a)   of   Clause   2.1   of   the   two
Information   Bulletins   does   not   actually   give
institutional preference to students who have passed
MBBS   or   BDS   from   Colleges   or   Universities   in   the
State   of   Karnataka,   but   makes   some   of   them
ineligible   to  take   the  Entrance  Test  for  admission   to
Post Graduate Medical or Dental courses in the State
of   Karnataka   to   which   the   Information   Bulletins
apply.”
28. The ratio of the aforesaid decision in  Vishal Goyal  (supra) for the
postgraduate course is not attracted to the basic course that is MBBS
course   as   laid   down   in   the   dictum   itself.   The   eligibility   criteria   for
36

basic MBBS course may be different and can be based on domicile but
not for the postgraduate and post­doctoral courses.
29. Dr. Kriti Lakhina & Ors. v. State of Karnataka & Ors . WP [C] No.
204/2018   decided   on   4.4.2018,   relied   on   by   petitioners.     The   Court
dealt with the case of admissions to postgraduate medical not that of
MBBS/BDS   course.   Thus,   the   provision   made   as   to   institutional
preference was  held  to  be ultra vires  Article  14. The decision  is of no
applicability with respect to basic MBBS/BDS/Ayurvedic Courses.
30. In   E.V.   Chinnaiah   v.   State   of   A.P.   &  Ors .  (2005)   1  SCC   394,   the
Court  dealt  with   respect   to   extent   of   reservation   for   a   class   based   on
the   micro   distinction.   Further   sub­classification   of   the   Scheduled
Castes for providing reservation came up for consideration. The Court
has   held   that   the   classification   whether   permissible   or   not,   must   be
judged   on   the   touchstone   of   the   object   sought   to   be   achieved.   It   was
observed:
“39.     Legal   constitutional   policy   adumbrated   in   a
statute   must   answer   the   test   of   Article   14   of   the
Constitution   of   India.   Classification   whether
permissible or not must be judged on the touchstone
of   the   object   sought   to   be   achieved.   If   the   object   of
reservation is to take affirmative action in favour of a
class which is social, educationally and economically
backward, the State's jurisdiction while exercising its
executive   or   legislative   function   is   to   decide   as   to
what   extent   reservation   should   be   made   for   them
either in Public Service or for obtaining admission in
educational institutions. In our opinion, such a class
cannot be  sub­divided  so  as  to  give  more  preference
37

to a minuscule proportion of the Scheduled Castes in
preference to other members of the same class.”
31. The decision in  Deepak Sibal v. Punjab University & Anr . (1989) 2
SCC 145 has also been pressed into service with respect to intelligible
differentia  test  applied   to  the   facts   with  respect  to  private  employees.
The   said   question   arose   with   respect   to   admission   to   LL.B.   classes.
There   was   the   exclusion   of   private   employees.   Admissions   were
restricted   only   to   Government,   semi­Government   and   employees   of
other   institutions   on   two   grounds.   Firstly,   regarding   production   of
bogus   certificates   of   employment   from   the   private   employers   and
secondly,   imparting   legal   education   to   the   employees   of   Government,
semi­Government   and   other   institutions.     The   Court   observed   that   it
was   not   appropriate   to   exclude   the   employees   of   private
establishments.   The   classification   was   not   based   on   intelligible
differentia.   The   Court   further   observed   that   a   classification   need   not
be   made   with   mathematical   precision   but   if   there   be   little   or   no
difference   between   the   persons   or   things   which   have   been   grouped
together and those left out of the group, in that case, the classification
cannot   be   said   to   be   a   reasonable   one.   There   is   no   dispute   with   the
aforesaid   proposition   with   respect   to   intelligible   differentia   test   laid
down   in   E.V.   Chinnaiah   (supra)   and   Deepak   Sibal   (supra).   However,
the test to be applied in the instant case is whether the classification
made is violative or irrational or lacks intelligible differentia criteria.
38

32. As   held   in   the   aforesaid   decisions,   it  is   permissible   to   lay   down
the   essential   educational   requirements,   residential/domicile   in   a
particular State in respect of basic courses of MBBS/BDS/Ayurvedic.
The object sought to be achieved is that the incumbent must serve the
State   concerned   and   for   the   emancipation   of   the   educational
standards   of   the   people   who   are   residing   in   a   particular   State,   such
reservation   has   been   upheld   by   this   Court   for   the   inhabitants   of   the
State and prescription of the condition of obtaining an education in a
State.   The   only   distinction   has   been   made   with   respect   to
postgraduate and post­doctoral super specialty course.
33. Rule   3(1)(c)   of   the   Rules   of   2017   lays   down   the   requirement   of
obtaining education in the State and relaxation has been given to the
wards   of   the   State   Government   employees   or   Central   Government
employees   or   to   an   employee   of   Corporation/Agency/instrumentality
under the Government of Assam or the Central Government, whether
on deputation or transfer on regular posting from obtaining education
from class VII to XII for the period his/her father or mother is working
outside the State. As urged on behalf of the petitioners the employees
of   other   State   Government  but  residents   of   Assam,   similar   relaxation
ought   to   have   been   made   cannot   be   accepted.   Thus,   their   exclusion
cannot   be   said   to   be   irrational   and   arbitrary.   The   wards   of   the
employees in the service of other States like Government employees of
39

Arunachal   Pradesh,   in   our   opinion,   form   a   totally   different   class.
When  the wards are  obtaining  education  outside  and the  parents  are
working in Arunachal Pradesh as Government employee or elsewhere,
they   are   not   likely   to   come   back   to   the   State   of   Assam.     As   such
Government   of   Assam   holds   that   they   should   provide   preference   to
State   residents/institutional   preference   cannot   be   said   to
unintelligible   criteria   suffering   from   vice   of   arbitrariness   in   any
manner   whatsoever,   thus,   Rule   3(1)(c)   framed   by   the   Government   of
Assam is based on an intelligible differentia and cannot be said to be
discriminatory and in violation of Article 14.
34. With   respect  to   the   private   employees   also,   the   submission   was
raised   that   wards   of   private   employees   working   outside   the   State
ought to have been placed at the similar footing as that of the wards of
the   State   Government/Central   Government   employees   etc.   In   our
opinion,   when   once   parents   have   moved   outside   in   a   private
employment   and   wards   obtaining   education   outside,   they   are   not
likely   to   come   back,   thus,   their   exclusion   as   afore­stated   footing
cannot be said to be irrational or illegal. 
35. It was urged that some of the students may obtain admission in
other States for the purpose of better coaching. Relevant data has not
been placed on record by the petitioners that in Assam coaching is not
available. Apart from that, when they can afford to obtain coaching in
40

other   States,   they   stand   on   a   different   footing,   they   are   the   one   who
belongs   to   an   affluent   class   who   can   afford   expensive   education   in
other   States   and   it   is   not   necessary   that   they   should   be   adjusted   in
State quota seat, they can stake claim for All India Quota Seats for the
State of Assam. They can stake their claim with respect to open seats
within   the   State   of   Assam.   The   exclusion   is   not   total   for   them.
However, with respect to the State­quota seats, since it is open to the
State   Government   to   lay   down   the   educational   as   well   as   domicile
requirement,   incumbents   must   fulfill   the   criteria.   The   criteria   so   laid
down in Rule 3(1)(c) of Rules of 2017, cannot be said to be ultra vires
of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
36. In   view   of   the   aforesaid   discussion,   we   find   that   the   writ
petitions/SLP   are   devoid   of   substance.     Rule   3(1)(c)   of   the   Rules   of
2017 is in consonance with the spirit of Article 14 of the Constitution
of   India.   The   writ   petitions/SLP   deserve   dismissal   and   the   same   are
hereby dismissed. Parties to bear their own costs.
……………………………J.
(Arun Mishra)
New Delhi; .…………………………. J.
August 17, 2018. (S. Abdul Nazeer)
41