2018 INSC 0558 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION C RIMINAL  A PPEAL  N O  ( S ). 1445­1446  OF  2012    Suresh and Anr.           …Appellant (s) Versus State of Haryana        …Respondent (s) With C RIMINAL  A PPEAL  N O . 1458  OF  2012    Sobhat Singh          …Appellant (s) Versus Dharampal and Ors.       …Respondent (s) J U D G M E N T N. V. R AMANA , J.    1. These   appeals   by   special   leave   petitions,   are   preferred   by   two accused  persons,  namely  Sobhat   Singh  and   Suresh,   against   the conviction   imposed   by   the   High   Court   and   the   consequential acquittal of other  persons, namely  Dharampal and Umed Singh, sons   of   Beg   Raj   and   Dharambir,   passed   by   the   High   Court   of Punjab and Haryana in Crl. Appeal No. 157­DB of 2002, 273­DB of 2002, 920­SB of 2002, 751­DBA of 2002 and Crl. Revision No. 907 of 2004. Facts being connected and issues being similar, we would like to deal with these appeals by a common judgment. 1 REPORTABLE 2. Few facts which are necessary for the disposal of these cases are that a panchayat election was held on 15.12.1994, in the village Sundawas,   where   there   were   two   major   contestants   namely Maha   Singh   and   Dharampal   son   of   Beg   Raj.   Deceased   Chander Bhan was an election agent for the losing candidate Maha Singh. It   is   necessary   to   note   that   there   was   a   quarrel   including   gun shots   being   fired   at   around   11   A.M,   on   the   day   of   election between   both   factions,   as   a   result   of   which   supporters   of Dharampal   son   of   Beg   Raj   (winning   candidate)   sustained injuries.   In   this   context,   a   FIR   No.   733   of   1994   was   registered against   Maha   Singh   (losing   candidate)   and   one   Darya   under Sections   307   read   with   34   of   Indian   Penal   Code,   1860 [ hereinafter  referred   as   ‘ IPC ’   for  brevity ]  and  Sections   25  and  27 of the Arms Act, 1959.  3. Later,   during   the   intervening   night   of   15 th   and   16 th   December   of 1994,   Dharampal   alias   Dharam   son   of   Nanak   Ram   [accused   A­ 1 ],   Sobhat   Singh   [accused   A­2 ],   both   being   supporters   of   losing candidate  Maha  Singh, came to the house of Chander  Bhan, on 2 the pretext that since Maha Singh had lost the election and was involved   in   a   criminal   case,   they   should   falsely   implicate Dharampal   son   of   Beg   Raj   also,   by   registering   a   counter   case against him. On this pretext, they accompanied Chander Bhan to Hisar.   On   their   way,   one   Suresh   [accused   A­3 ]   is   supposed   to have joined them. 4. One   Umed   Singh   son   of   Mahi   Ram   [ PW­14 ],   while   waiting   near Borstal   Jail,   Hisar   for   a   conveyance   at   4:00   A.M   on   16.12.1994 (morning) had seen A­1, A­2, Chander Bhan and A­3 going in an auto   rickshaw.   It   is   the   prosecution’s   version   that   all   of   them went to an abandoned house in Adarsh Nagar at Hisar, wherein Chander Bhan (deceased) was shot by the aforesaid accused. 5. Thereafter,   A­1   and   A­2   took   injured   Chander   Bhan   to   the   City Civil   Hospital,   Hisar   for   treatment.   It   is   alleged   that   in   the meanwhile   A­3   tried   to   hide   the   gun.   It   is   born   from   the   record that   Chander   Bhan   succumbed   to   his   injuries   20   minutes   after he was admitted to the aforesaid Hospital on 16.12.1994. 3 6. Thereafter,  accused A­2  went  to  the Police  Station, Sadar  Hisar, for   registration   of   a   complaint   against   Umed   Singh   son   of   Beg Raj,   Dharam   Pal   son   of   Beg   Raj   [Sarpanch]   and   Dharambir   for the death of Chander Bhan. Accordingly, FIR was filed before the police being FIR No. 736/ 1994, dated 16.12.1994, based on the accused A­2. 7. As   per   the   narration   of   accused   A­2,   on   16.12.1994,   at   about 4:30 A.M, the Chander Bhan (deceased), A­2 and A­1 were going to Chandigarh on foot. On reaching a few kilometers ahead of the village Sundawas, they spotted a jeep coming towards them. One of the occupants Umed Singh son of Beg Raj, raised   lalkara   that enemies   were   going   and   they   should   be   taught   a   lesson   for helping   Maha   Singh   in   the   elections.   Dharampal   and   Umed Singh sons of Beg Raj and Dharambir alighted from the jeep and Dharam   Pal   son   of   Beg   Raj,   who   was   armed   with   a   pistol,   shot Chander Bhan in his stomach and ran away. It is alleged that A­ 1 and A­2, who escaped the firing, rushed Chander Bhan to the City Civil Hospital, Hisar, where he succumbed to his injuries. 4 8. The   case   was   investigated   by   I.O.   Bhim   Singh   [ PW­15 ],   who reached the spot of the alleged occurrence as per the narration of accused   A­2.   However,   he   could   not   trace   any   incriminating material as alleged. Being suspicious of the version of accused A­ 2,   the   investigating   police,   started   to   investigate   from   different angles. 9. On   25.12.1994,   all   the   accused­appellants   contacted   one   Zile Singh   [ PW­16 ]   and   confessed   their   guilt   before   him.   To   put   the gist   of   their   extra­judicial   confessions,   it   may   be   noted   that   the accused   stated   to   Zile   Singh   ( PW­16 )   that   having   the   motive   to file   a   counter   case   against   Dharampal   son   of   Beg   Raj,   the Sarpanch,   the   accused­appellants   along   with   Chander   Bhan reached an abandoned house in Adarsh Nagar, Hisar and Suresh [ A­3 ] fired a shot at Chander Bhan in the house at Adarsh Nagar. Thereupon   accused   A­3   fled   away   with   the   gun.   Later,   accused A­1 and A­2 took Chander Bhan to the hospital and registered a false   complaint   against   Dharampal   son   of   Beg   Raj,   Dharambir and Umed Singh son of Beg Raj under Section 302, IPC.  5 10.      It may  be noted that Zile Singh produced all  the  accused before the   Police   and   thereafter   the   accused   identified   the   place   of occurrence. By virtue of such disclosure statements made by the individual   accused   persons,   the   police   are   alleged   to   have recovered   a   licensed   gun,   cartridges,   pellets,   some   concrete material   from   the   khurli   found   in   the   house   at   Adarsh   Nagar, Hisar. Based on the  aforesaid complaint, Bhim  Singh, S.I  to the P.S Sadar, Hisar, registered a case under Sections 25, 30, 54 and 59 of Arms Act, being  FIR No. 743 [Ex. PZ/1], against Lachman Singh [A­4] and A­3. 11.       After   the   completion   of   the   investigation,   charge­sheets   came   to be   filed   in   the   Court   against   the   accused   A­1,   A­2   and   A­3   for offences   under   Section   302   read   with   Section   34   of   IPC   and accordingly,   were   summoned   by   the   Addl.   Sessions   Judge   on 10.10.1995   [ in   Criminal   Case   No.   76­1­0802   of   1995   (Sessions Case   No.   60   of   1995   in   Sessions   Trial   No.   22   of   1995) ].   In   a connected case of FIR No. 743, the accused A­3 and Lachman (A­ 4) were being tried for usage of fire arms, which was consolidated 6 with   the   main   case,   by   order   dated   19.09.1999   and   both   the cases   were   tried   together.   During   the   trial,   the   Prosecution examined 17 witnesses and the Defense examined 4 witnesses in the Sessions Case No. 60 of 1995 .   It may be noted here that the accused   examined   themselves   as   defense   witnesses   under Section   315   of   Code   of   Criminal   Procedure,   1973   [ herein   after referred as  ‘ CrPC ’  for brevity ].  12.    The Trial Court in Sessions Case No. 60 of 1995 in Sessions Trial No.   22   of   1995,   by   order   dated   12.02.2002,   found   the   accused guilty   of   committing   the   crime   and   convicted   them   for   the offences punishable as under­ A CCUSED C HARGES C ONVICTION Sobhat Singh [A­ 2] S. 302/34 IPC RI   for   Life   and   fine   of   Rs 5,000.   In   default,   to   suffer RI for 6 months  Suresh [A­3] [1] S. 302/34 IPC [2] S. 25 Arms Act [1] RI for Life and fine of Rs 5,000.   In   default,   to   suffer RI for 6 months.  [2]   RI   for   1   year   and   fine   of Rs   500,   In   default,   to undergo RI for 15 days. Sentence   to   run concurrently. Lachman [A­4] S. 30, Arms Act Fine of Rs 1,000. In default, to suffer RI for 15 days. 7 It may be noted, that during the trial, accused A­1 died and the trial   against   him   got   abated.   The   Trial   Court,   held   the   accused guilty, and reasoned as under­ a) The motive is proved, wherein the crime was staged so as to   falsely   implicate   Sarpanch   Dharampal   belonging   to opposite political faction. b) That   the   accused   portrayed   a   fake   story   and   filed   a   FIR against   Dharampal,   Umed   Singh   sons   of   Beg   Raj   and Dharambir   alleging   that   they   have   murdered   Chander Bhan.   However,   no   evidence   was   found   against Dharampal,   Umed   and   Dharambir   at   the   place   of occurrence as described by accused A­2. c) There   was   no   motive   for   Dharampal,   Umed   Singh   and Dharambir   to   murder   Chander   Bhan.   Rather,   a   motive exists   on   the   part   of   the   accused,   since   their   candidate had lost the election.  d) Inference   was   drawn   that   the   probability   of   causing injuries   to   Chander   Bhan   by   A­1   and   A­2   was   relatively higher. e) That PW­14, Umed Singh son of Mahi Ram, had seen the accused   with   the   deceased   early   in   the   morning   when they had a small conversation and that the Umed Singh (PW­14)   had   noticed   that   Suresh   was   holding   a   single barrel gun.  f) That   the   version   of   accused   A­2   was   not   tenable   due   to many contradicting circumstances. g) That   the   accused   had   confessed   their   crime   before   Zile Singh   ( PW­16 ),   who   later   produced   the   accused   before the Police on 25.12.1994. h) That   the   disclosure   statements   made   by   the   accused appellants herein, before the police, led to the recovery of the licensed gun and pellets. 8 i) The   FSL   Report   concludes   that   the   pellets   which   were recovered   from   the   Khurli   as   per   such   disclosure   were similar to those found in the dead body.  j) The Post­mortem report confirms the death to have been caused   due   to   hemorrhage   and   shock   due   to   gunshot injuries.  13.     Aggrieved by the fact that the complainant was himself shown as an   accused   by   the   investigating   authority,   A­2   filed   a   complaint before the Magistrate against the Dharambir, Umed Singh son of Beg Raj and Dharam Pal son of Beg Raj, on the facts as revealed by accused A­2 in FIR No. 736 dated 16.12.1994. 14.     Accordingly,   the   Magistrate   separately   took   cognizance   and committed   the   case   to   the   Sessions   Court   against   Dharambir, Umed Singh  son  of  Beg  Raj and Dharam  Pal  son  of Beg   Raj, on 25.01.1997   [ in   Complaint   Case   No.   95­1   of   1995   (Sessions   case No. 62 of 1997 ] under Sections 302 read with 34 of IPC. Further by order dated 05.03.1997, the Sessions Judge ordered the trial of   all   the   cases   to   take   place   simultaneously.   All   the   accused pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried.  9 15.       In   Sessions   case   No.   62   of   1997,   the   Sessions   Court   by   order, dated   12.02.2002,   acquitted   Dharampal   son   of   Beg   Raj,   Umed Singh son of Beg Raj and Dharambir on the following reasons­ a) That   prosecution   failed   to   establish   motive   on   the   part   of accused­Dharampal son of Beg Raj, as he has already won the election. b) That   accused   persons   came   at   midnight   ­   15.12.1994 ­16.12.1994,   called   the   deceased   and   told   him   that   they had  to  shoot  somebody  so  as to  falsely   implicate Sarpanch Dharampal son of Beg Raj in a case as corroborated by the evidence of DW­1 (Kamla). c) That   the   story   of   the   prosecution   that   the   deceased   was shot on the road at a distance of 1­1/2 K.M. from village by the accused Dharampal son of Beg Raj is uncorroborated in the absence of any incriminating evidence in the said crime scene, as supported by the evidence of DW­5 Bhim Singh. d) That DW­2 Umed Singh corroborated that on 16.12.1994 at about   4:30   A.M.   while   waiting   for   conveyance   to   go   to   his village he had seen Sobhat Singh, Dharampal son of Nanak Ram   and   the   Suresh  who   was  carrying   a   single   barrel  gun along with the deceased in an auto­rickshaw.  e) The   complainant   had   taken   deceased   to   the   Hospital   at   6: 30 AM. In cross­examination Sobhat Singh ( PW­4/A­2 ) and Dharampal   ( PW­5/A­1 )   could   not   explain   when   the deceased   received   injuries   or   why   did   they   not   take   the deceased to the nearby hospital.  f) That   complainants   further   failed   to   explain   in   their   cross­ examination how the three­wheeler appeared merely within five­minutes to take them to the Hospital at Hisar. g) The   evidence   of   PW5­Dharampal   son   of   Nanak   Ram,   is contradictory   to   PW­4   (Shobat   Singh   [ A­2 ])   as   to   how   they took the deceased to the hospital. 10 h) That the complainants failed to state the number of vehicle, driver   of   the   vehicle   in   their   cross­examination.   They   have also   failed   to   explain   why   they   did   not   immediately   report the   matter   in   the   village   and   to   the   family   members   of   the deceased   when   they   were   just   at   a   distance   of   1­1/2   km from the village.  i) That   extra­judicial   confession   was   made   before   DW­3   (Zile Singh). j) That   the   gun   recovered   in   the   instant   case   was   the   gun belonging   to   complainant   Suresh   [ A­3 ]   and   FSL   report available on record proves that the pellets found in the body of the deceased were similar to those fired from that gun. k) Therefore,   the   prosecution   failed   to   prove   a   case   beyond reasonable   doubt   against   the   accused.   So,   all   the   accused were acquitted of the charge against them. 16.       Aggrieved   by   the   judgments   of   the   Trial   Court,   in   Session   Case No. 60, accused A­2, A­3 and A­4 filed Criminal Appeal No. 273­ DB, 157­DB, 920­SB  respectively   before the  High Court. On  the other hand, accused A­2 filed a Criminal Appeal No. 751­DBA of 2002, against the acquittal, of Dharampal son of Beg Raj, Umed Singh   son   of   Beg   Raj   and   Dharambir,   passed   by   the   Sessions Court in Sessions Case No. 62 of 1997. It may be noted that the High Court clubbed all the appeals and dismissed them through a   common   impugned   judgment   dated   03.01.2012.   The   High Court had further directed accused A­2 and A­3 to pay a sum of 11 Rs.   One   Lac   as   damages   to   Smt.   Kamla   and   her   two   children. 17.     The   High   Court   while   upholding   the   conviction   emphasized following grounds­ a) That   it   was   admitted   by   accused   A­2   and   A­1   that   they   had called for Chander Bhan at his house, in the presence of his wife, on 16.12.1994. b) That   the   evidence   produced   by   the   I.O   indicates   that   the accused   took   Chander   Bhan   to   a   room   in   Adarsh   Nagar, Hisar,   where   he   was   shot   by   accused   A­3   using   his   single barrel gun. c) The   accused­appellants   had   confessed   to   their   crime,   which led to the recovery of certain incriminating articles. d) Sufficient   evidence   is   on   record   like   recovery   of   pellets,   gun and some concrete material etc. to prove that Chander Bhan was shot inside that Kotha (Room) by the accused and not by the other gang, as alleged. e) There was a crystal­clear motive on the part of the accused A­ 2 to commit such crime so as to implicate Dharampal son of Beg Raj (Sarpanch) in a false case. f) Apart   from   the   testimony   of   wife­Kamla   and   the   recovery   of the   incriminating   materials,   the   evidence   of   PW   14   (Umed Singh), who deposed that he had seen the accused along with Chander   Bhan   (deceased)   earlier   that   morning   with   Suresh was also a major circumstance going against the accused. g) Lastly,   the   extra   judicial   confession   made   before   Zile   Singh (PW­16),   is   found   to   be   true   and   voluntary   and   since   PW­16 is an independent witness, his evidence cannot be doubted. h) The   chain   of   circumstances   are   complete   so   as   to   bring home the guilt of the accused. i) Further,   the   gun   used   was   a   licensed   gun   which belonged to Lachman, father of A­3, who had allowed the gun   to   be   taken   from   his   custody   and   misused   by   his son.   Hence,   the   conviction   under   Arms   Act   was   also justified. 12 18.      Aggrieved by the judgment and order of conviction passed by the High Court, accused A­2 and A­3 have preferred Criminal Appeal No (s). 1445­1446 of 2012 (arising out of SLP (Crl.) No (s). 2868­ 2869 of 2012) in Sessions Case No. 60 of 1995 in Sessions Trial No. 22 of 1995. Further accused A­2 preferred a Criminal Appeal, being   Criminal  Appeal  No.  1458 of   2012  (arising  from  SLP  (Crl.) No. 2926 of 2012), against the acquittal of Dharampal son of Beg Raj, Umed Singh son of Beg Raj and Dharambir in Sessions Case No. 62 of 1997 in Sessions Trial No. 97 of 1997. 19.    Learned senior counsel, Ms. Anjana Prakash, appearing on behalf of the appellant accused has mainly contended as under­ a) That   the   case   involves   no   direct   evidence   and   the   chain   of circumstantial   evidence   is   not   complete;   therefore,   the conviction   of   the   appellants   on   the   basis   of   unfounded evidence should not be sustained.  b) That PW­13 (wife of the deceased), when materially confronted, denied   the   statement   that   she   had   stated   to   the   police   that accused A­1 and appellant accused A­2 had told the deceased that they had to fire a shot at somebody to implicate Sarpanch Dharampal son of Beg Raj. c) That   PW­14   presence   at   spot   is   doubtful.     He   made   out   an illogical   story   that   while   waiting   for   conveyance   to   go   to   his village at 4:00 AM, he had seen the appellant and Dharampal with the deceased. But in Cross examination he was not able to   explain   why   he   was   waiting   for   the   conveyance   3½   hours 13 early,   especially   when   the   first   bus   for   his   village   leaves   at 7:30 AM.  d) That PW­14 has also admitted that he did not tell PW­13 that he   had   seen   accused   persons   carrying   gun   along   with   the deceased in the said auto­ rickshaw. PW­14  inter alia  has also admitted   that   he   and   PW­16   had   injured   the   deceased   at   an earlier point of time and denied the fact that brother of PW16 had fired upon the deceased.  e) That alleged extra­judicial confession made on 25.12.94 before PW­16 is not admissible on the ground that it was made under suspicious circumstances. PW­16  inter­alia , also admitted that Maha   Singh   had   defeated   him   previously   in   the   Sarpanch election;   therefore,   election   rivalry   is   evident   against   accused persons.  f) That   if   the   accused   persons   were   arrested   on   18.12.94,   then the   question   of   alleged   extrajudicial   confession   made   on 25.12.94 before PW16 casts doubt in the prosecution story.  g)   That   the   FIR   was   lodged   by   the   appellants   and   it   is   also   an admitted   fact   that   it   was   the   appellant­accused   who   had brought the injured at the hospital for treatment.  h) That the gun recovered in the instant case is the licensed gun of   the   father   of   the   accused   Suresh   and   there   is   no   forensic evidence available on record to prove that pellets found in the body of the deceased was fired from that gun. i) That   the   motive   plays   an   important   role   in   a   case   of circumstantial evidence. In the present case there is no strong motive  that   can  be inferred  on  the  part  of  accused  person  on the ground of election rivalry. j) That the role of investigating officer is doubtful in this case as there are contradictions in respect of the date of arrest of the accused persons. As the IO stated that he had found evidence against   appellants   within   two   days   of   occurrence   but   denied arresting them then. However, from the materials on record it is   evident   that   date   of   arrest   of   accused   persons   is   on 14 18.12.1994.   That   it   can   be   said   that   IO   is   exonerating   the actual accused and falsely implicating the appellants.  20.     On   the   Other   hand,   learned   counsel   appearing   on   behalf   of   the State, Dr. Monika Gusain, while supporting the judgment of the lower   courts,   has   drawn   our   attention   to   the   fact   that   the accused,  were   hard  core  criminals,   who   would   not   stop   short   of killing their own for political rivalry. She has also contended that the recovery at the place in Adarsh Nagar bolsters the case of the prosecution.   She   argues   that   if   for   a   moment,   the   version   of accused   A­1   is   taken   into   consideration,   then   there   was   no question   of   taking   the   deceased   to   a   Hospital   24   KM   away   in Hisar, while there was a Hospital near the vicinity of the alleged crime scene.  21. Having   heard   the   Learned   counsel   for   either   side   and   given our  anxious consideration to the facts and circumstances of the case   on   hand,   at   the   outset,   it   would   be   apt   to   observe   certain statements   of   prosecution   witnesses,   on   whose   evidence   the courts   below   have   excessively   placed   reliance.   For   this   purpose, it   would   be   necessary   for   us   to   deal   with   the   two   cases separately.   First,   we   would   like   to   take   up   the   Criminal   Appeal 15 N O .  1445­1446 OF 2012 and thereafter consider Criminal Appeal No. 1458 of 2012. 22.      PW­1(Dr. Bishnoi), SMO General Hospital, Tohana, deposed that he   was   the   person,   who   conducted   the   post­mortem   of   the deceased. Regarding the nature of the injury, he states that­ Multiple   rounded   and   oval   shaped   wounds   of   the size of 1/3 cm into 1/3 cm present on the front of trunk and pelvic area along with upper part of the front of both thighs numbering about (50). Majority of   these   wounds   were   present   on   the   left   side   of front   part   of   the   body.   These   were   covered   with clotted   blood   with   inverted   margins   with lacerations.   No   blackening   or   tattooing   were present.   …   All   structures   in   the   pelvic   and   in   the lower  abdomen including  small and large intestine and vessels were injured. Abdominal cavity was full of red colored blood. Further   he   has   deposed   that   the   death   of   Chander   Bhan (deceased)   resulted   because   of   hemorrhage,   and   shock   due   to gun­shot   injuries.   All   injuries   were   opined   to   have   been   ante­ mortem   in   nature   and   sufficient   in   the   usual   course   to   cause death. 23.     PW­2   (Dr.   Surinder   Singh),   Medical   Officer,   who   treated   the Chander Bhan (deceased) at the Hospital. He avers that from the perusal of the bed­head ticket, the Chander Bhan (deceased) was 16 brought   to   the   Hospital   at   Hisar,   by   accused   A­1   and   A­2.   It   is important   to   note   that   the   deceased   was   brought   in   a   semi­ conscious state to the Hospital. 24.     PW­   13   ­   Smt.   Kamla,   widow   of   deceased   Chander   Bhan   states that   on   15.12.1994,   an   election   was   held   in   the   village   of Sundawas, wherein the deceased Chander Bhan, was an election agent   for   Maha   Singh.   She   deposed   that   persons   in   support   of Maha   Singh,   supposedly   fired   gun   shots   and   the   supporters   of Dharampal son of Beg Raj, allegedly had received injuries in the aforesaid firing. In the intervening night of 15­16 th , A­1 and A­2, came   to   meet   the   deceased   Chander   Bhan.   She   states   that   her husband   had   enquired   with   the   aforesaid   accused,   who   had revealed   to   him   that   they   had   to   go   to   Hisar   and   had   to   shoot somebody   so   as   to   involve   Dharampal   son   of   Beg   Raj   in   a   false case. In that pretext she states that all the three accused (A­1, A­ 2 and A­3) and Chander Bhan (deceased) left for Hisar. 25.       It   may   be   of   some   significance   to   note   that,   during   her   cross examination, she states as under­ I   had   told   in   my   statement   to   the   police   that accused Dharma and Sobhat has told my husband 17 that   somebody   was   to   be   fired   at.   I   had   told   the police   in   my   statement   that   accused   Dharma   and Sobhat   had   told   my   husband   that   they   would   fire shots   at   their   own   brother   in   order   to   involve Dharampal Sarpanch.  Appellant­accused   has   extensively   placed   reliance   on   the aforesaid   statement,   to   point   that   the   statement   of   PW­13   was ridden   with   improvements,   which   questions   the   reliability   and credibility   of   her   statements.   The   consequence   of   the   same,   will be discussed at a later stage. 26.      PW­14 (Umed Singh son of Mahi Ram), states that he belongs to the   village   of   Sundawas.   On   15.12.1994,   after   casting   his   vote, he   returned   to   Hisar   in   the   evening   for   purchase   of   seed   and fertilizers.   Following   morning,   at   about   4   AM,   while   he   was standing near the Borstal Jail, Hisar, waiting for a bus to go back to   his   village   Sundawas.   Around   that   time,   one   auto   rickshaw came   from   the   side   of   Hisar   City   and   stopped   near   him.   The occupants of  the  auto­rickshaw  were accused A­1, A­2,  A­3 and Chander  Bhan. He states that accused A­3 was holding  a single barrel gun in his hand. When the occupants enquired about him, he  replied to  them  that  he was  waiting   for   the conveyance  to  go 18 back to his village and the occupants of the auto supposedly told him that they were going for some urgent work. 27.       PW­15­   Bhim   Singh,   the   Investigating   Officer   has   deposed   that accused   A­2   had   registered   a   complaint   against   Umed   Singh, Dharampal sons of Beg Raj and Dharambir on the grounds that they   have   shot   the   deceased   Chander   Bhan   on   account   of   prior rivalry. He further deposed that in furtherance of the enquiry, on reaching the alleged scene of the crime, he did not find any tyre marks of the jeep or any incriminating marks whatsoever. It may be   noted   that   his   evidence   is   a   crucial   link   to   portray   that   the case   of   false   prosecution   against   the   winning   candidate Dharampal son of Beg Raj was given full effect by misleading the police   authority   as   to   the   scene   of   the   incident.   He   further recorded the statement of PW­13­Smt. Kamla and found out that on 16.12.1994 the accused A­2 and A­1 came to the house of the deceased   at   around   midnight   and   took   Chander   Bhan   on   the pretext   that   since   Maha   Singh   had   lost   the   election   and   was involved   in   a   criminal   case,   hence   they   should   falsely   implicate 19 Sarpanch   Dharampal   son   of   Beg   Raj,   by   registering   a   counter case against him. 28.       PW­15   further   deposed   that   PW­14   informed   that   while   Umed Singh  ( PW­14 )  was   waiting  at   Borstal  Jail,   Hisar  for   conveyance at  4:00  A.M  on  16.12.1994, he  had  seen  that  accused A­1, A­2, deceased   Chander   Bhan   and   A­3   were   going   for   some   urgent work   and   that   he   had   also   noticed   A­3   holding   a   single   barrel gun.  29.      Furthermore, PW­15 had also deposed that later, on 25.12.1994, PW­16,   Zile   Singh   had   produced   the   accused   before   him   where he recorded the statement of Zile Singh with regard to the extra judicial   confession   made   to   him   by   the   accused.   It   may   be relevant   to   note   PW­15   in   the   examination­in­chief   states   that the Zile Singh (PW­16), left the Police Station and did not wait till the   completion   of   the   interrogation.   Whereas,   in   the   cross­ examination   he   contradicts   himself   that   Zile   Singh   (PW­16)   was present during the interrogation of the appellant­accused. PW­15 also deposed that by virtue of the disclosure statements made by the   individual   accused   persons,   the   recovery   of   the   gun, 20 cartridges, pellets and some concrete material from room and the khurli of the Adarsh Nagar House were made.  30.       PW­16   (Zile   Singh),   deposes   that   on   25.12.1994,   when   he   had come   to   the   village   Sundawas,   accused   A­1,   A­2   and   A­3   had confessed   before   him   by   detailing   the   modus   operandi   of   the crime   and   subsequent   cover­up   of   the   incident.   Thereafter,   he states   that   he   handed   over   the   accused   to   the   police   for interrogation   and   the   interrogation   was   conducted   in   his presence. At the appropriate stage, we will examine the relevance of   the   aforesaid   confession   made   before   Zile   Singh   (PW­16)   and its impact on the prosecution’s case. 31.      As regards to the evidence of other witnesses who supported the prosecution   case,   PW­17,   Mewa   Singh,   is   the   panch   witness   for the   seizures   made   by   the   police   from   crime   scene.   He   deposed that on 25.12.1994, he went to the police station along with one Sant   Lal   on   getting   the   information   that   the   real   culprits   in Chander   Bhan's   murder   case   have   been   arrested.   He   further deposed   that   I.O.   Bhim   Singh   interrogated   the   accused   in   his 21 presence.   That   during   such   interrogation,   accused   A­1   and   A­3 pointed out that they will be able to show the scene of the crime as   well   as   the   hidden   gun.   He   had   further   deposed   that   he   and Sant   Lal   were   witnesses   to   the   subsequent   recoveries   made   by the investigating officer. 32.    After having appreciated the evidence of certain crucial witnesses, we   would   like   to   clarify   at   the   outset   that   this   is   a   case   of circumstantial   evidence.   Jurisprudentially   the   meaning   of circumstantial evidence has never been settled. Although we may not   require   a   detailed   analysis   of   the   jurisprudential   dichotomy which exists as to what amounts to ‘circumstantial evidence’, we may indicate certain precedents and legal literature have given a definite   shape   for   the   aforesaid   term.   In   Thomas   Starkie,   A Practical   treatise   on   the   law   of   evidence,   and   digest   of proofs,   in   civil   and   criminal   proceedings   (vol.   I,   4 th   Eds., 1876) , it is said that­ "In   criminal   cases,   proof   that   the   party   accused was   influenced   by   a   strong   motive   of   interest   to commit the offence proved to have been committed, although   exceedingly   weak   and   inconclusive   in itself,   and   although   it   be   a   circumstance   which 22 ought   never   to   operate   in   proof   of   the   corpus delicti,   yet   when   that   has   once   been   established aliunde,   it   is   a   circumstance   to   be   considered   in conjunction   with   others   which   plainly   tend   to implicate the accused". Sir Fitz James Stephen, while writing his  Introduction to Indian Evidence Act , 1872, writes as under­ Facts   relevant   to   the   issue   are   facts   from   the existence of which inferences as to the existence of the facts in issue may be drawn. A   fact   is   relevant   to   another   fact   when   the existence of the one can be shown to be the cause or   one   of   the   causes,   or   the   effect   or   one   of   the effects,   of   existence   of   the   other,   or   when   the existence   of   the   one,   either   alone   or   together   with other   facts,   renders   the   existence   of   the   other highly   probable,   or   improbable,   according   to   the common course of events. Wharton's Criminal Evidence  (1955)­ "In   prosecutions   for   homicide,   as   in   criminal prosecutions   generally,   evidence   to   show   motive   is competent   and   considerable   latitude   is   allowed   in its introduction. When proof has been made of the corpus   delicti,   all   facts   and   circumstances   that tend to show motive on the part of the accused are relevant". 33.    Peacock v. The King ,  13 CLR 619, expounded the circumstantial evidence to mean­ Whether   the   fact,   or   that   body   of   facts   which   is called   the   'case'   is   capable   of   bearing   a   particular 23 inference,   is   for   the   Court,   and   unless   it   is   so capable, the Court's duty is to withhold it from the jury,   as   a   single   fact   or   as   a   case.   But   when   the case   is   undoubtedly   capable   of   the   inference   of guilt,   albeit   some   other   inference   or   theory   be possible, it is for the jury, properly directed, and for them   alone,   to   say  not   merely   whether   it   carries  a strong   probability   of   guilt,   but   whether   the inference   exists   actually   and   clearly,   and   so completely   overcomes   all   other   inferences   or hypotheses,   as   to   leave   no   reasonable   doubt   of guilt in their minds. 34.       In   Anant   Chintaman   Lagu   v.   State   of   Bombay ,   AIR   1960   SC 500, this court defined circumstantial evidence­ Circumstantial   evidence   in   this   context   means,   a combination   of   facts   creating   a   network   through which  there  is  no  escape  for   the  accused,  because the   facts   taken   as   a   whole   do   not   admit   of   any inference but of his guilt. 35.     In line with the aforesaid definition, this Court in catena of cases has   expounded   the   test   of   ‘complete   chain   link   theory’   for   the prosecution   to   prove   a   case   beyond   reasonable   doubt   based   on the circumstantial evidence. In  Hanumant and Others v. State of   Madhya   Pradesh ,   AIR   1952   SC   343   [ hereinafter   referred   as ‘ Hanumant   Case ’   for   brevity ],   this   Court   explained   one   of   the 24 possible ways to prove a case based on circumstantial evidence, in the following manner ­ in   cases   where   the   evidence   is   of   a   circumstantial nature,   the   circumstances   from   which   the conclusion   of   guilt   is   to   be   drawn   should   in   the first instance be fully established, and all the facts so   established   should   be   consistent   only   with   the hypothesis   of   the   guilt   of   the   accused.   Again,   the circumstances   should   be   of   a   conclusive   nature and   tendency   and   they   should   be   such   as   to exclude   every   hypothesis   but   the   one   proposed   to be proved. 36.     It   was   for   the   first   time   that   this   Court   formulated   a   test concerning  circumstantial   evidence.   Subsequently,  the   aforesaid test   was   applied   on   multiple   occasions   by   this   Court   in Deonandan   Mishra   v.   State   of   Bihar ,   AIR   1955   SC   801, Govinda Reddy v. State of Mysore , AIR 1960 SC 29. 37.      In   Charan Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh , AIR 1967 SC 520, this   Court   expounded   the   proposition   laid   down   in   Hanumant Case  (supra), and observed as under­ It   is   well   established   that   in   cases   where   the evidence   is   of   a   circumstantial   nature,   the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to   be   drawn   should,   in   the   first   instance,   be   fully established,   and   the   circumstances   so   established should   be   consistent   only   with   the   hypothesis   of 25 the   guilt   of   the   accused   person;   that   is,   the circumstances   should   be   of   such   a   nature   as   to reasonably   exclude   every   hypothesis   but   the   one proposed   to   be   proved.   To   put   it   in   other   words, the   chain   of   evidence   must   be   so   far   complete as   not   to   leave   any   reasonable   ground   for   a conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused person. We   may   note   that   this   Court   for   the   first   time   explained   the general test applicable for evaluating circumstantial evidence and brought in the concept of ‘completion of chain of evidence’.  38.       In   Sharad   Birdhichand   Sarda   v.   State   of   Maharashtra ,  AIR 1984   SC   1622.   Therein,   while   dealing   with   circumstantial evidence, it has been held that the onus was on the prosecution to prove that the chain is complete and the infirmity or lacuna in the   prosecution   cannot   be   cured  by   a  false  defense  or   plea.   The conditions precedent in the words of this Court, before conviction could   be   based   on   circumstantial   evidence,   must   be   fully established. They are ­   (1)   the   circumstances   from   which   the   conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully  established. The circumstances concerned ‘must or should’ and not merely ‘may be’ established; 26   (2)   the   facts   so   established   should   be   consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that   is   to   say,   they   should   not   be   explainable   on any   other   hypothesis   except   that   the   accused   is guilty;   (3)   the   circumstances   should   be   of   a   conclusive nature and tendency;   (4)   they   should   exclude   every   possible   hypothesis except the one to be proved; and   (5) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as   not   to   leave   any   reasonable   ground   for   the conclusion   consistent   with   the   innocence   of   the accused   and   must   show   that   in   all   human probability   the   act   must   have   been   done   by   the accused. The   aforesaid   tests   are   aptly   referred   as   ‘ Panchsheel   of   proof   in Circumstantial Cases’  [ refer  Prakash v. State of Rajasthan ,  AIR 2013   SC   1474].   The   expectation   is   that   the   prosecution’s   case should reflect careful portrayal of the factual circumstances and inferences   thereof   and   their   compatibility   with   a   singular hypothesis wherein   all  the  intermediate  facts  and  the  case  itself are proved beyond reasonable doubt. 39.       Circumstantial   evidence   are   those   facts,   which   the   court   may infer   further.   There   is   a   stark   contrast   between   direct   evidence and circumstantial evidence. In cases of circumstantial evidence, 27 the courts are called upon to make inferences from the available evidences,   which   may   lead   to   the   accused’s   guilt.   In   majority   of cases, the inference of guilt is usually drawn by establishing the case from  its initiation to the  point  of  commission  wherein  each factual   link   is   ultimately   based   on   evidence   of   a   fact   or   an inference thereof. Therefore, the courts have to identify the facts in   the   first   place   so   as   to   fit   the   case   within   the   parameters   of ‘chain   link   theory’   and   then   see   whether   the   case   is   made   out beyond   reasonable   doubt.   In   India   we   have   for   a   long   time followed   the   ‘chain   link   theory’   since   Hanumant   Case   (supra), which of course needs to be followed herein also. 40.      We need to consider five aspects and their impact on the case at hand,   before   we   put   forth   our   analysis.   It   is   well   settled   that motive is an important aspect in circumstantial evidence case. In Shivaji Genu Mohite v. State of Maharashtra , AIR 1973 SC 55 “In  case  the prosecution  is not  able to  discover  an impelling   motive,   that   could   not   reflect   upon   the credibility  of  a witness proved  to  be  a reliable  eye­ witness. Evidence as to motive would, no doubt, go a   long   way   in   cases   wholly   dependent   on circumstantial evidence. Such evidence would form one   of   the   links   in   the   chain   of   circumstantial evidence in such a case. But that would not be so 28 in   cases   where   there   are   eye­witnesses   of credibility, though even in such cases if a motive is properly   proved,   such   proof   would   strengthen   the prosecution   case   and   fortify   the   court   in   its ultimate conclusion. But that does not mean that if motive   is   not   established,   the   evidence   of   an   eye­ witness is rendered untrustworthy”. In   this   case   the   motive   has   an   important   role   as   this   case   is based on circumstantial evidence, motive herein forms one of the intermediate   fact/circumstances.   In   this   case,   the   motive   of killing   Chander   Bhan   (deceased)   was   to   foist   a   false   case   on Dharampal son of Beg Raj. If the motive was to foist a false case, then   it   is   quite   strange   to   believe   that   the   accused   went   to   the extent   of   killing   their   own   (supporter   of   Maha   Singh)   to   avenge the loss in the elections. Even if the motive is taken to be proved, then   this   too   only   forms   one   of   the   circumstances   for   adducing the guilt of the accused. 41.     The   credibility   of   the   witnesses,   which   the   prosecution   mainly relies   on   to   prove   the   case   on   the   basis   of   the   circumstantial evidence is an important aspect. In this case the evidence of PW­ 13   (wife   of   the   deceased)   is   crucial.   Her   statements   should   be carefully appreciated.  The statements, as indicated above, clearly 29 portray that there were material improvements in the statements, which   makes   her   statement   unreliable   and   doubtful.   The vindictive   statements   which   were   made   during   the   cross examination,   clearly   bars   us   from   taking   her   testimony   into consideration.   There   is   no   dispute   that   there   was   prior   enmity between   the   wife   and   the   accused   appellants,   which   makes   her statements  unreliable .  It is revealed from her evidence that, even though   she   knew   that   her   husband   was   taken   for   shooting somebody,   she   kept   quiet   and   did   not   stop   her   husband   from accompanying   the   accused.   Such   behavior   would   be   suspicious as it does not fit with the natural human behavior to inspire any confidence. 42.    Although this Court, on number of occasions, reiterated that mere relationship with the deceased will not be sufficient to discredit a witness,   in   the   present   circumstances,   it   is   apparent   that   the wife was an interested witness due to earlier enmity between the accused.   Hence,   we   are   of   the   considered   opinion   that   the aforesaid witness does not inspire confidence for us to rely on the same. 30 43.     Coming to the testimony of the PW­14 (Umed Singh), the defense has   tried   to   exposé   the   aforesaid   witness   on   certain contradictions   and   improvements,   which   needs   our consideration.   At   the   outset,   they   question   the   presence   of   the aforesaid witness at Hisar, as the veracity of him being a chance witness is questionable. Learned senior counsel for the accused­ appellant,   has   strenuously   contended   that   PW­14   is   a   chance witness, and contends that not much reliance may be placed on his statement.  44. Generally,   the   chance   witness,   who   reasonably   explains   his presence   in   the   named   location   at   the   relevant   time,   may   be taken   into   consideration   and   should   be   given   due   regard,   if   his version   inspires   confidence   and   the   same   is   supported   by surrounding   circumstances.   Nonetheless,   the   evidence   of   a chance   witness   requires   a   very   cautious   and   close   scrutiny.   A chance   witness   must   adequately   explain   his   presence   at   the place   of   occurrence   [ refer   Satbir   v.   Surat   Singh ,   (1997)   4   SCC 192;   Harjinder Singh v. State of Punjab , (2004) 11 SCC 253]. Deposition   of   a   chance   witness   whose   presence   at   the   place   of 31 incident   remains   doubtful   should   be   discarded   [ refer Shankarlal   v.   State   of   Rajasthan ,   (2004)   10   SCC   632].   The behavior   of the  chance  witness, subsequent  to  the  incident may also   be   taken   into   consideration   particularly   as   to   whether   he has informed anyone else in the village about the incident. [ refer Thangaiya v. State of Tamil Nadu , (2005) 9 SCC 650]. 45.    It may be noted that the (PW­14) has not explained as to why he was   standing   near   the   Bristol   Prison   so   early   at   4:00  AM   in  the morning   of   a   peak   winter   day,   when   the   first   bus   to   the   village was   at   7:00   AM.   Moreover,   it   is   doubtful   that   A­3   would   have brandished   a   gun,   while   travelling   in   the   auto­rickshaw.   It   is suspicious   that   even   after   getting   to   know   that   Chander   Bhan was killed at Hisar, PW­14 did not reveal to anybody that he saw the   deceased   in   the   company   of   the   accused­appellant   in   the morning travelling towards Hisar. Indeed, it is quite unbelievable that a man, during peak of north Indian winter, would wait at 4 A.M for a bus, which is scheduled to leave at 7:00 AM morning. These   suspicious   circumstances   impugn   the   general 32 trustworthiness   of   PW­14.   Therefore,   this   Court   cannot   accept the evidence of this witness as being credible. 46.       Now   coming   to   the   evidence   of   Zile   Singh   (PW­16).   He   narrates that the three accused met him in the bus stop on the morning of 25.12.1993, when they confessed to their crime individually. We may   note   that   his   statements   are   ridden   with   following   un­ clarified doubts­ a. That   the   Zile   Singh   (PW­16)   accompanied   the   accused, after   they   confessed,   from   the   bus   stand   to   the   police station. b. Not taking the accused to the Police personnel present in the Bus stand. c. That his presence in the police station itself is suspicious as   the   I.O.   Bhim   Singh   (PW­15)   has   contradicted   Zile Singh (PW­16) on this aspect. d. That there is no signature of Zile Singh ( PW­16 ) on any of the documents in the Police Station. In   light   of   these   circumstances,   we   need   to   be   cautious   in considering the statements of this witness. 47.     Now   we   need   to   concentrate   on   the   relevance   of   the   alleged confessions of the co­accused made before Zile Singh ( PW­16 ). In Re   Periyaswami   Moopan,   AIR   1931   Mad.   177,   Reilly   J. 33 observed   “where   there   is   evidence   against   the   co­accused sufficient,   if   believed,   to   support   his   conviction,   then   the   kind   of confession   described   in   Section   30   may   be   thrown   into   the   scale as an additional reason for believing that evidence”.  Therefore, the aforesaid   extra­judicial   confession   against   the   co­accused   needs to   be   taken   into   consideration   if   at   all   it   is   one,   only   if   other independent   evidence   on   record   have   established   the   basic premise   of   the   prosecution.   The   confession   of   the   co­accused cannot   be   solely   utilized   to   convict   a   person,   when   the surrounding   circumstances   are   improbable   and   creates suspicion. [ refer  Haricharan Kurmi v. State of Bihar ,  AIR 1964 SC   1184].   As   the   confession   of   a   co­accused   is   weak   piece   of evidence, we need to consider whether other circumstances prove the prosecution’s case. 48.    On the aspect of recovery of pellets from a house at Adarsh Nagar, Hisar, it is an argument of the learned senior counsel, appearing on   behalf   of   the   appellant   accused,   that   the   FSL   Report indicating   the   possibility   of   pellets   being   fired   from   the   gun recovered   from   the   confession   of   accused   A­3,   should   not   be 34 considered   as   the   person,   who   made   the   report   was   not examined­is of some relevance. The FSL report forms part of the evidence,  which   is  shown   to   point   out   that   the   crime  had   taken place in the house at Adarsh Nagar, Hisar and gun of 0.15 bore belonging   to   A­3   was   used   for   the   same.   The   prosecution   was expected   to   examine   the   author   of   the   report,   and   non­ examination   of   the   same   is   a   fatal   error   in   the   case   at   hand. Moreover, at the scene of occurrence, there was no blood or foot marks found, which is apparent from the evidence of PW­8. 49.      The last circumstance, pointed out by the learned senior counsel for appellant is that, if the intention of the accused­appellant was indeed   to   murder   the   deceased,   then,   why   would   they   take   him to   the   Hospital.   Thereby,   she   extends   this   argument,   to   portray that the accused, never  had an  intention to  kill the  deceased. It has not been explained by the prosecution, as to why such action would   be   undertaken   by   the   accused   and   risk   taking   an   alive person,   who   was   shot,   to   the   hospital.   The   contention   of   the State that this was a diabolic act of perverted criminals, may not fit the evidence available on record. 35 50.       In   line   with   the   aforesaid   discussion   on   various   circumstances, we   may   now   identify   the   intermediate   circumstances,   which   we are called upon to infer guilt from­ 1.) On   15.12.1994,   there   was   a   local   election,   wherein   main candidates   were   Maha   Singh   and   Dharampal   son   of   Beg Raj. 2.) Chander Bhan (deceased) was the election agent as well as the supporter of Maha Singh. 3.) On   the   day   of   the   election,   there   was   a   fight   between   two factions, in which Maha Singh and one Darya were charged for   firing   gun   shots   at   the   supporters   of   Dharampal   son  of Beg Raj. 4.) Maha   Singh   lost   the   elections,   which   was   known   to   the accused party as well as deceased. 5.) That Sobhat Singh [A­2], Dharampal son of Nanak Ram [A­ 1]   and   Chander   Bhan   (deceased),   met   on   15 th ­16 th   mid night. 6.) Near   Hisar,   the   Chander   Bhan   was   seen   going   with   the accused   around   the   time   of   the   incident.   [of   doubtful veracity] 7.) Injured   Chander   Bhan   was   alive   when   he   was   brought   to Hospital in Hisar by Sobhat Singh [A­1] and Dharampal [A­ 2]. 8.) Chander   Bhan’s   body   was   found   to   have   sustained   more than fifty ante mortem gun shot wounds. 9.) Gun   and   pellets   were   recovered   from   an   abandoned   house in Adarsh Nagar. 10.) Extra­judicial   confession   recorded   before   Zile   Singh   on 25.12.1994. 51.     From   the   aforesaid   circumstances,   we   may   note   that   the hypothesis canvassed by the prosecution cannot be said to have 36 been   proved   beyond   reasonable   doubt   as   there   exist   apparent gaps   in   the   prosecution   story,   which   are   left   incomplete   or insufficiently   proved.   In   Latesh   v.   State   of   Maharashtra ,   AIR 2018 SC 659, this court had observed the  ‘ When you consider the facts,   you   have   a   reasonable   doubt   as   to   whether   the   matter   is proved or whether it  is  not a reasonable doubt in this sense. The reasonableness of a doubt must be a practical one and not on an abstract   theoretical   hypothesis.   Reasonableness   is   a   virtue   that forms   as   a   mean   between   excessive   caution   and   excessive indifference   to   a   doubt.’     In   view   of   this   proposition,   we   accept that   there   is   no   direct   evidence   which   led   the   prosecution   to clearly   prove   that   deceased   was   shot   at   Adarsh   Nagar   in   Hisar. Even   the   circumstantial   evidence   which   is   led,   has   gaps   in between.   In   the   narration   above,   there   is   a   big   hiatus   between the   time   the   accused   left   the  village   and   the   accused­appellants were seen in the Hospital, at Hisar. Neither the intermediate facts are   established   with   certainty,   nor   the   case   as   a   whole   is established beyond reasonable doubt. 37 52.       We   may   note   that   every   acquittal   in   a   criminal   case   has   to   be taken   with   some   seriousness   by   the   investigating   and prosecuting authorities, when a case of this nature is concerned. We are aware of the fact that there has been a death of a person in this incident and there is no finality to the aforesaid episode as it   ends   with   various   unanswered   questions,   which   point   fingers at the lack of disciplined investigation and prosecution. Although Courts   cannot   give   benefit   of   doubt   to   the   accused   for   small errors   committed   during   the   investigation,   we   cannot   however, turn a blind eye towards the investigative deficiencies which goes to the root of the matter.  53.      Now, coming to the case foisted against Dharambir, Umed Singh and   Dharampal   (sarpanch)   sons   of   Beg   Raj,   in   Criminal   Appeal No. 1458 of 2012 (Sessions Case No. 62 of 1997 in Sessions Trial No.   97   of   1997).   The   prosecution   had   examined   PW­1   (Dr.   R.S. Bishnoi),   PW­2   (Dr.   Surendra   Singh),   PW­3   (ASI­Jagbir   Singh), PW­4   (Sobhat   Singh   [A­1])   and   PW­5   (Dharampal   son   of   Nanak Ram   [A­2]).   While   the   defense   had   led   DW­1   (Kamla),   DW­2 38 (Umed Singh), DW­3 (Zile Singh), DW­4 (Mewa Singh) and DW­5 (Bhim Singh). 54.    We have considered the reasoning of the court below in this case, which   we   accept.   Although   this   case   was   foisted   to   be   a   case   of direct   evidence,   there   is   no   credibility   in   the   statements   of   the accused­appellant   as   the   surrounding   circumstances   have shown, as already indicated in the earlier parts of the judgment, to be against them. We may note the golden rule of evidence that ‘men   may   tell   a   lie,   but   the   circumstances   do   not’,   which   is squarely   applicable   in   this   case   at   hand.   Therefore,   we   cannot also   accept   the   narrative   of   the   accused­appellant   in   the   other appeals, as a gospel of truth. 55.       In   view   of   the   discussion   above,   we   allow   the   Criminal   Appeal No(s).   1445­1446   of   2012,   before   us   and   simultaneously   set aside   the   conviction   and   punishment   as   provided   by   the   Trial Court in Sessions Case No. 60 of 1995 in Sessions Trial No. 22 of 1995,     and     dismiss     the     Criminal     Appeal   No.   1458   of   2012. 39 Further   the   concerned   authorities   are   directed   to   release   the appellants­accused, if not required in any other case. ……………………………..J. ( N. V. Ramana ) ……………………………..J. ( Mohan M. Shantanagoudar )  A UGUST  21, 2018 N EW  D ELHI 40